Re-imagining Australia: Migration, culture, diversity

Re-imagining Australia:

Migration, culture, diversity

Practical suggestions on the

challenges and opportunities ahead

Re-imagining Australia:

Migration, culture, diversity

Practical suggestions on the

challenges and opportunities ahead

Essays by Anne Aly, Colin Barnett, Farida Fozdar, Geo Gallop,

Paul J. Maginn, Mike Nahan, Juliet Pietsch, Benjamin Reilly,

Shamit Saggar, Samina Yasmeen, Edward Zhang

Re-imagining Australia:

Migration, culture, diversity

Practical suggestions on the

challenges and opportunities ahead

Edited by Shamit Saggar and Anna Zenz

These works are copyright. Apart from any fair dealing for the purposes of private study,

criticism or review, as permitted by the Copyright Act, no part may be reproduced by

any process without written permission.

Any view or opinion expressed in this publication is that of its author, and does not

necessarily represent the position of the author’s aliate organisations, The University

of Western Australia or UWA Public Policy Institute.

First published in 2020 by:

UWA Public Policy Institute

The University of Western Australia

M475, 35 Stirling Highway

CRAWLEY WA 6009

Design, typesetting and printing:

UniPrint, The University of Western Australia.

ISBN: 978-1-74052-978-5

Re-imagining Australia: Migration, culture, diversity | 5

Foreword

Jane den Hollander, Vice-Chancellor

Introduction

Shamit Saggar

Combatting radicalisation in Australia

Anne Aly

What middle Australia might think about immigration

Colin Barnett

Community cohesion choices

Farida Fozdar

Democracy, human rights and multiculturalism: can there be

a consensus?

Geo Gallop

In what sense is Australia a multicultural society?

Planning for/with multiculturalism

Paul J. Maginn

Multiculturalism in Australia: the triumph of self interest

Mike Nahan

Australian ethnic change and political inclusion: nding strength

in diversity in responding to global crises

Juliet Pietsch

An immigration economy that lacks ethnic diversity in its politics

and government

Benjamin Reilly

Contents

6 | The University of Western Australia Public Policy Institute

Is Australia at ease with itself?

Shamit Saggar

Australia’s Muslim story: Future opportunities

Samina Yasmeen

Can business support multicultural inclusion?

Edward Zhang

About UWA PPI 93

Re-imagining Australia: Migration, culture, diversity | 7

Foreword

Professor Jane den Hollander AO

Vice-Chancellor

Australia is a truly extraordinary country.

It comprises vibrant Indigenous peoples whose

understanding of the continent and cumulative knowledge

has only begun to be recognised across all communities.

The country is equally well known for its European colonial

settlers – Anglo-Celtic and beyond – who fashioned much

of Australia’s modern popular imagine. And Australia

has, in the past few decades, become home to very many

newcomers from Asia, Africa, the Middle East and the Pacic.

Australian multiculturalism is today a lived reality on a substantial scale. In

that sense, the country is rapidly becoming a cross-section of a very large part

of the globe, possibly second only to the United States as a great microcosm

nation. These recent changes have signicant implications for how Australia is

viewed by others, drawing on our own imagination of what it is to be Australia.

This timely collection of essays, published by the UWA Public Policy Institute,

is designed to shed light on this debate. The ideas, reections and suggestions

in the pages that follow should start fresh discourse here in Western Australia,

where regrettably it is all too common to pick up elements of discussions from

our eastern states.

The University of Western Australia has an important role as a civic partner in

shaping a successful WA society. Instilling evidence and examples of successful

practice into debates about the State’s future marks out the role of UWA’s Public

Policy Institute.

The State’s ethnic, cultural and linguistic composition has changed enormously

and will continue to do so. These are changes that are experienced every day across

neighbourhoods, schools, workplaces, public services and businesses. Hence

it is vital to understand the ingredients of successful social cohesion, cultural

diversity and fairness for us all. I am condent that the ideas and proposals in

Re-Imagining Australia will help us to do that.

Re-imagining Australia: Migration, culture, diversity | 9

Introduction

Shamit Saggar

The central idea that inspired Re-imagining Australia is

that Australia’s ethnic composition is changing at such a

rapid rate that very few of the policy implications have been

systematically examined. The purpose is to promote such

a debate and to ensure that there is traction behind the

arguments presented here. It is important that academic

researchers and policymakers can build on the publication

and develop better ways to test and measure future changes

in the economy and society.

The UWA Public Policy Institute exists to commission fresh perspectives

based on original research that are genuinely capable of improving people’s lives.

Government, businesses and non-prots are acutely aware of how the country’s

ethnic mix is changing, and yet often lack access to research ndings that can help

them manage and take advantage in response. For instance, the Asian, African,

Middle Eastern and Pacic Island origins of many newer communities create

the potential for new commercial opportunities on one hand, but on the other

hand, rather less is known about the precise measures needed to concentrate

eorts while not limiting the ambition of settled communities.

Several debates are advanced by the contributors in this publication – and

four stand out concerning the economics of mass migration, national stories

and symbols, social relationships, and the implications for political leadership.

First, Australia’s arrival in the club of mass migration receiving countries

in the past three decades roughly matches the stories of other developed

economies. The economics of meeting skill shortages through immigration

(often at both ends of the skills range) is commonplace across OECD countries

and has been a driver of improved productivity, non-inationary growth and

labour market exibility. Australia’s reliance on these migration ows has

reached very signicant levels and most evidence points to the new workers

10 | The University of Western Australia Public Policy Institute

Introduction

having a complementary eect overall so that new jobs and dynamic new sectors

are created.

The debate over economics does not stop at how large or small the benets

are. Indeed, there are big, unresolved questions about prosperous countries

turning to immigrants for utilitarian reasons. It can lead to a mindset that sees

immigrants’ value solely in terms of how much more prosperous they make us.

It can thwart any appetite for engaging with cultural diversity. And there is a risk

that a utilitarian model inaccurately describes the ambition and aspirations of

second and third generations who naturally seek to advance like anyone else.

Secondly, there is a big theme around national stories and symbols – about,

in other words, what we explicitly celebrate and implicitly value as essentially

Australian. Almost every national hero or heroine, business leader, senior

politician or celebrity tends to be drawn from Australia’s very long White Australia

history. The obvious explanation for this skewed picture is that insucient

time has elapsed since the end of that era to expect very big changes to national

portrayals of Australia. But in fact almost half a century has produced glacial

changes in top roles in business, the professions and politics, whereas portrayals

of ethnic diversity in mass entertainment are now racing ahead.

The country as an immigrant nation is a xed feature of popular imagination

but this is mostly linked to successive waves of white European inuxes. Grafting

non-white, non-European migration onto that base contains the possibility that

the latest waves are seen as inherently the same as earlier ones so that assimilation

is the only viable way of belonging.

What if Australians are not as good at embracing, trusting and championing

ethnic dierence as we assume that they are? It is a chilling question to pose. For

the left it presents a real challenge to existing ideas and policies that are designed

to widen and deepen social inclusion. For the right, the upshot is that nominally

colourblind politics and policies may have to be rethought.

The roots of disadvantage (and the despondency and dismay that accompanies

it) may be set considerably deeper than imagined, such that a concerted eort to

talk about ethnicity and race is the most important step to take. In Australia – of

all countries – this is a very substantial undertaking.

The complexion of national politics and politicians undoubtedly singles out

Australia where the absence of non-white faces is now widely commented on. It

suggests that there are real tensions within and across our arrangements for political

recruitment. Some have suggested that this reects ‘imputed discrimination’ – the

idea that party electors, managers and gatekeepers collectively fear a backlash

from mostly white electorates, so they act in a way that is consistent with (their

Re-imagining Australia: Migration, culture, diversity | 11

Introduction

understanding) of the prejudices of others. The reputational damage that is

done by this form of discrimination is a very serious concern.

Thirdly, several contributors have written about the quality and texture of

social cohesion. An important debate has raged in recent years about the extent

to which societies experiencing rapid ethnic change are successfully able to

maintain social solidarity among their people. Some have warned that none of

this should be taken for granted, arguing that not only do ‘birds of a feather ock

together’ but also that the competition for jobs, schools and neighbourhoods

can quickly become racialised. These political divisions are of course already part

of our political tradition but what is less clear is how ethnic and racial identity

politics can aect Australian politics.

International evidence generally points to diversity and solidarity being

connected but, more importantly, aected by inequality. In poorer, deprived

areas, whites and non-whites typically trust each other less than in better-o

areas. But the reason has less to do with ethnic or racial dierences since it is

common for everyone to be less trusting of those in poorer places as compared

with prosperous ones.

Ethnic change as it is seen from middle Australia matters because of how the

nation’s mainstream political parties address ethnic disparities in outcomes in

health, housing, employment, education and personal security. This kind of

politics for the most part is unfamiliar in Australia.

Finally, as several writers have attested, the politics of ethnic change touches

all parts of the political landscape. There are major implications for economic

policy, social policy, environmental policy, ageing policy, early years policy, trade

policy, foreign policy and so forth. In that respect, the chapters included here

touch on only a few of these policy elds and encourage readers to think about

the wider implications.

One simple example should suce to make this point. Many ethnic minority

groups in Australia are, relative to their white counterparts, characterised by

larger family sizes and a tilt towards multi-generational living. They may wish

to buy or rent very dierent kinds of homes; they may have very dierent social

care needs for their elderly; they may seek neighbourhoods and use transport

that maximises their connections with densely-knit families.

The upshot is that ethnic diversity touches much of what governments are

tasked to do. It is better to think of Australia’s changing character not one piece

at a time but rather as a source of nourishment and reordering across the board.

Imagine a Prime Minister making appointments to their government and to

arms-length agencies in which these challenges were written into every role.

12 | The University of Western Australia Public Policy Institute

Introduction

Imagine then, a Home Aairs ministerial role being the perfect test bed for a

successful Foreign Aairs ministerial appointment, and vice-versa.

These essays are not answers set in stone, but instead thought pieces to

stimulate wider debate about the challenges and the role of government. The

arguments presented in this volume are themselves diverse and reect varying

ideological persuasions and personal experiences.

We hope that Re-imagining Australia meets the audience’s thirst to be better

informed and, in doing so, endorses UWA’s important role in shaping evidence-

based public policy that improves people’s lives.

Finally, I would like to thank the UWA PPI sta for their eorts in producing

this volume and also Maria Osman (a member of the UWA PPI Advisory Board)

for her advice in shaping its contents.

Re-imagining Australia: Migration, culture, diversity | 13

Combatting radicalisation in Australia

Anne Aly

To say that we live in a turbulent and rapidly changing world

may be stating the obvious given recent events at the time

of writing. As we enter the second decade of the 2000s, a

global pandemic has swept through Europe, Asia, North

America and our own fortress, Australia. The novel virus

named severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2

does not respect borders. It does not discriminate and it

has devastated the global economy. It cannot be shot at,

bombed, arrested, turned back or sent home. Our frontline

of defense does not wear army fatigues and carry a gun. The virus is a stark

reminder that contemporary threats to security and wellbeing come from

unconventional sources.

Today’s security environment is characterised by diverse threats and a broader

range of actors. While interstate conict continues to be an enduring factor, it is

no longer the dening concern for international and national security. Intrastate

conict and the collapse of fragile states, climate change, mass population

displacement, extreme economic events, cyber security, energy and resource

security, transnational organised crime, terrorism and pandemics are likely to

continue to present as primary current and future concerns. Consequently, states

are no longer the only or even the major actors in the international security

landscape. Non-state actors, individuals, non-government organisations and

private corporations play a larger role in conict and security now than they

have in the past.

As new challenges emerge, individuals, communities, states and the

international security apparatus need to nd new ways of meeting them. In

the ght against terrorism, Western allies deployed conventional warfare against

a non-conventional enemy in the, perhaps, naïve belief that terrorism could be

defeated by bombs and bullets. The prolonged war on terror failed to eradicate

14 | The University of Western Australia Public Policy Institute

Anne Aly

the threat of international terrorism. It is reasonable to deduce that the ‘War

on Terror’ has actually led to a proliferation in the use of terrorist tactics by

non-state actors in conicts. In fragile states and those currently in conict,

indiscriminate terror attacks have become part of warfare. The wisdom of

employing a conventional ‘hard’ military response against an unconventional

enemy whose regenerative capacity relies on its ability to employ ‘soft’ strategies

of inuence and mobilisation has, rightly, been questioned.

Terrorism has been part of the human story since time immemorial. From

the Sicaari in the rst century through to the Ismaili Nizaris (widely known

as the Assassins) of the 13th century, to the Weathermen Underground in

the 1970s, Al Qaeda, ISIS and the rising violent far-right, acts of violence by

individuals and groups of individuals in the name of a cause have been a part of

the human story. At times terrorism has taken on political shades and at other

times religion or ideology have been used to justify indiscriminate attacks. The

scholar David Rapoport

distinguishes four waves of modern terrorism, each wave

precipitated by social and political circumstances and characterised by a pattern

of internationalisation of terrorist activity across several states with similarities

in objectives and tactics. The Anarchist wave, the rst of Rapoport’s waves, was

prevalent between the 1880s and the 1920s and was preceded by the invention

of the printing press, which allowed the European Anarchists to spread their

anti-authoritarian ideology throughout Europe, the United States and parts of

Asia. The Anti-Colonial Wave between the 1920s and1960s followed the end of

the Second World War and was borne out of the self-determination campaigns in

Africa, Asia and the Middle East. The New Left wave from the 1960s to the1990s

was initiated by the Vietnam War and widespread opposition to the West. The

fourth and nal of Rapoport’s four waves, the Religious Wave, gained momentum

in the late 1970s and persists in dierent forms today.

The driving ideology at the basis of the Anarchist doctrine was the belief that

violence and terror were necessary to achieve social change. Violence was an act

of creative destruction through which the Anarchist movement could destroy

the state and create an alternative society based on the principles of statelessness

and anti-authoritarianism.

The use of violence to destroy or deconstruct the status quo and create ‘new

worlds’ is a common thread that runs through all the waves of terrorism. The

Anti-Colonial movement sought to mobilise revolution against the established

1 David Rapoport, ‘The Four Waves of Rebel Terror and September 11’, in, Charles Kegley Jr.

(ed.), The New Global Terrorism: Characteristics, Causes, Controls. Pearson 2003, p. 36–53.

Re-imagining Australia: Migration, culture, diversity | 15

Combatting radicalisation in Australia

rulers. The New Left were radical Marxists who wanted to force the collapse of

capitalism. Among the terrorist groups that emerged during the religious wave of

terrorism, apocalyptic groups such as Aum Shinrikyo have claimed responsibility

for attacks. The organisation known variably as ISIS, ISIL or Daesh, claimed its

mission to be the establishment of the Caliphate in the Arab World. While not

strictly apocalyptic, the violent jihadist movement was initially conceived in the

age of imperialism with the aim of establishing an Islamic order and eradicating

secular rule in Arab countries.

Apocalypse, changing the world order, anarchy and revolution continue to

drive terrorism in its various forms. Since 2001 and the ensuing war on terror,

a fth wave of terrorism has emerged that continues these themes and calls for

a revolution of sorts.

The violent right-wing

The term ‘violent right-wing’ refers to a broad range of beliefs and movements

associated with far-right political and social ideologies. On its own, it oers

little more than a broad-brush branding of an increasingly prevalent mobiliser

for acts of violence and terror such as the Christchurch shootings. Within the

broad category of right-wing terrorism sits white nationalism, neo-Nazism,

eco-fascism, white separatism, ethnocentrism and patriot/militia movements,

among others. Some scholars include the Christian Identity Movement and anti-

abortion extremism while others argue that a contemporary typology of right-wing

extremism should dierentiate at least two main categories: racist extremism

and anti-government extremism. Across all types of right-wing extremism, the

mobilising narrative centres on a perceived threat and the justication for violence

through acts of ‘accelerationism’ – prompting the collapse of the government by

creating political tensions, schisms and crises. Variably, right-wing terrorist actors

may also be motivated by narratives of Satanism, violent misogyny and Great

Replacement conspiracies. According to the Great Replacement conspiracy, mass

migration and lower birth rates among white races are a matter of purposeful

design with the ultimate aim of destroying the white race altogether.

In 2008, the number of right-wing domestic terrorist incidents in the United

States doubled. Racially motivated crimes also increased as did the scope of

militia organising. Violent right-wing terrorism has since grown to overtake the

threat of violent jihadist terrorism in the United States. In 2018 alone violent

right-wing attacks caused fatalities in Florida, Pennsylvania, Washington, South

Carolina, Texas, Kansas, Michigan, Alabama, Georgia, Tennessee and California.

16 | The University of Western Australia Public Policy Institute

Anne Aly

In 2019 the world was rocked by the Christchurch terrorist attack that killed 51

Muslim worshippers at two mosques in the New Zealand city. The perpetrator,

an Australian, left a white nationalist manifesto that identied him with some

of the US and Europe’s most notorious terrorist actors and details the extent

to which he was motivated to act by his unquestionable belief in the Great

Replacement conspiracy.

The Great Replacement has existed in various versions for a number of decades

but has seen a contemporary resurgence originating in France with the French

author Renaud Camus who wrote Le Grand Remplacement in 2012. He argues

against immigration and identies it as a global threat. Those sentiments are not

just the domain of fringe elements that gather online in the dark spaces of the

internet to share conspiracies in whispers. They are also echoed by politicians

and media personalities who use their platforms to perpetuate notions of migrant

invasions, demonise minorities and stereotype certain ‘others’ (most notably

Muslims) as a threat.

Australia’s far-right extremism

We might begin by asking what lies behind the resurgence in what is at best

xenophobia and at worst outright violent racism. In Australia, the discursive

construction of migrants has been and continues to be a dening feature of our

media, political and public discourse. Since the 1800s cultural anxiety about

immigration and immigrants has been described variably in terms of a peril,

menace, evil, wave, tide or inux poised to invade, inundate, swamp or ood

Australia and annihilate, oppress, obliterate or penetrate the invisible rabbit-

proof fences of racial and cultural homogeneity – the myth of ‘White Australia’.

Indeed, Australia’s history is peppered with incidents of overt racism and a

political discourse that seeks to take advantage of anxiety, insecurity and fear

in order to maintain ‘Fortress Australia’.

The advent of a novel ‘enemy’ in the COVID-19 pandemic, gives us

reason to pause and reassess. Much has been written about how the health

response involving social distancing, isolation and lock-downs has heralded

a ‘new way’ of living. Workers have had to adjust to working from home and

employers have had to accommodate this. Millions face unemployment and

the current conservative government, nominally ideologically sceptical towards

welfare, has had to embark on a program of sweeping social reforms. But our

history oers a cautionary tale of how such crises can either bring us together

or tear us apart.

Re-imagining Australia: Migration, culture, diversity | 17

Combatting radicalisation in Australia

Right-wing extremism thrives in economic and political climates characterised

by recession, the outsourcing of jobs to migrant workers, and the perceived threat

to national sovereignty. In the short months since the coronavirus was declared

a global pandemic, far-right extremists in Australia have propagated a narrative

that blames the crisis on minority groups and calls for mobilisation against

these groups. They also attribute the government response to conspiratorial

attempts to exert control over Australians while also promoting segregation

and immigration restrictions. While these notions may seem to be the domain

of fringe groups, they are also notions that are expressed by some elements of

the current Australian parliament. Senator Pauline Hanson rose to notoriety on

the back of her maiden speech which warned of an ‘Asian invasion’. Her second

term as a Senator over a decade later, re-presented the threat as Muslims. The

former Senator Fraser Anning invoked the ‘nal solution’ – a Nazi euphemism

for the Holocaust – in his maiden speech calling for an end to immigration. The

threat Australia faces is not personied in immigrant others, but in the very

real mainstreaming of far-right ideologies that normalise ethnocentrism and

xenophobia and reconstruct them as legitimate political concerns.

Re-imagining Australia

How might we re-imagine Australia as a nation that responds to crisis not with fear

and xenophobia but in ways that challenge the far-right narrative and the dangers

that it poses? One answer may lie in building on concepts of collective security.

Early conceptualisations of collective security were applied to peace-keeping

collaborative programs between NATO and the United Nations. The traditional

concept of collective conict management focused on collaborative participation

in formalised arrangements between international and regional organisations

and individual states. A re-conceptualisation and broadening of this concept

in the contemporary security context would focus on two inclusions: rst, the

inclusive participation of civil society groups, professional bodies and task-

specic international bodies; and secondly, the inclusion of ad hoc, informal

and improvised collective action measures. New collaborative patterns of

behaviour involve co-operative participation by private industry, regional and

transnational task-specic forces, inter-governmental organisations and civil

society organisations representing diverse security interests.

As the ‘War on Terror’ moved from the hot battlegrounds of Afghanistan and

Iraq to the domestic domain, Western governments co-opted un-institutionalised,

community-based and informal collective action against terrorism.

18 | The University of Western Australia Public Policy Institute

Anne Aly

The national security and counter terrorism strategies adopted by governments

including Australia and the United Kingdom, to name just two, incorporate soft

approaches and recognise the role that communities play in a comprehensive and

multi-causal approach. Most commonly this is expressed in terms of building

community resilience to violent extremism and terrorism. Australia’s counter-

terrorism approach outlined in 2010 in The Counter Terrorism White Paper:

Securing Australia, Protecting our Community

describes four elements: analysis,

protection, response and resilience. While there have been several iterations

of Australia’s counter-terrorism policy since then, the four core strands remain

constant. Resilience in the Australian strategy is ‘building a strong and resilient

Australian community to resist the development of any form of violent extremism

and terrorism on the home front’. In 2011, the United States announced a refocusing

of its counter terrorism strategy with an emphasis on preventing the diusion

of extremist ideologies within the United States. The earlier US 2003 National

Strategy for Combating Terrorism

focused on four elements of defeating, denying,

diminishing and defending. The ‘diminishing’ element emphasised international

partnerships to address conditions in which terrorism ourishes and on de-

legitimising terrorism through public information initiatives.

The need to build community resilience to terrorist ideologies has not

gone unnoticed in the US. In 2009, the rst Special Representative to Muslim

Communities was appointed by the US Secretary of State tasked with engaging

Muslims around the world to counter terrorist ideologies.

While there appears to be signicant support for community-level collective

measures against terrorism, there is a marked absence in the literature on

citizen- and community-driven collaborative counter-terrorism activities. As

noted, much of the literature oers an analysis of collective action in counter-

terrorism as formalised arrangements, although the parties may act in ad-hoc,

informal or improvised ways. The literature on terrorism draws attention to the

social situations in which public support for terrorism ourishes, and asserts

that support for dissident terrorist activities is garnered in contexts where social,

political or economic inequalities exist. For this reason, international eorts

to counter terrorism through soft approaches target economic development,

political reform, and the promotion of social and political equality in countries

where terrorist groups are known to have signicant public support. The 9/11

2 Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, Counter-terrorism white paper: securing

Australia, protecting our community, Commonwealth of Australia, 2010.

3 United States Government, National Strategy for Combatting Terrorism, United States

Department of State Archive, February 2003.

Re-imagining Australia: Migration, culture, diversity | 19

Combatting radicalisation in Australia

Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist

Attacks Upon the United States

for example, supports the use of foreign aid as

a means of addressing the proliferation of terrorist ideologies among the poor

and disenfranchised. Such approaches are largely premised on the debatable

assumption that poverty and social or political grievances manifest in terrorist

movements and public support for terrorist activities.

In the domestic domain, the inclusion of elements such as prevention and

resilience in national counter-terrorism strategies also target disenfranchised

communities that are assumed to be more susceptible to radicalisation

and extremism.

The responses outlined here demonstrate that a holistic approach to collective

security which empowers civil society can be achieved. In the ght against Islamist

extremism, governments in Australia, the UK and the US have reached out to

Muslim communities and partnered with them in developing community-led

approaches to radicalisation and extremism. The same level of engagement has

not been forthcoming in response to the rising far-right terrorist threat. The same

political leaders who called on Muslim communities to work together to stamp

out violent jihadism, have been eerily silent on the far-right threat.

The political will to engage civil society in the ght against terrorism cannot

aord to be selective. Doing so is not just counterproductive, it is dangerous. And

importantly, it misses an opportunity to build on the tremendous outpouring

of compassion that Australians have witnessed in the responses to the bushre

and coronavirus crises.

We can re-imagine an Australia where nation-building is an inclusive concept

– not an exclusionary practice – and where the urgency of tackling far-right

violent extremism is a priority for all sides. But to do so we need to reimagine and

redirect the kind of political will that mobilised collective conict management to

counter violent jihadist terrorism to the threat of pernicious far-right ideologies.

Dr Anne Aly MP is the Labor Federal Member for Cowan, Western Australia, in

the Australian Parliament, and founder of People against Violent Extremism Inc

(‘PaVE’), an independent, non-government organisation committed to addressing

violent extremism in Australia and the region.

4 United States Government, The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National

Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, US Government Printing Oce

2002.

Re-imagining Australia: Migration, culture, diversity | 21

What middle Australia might think

about immigration

Colin Barnett

Australians have always felt safe living in an island nation

and distant from the most troubled parts of the world. Even

the coronavirus pandemic is unlikely to shatter our faith

in isolation and will more likely reinforce it as we feel better

o than those elsewhere.

Beyond physical isolation, the diversity of our population

is a barrier against the extremes of nationalism, racism and

religion that have been at the centre of many of the world’s

worst episodes of human suering.

For most of us it is enough to be proud of who we are with an almost nostalgic

trust in the Aussie ideals of ‘fair go’ and ‘mateship’. This, plus a stable democracy,

have given us an enviable system of education, health, public safety and social

support. We know we are not perfect and we know there have been some dark

moments in our past, but we still think this is the best place to be. So, say

middle Australia!

We also like to see ourselves as a young and successful nation with its future

before us. Our national anthem, Advance Australia Fair, exudes that brash

condence. And we are slowly heading along a path toward a reconciliation with

60,000 years of Aboriginal culture.

Such a sentimental Australia welcomes people from overseas and has always

done so. A pragmatic Australia also understands that immigration has been a

driving force for economic development and growth.

The history of Australia is very much the story of migration. Admittedly the

rst arrivals from England were reluctant convicts, then came free settlers to be

followed by a more diverse group of fortune seekers during the gold rush years.

For modern Australia, it was the post-war migration of the 1950s and 1960s that

set us on a path to a more outward-looking Australia. With a baby boom at home,

22 | The University of Western Australia Public Policy Institute

Colin Barnett

of which I am a member, the population surged. The traditional migration from

Britain increased, including many thousands of child migrants. The ‘Salvo’ boys

at my school were presumed to be orphans and lived in a nearby Salvation Army

home. They kept to themselves and we kept our distance. The truth is most of us

were afraid of them. We did use the term ‘Pommie’, but only with great caution.

However, it was the European migration that really changed things. Suddenly

there were large numbers of Italians, Greeks, Poles, Slavs, Jews and other ethnic

groups in our midst. They had come from the extreme hardship of a Europe

devastated by years of war. They were the ‘new’ Australians. A group of elderly

Italian men once told me that they arrived by ship dressed in a suit and carrying

a nice case with nothing in it. They then had to wait for years until they could

aord to bring their wife and children to join them.

By the time I reached high school the new arrivals were our mates. Yes, there

was derogatory name calling, but as often as not it was good humoured, and it

went both ways. Australia now had a multicultural society.

The other shift was a post-war fascination with America. My father would

say that America saved us at the Battle of the Coral Sea. For me, it was more

about television – The Mickey Mouse Club and The Space Race. Australia now

had a Pacic outlook with the ANZUS Treaty at the centre of our defence and

foreign policy.

For Western Australia, the development of the remote Pilbara region was

the big event of that time. It is heralded as a great economic achievement, yet it

also had a social dimension. The Pilbara iron ore mines were developed to feed

Japan’s steel industry, just 15 years or so after the end of the Second World War.

My father had fought against Japan and my uncle had been a prisoner of war on

the infamous Burma railway. For them and their generation it was a confronting

thought that Australia might establish closer ties with Japan. The fact that they

agreed, even if reluctantly, was a remarkable achievement by the then political

leadership. Australia now had a connection to Asia which over the following

decades was to set the pattern for both economic and social change.

Migration from southeast Asia increased rapidly and then from China. In the

1990s Australia showed an ugly face as a recession at home somehow translated

into an anti- Asian and, in particular, an anti-Chinese sentiment. This manifested

itself at a political level through the formation of the One Nation Party. These

events were oensive to most Australians and particularly so for Australians of

Asian descent.

In the early years of this decade, the integrity of our borders came under

challenge with a sharp increase of illegal immigration as asylum seekers undertook

Re-imagining Australia: Migration, culture, diversity | 23

What middle Australia might think about immigration

a hazardous ocean voyage in a desperate attempt to reach Australia. This was a

tragic time with at least 1,300 people drowning. The television coverage of men,

women and children being smashed on the rocky clis of Christmas Island

was shocking. This was a shameful day for everyone, though there was no clear

consensus at the time as to what could be done to prevent a repeat.

In an earlier episode involving a ship by the name of Tampa, the then Prime

Minister John Howard best captured the feelings of middle Australia when

he said words to this eect: ”We will decide who comes to Australia and the

circumstances under which they come”. The antagonism toward Asian migration

has now gone as far as middle Australia is concerned. The restoration of border

security has been essential in achieving that.

In more recent years, there has been an increase in the number of new arrivals

from the Indian Ocean nations of Africa, the Middle East and the subcontinent.

These are troubled parts of the world and there is understandably a level of

apprehension among Australians, just as there has been in previous periods

of migration. But just as in the past, these latest new Australians are quickly

becoming part of our multicultural society while maintaining their own cultural

heritage and religious beliefs.

Today, some 30 per cent of Australians were born overseas. That is well over

seven million people. There have been over 900,000 refugees welcomed to

Australia. That is something to be proud of. I have no doubt that Australia will

continue to welcome people from all over the world and that they will contribute to

our country, just like those before them. They will be part of that middle Australia

which respects dierent cultures and religions, with the only caveat being that

change needs to be properly managed and be at a moderate and consistent rate

which is accepted by the broad majority of the Australian people.

The Honourable Colin Barnett MLA is the former Premier of Western Australia,

former Member for Cottesloe, and Member of the UWA Public Policy Institute’s

Advisory Board.

Re-imagining Australia: Migration, culture, diversity | 25

Community cohesion choices

Farida Fozdar

To challenge our thinking about the categories of community

and cohesion, and therefore the choices available to us, I

wanted to entitle this thought piece: ‘Why don’t we care

about Mahmoud Hussein?’ Australians celebrated in 2015

when Australian journalist Peter Greste was freed from an

Egyptian jail. Activists, government ocials and the media

pressured the Egyptian government to release Greste, who

was being held without charge. Yet more than three years

after being imprisoned, his colleague, Egyptian Mahmoud

Hussein, remains in jail. We cared about getting Greste out. Why don’t we care

about Mahmoud?

It is because our ‘community’, as we conceive it and for which we feel solidarity,

is the nation-state, and Mahmoud is not a member. This entity, only around

400 years old, has become so all-pervasive in terms of where our allegiance and

responsibility lies, that we cannot think of ourselves in terms of membership of

other collectives. Yes, we may be part of a local football club, or a global religion

or gaming community, or have a particular gender identity, but when it comes

down to our sense of responsibility, it is to other Australians we turn. And this is

written into legislation. This hit me personally when the Australian government

negotiated the transfer of Australian passengers from the Costa Victoria cruise

ship, on which we were passengers, from Italy to Perth. Passengers and crew who

did not have proactive and powerful nation-states behind them are still on the

ship, and Australia has made it clear it feels no responsibility for members of

other nations on board ships currently at its ports. Our remit in this publication

was to ‘Re-imagine Australia’, but I want to question why Australia is the unit

of re-imagining, and whether we ought to be thinking about re-imagining the

world instead.

So rst we need to ask, is national solidarity a problem?

26 | The University of Western Australia Public Policy Institute

Farida Fozdar

Anthony Appiah argued for our ethical obligations to strangers, suggesting

our moral universe should extend beyond co-nationals, taking a cosmopolitan

outlook, concerned about the welfare of all humans. But he also argued the nation-

state remains necessary to protect human rights, and suggests the alternative,

a world government or global state, is impractical.

Calhoun also emphasised

the nation’s value as the political structure through which human rights can

be asserted and enforced, and where disadvantage and social injustice can be

addressed.

There is a signicant emotional element to membership too, both

positive (in terms of aective bonds and a sense of belonging for members), but

also negative (in terms of fear of loss of culture and privilege).

However others have argued a post-national world is the next natural step

in social (and political and economic) evolution. There are problems with the

structure of the nation-state in a globalised world, not least evident in the

inadequacy of a coordinated response to Covid-19. Universal rights should apply

to all, including freedom of movement, egalitarian principles of justice (fairness,

equality of opportunity), access to opportunities for work, education and health

care, and a recognition that people should not be advantaged, or disadvantaged,

by the arbitrary fact of birthplace.

The European Union, the African Union, and similar meso-level collectives

represent the beginnings of alternative models of political and economic

cosmopolitanism, and the ability of individuals to hold dual, even multiple,

citizenships, suggests the logic of the nation-state is breaking down. Capital,

social networks, risk, media, organisations, goods – these all traverse national

boundaries, but oddly, fellow feeling and community cohesion does not.

Why do we think other Australians deserve our care, and others do not? Why,

through an accident of birth, or some luck with the immigration system, do we

feel more ‘communitas’ or solidarity with these people? And does it really not

matter if these people are migrants or do we in fact retain an ethnic allegiance to

others which excludes those who do not share a particular heritage and culture,

rather than a civic allegiance, to co-nationals?

1 Kwame Anthony Appiah, Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers, W. W. Norton,

2006. For examples of everyday Australians making the same argument see Farida Fozdar,

‘No borders: Australians talking beyond the nation’, Journal of Language and Politics,

16(3), 2017, p. 367–387.

2 Craig Calhoun, Nations Matter: Culture, History, and the Cosmopolitan Dream, Routledge,

2007.

Re-imagining Australia: Migration, culture, diversity | 27

Community cohesion choices

What do we mean by community cohesion?

Community cohesion, or more commonly in Australia ‘social cohesion’, is an

ambiguous term – we all have a sense of what it means, but would be hard

pressed to dene it. Most denitions include characteristics of a collective such

as common values and civic culture; social order and social control; solidarity

and reductions in wealth disparity; recognition, inclusion and belonging for

all; social networks and social capital; and attachment to a particular place or

territory and identity.

Social cohesion has positive and negative elements. Obviously it makes groups

hold together, which has a range of benets. However it can be the basis of in-group

favouritism, and the corollary, exclusion and denigration of outgroup members.

It is because of this that social cohesion can be a fundamentally conservative

concept, since it is applied to a particular collective, thus being embedded in

assumptions about the relevant unit to which cohesion should apply, and because

it emphasises the need for cohesion as opposed to diversity, variance, dispersion

… even entropy. While it does not directly contrast with diversity, it is often

talked about in contexts where the dangers of diversity are being articulated, as

will be shown shortly.

Australian values

Discussions about social cohesion frequently orient to the need for a set of

shared values to ground diversity on a foundation of commonality. In my work,

analysing politicians’ speeches, and focus groups and survey data from ordinary

Australians, the notion of ‘Australian values’ is found to be part of the national

psyche and discourse, and fully supported by most of the population. It is seen

as what makes the Australian community hold together. However, what those

Australian values are diers person to person. Perhaps more importantly, the

term is generally used for rhetorical eect. Politicians, for example, tend to use

‘Australian values’ to emphasise the threat presented by those who do not share

them. It thus becomes a term of exclusion, rather than a concept holding us

together. This may encourage a particular type of cohesion incompatible with

multiculturalism.

Australia has a long history of suspicion of those seen as having dierent

values. UWA PhD student Catherine Martin is tracking the use of exclusionary

3 Andrew Markus and Ludmilla Kirpitchenko, ‘Conceptualising social cohesion’, in James

Jupp, John Nieuwenhuysen and Emma Dawson (eds.), Social cohesion in Australia, CUP,

2007, p. 21–32.

28 | The University of Western Australia Public Policy Institute

Farida Fozdar

metaphors used to refer to migrants over the last 150 years. Arguing against Asian

migration, the Sydney Morning Herald in 1921 reported the need to ‘safeguard’

“against the incursion of peoples whose basic social, economic, and political

ideas and standards are suciently dierent to make their presence in any large

numbers … a danger to that social order” (Sydney Morning Herald, 15 November

1921). Here we see the same basic ideas that are currently circulating about the

threat implied by those whose ‘values’ dier from ‘ours’, threatening the presumed

social cohesion of a presumed homogenous society.

Concerns about the importance of values to ensure social (national) cohesion

are part of a global trend, with a range of countries including the US, Germany,

the Netherlands and Australia, implementing values-based citizenship tests and

integration contracts over recent years. In Australia values questions have been

included in the Australian Citizenship test since 2007, and additionally, since

then, all long-term and some short-term visitors to Australia have been required

to sign an Australian Values Statement. These were introduced in the context

of fear of a loss of culture, to protect national identities from putative ‘threats’

such as terrorism, Muslims, asylum seekers, and globalisation more generally,

and to ensure social cohesion in a context of global migration. Here, belonging

to the nation and citizenship is no longer framed as being about civic rights, but

as a commitment to a particular way of living.

And as Gassan Hage has shown

us, it is the governing power of the charter/majority/white group that does the

‘tolerating’ of dierence and decides the limits to that tolerating.

In a very large survey undertaken recently by the ABC

, the most important

feature of ‘being Australian’ was identied by respondents as having respect

for Australia’s institutions and laws, followed closely by appreciation of the

environment, feeling Australian, speaking English and being a citizen. ‘Sharing

the same values as most Australians’ was lower on the list, but still important,

with around 70 per cent in agreement. Yet a signicant majority, around 80 per

cent, also agreed that migrants can retain their own cultural values and still be

‘Australian’. This suggests that there is no imperative to adopt Australian values.

4 Maria Chisari, ‘Testing citizen identities: Australian migrants and the Australian values

debate’, Social Identities, 21(6), 2015, p. 573–589.

5 Annabel Crabb, What makes an Australian? Probably not what you think, ABC

news, 22 October 2019, (reporting on the Australia Talks National Survey), https://

www.abc.net.au/news/2019-10-22/annabel-crabb-national-identity-what-makes-an-

australian/11623566.

Re-imagining Australia: Migration, culture, diversity | 29

Community cohesion choices

What are these values? The Australian Values Statement states:

Australian society values respect for the freedom and dignity of the

individual, freedom of religion, commitment to the rule of law, Parliamentary

democracy, equality of men and women and a spirit of egalitarianism that

embraces mutual respect, tolerance, fair play and compassion for those in

need and pursuit of the public good.

Australian society values equality of opportunity for individuals, regardless

of their race, religion or ethnic background.

» The English language, as the national language, is an important unifying

element of Australian society.

These are admirable, perhaps aspirational values (although language is not a

value). In a survey I undertook a few years ago, 89 per cent of a representative

sample agreed that this statement reects Australian values, 79 per cent agreed

migrants should have to sign the statement, and 49 per cent agreed that migrants

should be deported if they breached the values. So Australians put a great deal

of store in migrants following these values. Interestingly, another 49 per cent

agreed that Australia should adapt these values if migrants can improve them,

suggesting some willingness to change.

A range of political cartoons make the point that Australian values are variable,

and that while certain values such as the fair go and egalitarianism are promoted

in some contexts, they are ignored in others. Liberal politicians have used the

term to support a range of positions, including linking Australian values to

‘Western civilisation’ and ‘the First Fleet’ while critiquing the ‘politically correct’

who seek to change them. They have called them ‘Gospel values’ that give us the

‘best way to live’, and argued that calls to change the date of Australia Day are

against Australian values. Yet others say valuing diversity and a multicultural

identity are fundamental to Australian values. The Labor party and Greens tend

to emphasise diversity, respect and inclusion when talking about Australian

values, as well as justice, fair play, secularity and human rights.

A single quote from Peter Dutton illustrates how Australian values are often

used to divide: “Our diversity has enriched our nation, but it is not what holds

us together. Rather, our success is underwritten by our values, our mutual

understanding of our rights and responsibilities as citizens, our national language

and our respect for each other, regardless of race, sex or religion … It’s why

Australians appreciate straight talking and reject political correctness and

social engineering at odds with our heritage. It’s why terrorists and extremists

target our institutions and seek to foment dissent and disagreement among

30 | The University of Western Australia Public Policy Institute

Farida Fozdar

us, but they will never succeed. And it is why, in an age of high-speed internet

that enables people to live virtually in societies or social groups whose norms

are at odds with our own, we need to nurture our core values.” The assumption

about what Australians appreciate and reject, the signalling of a shared heritage

even though a majority are rst or second generation migrants, the notion

that disagreement is what terrorists and extremists seek to generate (implying

disagreement is akin to extremism), the signalling of the enemy within whose

‘norms are at odds with our own’ – this is how values are used to divide. Indeed,

what starts o as a call to civic nationalism, that connects us through shared

commitment to political institutions and shared responsibilities and rights, turns

into ethno-nationalism, calling all to a particular collective that excludes certain

segments of the community. A further omission is that there is no recognition

of Australia’s Indigenous peoples in this quote, and it is rare for Aboriginal

values to be identied as part of Australian values. Obviously these values are

also aspirational rather than actual, for we know people are not treated equally

regardless of sex, race or religion.

A nal point. Just how Australian are Australian values? In a comparison of

results from international surveys, psychologist Nick Haslam compared scores

for values such as autonomy, egalitarianism, harmony, collectivism and so on,

from 80 cultures. When comparing the deviation from the international average,

he found that Australia has the second least distinctive culture – we are average

in almost everything. So the values identified as ‘Australian’ are not actually

distinctively Australian at all, indeed they are shared by many cultures. Haslam

concludes “what is unique about Australian values is their averageness.”

6 Nick Haslam, Australian values are hardly unique when compared to other cultures, The

Conversation Australia, 1 May 2017, https://theconversation.com/australian-values-are-

hardly-unique-when-compared-to-other-cultures-76917.

Re-imagining Australia: Migration, culture, diversity | 31

Community cohesion choices

So what options, apart from promoting the rather divisive idea of ‘Australian

values’, do we have to engender cohesion? Very early on sociologists recognised

that societies can hold together based on internal similarity, but others recognised

that dierence can also be the basis of cohesion, where dierent elements rely on

each other for the collective to survive. We need to consider how our dierences

can be productively harnessed, for the benet not just of Australia, but globally,

to begin (continue) to develop global social cohesion. Here are some suggestions:

Support global initiatives that recognise the interconnectedness of the

contemporary world system.

Recognise Australia’s Indigenous peoples and value their contributions.

Accepting the recommendations of the Statement from the Heart would

be a start.

» Promote a positive national identity framed around inclusion rather than

exclusion through active political leadership and local engagement, but

always recognising that national identity is secondary to a commitment

to humanity generally.

» Improve civics and citizenship education, the history, English, and other

parts of the school curriculum in Australia, such that the benets of diversity

and awareness of global interconnection are prioritised.

Support grassroots initiatives that promote civic participation, intercultural

interaction, and global awareness and engagement.

» Engage in regional cooperation with countries in the Asia Pacic, without

assuming a paternalistic orientation.

Continue to work towards social equity and equality of opportunity to

create a more just society with less structural disadvantage.

Leverage migrant diasporas to build social, economic and political ties

with countries of origin.

Farida Fozdar is Associate Professor of Sociology at The University of Western

Australia, Chair of the Culturally and Linguistically Diverse Working Group of

the university’s Inclusion and Diversity Committee and a Fellow of the UWA

Public Policy Institute. Her research focuses on nationalism, cosmopolitanism,

migration, race and ethnicity, refugee settlement, and racism.

Re-imagining Australia: Migration, culture, diversity | 33

Democracy, human rights

and multiculturalism:

can there be a consensus?

Geo Gallop

It is often said the Australian condition is made up of three

elements: Aboriginal and Torres Strait Island Australia;

British or Anglo-Celtic Australia; and Migrant Australia.

In 1788 it all changed. The British came with their own

interests and ideas of race, life and progress, adapting

them as they saw t to produce what was aptly called “a

new Britannia in another world”.

As knowledge about

the opportunities oered by the newly created colonies

spread, others started to come neither white or British;

for example, the Chinese, their members peaking around 40,000 during the

century gold rushes.

For the British holders of political and military power it was a diabolical mix –

primitive and uncivilised people on the one side and barbarians from Asia on the

other. From the point of view of the colonial objectives of racial purity, economic

development and imperial security, something had to be done, and it was: White

Australia and its bedfellows, Immigration Restriction and Assimilation were

born. There were some who protested but they were lone voices.

These remained well into the 20

century, only to fall victim to new interests

and ideas related to the nation and its future. The sources for these developments

were many, baby-boomer radicalism being one and the prospects of new markets

to the north being another. The alternative to White Australia – whatever dierent

1 William Charles Wentworth, Australasia – A Poem Written for The Chancellor’s Medal

at the Cambridge Commencement, G and W.B. Whittaker, 1823. See also Humphrey

McQueen, A new Britannia: an argument concerning the social origins of Australian

radicalism and nationalism, Penguin, 1970.

34 | The University of Western Australia Public Policy Institute

Geo Gallop

versions it took, moderate or radical – we called Multiculturalism, as had been

the case in Canada. Lots of elements were involved, notably anti-racism, cultural

pluralism, democratic pluralism, interculturalism and Asian engagement. Add

to that perhaps, civic republicanism.

What we are talking about is an Australian approach to the issue of living

with the dierences generated by the co-existence of Aboriginal and Torres Strait

Island, British and Migrant Australia. These dierences take shape as a way of

understanding the past, present and future, and become realised as cultures and

communities with dierent modes of living and expression. Multiculturalism

involves the development of an ideology and policies that we would hope will not

only manage these dierences in the interests of social harmony but also add the

value diversity can bring to a nation, economically, socially and politically.

The

achievement of a consensus policy in this area is dicult because the diering

values associated with what we would call a left- or right-wing view of politics

are part of the mix: nationalism versus cosmopolitanism.

Consensus framing and pluralism

There are two senses in which we might understand the idea of consensus,

one more narrowly political than the other, but both relevant for those serious

about good public policy. Firstly, there’s the obvious political point of seeking to

maximise support for desired changes. That may mean some compromises are

needed along the way: the ‘two steps back to take one forward’ phenomenon.

Secondly, there’s the endeavour to ensure the wide range of good ideas is fully

incorporated into our thinking, thus avoiding the dangers of too much abstraction

and the bad policy that can follow. In thinking through the issues related to

multiculturalism, this second aspect is particularly important because we are

dealing with universals and particulars, individuals and groups and nations,

liberty and equality, and all of civil, political and social rights at the one time (or

at least we should be, if we are seeking sustainable and just outcomes). So too

are we faced with the tricky issue of working through the relationship between

the majority and minorities, a challenge that can’t be avoided if we support both

democracy and human rights.

A shift from a cultural pluralism to a democratic pluralism is my focus.

Democratic pluralism is a layered concept. It means starting with an understanding

of the inevitability of dierence, moving to a cultural pluralism that accepts and

2 On that value-add, see Esther Rajadurai, Success in diversity: the strength of Australia’s

multiculturalism, discussion paper, The McKell Institute, December 2018.

Re-imagining Australia: Migration, culture, diversity | 35

Democracy, human rights and multiculturalism: can there be a consensus?

respects such dierences, and nishing up with a unity in and around those

dierences, rather than one that is radically separated from it. It certainly means,

too, the avoidance of a structural pluralism that precludes a ‘common sharing’

and can lead to ugly forms of separatism.

Democratic pluralism is more than just liberal, in that it means going beyond

an understanding of citizenship as “a legal status embodying rights – civil, political

and social” to one that recognises the full participation of the “dierent”.

are taken beyond a “conventional view of citizenship” that “is disinclined to

recognise dierence in matters of public policy through for example, armative

action or dierential treatment of minority groups. Australia shares with most

democratic societies a reluctance to particularisms such as those of ethnicity in

matters of public policy”. It’s the view that dierential treatment “violates the

principle of non-discrimination”; we hear it often.

This is why a good multiculturalist will ask questions like, does the focus on

cultural needs and interests associated with cultural pluralism “minimise or

neglect the more material and instrumental needs of ethnic groups in the public

domain”?

Are racial and ethnic minorities being given a fair go when it comes to

appointments in government and business? When important matters are being

discussed, are minorities given a proper chance to contribute? It obliges us to ask

hard questions about our society and the way it works, and this can hurt because

it raises the question of power and inuence: who has it and how do they keep

it? Will a majority appreciate the power they have? No one should think the

search for good answers to these questions is easy, politically or substantively,

but they can’t be ignored or wished away.

Hard thinking like this was precisely what we sought with the WA Charter of

Multiculturalism, which reframed multiculturalism around four principles (Civic

Ideals, Fairness, Equality and Participation).

What binds us, as I said in the

Charter, “is not a traditional culture but the principles upon which this society is

governed, including mutual respect, freedom from prejudice and discrimination,

equality of opportunity, and full participation in society”.

3 Laksiri Jayasuriya, Transforming a ‘White Australia’: issues of racism and immigration, SSS

Publications, 2012, p. 151.

4 Laksiri Jayasuriya, ‘The Political Foundations of Australia’s Pluralist Society’, Australian

Journal of Social Issues, Vol. 29, No. 4, 1994, p.327.

5 Ibid, p. 322.

6 On the ideas behind the Charter, see Geo Gallop, Living with Dierence: Does

Multiculturalism Have a Future?, Walter Murdoch Lecture, Murdoch University,

17 September 2003, and Laksiri Jayasuriya, ‘Australian Multiculturalism Reframed’,

Australian Quarterly, Vol.80, Issue 3, May-June 2008.

36 | The University of Western Australia Public Policy Institute

Geo Gallop

A new and just relationship

A signicant part of our approach to living in a world of dierence was a Statement

of Commitment to build a “new and just relationship” between the Aboriginal

people of WA (represented by the WA ATSIC State Council and supported by the

three major Aboriginal peak bodies) and the Government of WA. It set out the

principles and a process for the parties to negotiate on the agreed basis that the

Aboriginal people are “the rst peoples” of WA, something like what is intended

for the proposed Voice

but not with the constitutional recognition being sought

for that Voice. Its ambit was regional as well as statewide, providing a framework

for negotiated regional agreements, again a bit like the Voice. It was forged in

the knowledge that we were dealing with the intersection of two histories. The

need to respect the land and cultural rights of Aboriginal people followed, as did

the need to address their political and social rights as a disadvantaged minority.

Incorporating the question of Indigenous rights into the debates around

multiculturalism is not without its controversy but is still important because it

ensures we are reminded of the range of sources for dierence in our society (one

of these in Australia being indigeneity). Whereas British and Migrant Australia

brought their own histories and traditions to a new land, all too conveniently

regarded by the British as unoccupied, Indigenous Australia has 60,000 years

or more of history and culture related to that land. It is one of those facts about

dierence and the unavoidability of deep moral and political disagreement that

we tried to extinguish with the doctrines of Terra Nullius and Assimilation.

Aboriginal peoples, their languages and their culture and their history pre-white

settlement cannot just be extinguished as our predecessors thought possible.

That a sense of pride and spiritual connection with this history is carried

forward by Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Australians today should be

easy to understand by a British Australia that celebrates – and rightly so – its

history of liberal and democratic achievements from the past, for example in

relation to the Magna Carta (1215).

Earlier attempts in our history to de-legitimise and then destroy this very idea

of Aboriginality were wrong, and did not and could not work. Initiatives like the

Voice and our own Statement of Commitment are constructive and unifying;

citizens of the Commonwealth Indigenous Australians remain and so too does

the Constitution as the Nation’s primary document. What is added is recognition

of Aboriginal prior occupancy and jurisdiction, and institutionalisation of a right

7 The common reference to the current initiative to develop formal mechanisms to include

Indigenous people in local, regional and national governance including constitutional

recognition – see: indigenous.gov.au/topics/indigenous-voice.

Re-imagining Australia: Migration, culture, diversity | 37

Democracy, human rights and multiculturalism: can there be a consensus?

to be heard. It’s a constructive step that builds on achievements like the Race

Discrimination Act (1975) and Native Title (1992).

Substantive equality

Just to say all Australians, born locally or overseas, Indigenous or non-Indigenous,

are equal in civil and political rights only takes us so far down the road of a

genuinely democratic pluralism. Formal freedoms may lack the back-up of

capacity and opportunity to make them eective. The right to vote is important

but still there will be minorities as well as majorities, and how the relationship

between the two plays out can be as subtle as a wink and a nod, unseen and

unacknowledged, or as obvious and hurtful as a torrent of abuse on a bus or train.

So it was that the concept of ‘substantive equality’ became a central element in

the Gallop Government’s multicultural armoury, its advocacy and transmission

being given to a unit in the Equal Opportunity Commission. Formal equality

prescribes “equal treatment of all people regardless of circumstances” and is

“equated with fair treatment” but doesn’t take into account “the accumulated

disadvantage of generations of discrimination or the disadvantage faced by groups

in a system that fails to recognise dierent needs”. Substantive equality, on the

other hand, “recognises that equal or the same application of rules to unequal

groups can have unequal results.”

It is a reminder of the tension between ideas

in general and ideas in practice.

What is being recognised here is that the legislation making it unlawful to

discriminate on the ground of race in certain areas of public life, including the

provision of goods, services and facilities, needs to be backed up by a deeper

understanding of how inequality plays out in the community and in relation to

government (for example an understanding of the dierence between accessibility

and responsiveness, both being needed if services are to play the role intended

of them).

Critics talk of the splitting of the nation into two peoples, one with rights

to representation not enjoyed by others, and see this as a recipe for ongoing

conict; one Australia not two, they preach! In relation to substantive equality,

critics say involvement and integration into our society and its government

does not require special measures as much as it requires individual and group

commitment, something that is lost if minorities see themselves and are seen as

victims. Positive or negative attitudes to migration – the numbers and the mix

8 Western Australia Equal Opportunity Commission Substantive Equality Unit, The Policy

Framework for Substantive Equality, Government of Western Australia, 2005, p.6.

38 | The University of Western Australia Public Policy Institute

Geo Gallop

– are also part of the package that underpins these disagreements. Attempts to

take historical and structural inequality out of politics eventually fail, community-

wide reections on how power and inuence is distributed being at the heart of

the human condition and our individual consciences.

Racism and extremism challenges

Racism is another distinguishing feature of the politics of social and political

inclusion. It is dangerous because it does not seek consensus via the balancing

of values like liberty and equality, but rather seeks to impose a narrowly based

conception of life, community and government. The ends are bad and often the

means to achieve them even worse.

“This [is] vividly expressed by the cryptic slogan presented as a conict

between those who ‘ew here’ and those who ‘grew here’.”

It becomes a case

of prioritising ‘our culture’ against ‘their culture’, our culture being dened

much more widely than may be assumed to follow from a democracy-inspired

patriotism. Underneath, too, lies the view that, as much as they may try, nations

accepting and promoting multiculturalism will inevitably nd themselves

engulfed in serious conict.

The challenge faced by multiculturalism is not just to deal with these types

of racism (which quite often manifest themselves as connected parts of one,

always ugly whole), but also to face up to the reality of religiously justied Islamic

extremism, be it homegrown and/or internationally inspired. Ultra-nationalist

and ultra-religious extremism feed o each other, encourage separatism and

create fear.

Add to that speaking out against prejudice and racism directed at minority

communities. As Tim Soutphommasane put it in relation to Muslim communities:

“If we are to expect Muslim communities to repudiate extremism perpetrated

in the name of Islam, our society must be prepared to repudiate extremism that

targets Muslim communities.”

9 Laksiri Jayasuriya, Transforming a ‘White Australia’: issues of racism and immigration, SSS

Publications, 2012, p. 116.

10 Tim Soutphommasane, The success of Australia’s multiculturalism, Speech to the Sydney

Institute, 9 March 2006.

Re-imagining Australia: Migration, culture, diversity | 39

Democracy, human rights and multiculturalism: can there be a consensus?

Australian values

Surely there has to be some set of over-arching principles that can allow unity

and diversity to live together? Does the state need to be completely neutral on

the question of values? Our Citizenship Pledge states, “From this time forward,

I pledge my loyalty to Australia and its people, whose democratic beliefs I share,

whose rights and liberties I respect, and whose laws I will uphold.” For those of

a religious disposition, the words “under God” can also be used.

Adding other aspects of ‘Australianness’ to the equation becomes an important

issue to explore. For example, the Commonwealth says this, regarding its

expectations of migrants: “People are also expected to generally observe Australian

social customs, habits and practices even though they are not normally legally

binding.”

That is vague but provocative; on the surface perhaps understandable,

but when you dig deep all sorts of hostilities may be given licence: for example,

the clothes we wear, the food we eat and the events we do or do not celebrate.

Indeed, it can be a code for prejudice.

What, then, of the prospect of consensus when it comes to unity and diversity?

There is a culture war going on in which a conservative sees a once resilient status

quo under attack, successful in defending our political inheritance from Britain

but losing out in relation to traditional values associated with life, gender and

sexuality. They plead, why interfere with a society and system that’s worked

well? In relation to the politics of culture that means priority for their version of

Australian values and experience. In this frame, the obligation of newcomers to

integrate into that history is given emphasis. To minorities, they say, opportunity

is yours to grasp more than it is ours to promote.

Democratic pluralists, on the other hand, celebrate the freedoms associated

with multiculturalism, seeing them as providing a dynamic base for both stability

and progress. They are more aware of the power and inuence of the new racism

described above and the range of structural factors that aect life chances. They

refer to active versus passive tolerance again, they understand that “mutual

respect goes beyond passive tolerance in asking for styles of conduct and speech

consistent with co-existing in a world of dierence”.

They do not ignore the

realities of inequality and are much more open to the changes that can happen

as dierent peoples come together, respecting each other’s uniqueness and keen

to explore new ways of doing things.

11 Department of Immigration and Border Protection, Life in Australia: Australian Values

and Principles, Commonwealth of Australia, 2016.

12 Geo Gallop, Living with Dierence: Does Multiculturalism Have a Future?, Walter

Murdoch Lecture, Murdoch University, 17 September 2003, p.13.

40 | The University of Western Australia Public Policy Institute

Geo Gallop

This is an abridged version of the inaugural Laki Jayasuriya Oration given at

UWA on 10 March 2020.

The Honourable Geo Gallop AC is the former Premier of Western Australia and

Emeritus Professor at the University of Sydney.

Re-imagining Australia: Migration, culture, diversity | 41

In what sense is Australia

a multicultural society?

Planning for/with multiculturalism

Paul J. Maginn

According to the Australian Government’s 2017 statement

Multicultural Australia: United, Strong, Successful

, Australia

is “the most successful multicultural society in the world,

uniting a multitude of cultures, experiences, beliefs and

traditions”.

The claim that Australia is the most successful

multicultural country is open to debate however. Questions

abound in relation to: (i) how multiculturalism is dened

– demographically, sociologically and politically; (ii) the

overarching aims and objectives of multicultural policy – assimilation, integration

and multiculturalism; and (iii) the criteria for measuring the successfulness

of multiculturalism and multicultural policy – visibility, representation and

participation in social, economic and political life.

In short, multiculturalism is more than just a demographic measure of

the overall degree of cultural diversity at any given spatial scale – national,

state, metropolitan, regional or suburban. This is, of course, not to dismiss the

value of cultural diversity on the overall social, economic and cultural fabric

of Australia.

The Commonwealth government’s use of the term “successful multicultural

nation” conveys the idea that all groups, especially immigrant and ethnic/racial

minority communities, are integrated into the host society. Furthermore, the

term ‘integration’ suggests that aspects of the identities, beliefs and practices of

culturally diverse minorities are in some way surrendered, subsumed and even

1 Australian Government, Multicultural Australia: United, Strong Successful, Australia’s

multicultural statement, Australian Government, 2017.

42 | The University of Western Australia Public Policy Institute

Paul J. Maginn

rendered subordinate within, by and to the dominant white Judeao-Christian

culture.

By way of a simple example, Australian migrant communities tend not to

be referred to as ‘African-Australians’, ‘Asian-Australians’, ‘Indian-Australians’,

‘Italian-Australians’ or ‘British/Irish-Australians’ within political, policy or

public discourses. This diers from the US where the ethnic and/or ancestral

background of ‘minority’ Americans are commonplace – African-American,

Asian-American, and Native-American. Such terminology itself acts as a signier

of cultural diversity.

Relatedly, whereas white migrants to Australia from countries such as the

UK, Ireland and Europe are often (self-)described as ‘expats’, migrants from

culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds (CALD) tend to be dened

as immigrants. When used, both of these terms signify a process of ‘othering’

whereby the former (expats) are deemed to have greater social status than the

latter (immigrants).

People who migrate to Australia are encouraged (and expected) to become

Australian and sign up to so-called Australian values – respect, equality, freedom

and security – that underpin Australian democracy. These are, of course,

worthy values but they are by no means uniquely Australian per se. While they

underpin Australian democracy and are outlined in both Commonwealth and

state government multicultural policy documents, not all migrant/minority

communities enjoy the same level of respect, equality, freedom and opportunity

as the wider white Australian population.

If this were the case, then a truly successful multicultural nation would look

very dierent. That is, we could expect to see greater visibility, representation and/

or participation of ethnic minority groups within all aspects of Australian society.

More specically, there would be greater cultural diversity in senior/leadership

roles within the business, media, arts and culture, science and technology and

academic worlds – a point echoed in Shamit Saggar’s essay ‘Is Australia at ease

with itself?’ in this volume.

Ethnic diversity at state level

The same would also be true of all levels of politics and policymaking – national,

state and local. Since local government is the level of government closest to

the people, and the socio-spatial governance level where culturally diversity is

most visible, we might expect to see greater cultural diversity in terms of local

Re-imagining Australia: Migration, culture, diversity | 43

In what sense is Australia a multicultural society?

councillors and professional sta. This is not the case in WA/Perth.

Greater

diversity among our elected ocials and policymakers might therefore translate

into a policy environment more aware of cultural diversity.

In fact, it is curious that multiculturalism does not feature more prominently

within government policies in Western Australia. After all, WA is a culturally

diverse region with some 39.7 per cent of the state’s population, according to the

2016 Census, born overseas. This is greater than both NSW (34.5 per cent) and

Victoria (35.1 per cent). Furthermore, WA has had a Charter of Multiculturalism

since 2004. It states:

“The purpose of the Charter is to explicitly recognise that the people of

Western Australia are of dierent linguistic, religious, racial and ethnic

backgrounds, and to promote their participation in democratic governance

within an inclusive society.”

The Charter goes on to note that it is important for policymakers to be sensitive

and responsive to the fact that although culturally diverse groups may have

many of the same needs as the wider white Australian population they also have

culturally specic needs.

“Despite the adoption of policies on multiculturalism for some decades,

there is still a lack of appreciation that the needs of Indigenous people

and people from Culturally and Linguistically Diverse background can

be dierent, and that exibility in service provision is required to cater

to these dierences. It is important to note that the exibility in service

arrangements to cater to dierent needs does not necessarily translate to

parallel services.”

The Charter does not appear to have been adopted and championed within state

government policy domains. In terms of urban and regional planning policy, for

example, the State’s two most important strategic planning frameworks – State

Planning Strategy 2050 and Perth and Peel @ 3.5m – only make tacit reference

to cultural diversity. Relatedly, WA State Government population forecasts (WA

2 Paul J. Maginn and Fiona Haslam-McKenzie, Census of Western Australian Elected

Members 2016, Centre for Regional Development, School of Earth and Environment, The

University of Western Australia, March 2017.

3 Government of Western Australia, Oce of Multicultural Interests, WA Charter of

Multiculturalism, Government of Western Australia, November 2004.

44 | The University of Western Australia Public Policy Institute

Paul J. Maginn

Tomorrow: Medium-Term Age-Sex Population Forecasts 2016 to 2031) provide no

kind of analyses on cultural diversity and what implications this might have on

planning and public policy more generally, in relation to issues such as housing,

education, employment, health and so on.

Urban and regional planning

The absence of a meaningful policy commitment or interest in cultural diversity

within urban and regional planning at the state level means that there is unlikely

to be a substantive policy commitment to multiculturalism – beyond recognising

and celebrating cultural festivals, harmony day, and NAIDOC week – at the

local government level. Again, this is not to discount the role of this type

of multicultural policy expression; these events are good starting points in

acknowledging and promoting cultural diversity. Indeed, other simple policy

actions could be developed in order to enhance and promote the fact that Perth/

WA is a multicultural society.

In terms of local government planning being more responsive and inclusive

of cultural diversity, the ideal policy space for this to occur is the local planning

strategy (LPS). All local governments in WA are required to develop an LPS, and

as the title of this particular planning policy document indicates, its function

is to respond and translate long-term strategic planning directions of the State

Government to the local level.

The City of Stirling and the City of Vincent are two of the most culturally

diverse local government areas within the Perth metropolitan region, with the

share of overseas-born population accounting for 45 per cent and 44 per cent

respectively of total population in 2016. Stirling is also the largest local government

area (LGA) by population within Perth, with some 208,400 people, and covers a

large geographical area that comprises a diverse mix of residential, industrial and

commercial suburbs. In contrast, Vincent is a relatively small inner-suburban

LGA, with a population of around 33,700 people.

Despite the high level of cultural diversity within both LGAs, multiculturalism

does not appear to permeate either councils’ LPSs in any meaningful policy sense.

The term ‘cultural diversity’ appears once in the City of Vincent LPS, as part of

policy recommendations relating to Built Form:

“Build on the sense of place evidenced by the area’s history and cultural

diversity.”

4 Government of Western Australia, Department of Planning, City of Vincent Local

Re-imagining Australia: Migration, culture, diversity | 45

In what sense is Australia a multicultural society?

Ironically, the City of Vincent LPS makes a bold statement about its multicultural

character under the vision statement in its introduction:

“A Community of Communities…In 2024, Vincent is a place of colour and

immense personality, a rich cosmopolitan melting pot of cultures

from every part of the globe. With our warm and open attitude, people

from all walks of life choose to live here. Abundantly endowed with

memorable places, intriguing and fascinating elements, and every

imaginable convenience, Vincent has an outstanding residential quality

of life.”

Similarly, the City of Stirling LPS only mentions “cultural diversity” once and

this in a rather matter-of-fact statement:

“There is strong multi-cultural diversity within the City of Stirling which

includes people born in over 35 countries other than Australia.”

Interestingly, the City of Stirling LPS seeks to enhance the cultural diversity of

the local government area by attracting more international visitors by oering

diverse attractions

“The City currently lacks a diversity of tourist attractions to meet the

future tourism trends. These trends include entertainment, shopping

and other urban activities to service the emerging tourism markets in

China, Singapore, Malaysia and other Asian countries. However the City

is strategically positioned to take advantage of these tourism trends by

growing and diversifying the City’s major Activity Centres and Corridors.”

The absence of a substantive policy commitment to cultural diversity within the

LPSs of the City of Stirling and the City of Vincent (and, presumably, those of

other councils) appears largely due to the fact that cultural diversity does not

feature in state planning policy discourses. Since local councils generally take

their policy cues from the state government, if there are no clear policy signals

that multiculturalism is a policy priority there can be little expectation that many

councils will give it due attention.

Planning Strategy, Government of Western Australia, November 2016.

5 Government of Western Australia, Department of Planning, City of Stirling Local Planning

Strategy, Government of Western Australia, October 2019.

46 | The University of Western Australia Public Policy Institute

Paul J. Maginn

Ultimately, a more nuanced and substantive policy commitment to

multiculturalism is required if we are to ensure Indigenous and ethnic/cultural

minority communities are given a ‘fair go’ at reaping the benets of the opportunities

Australia has to oer its citizens and residents. A step in this direction will move

us closer to laying claim to being a successful multicultural nation.

The new Multicultural Policy Framework

The WA State Government has recently (February 2020) taken up the mantle of

multiculturalism with the endorsement of the Multicultural Policy Framework

(MPF), which scaolds o the Charter of Multiculturalism. The MPF is designed

to get state-level public sector agencies to become more responsive to cultural

diversity by developing multicultural plans that must include “strategies, actions

and key performance indicators”. The MPF is somewhat similar to Disability

Action Plans that government agencies are required by law to develop to ensure

people with disabilities are treated fairly. Both reect a philosophy of sensitising

public policy to meet dierential needs.

Although the MPF does not apply to local governments, there is potential

for policy changes brought about by it at the state agency level to lter down

to local councils. And, the State Government has indicated, “local government

authorities and community and non-government organisations may wish to

adapt the framework to their needs”. This provides an ideal opportunity for

major culturally diverse councils such as Stirling and Vincent, along with the

City of Perth, City of Canning and City of Gosnells, to be leaders in multicultural

policy development.

Some proposals

In terms of urban and regional planning, and playing a developmental and more

instrumental role in enhancing multiculturalism within WA (and particularly

within the Perth metro region), a number of broad policy ideas are proposed below.

First, in light of the recently endorsed MPF, the Western Australian Planning

Commission (WAPC) should consider the development of a State Planning

Policy (SPP) on multiculturalism. SPPs are the highest level of planning policy

guidance within the WA planning process. They are used by the WAPC to guide

it on strategic decisions relating to land subdivision and development approval,

and to guide local councils on relevant matters pertaining to the preparation

6 Government of Western Australia, Western Australia Multicultural Policy Framework,

Government of Western Australia, February 2020.

Re-imagining Australia: Migration, culture, diversity | 47

In what sense is Australia a multicultural society?

of local planning schemes (it is also assumed here that such guidance would

apply to local planning strategies, since this policy framework informs planning

schemes). An SPP on multiculturalism would eradicate the apparent policy

vacuum within local government planning on substantive multicultural policy.

Next, there should be more structured and developed training on

multiculturalism for both state and local government planners so policy-making

is more critically sensitive and responsive to the land-use and humanistic

issues underpinning cultural diversity. Relatedly, there should also be better

multicultural training and education for all elected ocials within state and

local government. For example, an increased understanding of cultural traditions

in relation to familial/household structures, religious practices, educational

requirements, social practices and the role of structural, institutional and

individual discrimination will help create better-informed planning policies.

Third, when state and local government planners engage in consultations and

participation exercises, they should monitor the prole of those who participate

in any such events or processes. If minority groups in culturally diverse areas are

absent and/or under-represented then alternative steps should be taken in an

eort to reach those groups before any decisions are nalised.

Fourth, the cultural diversity within WA/Perth is also accompanied by linguistic

diversity. Despite this, it is not often we see other languages used explicitly in

public spaces, by public services or on public signage. Furthermore, in light of

WA’s shifting demographic prole – with increasing numbers of migrants from

China and elsewhere in Asia – plus our increasing economic relationship with

these same countries via the resources sector, tertiary education and tourism, a

multi-lingual strategy should be developed. In short, public transport services,

road signs and other public service signs should provide information in a range

of languages over and above English.

Dr Paul J. Maginn is an urban planner/geographer and Senior Lecturer in the

Department of Geography at The University of Western Australia with research

expertise in urban policy and governance, strategic planning and planning reform,

Australian suburbia, and geographies of cultural diversity and sexuality.

Re-imagining Australia: Migration, culture, diversity | 49

Multiculturalism in Australia:

the triumph of self interest

Mike Nahan

Most objective observers agree Australia has done

multiculturalism well.

Over the last 25 years, we have become a truly multi-

ethnic, multicultural society. This has been achieved by a

large expansion of our immigration intake in tandem with

an increasing proportion of new migrants from across Asia.

It’s not just the degree and speed of change to our cultural

mix but the generally harmonious nature of multicultural

Australia; while there have been tensions at times, these

have been nowhere near the level seen in other countries.

How did it happen? Primarily, it occurred because of the economy. Australia,

prior to the 2020 coronavirus recession, experienced just under 20 years of

unbroken economic growth, including one of the largest resource booms in

its history. During this period, unemployment was low but at the same time

there were skill shortages, and our economic success was largely based on the

expanding markets in Asia. Consequently, Government reached out for people

and skills, and Asia was the logical source.

Additionally, governments, with diering degrees of success, regained

public support for immigration by refocusing policy on the needs of the labour

market and, more controversially, by limiting and controlling the intake of

unskilled migrants.

One of the great ironies of this process has been the role of former Prime

Minister John Howard. Mr Howard had, prior to winning government in 1996,

expressed concerns about multiculturalism and the ability of the nation to absorb

a large range of diverse cultures, specically from Asia.

As such he was, and arguably still is, perceived by many as no friend of

multiculturalism. Yet the policies of the Howard Government, through a wider

50 | The University of Western Australia Public Policy Institute

Mike Nahan

appetite for new migration, resulted in the ourishing of multiculturalism in

Australia, specically from Asia. As respected journalist Paul Kelly correctly

stated in 2005, “Howard is now one of the main architects of Australia as a

multicultural society.”

Populate or perish: multiculturalism’s foundation

Of course, Australia’s multicultural experiment did not start with the Howard

Government, but with the Curtin and Menzies governments, and was further

developed by successive governments. Following World War II, there was an

accepted need for Australia to populate or perish, and to build a new industrial

Australia. This gave rise to the requirement for people and labour beyond those

who could be drawn from what was then perceived as the mother country.

Over the next twenty-ve years, millions of migrants from all over continental

Europe were welcomed to Australia to meets its needs. Most of the migrants

were unskilled; however, they met the needs of the time, based on an economy

that remained highly agricultural and focused on primary industries.

There was next-to-no government assistance available to migrants other

than plenty of job opportunities and, as such, they posed no nancial burden

to the existing population. While they did face prejudice early, this dissipated

over time through a strong work ethic, good citizenship, economic success and

intermarriage. Eventually their cultures became part of the Australian culture.

They established the core foundation of multicultural Australia.

Even though there was a large increase in migrants from non-traditional sources

in the 1950s and 1960s, migrants from the UK continued to dominate Australia’s

intake. Notably, during those decades people deemed to be non-European were

prevented from migrating here by the White Australia policy. During this time,

Australia experienced full employment, with the unemployment rate cycling

around two per cent. Consequently, the economy was able to absorb high levels

of migration, including low-skill migrants.

From the 1970s to the early 1990s, Australian governments confronted a

number of fundamental challenges. First, and most importantly, population and

industrial development policies of the past were fraying, resulting in growing

unemployment, particularly for low-skilled labour. From 1974, unemployment

rates began to ratchet upward, reaching six per cent by the late 1970s. It was

pushed up again to 10 per cent by the recession of 1982–83. It remained high

1 Paul Kelly, Howard and his haters miss real migrations story, The Australian, 21 December

2005.

Re-imagining Australia: Migration, culture, diversity | 51

Multiculturalism in Australia: the triumph of self interest

throughout the 1980s and once again rose to 11 per cent during the recession of

the early 1990s.

Additionally, there was a move by major western nations – including Canada,

the US, the UK and Australia – towards an open, non-discriminatory immigration

policy. The White Australia Policy, which had been the cornerstone of Australia’s

immigration policy since the federation, was abandoned by the Holt Government

in 1966.

Furthermore, the focus of government changed from creating growth and

jobs to the creation of the welfare state.

Finally, Australia confronted the need to assist in accommodating waves

of refugees from Vietnam, Cambodia, Lebanon, China, former Yugoslavia, Sri

Lanka and Timor. Most of these refugees were unskilled, non-English-speaking,

poor and traumatised.

Not surprisingly, successive governments from Whitlam through to Keating

adjusted Australia’s migration policies to meet these challenges and changed

conditions. In response to rising unemployment, governments cut the permanent

intake. The migrant intake was reduced from a post-war record high of

185,099 in 1969–70, to post-war low of 52,752 in 1975–76.

The migrant intake remained low until 1986, when it was allowed to increase

to around 140,000. With the increase in unemployment in 1990, however, the

permanent intake was cut back to between 60,000 and 80,000 by the mid-1990s.

The last vestiges of the White Australia policy were eliminated by the

Whitlam Government. It also introduced the Racial Discrimination Act, which

made discrimination based on race or religion illegal. The Hawke Government

subsequently put in place a non-discriminatory immigration policy and introduced

skilled categories.

As part of its welfare agenda, the Whitlam Government introduced a family

reunion program that increasingly came to dominate Australia’s migration intake,

accounting for 80 per cent of total intake by the mid-1990s. Subsequent Australian

governments responded to the relevant waves of refugees by accepting them on

a controlled and limited basis. Despite attempts to claim otherwise, there has

been (with perhaps the exception of the Fraser Government) a commonality

in approach, policies and even the rhetoric of consecutive governments from

2 Jerome Fahrer and Alexandra Heath, The Evolution of Employment and Unemployment in

Australia, Research Discussion Paper 9215, Reserve Bank of Australia, December 1992, p.4.

3 Janet Phillips, Michael Klapdor and Joanne Simon-Davies, Migration to Australia since

Federation: a guide to statistics, Background Note, Parliamentary Library, Parliament of

Australia, October 2010, p.4.

52 | The University of Western Australia Public Policy Institute

Mike Nahan

Whitlam to Morrison regarding refugees. For example, the Whitlam Government

established a specic refugee programme in 1975, largely retained by successor

administrations. The number of refugee places varied over the years, peaking

under the Fraser Government at 21,917 in 1981–82.

Governments established a range of programs designed to assist refugees.

Even decades after they arrived, many struggled in the workplace, with one-

third or more of recently arrived migrants depending on welfare as their main

source of income.

By the early 1990s there was growing concern with the ability of the Australian

community to absorb refugees and unskilled migrants. While there was relatively

limited ethnic conict, migrants, particularly refugees and family migrants,

tended to struggle in the job market. These issues naturally translated to broader

community concerns with the immigration program and multiculturalism.

These concerns largely rose and fell with unemployment levels, a trend that

continued into the 2010s.

The FitzGerald Report of the Committee to Advise on Australia’s Immigration

Policies, commissioned by the Hawke Government in 1988, warned “of a clear

and present need for urgent immigration reform,” and widespread concerns

about multiculturalism.

Howard’s changes

In response to these concerns, the Howard Government, elected in 1996, made

major changes to Australia’s migration program.

First, the skills categories were expanded and given priority, and after a few

years the overall permanent intake was expanded dramatically. Between 1996 and

2006, Australia’s intake of skilled migrants increased more than threefold, and

then went on to double again by 2013. In 2017–18, skilled categories accounted

for about 70 per cent of the total permanent intake, compared to around 30 per

cent in 1996. The permanent intake reached a historic high in 2013.

4 Robert Birrell, Immigration Reform in Australia: Coalition Government Proposals and

Outcomes since March 1996, Centre for Population and Urban Research, Monash

University, 1997.

5 The Treasury and Department of Home Aairs, Shaping a nation: population growth and

immigration over time, Commonwealth of Australia, Commonwealth of Australia, 2018,

Figure 35.

6 Stephen FitzGerald, Immigration: A Commitment to Australia, Report of the Committee

to Advise on Australia’s Immigration Policies, Australian Government Publishing Service,

1988, chapter 1.

7 Leith Van Onselen, Australia’s skilled migration programme is a giant fraud, Australian

Re-imagining Australia: Migration, culture, diversity | 53

Multiculturalism in Australia: the triumph of self interest

Australia’s refugee program was cut by the Howard Government and then held

there by subsequent governments. The family reunion category has been kept

more-or-less constant in absolute terms, but declined sharply as a share of total

intake. In short, subsequent governments have sought to limit the number of

unskilled migrants.

Subsequent governments – Labor and Liberal – have maintained Howard’s

basic approach and priorities.

While the family reunion category was eectively capped, family migration

was supported under the skilled migrant programs, as skilled migrants were

allowed to bring their immediate family with them.

The Howard and subsequent governments also introduced and expanded a

range of temporary programs to meet the needs of workforce and businesses.

These programs have largely remained uncapped, and grew signicantly from

660,590 new visas in 2008–09 to 816,719 in 2017–18.

The largest categories are

student visas, followed by working holiday visas. Overall, there were 1.6 million

temporary migrants in Australia in 2017.

Consistent with the aim of encouraging permanent settlement, many of

the temporary visa categories have been provided with pathways to permanent

residency. The Australian Treasury identied more than 5,500 dierent pathways

for people to move from a temporary to a permanent visa. These opportunities

have been taken up at an increasing rate. The Department of Immigration and

Citizenship estimated that in 2007–08, about one-third of the permanent intake

came directly from temporary visa holders.

Treasury found in 2018 this trend

had increased to around 55 per cent.

It is clear that the Howard Government’s immigration policies have had a

profound impact on the nation. They have resulted in the doubling of the overall

population growth rate, limited the aging of the population, provided needed

skills (particularly during the recent resources boom), laid the foundation for

Australia’s international education industry – now one of the nation’s largest,

which has provided vital funding to our universities and TAFEs – and underpinned

the growth in the housing market, amongst other things.

Economy, Macro Business, 14 March 2018, https://www.macrobusiness.com.au/2018/03/

australias-skilled-migration-program-is-a-giant-fraud/.

8 Australian Bureau of Statistics, Migration Australia 2017/18, 3412.0, 2019.

9 The Treasury and Department of Home Aairs, Shaping a nation: population growth and

immigration over time, Commonwealth of Australia, 2018, 19.

10 Department of Immigration and Citizenship, Annual Report 2009-10, Commonwealth of

Australia, 2010.

54 | The University of Western Australia Public Policy Institute

Mike Nahan

Australia’s ethnic mix

These policies also led to a signicant shift in Australia’s ethnic mix. Over the

last 25 years, people from Asian countries have increasingly come to dominate

permanent migration. In 2017–18 Asia accounted for 64 per cent of Australia

permanent migrants, while Europe (mainly the UK) accounted for just 25 per

cent. This was almost a complete reversal of the proportion in 1996.

India was by far the largest source of permanent migrants in 2017–18, followed

by China, the UK and the Philippines (together accounting for 43 per cent of

the permanent intake).

The changes to immigration policy and to the source countries have resulted in

the majority of residents born overseas coming from Asian countries rather than

Europe. This is a remarkable change that illustrates a signicant transformation

in the multicultural character in our nation.

What is extraordinary is that the change in the scale and composition of our

migrant intake has been accompanied by a high level of support for immigration.

As shown in Figure 1, public support for Australia’s migration program has

increased from a low of 25 per cent in the early 1990s to more than 60 per cent

in 2016. There is a number of reasons for this increased level of support.

Firstly, the last 25 years have been a period of sustained low unemployment

and solid economic growth. Secondly, the public recognises the very real benets

of the expanded migration program and the need for skilled immigrants.

An international survey by the Pew Research Centre

recorded a 78 per cent

level of support for skilled migrants in Australia. The survey also found that 62

per cent of Australians who were critical of high immigration generally, supported

the migration of skilled people.

Lastly, new skilled migrants acclimatised well and quickly, and were net

contributors to their new society immediately. Asian skilled migrants have a

high level of workplace participation, higher-than-average incomes, low levels

of welfare, a good command of English, and have settled into the Australian

way of life.

11 Department of Home Aairs, Permanent Additions to Australia’s Population 2017-18,

Commonwealth of Australia, 2018.

12 Jacob Poushter and Stephen Cornibert, Americans and Germans Disagree on the State of

Bilateral Relations, but Largely Align on Key International Issues, Spring Global Attitudes

Survey, Pew Research Centre, 2019, Q53c.

Re-imagining Australia: Migration, culture, diversity | 55

Multiculturalism in Australia: the triumph of self interest

The picture today

In 2019, the Morrison Government reduced the permanent intake planning target

from 190,000 to 160,000, arguably heralding further reductions in the future.

The Government has also tightened up by extending waiting time for migrant

access welfare and replacing the 457 temporary visa class to limit pathways to

permanency. It is also putting in place policies aimed at ensuring temporary

migrants work in regional areas for a greater proportion of their overall time,

following dispersal programs that have been adopted (with mixed success)

in Canada.

With the severe economic challenges facing Australia for the foreseeable

future due to the COVID-19 pandemic, I expect there to be a review of Australia’s

migration program. The Government will be required to focus on the recovery

of the domestic economy and the high levels of unemployment.

As I have outlined earlier, Australia’s migration policy has largely been dictated

throughout its history by the nation’s labour market and economic needs. Here

in Western Australia, there was already little capacity throughout the domestic

economy before the crisis hit us.

Many skilled migrants in recent years have had to take up unskilled work to

obtain employment and develop an income stream. With millions of people

rendered unemployed due to the closure of businesses across Australia, there will

be minimal capacity for the nation to accept new skilled migrants from overseas.

Consequently, the Commonwealth Government will be forced to wind back

immigration levels, perhaps to historic lows, although this will not dissipate a

large increase in demand from abroad from skilled people seeking a safer, better

life in Australia. While the demand for refugee entry will only increase, Australia

should continue to control its intake according to its needs and capacity.

This is a unique time in Australia’s history, as historically we have been

required to look abroad to boost population and meet skill shortages. In the

short to medium term, however, policy-makers will be confronted with a

dierent challenge.

In short, the Government will continue to alter the migrant intake and

immigration policies to meet Australia’ labour market and economic needs. If

they do, as it has in the past, it will bode well for multiculturalism in Australia.

The Honourable Dr Mike Nahan MLA is the Member for Riverton in the Parliament

of Western Australia.

Re-imagining Australia: Migration, culture, diversity | 57

Australian ethnic change and political

inclusion: nding strength in diversity

in responding to global crises

Juliet Pietsch

Shortly after the COVID-19 epidemic broke out in the

Chinese city of Wuhan, Australians with migrant or ethnic

heritage, especially Asian-Australians, reported an increase

in racism, hostility and other forms of intolerance, especially

on public transport. In the period when the outbreak was

still centred in Wuhan, the Australian Human Rights

Commission noted that about one in four people who

lodged racial discrimination complaints during January

and February 2020 were targeted because of the fear that

the COVID-19 disease would spread to Australia.

Chinese and Hong Kong

international students were particularly at risk because of their visible markers

of dierence and their prior experience of infectious diseases such as the SARS

outbreak in 2002-2004. Those who had lived through similar pandemics overseas

had quickly learnt of the importance of wearing protective facemasks to protect

others in the community. This learned community response, however, was a

marker of cultural dierence that subjected some to experiences of stigmatisation

or racial hostility.

The negative experience of Asian-Australians was no doubt emboldened by

political leaders, such as President Trump referring to the coronavirus as the

‘Chinese virus’ or the ‘Wuhan virus’. The World Health Organisation repeatedly

advised political leaders not to target any nationality or ethnicity in references

1 Jason Fang, Erwin Renaldi and Samuel Yang, Australians urged to ‘show kindness’ amid

reports of COVID-19 racial discrimination complaints, ABC News, 3 April 2020, abc.

net.au/news/2020-04-03/racism-COVID-19-coronavirus-outbreak-commissioner-

discrimination/12117738

58 | The University of Western Australia Public Policy Institute

Juliet Pietsch

to the COVID-19 as it could lead to racial proling against Asians in migrant-

receiving countries around the world. Mike Ryan, executive director of the

WHO’s Emergencies Program, reminded political leaders that “viruses know

no borders and they don’t care about your ethnicity, the colour of your skin or

the money you have in the bank”.

In Australia, Pauline Hanson, Queensland

Senator for One Nation, felt these comments were not justied. In a Twitter

statement, she suggested that, “China must be called out and any attempts to

attack or criticise people for referring to COVID-19 as a ‘Chinese virus’ should

be pushed back on”, which generated more than 3,500 retweets and 9,400 likes

among her Twitter followers.

What is disappointing is not so much Pauline Hanson’s comments – which

have always represented those with a genuine fear of globalisation and new

patterns of migration – but rather the silence in the broader political debate on

the importance of protecting migrant and ethnic-minority communities from

stigmatisation and racial hostility in times of perceived external threat. During

such times, there is an even greater need for political leaders to promote cultural

diversity as a source of strength, especially in addressing some of the biggest

global catastrophes and challenges of our time. Cultural diversity can bring

to the table a variety of dierent perspectives, experiences and viewpoints to

address a common goal. For example, political leaders from Singapore, Taiwan

and Hong Kong have had very dierent views on the importance of wearing

masks as a community response to COVID-19. This is just one example of the

need for dierent experiences in political decision-making.

In a recent study on temporary migration, Anna Boucher from the University

of Sydney noted that the coronavirus pandemic brings not only a health and

economic crisis but a migration crisis, which is closely related to the long-term

shift from permanent migration to temporary migration.

The bulk of Net

Overseas Migration (NOM) is now primarily made up of temporary migrants,

which, as Boucher observes, has largely contributed to Australia’s economic success

story. Further to this, one of Australia’s biggest export markets is international

students. In 2018, international students collectively contributed more than $35

2 Morgan Gstalter, WHO ocially warns against calling it ‘Chinese Virus,’ says ‘there is no

blame in this, The Hill, 19 March 2020, thehill.com/homenews/administration/488479-

who-ocial-warns-against-calling-it-chinese-virus-says-there-is-no

3 Pauline Hanson (24 March 2020), twitter.com/paulinehansonoz/status/1242290462

615990272?lang=en, [Twitter Post].

4 Anna Bucher, Covid-19 is not only a health crisis, it’s a migration crisis, The Lowy Institute,

2 April 2020, lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/COVID-19-not-only-health-crisis-it-s-

migration-crisis.

Re-imagining Australia: Migration, culture, diversity | 59

Australian ethnic change and political inclusion

billion to the Australian economy, supporting 240,000 jobs, while also partly lling

the shortfall in declining federal government funding for Australian universities.

Yet, international students and other temporary visa holders were not considered

eligible for nancial support at the commencement of Australia’s coronavirus

lockdown. Instead, Prime Minister Scott Morrison remarked that if international

students were unable to support themselves, “there is the alternative for them

to return to their home countries. Australia must focus on its citizens and its

residents to ensure that we can maximise the economic supports that we have”.

Migrants of East Asian descent and international students have not been

the only targets of stigmatisation and hostility during the COVID-19 crisis.

Temporary migrant workers and asylum seekers are also easily forgotten about,

often carrying with them a great deal of knowledge, skills and experience, not

to mention a great deal of resilience necessary for coping in times of crisis and

upheaval. Migrant workers living in overcrowded hostels and asylum seekers

in detention centres are experiencing great diculty in following government

directives on social distancing. While more than 80 per cent of asylum seekers

have been found to be genuine refugees under the UN convention, they are

currently living in conditions that can be regarded as dangerous, with many

having existing health conditions that place them in the high-risk categories

for COVID-19.

International students, migrant workers and asylum seekers, who now have

no access to social welfare, also nd themselves between a rock and a hard place,

as their home countries are facing COVID-19 outbreaks that are quite likely to be

much worse than Australia’s. Even if they wanted to go home, with limited access

to employment many no longer have the nancial means to purchase a return

ight. Of course, that’s even if there are available ights to their home country.

With QANTAS and Virgin Australia grounding virtually their entire eets, and

almost all other international carriers doing the same, nding a ight home is

an increasingly unlikely scenario.

What is clear in the present crisis is that ‘Team Australia’ – a phrase frequently

used by politicians – is not inclusive of many migrants and ethnic minorities who

are signicant contributors to the Australian labour market and social fabric.

Their exclusion not only exposes existing social and political inequalities but also

whether or not Australia is truly committed to the values of multiculturalism

and inclusivity within its democracy. One reason why stigmatisation and racial

5 Jano Gibson and Alexis Moran, As coronavirus spreads, ‘its time to go home’ Scott Morrison

tells visitors and international students, ABC News, 3 April 2020, abc.net.au/news/2020-

04-03/coronavirus-pm-tells-international-students-time-to-go-to-home/12119568

60 | The University of Western Australia Public Policy Institute

Juliet Pietsch

hostility towards migrant and ethnic-minority groups continues in Australia

without any real challenge is the lack of ethnic political representation and

leadership. In a case study of India, Simon Chauchard (2014) shows that improving

ethnic representation in politics matters for intergroup relations, because their

presence in leadership roles signals that members of disadvantaged groups ought

not to be treated with hostility.

The numerous benets of ethnic representation

have been found in other democracies with culturally diverse populations. For

example, across Europe, Bloemraad and Schönwälder (2013) nd that “political

parties are gradually recognising that they need to broaden their appeal to reach

out to residents of migrant origins and to represent this new diversity in their

membership and leadership.”

Other studies in the United States, Canada, and

the United Kingdom have similarly demonstrated the symbolic and material

benets of descriptive representation for racial and ethnic minorities.

Greater ethnic representation and inclusion in politics not only brings

about important symbolic social change but also includes migrants and ethnic

minorities in decision-making processes more generally, especially on issues such

as racism that have a disproportionate impact on new migrants with markers

of dierence to the majority population. Internationally, research has shown

political representatives with experience of stigmatisation and racial hostility

are more likely to make a stand on racism and the protection of marginalised

communities from harm. For example, Heath et al. (2013) demonstrated the

similarities in the political agendas and opinions of ethnic minority candidates on

issues such as combating racial discrimination and labour-market disadvantage.

Of course, not all ethnic candidates are likely to have similar views on social

and political issues that inuence party-political decision-making. However,

6 Simon Chauchard, ‘Can Descriptive Representation Change Beliefs about a Stigmatized

Group? Evidence from Rural India’, American Political Science Review, 108 (2), 2014, p.

403-422.

7 Irene Bloemraad and Karen Schönwälder, ‘Immigrant and Ethnic Minority Representation

in Europe: Conceptual Challenges and Theoretical Approaches’, West European Politics,

36, 2013, p. 565.

8 Susan Banducci, Todd Donovan and Jerey Karp, ‘Minority Representation,

Empowerment, and Participation’, Journal of Politics, 66, 2004, p. 534-56; Karen Bird, ‘The

Political Representation of Visible Minorities in Electoral Democracies: a Comparison of

France, Denmark, and Canada’, Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, 11, 2005, p. 425-65; Karen

Bird, Thomas Saafeld and Andreas Wüst (eds.), The Political Representation of Immigrants

and Minorities: Voters, Parties and Parliaments in Liberal Democracies, Routledge, 2011;

Didier Ruedin, ‘Ethnic Group Representation in a Cross-National Comparison’, Journal of

Legislative Studies, 15, 2009, p. 335-54.

9 Anthony Heath et al., The Political Integration of Ethnic Minorities in Britain, Oxford

University Press, 2013.

Re-imagining Australia: Migration, culture, diversity | 61

Australian ethnic change and political inclusion

in terms of combating racism, preliminary evidence in Australia suggests those

with a migrant or minority background are more likely to make a stand. As an

example, 21 March was the UN’s International Day for the Elimination of Racial

Discrimination. With the spike in COVID-19 related racism cases, it seemed like a

good opportunity for senators and MPs to remind Australians of the importance

of combating racism, xenophobia, stigmatisation, hostility and other forms of

racial intolerance that are known to increase in times of perceived external threat.

However, any gestures of support were limited to just a handful of politicians

with a relatively recent experience of migration or racism.

In scanning the ocial digital platforms senators and MPs use to connect

with local constituents, it is clearly evident those with a personal experience of

migration or racism are the ones most likely to post or tweet an acknowledgment

of the value of cultural diversity and the need to protect minority communities

from harm. On 21 March, the Egypt-born Anne Aly, Member for Cowan, asked

Australians to “use today to reect, and remind ourselves of the need to be ever

vigilant against hatred and division in our society”.

The Malaysia-born Penny

Wong, Senator for South Australia, called for Australians to “make Australia

more inclusive, accepting, respectful and equal”.

Peter Khalil, Member for

Wills and with parents born in Egypt, has acknowledged the importance of the

Australian-Kurdish community in his electorate and its contribution to Australia’s

multicultural society. Maria Vamvakinou, Member for Calwell, acknowledged that

the COVID-19 crisis meant that “For those Australians who have lived through

war and depression, who have experienced expulsion from their homes and the

destruction of their lives, understanding the current threat to our lives, here in

this lucky country, will come easier than to those of us who have not had such

experiences”.

Finally, Linda Burney, Member for Barton and an Indigenous

Australian, highlighted the challenges faced by Chinese restaurant owners and

grocers in her electorate

(as well as Indigenous and remote communities) who

are disproportionately at risk of catching, and perhaps dying from, COVID-19.

10 Anne Aly (21 March 2020), https://www.facebook.com/anneazzaaly/posts/today-march-

21st-is-the-international-day-for-the-elimination-of-racial-discrimi/1035582463490283/

[Facebook Post].

11 Penny Wong (21 March 2020), https://twitter.com/welcomingaus/status/1241155728

502472704 [Twitter Post].

12 Maria Vamvakinou (21 March 2020), https://www.facebook.com/pg/mariavamvakinou/

posts/?ref=page_internal [Facebook Post].

13 Linda Burney, We stand with you and we are going to get through this together, Speech

at the House of Representatives, 27 February 2020, https://www.lindaburney.com.au/

speeches.

62 | The University of Western Australia Public Policy Institute

Juliet Pietsch

The examples above show racial and ethnic representation in politics matters.

While there are always exceptions, on the whole the academic literature in migrant-

receiving countries has found those with a relatively recent experience of migration

or racism are more likely to make a stand on changes to legislation and policies

that have a disproportionate impact on migrants and ethnic communities.

Having one or two voices in Parliament is a step forward in making symbolic

change. However, a stronger collective voice is more likely to result in substantive

policy changes that address racism as well as promote the benets of diversity as

a source of strength. At present, that only a few politicians in Australia regularly

make a public stand during times of crisis, economic instability or perceived threat

is a possible reection of a lack of wider party buy-in. In this sense, Australia

is an outlier compared to other Western immigrant societies and stands out as

not only having limited ethnic representation compared to other parliaments

around the world, but also as having a weak political voice necessary to stand

up against racism and drive change in social attitudes. This is perplexing in a

country that prides itself on its multicultural successes.

The world we live in is far more globally interconnected than ever before. While

there are always initial social, cultural and policy challenges with each migration

wave, Australia needs to ensure that all of those living within its borders are

treated with care and dignity, and are seen to be part of the solution to national

and global crises rather than the cause. It is the acknowledgment, strengthening,

equipping and resourcing of Australia’s migrant and ethnic communities that will

assist with the kind of innovation and problem-solving needed to address some

of the most dicult social and political challenges. Following the coronavirus

pandemic, other crises – such as climate change, mass human displacement,

terrorism and extremism, global poverty, economic insecurity and violence

towards women and children – await urgent attention. Australia will need a

well-resourced and valued migrant population to contribute to solving some

of the serious problems that lie ahead. This will require strengthening our

commitment to the value of diversity within Australia’s core political institutions

as a rst step. The next step may require a rethink on migration policy more

generally. The global health crisis has exposed a possible fragility in migration

policy, as demonstrated by the sudden experiences and feelings of insecurity

within Australia’s comparatively large migrant and ethnic-minority population.

14 Juliet Pietsch, Race, Ethnicity and the Participation Gap: Understanding Australia’s

Political Complexion, University of Toronto Press, 2018.

Re-imagining Australia: Migration, culture, diversity | 63

Australian ethnic change and political inclusion

Juliet Pietsch is a Professor of Political Science at Grith University and Head of

the School of Government and International Relations. She has particular research

interests in Australian politics, migration and comparative politics.

Re-imagining Australia: Migration, culture, diversity | 65

An immigration economy that

lacks ethnic diversity in its

politics and government

Benjamin Reilly

Introduction

This short piece surveys three big challenges for migration,

democracy and diversity in Australia.

The rst challenge is our historically exceptionally

high rate of immigration, which for the past two years

has been increasing our population at a faster rate than

our national economic growth. Even though immigration

contributes to economic growth, it has now reached the

point that per capita income levels are, for the rst time in

a generation, declining.

A second major challenge is the dierential impact of migration on our

cities and regions. Migration in Australia is not evenly distributed, but is

accruing overwhelmingly in Sydney and Melbourne, while other cities, and

in particular regional areas, are missing out. Australia’s fastest-growing city,

Melbourne, received 120,000 additional residents in 2018 – 2,400 a week. Most

of this population growth (65 per cent) was due to net overseas migration and

concentrated in outer suburbs. In comparison, the rest of Victoria could attract

less than 20,000 people all year. This is causing great congestion, bottle-necks

and problems of basic servicing of outlying areas. Various government schemes

to try to address this problem – by incentivising migrants to settle in rural areas,

for instance – have had some success at the individual level but have done little

to shift the balance in terms of overall numbers.

A nal challenge is one for our political system, and our political parties and

parliaments in particular. These key institutions of democracy are no longer

themselves representative of the diversity of our society. The composition of our

66 | The University of Western Australia Public Policy Institute

Benjamin Reilly

immigration has changed dramatically – most now comes from the Indo-Pacic,

rather than Europe, as in the past. India and China have overtaken traditional

migration countries such as the United Kingdom and New Zealand as our top

source countries. But our politics has not kept pace, and recent research has found

that our parliaments in particular are highly unrepresentative of our diversity.

We fall well behind other comparable countries on most measures and in some

ways the problem is getting worse, not better.

Discussion

Immigration has been a great boon for Australia – indeed, it was successive

waves of post-war immigration that, more than any other factor, saved Australia

from global marginalisation, domestic parochialism and economic decline. Our

country has been immeasurably benetted by the new entrants from all parts

of the world. Australia’s population has doubled in size over the course of my

lifetime, and today almost half the population were either born overseas or are

the children of someone born overseas.

But with this change has come a new and troubling dependence. Australia’s

economy is now addicted to immigration. This has been very good for the size of

our economy and for those who can aord to live in well-serviced areas of major

cities. But for those who are pushed into the outer suburbs, which includes a

large proportion of immigrants themselves, things are much harder. Commuting

time, public transport and basic infrastructure for example, simply have not kept

pace with our immigration-fuelled growth.

There is also a deeper problem. Immigration has changed from a situation

where those outside Australia are lured here by a growing economy to one

where our growing economy is a result of that very migration itself. We are in

danger of turning immigration itself –- rather than innovation and productivity

improvements –- into a major driver of economic activity, with growth stemming

purely from the infusion of new people and the resulting demand for housing

and services.

Without new migrants from Asia each year, Australia’s economy would quickly

slide into recession. Indeed, on estimates of per capita GDP, Australia has been in

a per capita recession since 2019. The reason is not the composition of migration

but the rate. For the past decade, we have been increasing our population via

international migration at over 200,000 migrants per year. In recent years, that

gure has been higher, increasing our total population by almost one per cent

a year. As a result, since 1990, Australia’s population has increased by almost

Re-imagining Australia: Migration, culture, diversity | 67

An immigration economy that lacks ethnic diversity in its politics and government

50 per cent – an historic and unprecedented pace of growth even when compared

to other settler societies such as the US or Canada.

As The Australian’s Adam Creighton has argued,

“Politicians crow about the scarcity of our recessions – by convention,

two quarters of negative GDP growth – but the relentless inux of people

means it’s nigh on impossible to have one.

Consider that US net overseas migration was 595,000 last year; in Australia,

with less than 8 per cent America’s population, it was about 240,000. Indeed,

when adjusted for population, Australia has had recessions in 2000, 2006,

late 2008 and is almost certainty in the midst of one now.

GDP growth is being propped up by immigration-fuelled population

growth. When you account for population growth, the Australian economic

‘miracle’ quickly evaporates. In fact, on a per capita basis, Australia is one

of the worst performing economies in the developed world”.

Some analysts go further, arguing that immigration in Australia has the

characteristics of a Ponzi scheme, in which ever-increasing infusions of new

entrants are needed to stave o an inevitable collapse. Sydney University’s

Salvatore Babones, for instance, argues that Australia has become “the world’s

rst immigration economy”:

“As Australia’s population grows, the country needs exponentially more

and more immigrants in order to continue to reap the same economic

benets. As a result, Australia’s heavy reliance on immigration to oat the

economy and fund government budgets runs the risk of turning into a giant

immigration Ponzi scheme. So far, Australia has more or less been able to

stretch existing infrastructure to accommodate a much larger population.

But sooner or later, things will come to a head. When they do, Australia

may experience the world’s rst immigration economic crash.”

Universities are both the beneciaries of this shift and part of the problem. In

2019, the total number of international students in Australia hit an all-time high

1 Adam Creighton, GDP has never been an ideal measure of nation’s health, The Australian,

25 February 2020.

2 Salvatore Babones, The world’s rst immigration economy, Foreign Policy, October 2018.

68 | The University of Western Australia Public Policy Institute

Benjamin Reilly

of 613,000 – many of whom are attracted by the prospects of post-study work

visas. But despite all the rhetoric about skills and targeted occupation lists, many

students and indeed skilled visa holders nd their post-study careers mired in low-

skilled work. The Grattan Institute has found that of the one million temporary

visa holders in Australia – a huge number for a country of 25 million people -

almost 60 per cent of the 600,000 who are in work are in low-skill occupations.

A quarter of all workers with temporary skilled visas are in low-skilled

occupations. As well as being a poor investment for the students and temporary

workers themselves, this has created a large pool of workers competing for the

low-skilled entry-level jobs on which many of Australia’s young people and

those from disadvantaged backgrounds rely for the rst steps in employment.

This strains social cohesion and could also undermine popular support for

immigration more generally.

A nal challenge for democracy and diversity in Australia is our increasingly

unrepresentative politics. An ever more diverse Australian society is represented

politically by parliaments which look less and less like the population at large.

This is not just a case of needing to catch up with a changing society. Our

federal parliament, for example, is far less diverse in its ethnic composition than

comparable assemblies in Canada, New Zealand and the United Kingdom, despite

ours having on most measures a higher degree of societal diversity.

Consider some statistics. According to one survey, one in 10 MPs elected in

the recent British election are from black and minority ethnic backgrounds. At

the 2019 Canadian federal election, 15.1 per cent of MPs elected were what the

Canadians call ‘visible minorities’. In New Zealand, Maori seats are reserved

in Parliament, over six per cent of all MPs hail from the Polynesian region and

another six per cent from Asia. By contrast, only nine of 227 or four per cent

of Australian federal MPs have non-European heritage. Under-representation

extends to senior leadership levels. Not a single Australian federal minister is

from an Asian-Australian background. In stark contrast, upon becoming Prime

Minister, Boris Johnson said he would form a “cabinet for modern Britain”,

including four British Asians in senior positions. In Canada, six of the 37 members

of the Cabinet are Canadians of Asian heritage. Australia lags behind its peers

in every aspect of political representation of culturally diverse minorities.

Studies by Juliet Pietsch

have found that in comparative terms, Australia’s

3 Juliet Pietsch, Race, Ethnicity, and the Participation Gap: Understanding Australia’s

Political Complexion, University of Toronto Press, 2018. Juliet Pietsch, ‘Trends in Migrant

and Ethnic Minority Voting in Australia: Findings from the Australian Election Study’,

Ethnic and Racial Studies, 40(14), 2017, p. 2463–2480.

Re-imagining Australia: Migration, culture, diversity | 69

An immigration economy that lacks ethnic diversity in its politics and government

very low rates of immigrant and ethnic minority political representation are

particularly concentrated in the federal House of Representatives, where

governments are formed. This democratic decit suggests the existence of

persistent ethnic hierarchies within our formal political institutions – including

our political parties, who are responsible for recruiting and nominating candidates

– which is inconsistent with democratic ideals of representation and accountability

in pluralist societies.

The paradox here is that our major political parties, while struggling to put

forward diverse candidates, are extremely attentive to ethnic voters. Our major

parties have consistently sought to incorporate ethnic voters into their fold. The

research on migrant voting in Australia shows that the “ethnic vote” has almost

disappeared. Today, migrants come from an array of countries (with India and

China the fastest-growing source), but tend to vote in similar ways to the rest

of the population, following class cleavages rather than ethnic origins. In 2013,

India was Australia’s largest source country, making up 23 per cent of the total

migration program, with China second largest and Vietnam, Malaysia, the

Philippines, Sri Lanka, Korea and Singapore all in the top 10 for skilled migrants

in Australia. The disappearing ethnic vote at a time of increased migration from

abroad is the dog that did not bark of Australian politics.

Nonetheless, Australian politics does have a clear problem in terms of

ethnic representation in the leadership of our parties and particularly in our

parliaments. Osmond Chiu has written about this situation from the perspective

of a Chinese Australian. He argues Asian-Australians face a range of barriers to

political participation. In most seats, political parties do not see pre-selecting

Asian candidates as electorally advantageous, while Chinese-Australians face

additional hurdles due to the foreign interference debate. While parties have

courted Asian-Australian communities, these are primarily vehicles for nancial

donations with no role in party decision making. This means that engagement

is often ‘transactional’ and focuses on fundraising or numbers for support in

pre-selections rather than improving representation.

One positive consequence of this situation is that even as Australia’s parties

struggle to nominate diverse candidates, they remain broad-based in their

electoral strategies. I believe that we are lucky that Australian politics has

never featured ostensibly ethnic parties of the kind common in many diverse

democracies, including comparable countries such as the United Kingdom

4 Osmond Chiu, What should Australia do about ... its politics being too white?, China

Matters Explores, January/February 2020, http://chinamatters.org.au/policy-brief/policy-

brief-january-february-2020/.

70 | The University of Western Australia Public Policy Institute

Benjamin Reilly

(e.g. the Ulster Unionists and Sinn Féin), Canada (Parti Québécois) or New

Zealand (Māori Party). One reason for this is our political institutions: the

combination of compulsory voting, majoritarian elections, preferential balloting

and impartial redistricting has made elections a contest for the political centre,

and protected the positions of the major parties of government.

This has made

it dicult for ethnically-based movements to emerge – including in the Senate,

which oers much lower barriers to entry. Although some might argue that

populist insurgent parties such as One Nation are an example of a ‘white right’

ethnic party themselves.

Policy recommendations

The federal and state parliaments should publish data on the cultural

diversity of its parliamentarians.

Political parties should foster internal diversity in party membership, party

executives and candidate pre-selection processes.

» Political parties should adopt targets, e.g. 20 per cent of culturally diverse

candidates for winnable seats.

» GDP per capita should be used as a relevant indicator and migration rates

adjusted when it turns negative.

» Skilled migration visas should not be available for unskilled labour.

Benjamin Reilly is Professor of Political Science and International Relations

in the School of Social Sciences at The University of Western Australia and a

Fellow of the UWA Public Policy Institute. His work focuses on democratisation

and electoral reform in ethnically divided societies.

5 Benjamin Reilly, Democracy in Divided Societies: Electoral Engineering for Conict

Management, CUP, 2001; idem, ‘Centripetalism and Electoral Moderation in Established

Democracies’, Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, 24(2), 2018, p. 201–221.

Re-imagining Australia: Migration, culture, diversity | 71

Is Australia at ease with itself?

Shamit Saggar

Commentators, who are used to comparing countries,

particularly across the rich, developed world, take Australia

in their stride. Its economy, schooling, healthcare,

infrastructure and social values are regularly put up against

those of Western Europe and North America, allowing

intelligent comparisons to be drawn. Like is compared

with like.

But when it comes to the ethnic composition of its

population these comparisons are distorted by history. The unspoken twist is

that, until two generations ago, Australia practised a policy of racial exclusion.

The nation-builders of federation sought to place a tight straitjacket on the ethnic

complexion and character of future Australians, reecting the values of the early

post-Victorian age. This policy persisted into the 1970s and meant that Australia

remained, for a very long time, in Asia but certainly not of Asia.

In 2020 it is possible to see the results of this social experiment. Very few

older Australians beyond their fties are of non-European descent, and this

demographic feature is now hard-baked into politics and policy debates. There

is a danger that political and business leaders, seeing little ethnic heterogeneity

in their ranks, absent-mindedly miss the very real changes that have taken place

in a country much browner than when they grew up.

The over-fty white Australians have also grown up as the rst generation that

has had to share legal rights and citizenship with Indigenous Australians. They

have done so starting from a low base but progress has been glacial.

Dierences and distinctions

In policymaking terms, these changes also aect how smart, evidence-based

policies are formulated to meet changing circumstances. For example, each

new slew of proposals concerning health and social care, taxation on higher

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Shamit Saggar

earnings and property ownership is perceived very dierently by white Australians

than their ethnic-minority counterparts. This is chiey because the former are

structurally older, better o and homeowners, so they are more reliant on (and

exposed to changes in) these services and policies.

Equally, younger Australians are considerably more likely to be of Asian (and

increasingly of African, Middle Eastern and Pacic Islander) heritage, and are

disproportionately impacted by policy proposals in tertiary education, access

to the housing market and international visa regimes that give them access to

overseas labour markets and public benets. These are the parts of public life

in which they participate in larger numbers. Besides generational dierences,

Australia’s Asian groups are concentrated in urban areas and mostly untouched

by social care needs, so policies to expand infrastructure and services in those

areas will have similar uneven impacts.

Much the same happens in other ethnically plural, developed societies. For

example, as the UK began a dramatic shift to a mass higher-education system 25

years ago, it was possible to predict that a very large slice of the new participants

would hail from its young ethnic minority groups, the parents and grandparents

of whom had settled there a couple of decades previously.

In other words, a subtle yet signicant ethnic twist is contained in each of

these policy areas and therefore in the formulation of future public policies. The

question is how much emphasis should be given to these dierential exposures

and impacts, regardless of how important we think that ethnic dierences are

in themselves.

By not taking these demographic facts into account it is easy to imagine a

major lacuna in policymaking. In the early phase of the COVID-19 public health

crisis, the Commonwealth government sought to support employment through a

wage subsidy program, but specically excluded temporary skilled visa holders,

substantial proportions of whom are from Asia and India in particular. The

uneven eects of the policy are not hard to see.

Dealing with the past

Modern Australia is a tale of its racial history benignly distorting the present.

Meanwhile demographic destiny is not only about the past, in which White

Australia was the only Australia. Indigenous Australia remained outside the realm

of ocial recognition until the 1960s, and national reconciliation continues to

elude government to this day. It is wise to remember that for much of the post-

war period, Australia’s leaders anguished over the need to populate or perish,

heralding the large migration of white Europeans to the young, hopeful country.

Re-imagining Australia: Migration, culture, diversity | 73

Is Australia at ease with itself?

But it remained a white past and a white future. Demographically, the country

had changed, but its major institutions, including politics, higher education,

media, the arts and the public service, failed to reect this.

That hangover can aect many parts of Australia, not least the majority

white group’s sense of their attachment to national cultural norms, symbols

and practices; it also fuels fears among some that these are being watered down

or too rapidly eroded in favour of newer, more inclusive national baggage. Tim

Wilson, MP (Liberal), stepping into a political row over religious freedom in 2016,

argued that there was “a cultural concern about whether we’re preserving the best

type of society we’ve been in the past...based on Western traditions of freedom

of religion, freedom of speech and liberal democracy”.

Indigenous people and

early Chinese migrants would have been excluded from his sense of a mythical

white past. That past contains many other tensions. For example, most country

towns in the 1940s and 1950s were divided between Catholics and Protestants,

who were rarely allowed to associate with one another. Intermarriage caused all

sorts of problems for families who had not been allowed to speak to each other.

In that sense Australia’s advocates of maintaining faith in institutions steeped

in the past are connected to similar disputes across Europe and North America.

A large slice of President Trump’s appeal in 2016 rested on reversing the erosion

of a white settler past. Dealing with the past in all of these places has been

controversial, ranging from statues of Cecil Rhodes in Oxford through to calls for

state reparations for historic crimes such as the slave trade. Cultural and ethnic

polarisation is both a symptom and a cause in these disputes.

Ethnic penalties

The past can also be overlaid with exclusion and resistance. If success was

correlated with whiteness, a lack of success should not be so hard to explain.

It is frankly embarrassing that in modern-day Australia almost all senior

roles in government or business are held by middle-aged white men – a point

also made by Paul Maginn in his essay ‘In what sense a multicultural society?

Planning for/with multiculturalism’ in this volume. One (sympathetic) spin

on this is that they have grown older and more successful because their cohort

was hard-wired to be ethnically homogeneous, and they grew to trust and work

collaboratively with those ‘just like us’. For them, it is hard to notice that which

is ubiquitous. Another interpretation is that they have never had to compete

1 Kathy Marks, The racial discrimination law dividing Australia, BBC News, 6 December

2016, bbc.com/news/world-australia-38205024.

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Shamit Saggar

with a wider pool, and continue to behave rationally to restrict competition in

order to maintain their privilege. As a group, they were never required to learn

to trust and work alongside others who ‘are not like us’. Many mediocre, white

men have been excused from competing as a result.

Juliet Pietsch’s recent study on Australian federal politics

drives home this

point and complements my own recent work on top jobs and professions in the

UK.

Both signal that these gross disparities in the complexion of those at the

top matter, and for two reasons. One is that manifest unfairness in opportunity

structures. This should be tackled as a priority so that better outcomes are

secured for those who are held back. The other reason is, if anything, more

important. It is about the reputational stain aicting those organisations that

are slow to reform, and the danger of second-generation migrants beginning to

buy into grievance politics because they sense they are being overlooked. Their

patience is stretched if we expect them to stand politely behind those they can

comfortably outperform.

Setting the pace of change

How fast should governments go to address these issues? Conventionally,

academic experts and commentators have erred towards caution. They held that

the majority white electorate was easily antagonised by policies and gestures

that favoured ethnic minorities in areas such as education, jobs and housing.

Any political party perceived as minority-friendly, whatever its intentions,

would be punished by the median white voter who had weaned on a formula

of soft hostility to newcomers. This outlook has dominated Australian politics

and underscores Sam Roggeveen’s recent warning about the potential for black

and brown immigration to polarise Australian public opinion and poison the

country’s politics.

Other countries, by contrast, have gone faster and further, even though many

of the same electoral fears have existed. In this volume, Ben Reilly notes that

a tenth of the UK national parliament comprises visible minorities, and Boris

2 Juliet Pietsch, Race, Ethnicity, and the Participation Gap – Understanding Australia’s

Political Complexion, University of Toronto Press, 2018.

3 Shamit Saggar et. al., Bittersweet Success? Glass Ceilings for Britain’s Ethnic Minorities at

the Top of Business and the Professions, Policy Exchange, 2016.

4 Sarah Cameron and Ian McAllister, Trends in Australian Political Opinion: Results from

the Australian Election Study, School of Politics and International Relations, ANU, 2019,

p.125.

5 Sam Roggeveen, Our Very Own Brexit: Australia’s Hollow Politics and Where It Could Lead

Us, Penguin, 2019.

Re-imagining Australia: Migration, culture, diversity | 75

Is Australia at ease with itself?

Johnson’s still-newish Cabinet includes several big hitters of South Asian heritage.

The substantial over-representation of South and East Asian gures at the top of

US tech and social media giants has not gone unnoticed. Australia’s best-known

example – Shemara Wikramanayake, presiding over Macquarie Bank – appears

to be an exception to prove a rule. It may seem tough at the top in Australia but,

by any accounts, fresh and overdue competition from ethnic minorities will be

make it considerably tougher.

The transformation has ebbed and owed, fuelled by two factors. First,

the demographic wave in Australia has been smaller and began moving later,

compared to the UK and North America. There, very large concentrations of non-

white ethnic minorities are now well or highly educated, hold good jobs, seek out

prestigious education for themselves and their ospring, and have aspirations

that are not lightly deected. Their path to integration is set and accelerating

and, while they may be held back by unfair and unaccountable practices, their

drive has been enough to get to their destination.

Secondly, Australia still lacks reliable data on its ethnic composition, itself

a prerequisite for an informed view about whether, or how far, people’s ethnic

and cultural background aects their material opportunities. Through complex

analysis of labour market data, the performance of white majorities and visible

minorities in acquiring, holding onto and progressing in employment can be

measured, taking account of the facts about their skills, qualications, experience

and other pertinent factors that are unevenly distributed across groups.

In Australia, we know with clarity that being of an Indigenous background

– all else considered – remains a signicant disadvantage in employment. Some

other ethnic minority groups (primarily but not limited to those of African

heritage) limp along the bottom of the jobs market, earning much less than

similarly qualied white Australians. Other groups such as Indians (through

the international student pathway to Australian residency and citizenship) are

succeeding in accessing employment. That is the good news. The bad news is

that many are now working in occupations that provide a poor return to their

investment in their education. The worry is that, while holding postgraduate

degrees, Australia’s Indian Uber drivers grow resentful of an outcome they had

not imagined.

The case for reliable data is not predicated on demonstrating ethnic

disadvantage. It is not denitive evidence of discrimination at work but instead a

6 Damien Cave, Get to Know Your Overqualied Uber or Ola Driver, The New York

Times, 22 March 2018, nytimes.com/2018/03/22/world/australia/uber-ola-immigration-

multiculturalism-letter50.html.

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Shamit Saggar

very heavy hint that the ambitions of whole groups are being thwarted. Evidence

from mystery shopping using CV tests is much better at making this case.

That points to a further danger: that Australia’s reputation for fairness will

become eroded in the eyes of its future generations. Young, educated, urban,

white Australians may also object to discriminatory practices going unchecked

and call for tougher actions by government. Dr Imran Lum, a young banking

executive at NAB, makes the pointed observation that there are not many people

who look like him at the snowy white peaks of his industry and others like it.

Immigration’s pace

These are not minor risks for Australia to be at ease with itself. They are heightened

by Australia’s very high net migration rate, which hovers at around a quarter

million each year – a staggeringly large gure, comparatively speaking, given

the country’s population base. Setting aside debates about the economic aspects

of current inward migration, it is clear that Australia is becoming browner and

especially more East and South Asian in its major metropolitan areas.

The politics of immigration are not so straightforward. For one thing, following

the Tampa refugee crisis in 2001, national party competition has revolved around

an unwritten rule that tough border controls should be upheld and seen to be

upheld. Any hints of irregular migrant ows into the country quickly dominate

and paralyse the debate. Secondly, Australia is situated close to populous countries

with potential instabilities. Not so long ago, Indonesia was viewed in sceptical

terms by immigration hawks, and today its democratic and economic successes

have calmed many of these concerns. This may not be for long if Indonesia and

other South East Asian countries struggle to deal with the COVID-19 public

health crisis.

Finally, fresh, non-European migration into Australia is a regular reminder

that the ethno-cultural fabric of the country is changing at a rapid pace, and

this gives rise to rst-order questions about common values. For instance, in the

decade ending 2016, Australians in the General Census who self-identied as

Muslims rose from 340,000 to 604,000, Buddhists from 419,000 to 564,000 and

Hindus from 148,000 to 440,000.

This level of diversity of faith is uncharted

territory for Australia.

7 Speaking at the Western Australia-ASEAN Trade and Investment Dialogue (Perth, 15

November 2019).

8 Andrew Markus, Mapping Social Cohesion 2019, The Scanlon Foundation Surveys, Scanlon

Foundation Research Institute, 2019.

Re-imagining Australia: Migration, culture, diversity | 77

Is Australia at ease with itself?

Multiculturalism’s future

How far can the values and preferences of Australia’s non-European groups

be fused together with pre-existing ideas about what Australia is and what it

means to be Australian? The multicultural framework has created more than

an agenda for this to happen, although in practice the national debate has been

highly reactive and event-driven.

One useful metric is the Scanlon-Monash Index of Social Cohesion, an

element of which examines levels of backing for governments who support

ethnic minorities to maintain their customs and traditions. By 2019, two-fths

of Australians endorsed this principle. Meanwhile, just 14 per cent fully signed

up to the claim that “accepting immigrants from many dierent countries makes

Australia stronger”, although to put this in some context the true disbelievers (who

strongly or very strongly rejected this claim) stood at 28 per cent. Overall, those

who agreed (with dierent levels of intensity) amount to seven in 10 respondents.

Perhaps the biggest challenge lies in clarifying how multiculturalism is

understood by Australians today. Most of the debate is centred on a broad-based

celebration that the country’s rich and quite recent ethnic diversity has come

about without great political rancour. The opposition of One Nation supporters

and identiers has mostly surged and peaked, with its appeal limited (and, over

time, diminishing) to the misgivings of older, less educated voters. The other

concentration lies among rural and regional voters, for example in regional areas

of North Queensland, and Ipswich on the outskirts of Brisbane (typically big

mining and working-class towns that have been more exposed to global shocks

than elsewhere in Australia).

The fulcrum of this celebratory account is in the sense of the absence of overt

conict – i.e. that European-style discord has been largely avoided in Australia.

Harmony has prevailed, therefore. Few minorities have taken to hard-line

oppositional politics, let alone pursued violence in support of their viewpoint.

This outlook can mask complacency, however, since harmonious relations are

likely to be papering over frustrations about the extent of equal opportunities

and fair chances in education, employment and housing. The true extent of

Australia’s ‘Fair-Go’ mantra will depend not so much on the transmission of

older values and symbols to newer ethnic minority Australians, but more on

their experiences and perceptions of level playing elds.

The immigrant dream is often cited, containing the idea that the hardships

and setbacks of the rst generation are warranted on the implicit understanding

that tomorrow will be a brighter (and fairer) day for their ospring. It is a simple

and credible test of Australian national inclusion and of a society at ease with

78 | The University of Western Australia Public Policy Institute

Shamit Saggar

itself, with great application to the country’s future success. ‘Making it’, for Asian,

African Middle Eastern and Pacic Islander Australians, rests on translating that

ideal into lived experience.

Shamit Saggar CBE FAcSS is Director of the UWA Public Policy Institute, Visiting

Professor at the Policy Institute, King’s College London and Emeritus Professor of

Political Science at the University of Essex. He has research interests in migration,

public policy, political participation, regulation and radicalisation.

Re-imagining Australia: Migration, culture, diversity | 79

Australia’s Muslim story:

Future opportunities

Samina Yasmeen

Australia’s Muslim story is not new. Traditional links between

indigenous communities in the north and Muslims from

the Makassar region left cultural imprints long before the

Europeans arrived. British control of the continent, and

later the formation of the Commonwealth of Australia,

turned it into a migration story. Cameleers arrived from

British India, including a large contingent of Muslims, who

made their mark across the continent by constructing

mosques and practising their religion. After the First World War, migrants from

Turkey and Albania added to Muslim numbers, followed by the arrival of

Lebanese Muslims in the 1970s. But it was only after the end of the Cold War

and the resulting instability that the number and cultural diversity of

Muslims increased.

According to the 2016 Census of Population and Housing, 604,240 Muslims

constituted 2.6 per cent of the total population in 2016. Of these, nearly two-

thirds (62 per cent) were born overseas and 93 per cent lived in urban areas across

the country. The median age for this population was 27 years – one of the two

youngest religious communities in the country.

Estimates suggest that Muslims

are likely to account for 4.9 per cent of the total Australian population by 2050,

ranking as the second-largest religion in the country after Christianity.

Ensuring

their inclusion in social, economic and political spheres marked by substantive

equality will be necessary in a multicultural Australia.

1 The other group includes those holding Aboriginal traditional beliefs. Australian Bureau

of Statistics, Census reveals Australia’s religious diversity on World Religion Day, Media

Release, 18 January 2018.

2 Pew Research Centre, The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2010-

2050, 2 April 2015, p. 234.

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Samina Yasmeen

The growing negative perception of the wider community towards Muslims

(and Islam) presents a major challenge on the path towards ensuring both broader

and deeper inclusion of Muslims in Australia. While Muslims were historically

‘othered’ as part of the Asian immigrants, the tendency to essentialise Islam as

inherently antithetical to Australian core values, and Muslims as harbouring aims

that threaten Australian security, has gained strength in the post-9/11 decades.

That some Muslims have engaged in anti-state terrorist planning and activities,

and also joined the so-called Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, could explain this

negativity. But it does not take into account that only a tiny minority among the

Muslim minority communities of Australia have participated in the militant space.

Instead, in line with the expression popularised by the Runnymede Trust (UK)

in the 1990s, “‘closed’ views of Islam and Muslims have come to dominate the

language of ‘othering’ Muslims. Islam is perceived and portrayed as a monolithic

religion marked by irrational, primitive, sexist and violent values”.

Muslims

are seen as committed to introducing Sharia law in Australia, which would run

counter to the core Australian values. Some alarmist concerns are also based

on the faulty assumption that Muslim women’s birth rate far exceeds that of

the mainstream Australian females (4.5 children per couple as opposed to 1.5

children per couple for the national average). This trajectory is seen as shifting

the demographic balance in a couple of generations, with a Muslim majority in

Australia that may vote in Sharia law.

Islamophobic views have contributed to prejudicial portrayals of Muslims in

the media as much as everyday conversations. Muslim women who subscribe to

traditional Islamic dress code have borne the brunt of such prejudices: they are

harassed, often publicly criticised and sometimes physically threatened. The

frequency of such violence increases in times of crisis, such as the Sydney siege

(2014), when Muslim women were afraid of travelling alone.

Public attitudes also limit Australian Muslims’ access to employment. Research

ndings indicate that unemployment/non-participation rates among working-

age Muslims are 43 per cent, compared to the national average of 24 per cent.

To some extent this imbalance may reect a current cultural preference among

Muslim women to forsake employment in favour of bringing up children at

3 The Runnymede Trust, Islamophobia: A Challenge for Us All, Report of the Runnymede

Trust Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia, 1997, p. 3.

4 Liz Allen and Nick Parr, Factcheck Q&A: the facts on birth rates for Muslim couples

and non-Muslim couples in Australia, The Conversation, 24 July 2017, theconversation.

com/factcheck-qanda-the-facts-on-birth-rates-for-muslim-couples-and-non-muslim-

couples-in-australia-81183.

Re-imagining Australia: Migration, culture, diversity | 81

Australia’s Muslim story: Future opportunities

home – a preference not grounded in religious beliefs. But even then, the fact

remains that the Muslim male employment rate is the lowest, at 70 per cent

as opposed to the national average of 81 per cent.

This is despite the fact that

educational qualications of both Muslim men and women either equal or are

better than the national average.

The relative lack of access to the labour market impacts on family dynamics,

including domestic violence. Though denitive research ndings on the

prevalence of domestic violence directed at women is not available, groups

focusing on Muslim women’s rights in Australia place it at par with the national

rate of incidence. Anecdotal evidence suggests that it is closely linked to the

assumption that male members are to be the breadwinners in a family. Hence,

if Muslim men are unemployed or employed at a level that is not commensurate

with their qualications, they feel a loss of power and status within the family

sphere. The sense of powerlessness contributes to them adopting restrictive or

violent attitudes towards women, and other members of the family. Some of these

men erroneously justify such violence in terms of religious teaching, which, in

their view, accords men a higher status in the family.

The lower socio-economic status of Muslims in Australia, coupled with

the growing Islamophobia, also has inter-generational implications. Other

than restricting the possibilities of the next generations of Muslims for

upward social and economic mobility, negative perceptions also aect Muslim

children. A collaborative research project on children and Islamophobia being

conducted by researchers from Charles Sturt University, Western Sydney

University and the Centre for Muslim States and Societies at UWA indicates some

Muslim children are indirectly and directly facing the eects of Islamophobia.

Focus-group discussions with young Muslims at university level have also

revealed concerns among the youth that they are mistrusted by their fellow

students and wrongly assumed to be supporting jihadi violence. Given that,

according to the 2016 Census, 37 per cent of the Australian Muslim population is

below 19 years of age, it is possible that a proportion of the Muslim youth could

be growing up feeling perceptually, economically and socially excluded from

the mainstream Australian community. This could even impact on Australia’s

5 Sushi Das, Fact Check: Are more than half of Australia’s working-age Muslims not in

the workforce?, ABC News, 6 September 2018, abc.net.au/news/2018-06-04/fact-check-

muslim-workforce/9800656.

6 Riaz Hassan, Australian Muslims: A Demographic Prole of Muslims in Australia,

International Centre for Muslim and Non-Muslim Understanding, University of South

Australia, 2015.

82 | The University of Western Australia Public Policy Institute

Samina Yasmeen

reputation – particularly in the Indian Ocean region – as a country hostile to

its Muslim population.

Developing appropriate policies to address both the current and future

impediments to promoting Muslim substantive inclusion is entangled with an

associated challenge: who to engage from within the Muslim community to deal

with the situation? Historically, Muslim men have dominated the structures and

associations established to communicate Muslim issues, voices and suggestions.

The rapid growth in the number and ethno-national origins of Muslim immigrants

has altered the situation to some extent in the post-9/11 era. Muslim women

across all ages are also exhibiting activism to counter both misperceptions and

negativity towards Islam and Muslims.

But the extent to which these new voices and agents are actively engaged by

state and federal government is determined by the tendency prevalent even among

governmental institutions to essentialise Islam and Muslims. The tendency to

treat Muslims as a monolithic community – severely distorting in the face of

ethnic and sectarian diversity characteristic of the Muslim communities – and

the privileging of orthopraxy as the site where partners could be found, has

often resulted in state and federal governments missing out on the full array of

possible partners from among Muslims.

A tendency persists of engaging imams and other Muslims who subscribe to

more traditional interpretations of Islamic teachings as a pathway to promoting

more substantive inclusion of the Muslim community. Such approaches fail to

appreciate the diversity of views and approaches within the Australian Muslim

community: in line with the global trends, transnationalism has contributed to

the emergence of progressive, conservative and Su networks among Australian

Muslims. This multiplicity, coupled with the arrival of a generation of professional

Muslims including doctors, engineers and IT specialists in the new millennium,

has meant that not all Muslims privilege orthopraxy. Nor do they all view imams

and mosques as the source of guidance and engagement. This diversity is also

present among Australian-born Muslims, who comprise 36.3 per cent of the total

Australian Muslim population.

Devising strategies to promote Muslim inclusion through appropriate agents

of change, therefore, requires nuanced approaches. The project must take into

account the eect of responses to the COVID-19 pandemic. As the rates of

unemployment increase in the wake of the coronavirus, Muslim communities will

7 The Christchurch attacks by an Australian citizen in March 2019 have already been used

by some Muslims in the region as evidence of ‘rampant Islamophobia’ in Australia.

Re-imagining Australia: Migration, culture, diversity | 83

Australia’s Muslim story: Future opportunities

also be aected. It is too early to estimate the true extent of this impact, but it is not

inconceivable that the downward economic trend and increased unemployment

rates would further worsen the situation for Muslim families. The problem is likely

to be compounded by continuing, if not increasing, Islamophobia. The fear and

stigmatisation of the ‘others’ has already commenced, with Chinese and Asian

communities being blamed for the virus, but it is conceivable that this negativity

would extend to and encompass all those who are visibly dierent, including

Muslims. Under these circumstances, both federal and state governments need

to focus on altering the perceptual blockage – or Islamophobia – in society as a

pathway to dealing with equitable access to employment and preventing inter-

generational negative impacts on Muslim communities.

Public statements by leaders at state and federal levels occupy a signicant

place in addressing Islamophobic ideas. The existence of jihadi narratives and

associated militant acts within Australia and overseas sometimes prompts

Australian political leaders to seek ‘reformation’ of Islam, or suggestions that

the Muslim community needs to be more ‘proactive’ in tackling terrorism. Such

reactions reect the prevalent tendency of essentialising Muslim identities that

are not restricted to Australia, but they rearm negative views among some in the

mainstream community while simultaneously conveying to Muslims that they are

being viewed suspiciously, despite not condoning violent interpretations of Islam.

This, in turn, undermines prospects of countering Islamophobia and promoting

Muslim inclusion in the society. The project of promoting Muslim inclusion,

therefore, necessitates that government leaders avoid such generalisations when

addressing acts of militancy.

Declared statements that do not essentialise Muslim identities, however, need

to be supplemented with creating spaces in which Muslims across all ages can

collaborate in projects with members of the wider community as citizens. It is

mainly through the active and collaborative interaction between Muslims and

members of the wider community to address issues being faced in their localities

that a shared sense of citizenship and belonging can be fostered. For example,

this would be promoted through fresh state government funding for schools

that bring students from diverse backgrounds to identify and operationalise

projects that could serve their communities. This could be designed along the

model developed by APEX Australia – which has operated in Australia since

1931 and has been engaged in ‘transforming communities at grass roots level’

and raising funds for numerous charities – but it would need to be structured

for school-age children. Similarly, specic allocations could be made in funding

for community engagement projects managed by the Federal Government that

84 | The University of Western Australia Public Policy Institute

Samina Yasmeen

engage Muslim men and women in distinct spaces to collaborate and work with

others in the wider community.

The success of this approach is closely intertwined with selecting appropriate

leaders-cum-inuencers from within the Muslim community. As previously

mentioned, privileging religious leaders and orthopraxy would limit the nature

of Muslim engagement. While continuing to engage children enrolled in Islamic

schools or areas with Muslim majority population, for example, it would be as

much use – or even more useful – to engage Muslim children enrolled in state

schools as well as Muslim professionals (both male and female) as leaders.

Expectations matter, and it is important to recognise that instantaneous

solutions to the emerging Islamophobia are not possible. But creating spaces

for collaboration across dierent members of our communities would provide

a long-lasting and more resilient pathway to dealing with misperceptions about

Muslims in the wider community, and vice versa.

Samina Yasmeen AM is Professor at the School of Social Sciences and Director of

the Centre for Muslim States and Societies at The University of Western Australia,

and Fellow of the UWA Public Policy Institute. She has conducted qualitative

research on Muslim identities in Australia and published papers and reports on

Islamophobia, Muslim inclusion and exclusion, and Muslim women as citizens

in Australia.

Re-imagining Australia: Migration, culture, diversity | 85

Can business support

multicultural inclusion?

Edward Zhang

Multiculturalism and multicultural inclusion

In the introduction of the WA Charter of Multiculturalism

formulated in 2004, Geo Gallop states, “Today, Western

Australia is a multi-ethnic, multi-religious and multicultural

society, whose members are drawn from a rich heritage of

cultural traditions and histories. Such cultural diversity

brings with it many and varied benets, not least of which

is a creative, sustainable and successful economy that can

meet the challenges of the 21st century. The diversity also

brings with it many challenges that we as a society must collectively address.”

The Cultural and Linguistic Diversity in Western Australia 2016 Census shows

that 28.5 per cent of Australians were born overseas. People of Western Australia

have their origins in more than two hundred countries and regions, and speak

more than 270 languages.

In the contemporary political context, multiculturalism has opened a new

perspective to cope with the challenges that accompany Australia’s ever-growing

cultural, linguistic and religious diversity. Only through the better inclusion of

culturally and linguistically diverse (CaLD) groups can the many challenges be

appropriately addressed.

Multiculturalism has enriched and vitalised the Australian society

since its beginnings in the 1970s. Businesses have played an important

role in its shaping and evolution, and in supporting multicultural

inclusion. Multiculturalism as enunciated by the Charter enables all Western

Australians, irrespective of their dierences on the basis of culture, religion,

1 Government of Western Australia, Oce of Multicultural Interests, WA Charter of

Multiculturalism, Government of Western Australia, November 2004.

86 | The University of Western Australia Public Policy Institute

Edward Zhang

history and other variables, to have the opportunity to participate equally in the

political, social and economic life of this society.

As Inclusion WA puts it, “Inclusion is acceptance of all people regardless

of their dierences. It is about appreciating people for who they are. Inclusion

allows people to value dierences in each other by recognising that each person

has an important contribution to make to society.”

Multicultural inclusion provides CaLD groups and individuals with the

opportunity to nd a valued role and to cultivate a sense of belonging in Australian

society. Members of multicultural communities thus require equal opportunities

to be involved in social, cultural, political and economic activities, and can achieve

their goals and aspirations through participation in those activities.

Multicultural inclusion is by no means a synonym for ‘a melting pot’, as used

in the United States in its early migration history. In that context, a melting pot

is a society in which members of minority groups are expected to assimilate into

the dominant culture, in contrast to one in which members of minority groups

can maintain their distinct collective identities and practices.

Businesses can support multicultural inclusion in many ways internally

and externally.

Internally, they can support their CaLD employees by giving them the

opportunity to maintain their respective languages and cultures while using

English as their main language of communication. Multicultural inclusion

in a business means that such employees have the opportunity to participate

in a welcoming environment, and that the role such employees play is valued

by the business.

Externally, businesses provide opportunities for groups and individuals

to participate in activities, campaigns, sports and recreational events that

celebrate and help maintain dierent cultural practices, and that are organised

by governments, mainstream communities and other CaLD organisations.

At the same time, businesses themselves, which may have dierent cultural

backgrounds, also need to be included in the Australian economy and society.

However, ethnic minority businesses, for example those owned by Chinese and

Vietnamese migrants, are often more concentrated in certain sectors including

real estate, groceries, international trade, and so forth, though some of their

business activities may not be conned to their respective communities. The

barriers they face when trying to enter other business areas may vary, from lack

of support to discrimination.

2 inclusionwa.org.au/about-us

Re-imagining Australia: Migration, culture, diversity | 87

Can business support multicultural inclusion?

The larger issue has to do with why such businesses owned or run by ethnic

minorities succeed to begin with. While some undoubtedly exist and thrive to

support real demands within those communities (e.g. grocery provision, fashion

and apparel, specialised travel services), many of these businesses serve to provide

some employment for those who have been rebued in mainstream job markets.

Individuals who are discouraged by discrimination and scarce opportunities may

nd it rational and attractive to set up on their own. Only some of them will

serve their own communities as their primary markets, whereas many others

will branch out to innovate and serve demand across society as a whole. It is the

latter who have the greatest chance of aecting dynamic change to reshape the

wider business environment.

Need of business support for multicultural inclusion

Encouraging multicultural inclusion requires eective policies and support

from government, and – equally important – assistance and action from the

business sector.

Increasing multicultural inclusion not only benets CaLD communities, which

are generally relatively low socio-economic communities and low participation

groups, but the Australian society as a whole.

Multicultural inclusion is not just about including people of dierent

backgrounds in the public life, but also about sharing cultural heritages, so all

Australians can learn from each other, appreciate the beauty of dierent cultures

and languages, and present a unique and brand-new Australian image.

One of the principles of the WA Charter of Multiculturalism is to

encourage the full and equitable participation in society by individuals and

communities, irrespective of origins, culture, religion, ethnicity and nationality,

and encourage a sense of identity and belonging as Australian citizens within

a multicultural society.

With the increase of migrants, the backgrounds and prole of the Australian

workforce have inevitably changed, with more and more CaLD people being

trained and employed. To include them in all walks of life has become a key

factor in building a harmonious society in Australia.

According to the WA Department of Local Government, Sports and Cultural

Industries, only half of Western Australians who were born in non-English

speaking countries participate in an organised physical activity, that is, have

memberships at local and state sporting clubs.

3 dlgsc.wa.gov.au/sport-and-recreation/participation/community-inclusion

88 | The University of Western Australia Public Policy Institute

Edward Zhang

To encourage the other half to be included, businesses have lots to contribute

and to oer, for example, providing nancial and organisational assistance.

Case study: WA Chinese community

It is not only long-established, large enterprises (such as mining companies)

that can meaningfully support multicultural inclusion. In a sense, businesses

set up by multicultural communities can contribute even more in this regard.

In the last thirty years, with a mining boom and the resulting economic growth,

Western Australia has attracted more and more new migrants, who, being the

rst generation of migrants, rarely have family or other support networks and

resources. This is where support from business proves to be crucial. Among new

migrant communities, the WA Chinese community, with 103,683 people, i.e., 4.2

per cent of WA’s total resident population in 2016, is the fastest-growing ethnic

minority community.

Businesses in the Chinese community collaborate with arts and sports groups

and associations to identify opportunities of participation, from single projects

to building long-term relationships with organisers and organisations. They

provide nancial support and organisational capacity so certain individuals or

groups can aord to take part in events and activities that incur costs, fees or

other expenses.

Since the Labor government formulated the WA Charter of Multiculturalism

and started the inception of the Oce of Multicultural Interests (OMI),

businesses operated by members of the Chinese community have contributed

tremendously to the formation and development of the multicultural society

of Western Australia.

In the 190 years since the rst Chinese man (called Man Chow) arrived in WA,

businesses owned by migrants with Chinese heritage have emerged, from carpentry,

gardening and restaurants in the early days to education, tourism, publishing,

real-estate development, importing and exporting, religious and cultural products

and practices, in the last thirty-odd years. The Chinese community – consisting

of people of Chinese heritage from China, Malaysia, Singapore, Vietnam and

other countries – has brought culture that has enriched the multicultural fabric of

Australia. Lion dancing, dragon dancing, Chinese painting, calligraphy, Chinese,

Malaysian and other Asian cuisines and ingredients,, commodities and articles

have since entered the local market.

4 Government of Western Australia, Oce of Multicultural Interests, Western Australia

Multicultural Policy Framework, Government of Western Australia, February 2020, p. 6.

Re-imagining Australia: Migration, culture, diversity | 89

Can business support multicultural inclusion?

As a result, the Chinese community sees more successful entrepreneurs,

business owners and individuals emerging – mostly new migrants in the last

three decades – who actively support multicultural inclusion.

Three businesses owned by Chinese migrants are reective of this. Australian

Education and Migration Services Pty Ltd, established in 1999, with customers

in more than 32 countries, has developed close business relationships with

government agencies, local businesses, universities, colleges and schools in

WA and nationwide to promote Australian education and other business and

investment opportunities to overseas customers. In 2018, the company initiated

the Alpha Innovation Contest, which attracted contestants from dierent cultural

backgrounds and with a panel consisting of multi-national professionals. Its

purpose is to promote Australian technologies, innovations and start-ups, as well

as funding opportunities, commercialisation and markets through international

links and partners.

Australian Natural Biotechnology Pty Ltd was established in 2009. Besides

selling and exporting Australian health products, the company is now focusing on

beekeeping and honey production. They have imported high-quality beekeeping

equipment and facilities for local beekeepers, whose costs are greatly reduced as

a result. The company has been trying to include people of dierent backgrounds

in the beekeeping and honey-producing industry, for example the Noongar

people, to whom they have donated beehive boxes and provided beekeeping skills.

Sunlong Fresh Foods, established in the early 1990s, has employees from

around twenty countries and regions, including China, Cambodia, Vietnam,

India, Iraq, Japan, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore, Greece, United Kingdom

and Italy. Sunlong has nancially supported the dragon boat team of Chung

Wah Association, the rst Chinese association in WA, incorporated 100 years

ago. Chung Wah staged the rst Chung Wah Cup Dragon Boat Competition

on 12 June 2016, attended by about eight hundred people. Dragon boating is a

traditional Chinese watersport and cultural event, but for many years, Chung

Wah Dragon Boat Team was not even a member of the Dragon Boating WA Inc

(DBWA), the state governing body for the sport. Two years ago, with Sunlong’s

support, Chung Wah Dragon Boat Team became a member of DBWA for the rst

time. Last year, the team participated in the competition organised by DBWA,

and outperformed most teams.

Like the dragon boating, events organised by the Chinese community – such as

the Chinese Cultural Festival, the Chinese New Year Festival, the China Day Racing

Event, the Chinese Idol Singing Competition, and Dragon Dancing, Tai Chi and

Kung Fu – have included many CaLD groups and the mainstream community.

90 | The University of Western Australia Public Policy Institute

Edward Zhang

Chinese background singers, dancers and artists participate in cultural events

demonstrating their own cultural characteristics, which have formed a new

and unique facet in our multicultural society. They are employed, contracted

or invited to perform with professional music or artistic bodies such as WASO,

AusDancing, and Voice Moves. They are seen on the stage at dierent cultural

events such as the Perth Festival, the Swan Valley Festival, the Mandurah Chinese

New Year, the Christmas Pageant, and the WA Australian Asian Association’s

multicultural dancing festival.

Challenges and suggestions

However, there are still diculties and challenges when businesses – especially

businesses with Chinese background – support multicultural inclusion in certain

areas of life in Australia, especially in politics. Multicultural inclusion in these

areas remains inadequate and weak.

First, there is further scope for business support for multicultural inclusion

to be provided in an organised or well-planned way as a result of systematic

backing from government. Businesses need government policy and incentives to

strengthen their actions on multicultural inclusion, such as preferential taxation

policies, funding and rewards.

Second, challenges mentioned in the introduction to the WA Charter of

Multiculturalism still exist today. “Multiculturalism is still a contested idea,

often because it is misunderstood and perceived either as a policy which

compartmentalises on the basis of culture, or as a policy which provides special

treatment to some minority groups.”

Promotion of multiculturalism still has

a long way to go.

Third, there are challenges to rene and adapt strategies to best include

people of dierent cultures and religions. Businesses need support to develop

cultural awareness to acknowledge dierences such as taboos, protocols and

oences. There is tremendous practical know-how available that can be richly

deployed in our state.

Fourth, a constant challenge confronting CaLD communities is the cultural

shock experienced by rst-generation immigrants. Support is needed for a CaLD

community to maintain its original culture, language and social habits, so it can

help reduce this shock and enable new immigrants to settle down more smoothly.

5 Government of Western Australia, Oce of Multicultural Interests, WA Charter of

Multiculturalism, Government of Western Australia, November 2004.

Re-imagining Australia: Migration, culture, diversity | 91

Can business support multicultural inclusion?

Last, but not least, racial discrimination still exists in certain areas and, to

certain degrees, adversely aects multicultural inclusion. Thus, there is an onus

on government to develop smarter policies to bear down on discrimination.

Another approach is for government to develop better recognition and rewards

for medium and large businesses that have achieved the most in terms of

workplace inclusion. These leaders have invested in their diverse workforces and

can act as a powerful force to mobilise other businesses that are supportive in

principle but lack suitable know-how to get started. The UK’s Think, Act, Report

initiative

– dealing with gender equality – is an excellent example that can be

used to shape change in WA.

In February 2020, the State Government launched the Western Australia

Multicultural Policy Framework as a guideline for government departments and

agencies to implement the WA Charter of Multiculturalism. The Framework

emphasises the centrality of evidence-based policies, programs and services that

are culturally responsive, in order to achieve equitable access and outcomes for all.

In conclusion, to address the challenges, government departments and agencies

need to improve their communication with CaLD communities through eective

channels to be ocially established. Businesses should be encouraged to employ

CaLD sta, provide language services and run cultural training programs among

their sta members. For this, more support is needed from federal, state and

local governments in opportunities, policies and funding.

Australia is a pluralistic society, and its ethnically diverse communities

are valuable resources in developing its economy, establishing cooperative

relationships and building a healthy and harmonious multicultural society. CaLD

groups should not just be included in our society, they should be regarded and

treated as a pivotal force.

Dr Edward Zhang OAM JP is Associate Professor in China, PhD graduate and

lecturer at Curtin University, Chief Editor of Australian Chinese Times and Member

of the Multicultural Advisory Group of the Western Australian government.

6 gov.uk/government/publications/think-act-report/think-act-report

7 Government of Western Australia, Western Australia Multicultural Policy Framework,

Government of Western Australia, February 2020, p. 12.

Re-imagining Australia: Migration, culture, diversity | 93

About UWA PPI

The UWA Public Policy Institute (UWA PPI) is a bridge between academic

research and government, public and business needs, delivering real-world

policy impact at state, national and regional levels.

UWA PPI helps to provide solutions to local and regional policy challenges,

both current and future. Through our collaboration with UWA academics and

research users and practitioners we support a healthy and eective policy-

ecosystem in Perth and WA.

Drawing on UWA’s distinct geographical advantage as Australia’s Indian Ocean

capital city, and by championing an evidence-based approach to policy-making,

we also create fresh opportunities for UWA to collaborate with countries across

the region.

We do all of this by

translating current UWA research insights into private policy roundtables,

public awareness events and report launches;

building capacity with UWA academic sta to enable successful policy

engagement;

commissioning and publishing evidence-based reports to inform state

government strategic priorities;

delivering programs that nourish leadership capabilities to meet the future

challenges of the Indian Ocean region.

Director

Professor Shamit Saggar CBE FAcSS

Chair of the Advisory Board

Professor the Hon. Stephen Smith

UWA Public Policy Institute

The University of Western Australia

M475, 35 Stirling Highway, Crawley WA 6009

uwappi@uwa.edu.au

+61 8 6488 5825

ISBN: 978-1-74052-978-5

Edited by Shamit Saggar and Anna Zenz

Essays by Anne Aly, Colin Barnett, Farida Fozdar, Geo Gallop,

Paul J. Maginn, Mike Nahan, Juliet Pietsch, Benjamin Reilly,

Shamit Saggar, Samina Yasmeen, Edward Zhang

Re-imagining Australia: Migration, culture, diversity

Practical suggestions on the challenges and opportunities ahead