“Not an Idea We Have to Shun”: Chinese Overseas
Basing Requirements in the 21
st
Century
by Christopher D. Yung and Ross Rustici
with Scott Devary and Jenny Lin
CHINA STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVES 7
Center for the Study of Chinese Military Aairs
Institute for National Strategic Studies
National Defense University
Institute for National Strategic Studies
National Defense University
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Cover photo: Pakistan and Chinese navy ships during joint maritime exercise
in Arabian Sea, November 24, 2005. Pakistan and China hold naval exercises,
particularly in nontraditional security fields to strengthen their defense
capability and enhance professional skills
(AP Photo/Inter Services Public Relations/HO)
“Not an Idea We Have to Shun”
Center for the Study of Chinese Military Aairs
Institute for National Strategic Studies
China Strategic Perspectives, No. 7
Series Editor: Phillip C. Saunders
National Defense University Press
Washington, D.C.
October 2014
by Christopher D. Yung and Ross Rustici
with Scott Devary and Jenny Lin
“Not an Idea We Have to Shun”:
Chinese Overseas Basing Requirements
in the 21
st
Century
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First printing, October 2014
Contents
Executive Summary ........................................................................................... 1
Introduction ........................................................................................................ 3
China’s Overseas Interests, Missions, and Likely Base and Facilities
Support Requirements ....................................................................................... 5
Six Alternate Models of Basing: e Deductive Approach ......................... 12
Dual Use Logistics Facility versus the String of Pearls:
e Inductive Approach ..................................................................................25
Could the String of Pearls Support Major Combat Operations? ...............33
Additional Considerations for a PLAN Logistics Base ...............................39
Conclusion and Policy Implications ..............................................................46
Appendix 1. “String of Pearls” Distance to Chinese Bases in
Nautical Miles ...................................................................................................50
Appendix 2. Required PLAN Force Structure for an Indian
Ocean Region Conict ....................................................................................51
Appendix 3. U.S. DOD Port Requirements Applied to Zhanjiang ............52
Appendix 4. Citizen and Netizen Public Opinion on
Overseas Basing ................................................................................................ 53
Notes .................................................................................................................. 54
About the Authors ............................................................................................61
1
Chinese Overseas Basing Requirements
Executive Summary
China’s expanding international economic interests are likely to generate increasing demands
for its navy, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), to operate out of area to protect Chinese
citizens, investments, and sea lines of communication. e frequency, intensity, type, and location
of such operations will determine the associated logistics support requirements, with distance
from China, size and duration, and combat intensity being especially important drivers.
How will the PLAN employ overseas bases and facilities to support these expanding
operational requirements? e assessment in this study is based on Chinese writings, com-
ments by Chinese military ocers and analysts, observations of PLAN operational patterns,
analysis of the overseas military logistics models other countries have employed, and inter-
views with military logisticians. China’s rapidly expanding international interests are likely
to produce a parallel expansion of PLAN operations, which would make the current PLAN
tactic, exclusive reliance on commercial port access, untenable due to cost and capacity fac-
tors. is would certainly be true if China contemplated engaging in higher intensity combat
operations.
is study considers six logistics models that might support expanded PLAN overseas
operations: the Pit Stop Model, Lean Colonial Model, Dual Use Logistics Facility, String of
Pearls Model, Warehouse Model, and Model USA. Each model is analyzed in terms of its abil-
ity to support likely future naval missions to advance China’s expanding overseas economic,
political, and security interests and in light of longstanding Chinese foreign policy principles.
is analysis concludes that the Dual Use Logistics Facility and String of Pearls models most
closely align with China’s foreign policy principles and expanding global interests.
To assess which alternative China is likely to pursue, the study reviews current PLAN
operational patterns in its Gulf of Aden counterpiracy operations
1
to assess whether the
PLAN is currently pursuing one model over the other and to provide clues about Chinese
motives and potential future trajectories. To ensure that this study does not suffer from
faulty assumptions, it also explicitly examines the strategic logic that Western analysts asso-
ciate with the String of Pearls Model in light of the naval forces and logistics infrastructure
that would be necessary to support PLAN major combat operations in the Indian Ocean.
Both the contrasting inductive and deductive analytic approaches support the conclusion
that China appears to be planning for a relatively modest set of missions to support its
overseas interests, not building a covert logistics infrastructure to fight the United States or
India in the Indian Ocean.
2
China Strategic Perspectives, No. 7
Key ndings:
ere is little physical evidence that China is constructing bases in the Indian Ocean to
conduct major combat operations, to encircle India, or to dominate South Asia.
China’s current operational patterns of behavior do not support the String of Pearls
thesis. PLAN ships use dierent commercial ports for replenishment and liberty, and the
ports and forces involved could not conduct major combat operations.
China is unlikely to construct military facilities in the Indian Ocean to support major
combat operations there. Bases in South Asia would be vulnerable to air and missile at-
tack, the PLAN would require a much larger force structure to support this strategy, and
the distances between home ports in China and PLAN ships stationed at the String of
Pearls network of facilities along its sea lines of communication would make it dicult
to defend Chinese home waters and simultaneously conduct major combat operations in
the Indian Ocean.
e Dual Use Logistics Facility Model’s mixture of access to overseas commercial facili-
ties and a limited number of military bases most closely aligns with China’s future naval
mission requirements and will likely characterize its future arrangements.
Pakistan’s status as a trusted strategic partner whose interests are closely aligned with
China’s makes the country the most likely location for an overseas Chinese military base;
the port at Karachi would be better able to satisfy PLAN requirements than the new port
at Gwadar.
e most ecient means of supporting more robust People’s Liberation Army (PLA)
out of area military operations would be a limited network of facilities that distribute
functional responsibilities geographically (for example, one facility handling air logis-
tics support, one facility storing ordnance, another providing supplies for replenishment
ships).
A future overseas Chinese military base probably would be characterized by a light
footprint, with 100 to 500 military personnel conducting supply and logistics functions.
Such a facility would likely support both civilian and military operations, with Chinese
3
Chinese Overseas Basing Requirements
forces operating in a restrictive political and legal environment that might not include
permission to conduct combat operations.
Naval bases are much more likely than ground bases, but China might also seek to
establish bases that could store ordnance, repair and maintain equipment, and provide
medical/mortuary services to support future PLA ground force operations against terror-
ists and other nontraditional security threats in overseas areas such as Africa.
A more active PLA overseas presence would provide opportunities as well as challenges
for U.S.-China relations. Chinese operations in support of regional stability and to address
nontraditional security threats would not necessarily conict with U.S. interests and may
provide new opportunities for bilateral and multilateral cooperation with China.
Long-term access to overseas military facilities would increase China’s strategic gravity
and signicantly advance China’s political interests in the region where the facilities are
located. To the extent that U.S. and Chinese regional and global interests are not aligned,
the United States would need to continue to use its own military presence and diplomatic
eorts to solidify its regional interests.
A signicantly expanded Chinese military presence in the Indian Ocean would compli-
cate U.S. relations with China and with the countries of the region, compel U.S. naval and
military forces to operate in closer proximity with PLA forces, and increase competitive
dynamics in U.S.-China and China-Indian relations.
Finally, if some of the countries of the Indian Ocean region and elsewhere agree to host
PLA forces over the long term, their decision will imply a shi in their relations with the
United States, which may ultimately need to rethink how it engages and interacts with
these countries.
Introduction
is is the second report by the Center for the Study of Chinese Military Aairs assess-
ing the future trajectory of China’s out of area naval operations. A December 2010 report
used case studies of past Chinese operations, considered how other navies conducted out of
area operations, identied obstacles that all navies confronted in operating out of area, and
analyzed possible solutions the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) may undertake to
4
China Strategic Perspectives, No. 7
conduct out of area operations more eectively.
2
is report focuses on the logistics require-
ments for PLAN overseas operations in support of China’s expanding global interests and the
facilities and basing arrangements the PLAN might employ to support these missions over
the next 25 years.
This report is organized in five sections. The first section examines China’s expand-
ing international economic interests, which are likely to generate increasing demands for
the PLAN to operate out of area to protect Chinese citizens, investments, and sea lines of
communication (SLOCs). The second section establishes six alternative logistics and sup-
port models the PLAN could potentially use to support its expanded operations. It evalu-
ates each model against Chinese foreign policy and national security interests and then
considers its compatibility with established Chinese foreign policy principles. This section
employs a deductive approach: assessing China’s future overseas interests and likely mili-
tary operations and then identifying which basing/access arrangements would best support
those interests. The next section approaches the same issue with an inductive approach,
examining potential basing/access arrangements through the prism of Chinese activities in
the Indian Ocean and the operational patterns of Chinese military behavior in current out
of area operations.
e fourth section takes a closer look at the supposed strategic rationale for the String
of Pearls alternative and asks several questions: If China were intent on conducting major
combat operations in the Indian Ocean and elsewhere, what force structure and logistics in-
frastructure would be necessary? What indicators would be present if China were to embark
on this path? Are there indications that this is taking place? Would the Chinese consider this
a sound strategic option?
e h section draws on interviews with U.S. military logisticians and Chinese writings
to assess how China might implement logistics support arrangements that involve an overseas
logistics support base, including speculation about potential base sites.
e conclusion explores the strategic implications of the analysis. What do these ndings
suggest the United States should do with regard to its relationship with the other countries of
South Asia and the Indian Ocean region (IOR)? What do these ndings suggest about the future
of the U.S. relationship with China? What activities should the United States military engage in,
given the presence of Chinese military forces in facilities in the Indian Ocean and elsewhere?
What do the ndings of this report suggest about China’s future ambitions as a global or re-
gional military power?
5
Chinese Overseas Basing Requirements
China’s Overseas Interests, Missions, and Likely Base and Facilities
Support Requirements
Observers of Chinese foreign policy have long asserted that Chinese international eco-
nomic interests are expanding and that its foreign policy and security interests will inevitably
follow.
3
e growth in China’s global economic ties over the past decade has been dramatic.
e desire of foreign rms to tap inexpensive Chinese labor and access the Chinese market
produced a ow of foreign direct investment into China in the 1980s and 1990s, building new
production networks that integrated China into the regional and global economy. China’s
trade ties with both suppliers and markets grew rapidly as production of many goods relo-
cated to sites in China. Over the last decade, Chinese state-owned enterprises and private
companies have become signicant international actors in their own right, making interna-
tional investments to build factories and develop energy and mineral resources, acquiring
foreign rms, and building major infrastructure projects everywhere from Latin America to
Southeast Asia.
4
is activity has increased China’s overseas economic presence and made its
domestic growth—and thus its internal stability—dependent on the ability to access global
markets and resources.
From 2003 to 2014, Chinese foreign trade nearly quintupled, growing from $851 billion
to more than $4.16 trillion. China became a major exporter to developed country markets in
North America and Europe and also to developing countries in Africa, Latin America, and
the Middle East. At the same time, China began to import large volumes of oil and natural gas
(surpassing the United States as the world’s largest oil importer in September 2013).
5
e Chi-
nese economy also imported large quantities of minerals, metals, foodstus, and other natural
resources, becoming the most important driver of a global boom in commodity prices. Chinese
imports from resource-rich countries in Africa, Latin America, North America, and the Middle
East grew even faster than China’s overall trade, producing a new dependence on the mari-
time trade routes that connect China to regions outside Asia. In 2011, more than 60 percent of
China’s trade traveled by sea.
6
Trade is not the only dimension of China’s growing international presence. Chinese com-
panies have become major investors in Asia, Africa, Latin America, and Europe. Ocial data
indicates that the cumulative total of Chinese outbound investment grew from approximately
$33.2 billion in 2003 to more than $531.9 billion in 2012. Chinese government data shows that
as of 2012, Chinese companies had invested more than $21.7 billion in Africa, $68.2 billion
in Latin America, and $25.5 billion in North America.
7
e Heritage Foundation/American
6
China Strategic Perspectives, No. 7
Enterprise Institute “China Global Investment Tracker,” which captures the nal destination
of Chinese investment with more precision than ocial government data, shows even higher
totals of Chinese investment outside Asia.
8
While Chinese foreign direct investment in overseas factories, mines, and energy projects
is an important and growing national interest, it also involves a signicant increase in Chinese
expatriates living and working abroad, particularly in the developing countries of sub-Saharan
Africa. Erica Downs of the Brookings Institution testied in April 2011 that:
[t]he expansion of Chinese companies around the world has increased the
number of Chinese citizens working overseas, including in countries with elevated
levels of political risk. e number of Chinese working abroad is estimated to
have increased from 3.5 million in 2005 to 5.5 million today. is has prompted
China’s foreign policy establishment to step up its eorts to ensure the safety of
Chinese citizens overseas.
9
In addition to the 5.5 million Chinese citizens working abroad, more than 60 million
travel overseas every year. Protecting these citizens—or evacuating them if the political or
security environment becomes unstable—has become an increasingly important and politi-
cally sensitive task for the Chinese government. Mathieu Duchâtel and Bates Gill note that
between 2006 and 2010, “a total of 6000 Chinese citizens were evacuated from upheavals in
Chad, Haiti, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Solomon Islands, ailand, Timor-Leste and Tonga.” In
2011 alone, “China evacuated a staggering 48,000 of its citizens from Egypt, Libya and Ja-
p a n .”
10
Both PLA Navy and PLA Air Force (PLAAF) units deployed to assist in the evacuation
of Chinese citizens from Libya.
ese trends are likely to continue, albeit at a slower pace, as the Chinese government tries
to rebalance the Chinese economy to rely more on domestic consumption to drive economic
growth. China’s dependence on imported food, minerals, metals, and especially energy will also
continue to deepen. China currently imports about 6.2 million barrels of oil a day, mostly from
the Middle East and Africa. is gure is projected to rise to 13 million barrels a day by 2035.
11
Despite government eorts to improve energy eciency and diversify supplies of oil and natu-
ral gas, a recent study by the State Council’s Development Research Center concluded that by
2030, China might import 75 percent of its oil and that dependence on overseas natural gas will
also rise rapidly. e director of the center warned that “rising risk for the energy transporta-
tion routes will pose new challenges which will be directly aected by geopolitical risks in the
7
Chinese Overseas Basing Requirements
neighboring regions, the Middle East and Africa.”
12
China is constructing oil and natural gas
pipelines from Kazakhstan, Russia, and Burma to mitigate some potential transport risks, but
it will remain heavily dependent on seaborne oil and liqueed natural gas supplies from the
Middle East and Africa. Andrew Erickson and Gabriel Collins conclude, “In the end, pipelines
are not likely to increase Chinese oil import security in quantitative terms, because the addi-
tional volumes they bring in will be overwhelmed by China’s demand growth; the country’s net
reliance on seaborne oil imports will grow over time, pipelines notwithstanding.”
13
Expanding Interests, Expanding Missions
Chinese civilian leaders have called upon the PLA to play a greater role in protecting Chi-
na’s overseas interests. en–General Secretary Hu Jintao used a 2004 speech to the Central
Military Commission to give the PLA four “New Historic Missions.” Daniel Hartnett summa-
rized them: “to ensure military support for continued Chinese Communist Party (CCP) rule
in Beijing; to defend China’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and national security; to protect
China’s expanding national interests; and to help ensure a peaceful global environment and
promote mutual development.”
14
e third mission gives the PLA new responsibilities to help
protect China’s overseas economic, political, and security interests. Examples include PLAN
participation in counterpiracy missions in the Gulf of Aden since 2008 and PLAN and PLAAF
eorts to evacuate People’s Republic of China (PRC) citizens from Libya in 2011.
Chinese ocers and scholars have begun writing openly about how expanding interests
abroad require a greater PLA role to protect those overseas interests and recommending that the
Chinese leadership consider establishing bases overseas. Retired PLAAF Colonel Dai Xu writes:
China is the world’s number-one or number-two importer of crude oil and
mineral markets. At the same time, China is a major exporter of textiles, toys,
and other goods. is import-export trade is primarily dependent upon maritime
transport, yet these sea routes are full of incredibly perilous factors. . . . Looking
at the example of the Middle East, which supplies over half of China’s oil imports,
Chinese oil transport vessels traveling from that region must pass through the
Persian Gulf, the Indian Ocean, the Strait of Malacca, and the South China Sea.
Danger is everywhere in the Persian Gulf, pirates run amok on the Indian Ocean,
and the navies of India and the United States eye our vessels jealously. e power
of various countries crisscrosses the Strait of Malacca and the South China Sea,
and pirates also hunt these areas.
15
8
China Strategic Perspectives, No. 7
He goes on to note:
[a]nother aspect is that, following the growth of China’s foreign exchange reserves
and the expansion of foreign investment, the amount of Chinese-held xed assets
overseas will become increasingly larger. Incidents in recent years of Chinese oil
workers being kidnapped in Africa and facilities being raided have also sounded
the security alarm. erefore, when selecting locations for overseas bases, in
addition to the needs of escorting and peacekeeping, one must also consider the
long-term protection of overseas interests.
16
East China Normal University Professor Shen Dingli argues that the Chinese public ex-
pects the government to protect overseas interests and furthermore, he argues that the issue of
an overseas base need not be considered taboo: “[Setting up overseas military bases is not an
idea we have to shun; on the contrary, it is our right. . . . As long as the bases are set up in line
with international laws and regulations, they are legal ones. . . . ere are four responsibili-
ties: the protection of the people and fortunes overseas; the guarantee of smooth trading; the
prevention of the overseas intervention which harms the unity of the country; and the defense
against foreign invasion.”
17
Shen also highlights the utility of overseas bases in protecting these
interests, including potential threats against Chinese SLOCs:
When the public discusses overseas military bases they refer to the supply base
for the navy escorting the ships cruising in the Gulf of Aden and Somalia. e
discussion shows people’s enthusiasm in defending the interests of the country.
Yet their worries are not the most important reasons for the set up of an overseas
military base. It is true that we are facing the threat posed by terrorism, but
dierent from America, it is not a critical issue. e real threat to us is not posed
by the pirates but by the countries which block our trade route.
18
The vulnerability caused by China’s increasing dependence on imported oil is of par-
ticular interest to Chinese strategists. As James Mulvenon writes, “It is no surprise that
PLA strategists would view China’s dependence on USN [United States Navy] protection
of critical SLOCs as a source of frustration and motivation and would therefore seek to
develop an independent means of securing key energy supply routes.”
19
Mulvenon notes
that this does not necessarily suggest that China will develop a full-fledged blue water navy
9
Chinese Overseas Basing Requirements
to protect its SLOCs unilaterally. Beijing could devise a mixture of strategies and policies
including diplomacy, maritime cooperation with countries in the IOR, and enhanced naval
capabilities.
20
A debate is under way about how China should meet the challenge of protect-
ing overseas interests.
Expanded Missions for the People’s Liberation Army Navy
China’s expanding international economic interests are almost certain to generate increas-
ing demands for the PLAN to operate out of area to protect Chinese citizens, investments,
Expanded Chinese Interest Potential Corresponding PLA Missions
Protection of citizens living abroad Noncombatant evacuation operations,
humanitarian assistance/disaster relief,
counterterrorism, counterinsurgency,
training and building partner capacity,
special operations ashore, riverine
operations, military criminal investigation
functions, military diplomacy
Protection of Chinese property/assets Counterterrorism, counterinsurgency,
humanitarian assistance/disaster relief,
training and building partner capacity,
special operations ashore, military criminal
investigation, physical security/force
protection, riverine operations, military
diplomacy, presence operations
Protection of Chinese shipping against
pirates and other nontraditional threats
Counterpiracy, escort shipping, maritime
intercept operations, training and building
partner capacity, sector patrolling, special
operations ashore, visit, board, search and
seizure, replenishment at sea, seaborne
logistics, military diplomacy
Protection of sea lines of communication
against adversary states
Anti-submarine warfare, anti-air warfare,
anti-surface warfare, carrier operations,
escort shipping, maritime intercept
operations, air operations o ships,
helicopter operations, vertical replenishment,
replenishment at sea, seaborne logistics
operations, military diplomacy, mine
countermeasures
Table 1. Notional PLA Missions to Protect Chinese Overseas Interests
10
China Strategic Perspectives, No. 7
and SLOCs. Such tasks could include protection of PRC citizens living and working abroad,
of Chinese property or assets on foreign soil, of Chinese shipping from pirates and other non-
traditional security threats, and of SLOCs against hostile adversary states. e PLAN could be
assigned specic missions to protect those interests (see table 1).
e frequency, intensity, type, and location of operations will determine the military forces
necessary and the associated logistics support requirements, with distance from China, size
and duration of operations, and combat intensity being especially important drivers of logistics
support requirements. Most of these missions would not require PLAN forces to conduct com-
bat operations against adversary states. Accordingly, they have less demanding logistic support
requirements, with distance, size, and duration of operations being the main drivers. ese less
intensive missions are listed in the rst three rows of table 1 displayed above.
However, some missions (listed in the fourth row of table 1) necessary for the protection of
Chinese SLOCs against adversary states would require the PLAN to be prepared for high-inten-
sity conict against a modern military in waters far from China. is type of combat operations
would impose additional logistic support requirements, including large hospital and healthcare
facilities; ordnance storage and distribution; petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL) storage and
distribution; mortuary services; large ship and equipment repair facilities; air trac control;
and other air support facilities and operations.
Historically, such combat operations are best supported by well-developed bases in the vi-
cinity of the operational area. Sustaining the large naval forces needed to conduct major combat
operations against a major state in the Indian Ocean would require a sizable logistics support
infrastructure. Ships get damaged in combat, so the PLAN would need large and numerous
shipyard facilities to repair them. It is possible that the Chinese have a dierent operations
and strategic concept in mind if they are contemplating a major conventional conict with
India—possibly a short, sharp attack intended to shock the Indians into compliance. Nonethe-
less, two historic data points appear to belie this argument. First, the Chinese are aware of the
importance of logistics support and infrastructure for major conventional conicts such as the
Second World War.
21
During that conict, the United States established hundreds of shipyards
throughout the Asia-Pacic to support the war eort. A considerable amount of writing on this
subject emphasizes the importance of strategic rear areas, transportation support, and supply-
ing front lines.
22
Second, lessons taken from the Falklands/Malvinas conict have made the
Chinese intimately aware that even limited wars can impose a heavy logistical burden on com-
batants operating out of area.
23
11
Chinese Overseas Basing Requirements
Major combat operations typically also produce large numbers of casualties, which would
require sizeable hospital facilities in mainland China and in a forward location to treat critically
and seriously wounded soldiers and sailors. e United States relies on forward medical facili-
ties to stabilize seriously wounded soldiers before transport and also on large hospital facilities
in Europe to care for wounded personnel from Iraq and Afghanistan before sending them to the
continental United States (CONUS) for additional treatment at Walter Reed National Military
Medical Center.
e PLAN would need ordnance resupply, given the high ammunition expenditure rates
in major combat operations.
24
Ordnance could be transported from depots in China on am-
munition ships, but these ships would be vulnerable to submarine and air attacks (as happened
with Japan during its Pacic War with the United States). A country cannot rely entirely on air
or sea transport over long distances to resupply units engaged in combat. Militaries typically
store some ordnance in forward armories so it can be easily accessible and dispensed to combat
units. e long distance from China to the Indian Ocean means the PLAN would need an over-
seas base to store ordnance, especially for submarines and ships with vertical launch tubes that
cannot be reloaded at sea.
25
In addition, the PLAN would need access to petroleum, oil, other lubricants, and other
replenishments to operate away from home ports for long periods. During peacetime, these
stocks are available from commercial port facilities. However, during a conict, the laws of war
and customary requirements for neutrality prohibit port facilities or bases in neutral countries
from providing support to combatants.
26
If such a facility were supplying PLAN forces, it would
no longer be considered neutral and therefore would be subject to attack by China’s adversaries.
Finally, any military bases and logistics facilities providing support for PLAN combat op-
erations would require protection from air and missile attack. As the history of conventional
military conicts attests, from World War II to the Gulf War, if China was facing a country such
as India with signicant military capabilities, the PLA would need air bases to provide air cover
for naval forces and to defend bases and logistics facilities from attack. e PLA would also
want surface-to-air missiles with some ballistic and cruise missile defense capability to protect
air bases, naval bases, and logistics facilities from air and missile attack. is all adds up to a
substantial military footprint within the territory of a third-party host country.
e bottom line is that if China wants military dominance in the Indian Ocean (which
implies the ability to ght and win major combat operations), it would need a much larger
navy and a logistics and support infrastructure that far exceeds current capabilities. Even if we
12
China Strategic Perspectives, No. 7
posited the possibility of Chinese use of covert munitions storage and secret wartime access
agreements,
27
it would be insucient for sustained combat operations.
Some evidence suggests that even if its international missions do not expand, the PLAN is
already having diculty supporting current missions due to limitations in the available logistics
infrastructure. ese operational limitations are likely to eventually lead the Politburo Standing
Committee and the Central Military Commission to authorize the establishment of some kind
of overseas PLA facility. Retired PLAN Rear Admiral Yin Zhuo is an outspoken advocate for
overseas bases. Not long aer the initial Gulf of Aden deployment in October 2008, he insisted
that China consider establishing an overseas base to ease the logistical and supply strain on
PLAN forces.
28
He noted that multiple 3-month deployments aected PLAN morale and ability
to maintain readiness.
29
Yin also pointed out that diculties Chinese sailors confronted in out
of area deployments (such as lack of fresh fruits, vegetables, and potable water, problems com-
municating directly with Beijing, and lack of medical care) would be resolved if Beijing would
allow the PLAN to establish an overseas base near its forward operations.
30
en–PLA Chief of General Sta Chen Bingde also highlighted obstacles the PLAN faces
while conducting out of area operations. In a May 2011 speech at the National Defense Uni-
versity in Washington, DC, General Chen noted that continued Gulf of Aden counterpiracy
deployments would strain the PLAN and “give China great diculty.”
31
Chen also stated that
China plans to continue these deployments because the missions protect its national interests
abroad.
32
e PLAN’s operational diculties in performing current out of area operations, the
likely increase in demand for such operations in the future, and other factors such as Chinese
public support for overseas bases (see appendix 4) suggest that the PLAN cannot rely inde-
nitely on commercial facilities alone to support its overseas operations.
Six Alternative Models of Basing: e Deductive Approach
is report explores six possible overseas logistics support models that Chinese civilian
and military leaders may consider to support expanded overseas operations: the Pit Stop Model,
Lean Colonial Model, Dual Use Logistics Facility, String of Pearls Model, Warehouse Model,
and Model USA. Each is dened and discussed below.
e Pit Stop Model. One option is to continue the current PLAN practice of using com-
mercial port facilities to compensate for the lack of overseas bases. Some Chinese scholars and
military analysts advocate continued use of commercial ports as “pit stops” to provide basic
services such as refueling, provisioning, electrical power, and waste disposal for PLAN surface
vessels.
33
One article noted that “[s]uch arrangements are basically a commercial undertaking,
13
Chinese Overseas Basing Requirements
but must be negotiated government-to-government because military forces are involved. Many
nations have such arrangements in the region, particularly the Persian Gulf. Chinese sailors
coming ashore would basically be treated like tourists, and subject to local law.”
34
Some PLAN ocers appear content with current ad hoc arrangements supporting the Gulf
of Aden deployments.
35
Zhang Deshun, then-PLAN Deputy Chief of Sta, stated in 2010, “[w]e
have no agenda to set up military establishments” and no need to establish overseas bases.
36
Senior
Captain Yan Baojian, a South China Sea Fleet commander, indicated that the navy could operate
overseas and conduct out of area missions without any bases on foreign soil: “e naval force can
work extensively with China’s business operations worldwide for military supplies, in addition to
[obtaining materiel from] advanced supply ships.”
37
In a 2010 article, retired Rear Admiral Zhang
Zhaozhong noted that the commercial use of regular supply points for rest and entertainment,
food and water, ship and equipment maintenance, and medical treatment should suce.
38
Zhang
argued both the international community and host nations would welcome these kinds of activi-
ties because the supply stops support United Nations–mandated missions, and the PLAN boosts
the local economy by spending money at commercial facilities.
e Lean Colonial Model. e Lean Colonial network involves specialized bases scattered
throughout the world to support colonies. Nations that utilized this model in the 19
th
and 20
th
centuries did so to support broader economic and foreign policy objectives rather than to proj-
ect military power. e model utilizes bases within sailing distance of each other but lacking
any fortications or defenses against seaborne attack. e Lean Colonial Model can advance
national commercial interests but cannot support a naval presence strong enough to preserve
sovereignty when challenged.
Germany’s Pacic colonies, which at one time stretched from mainland China to just north
of Australia and New Zealand, illustrate the Lean Colonial Model. With the exception of the
Qingdao port in China, German colonial possessions were initially established by trading com-
panies acting without government support.
39
Germany supported these colonies nancially, but
they were viewed primarily as a source of national pride and prestige.
40
German colonies devel-
oped ports and logistics centers to support commercial operations but did not invest in defen-
sive fortications or infrastructure to support naval operations. Although equipped with nine
ships, the German Asiatic Squadron’s forays from its homeport in Qingdao were infrequent and
ill supplied.
41
e squadron’s logistics network was based on contracts with private companies,
which greatly limited its operational capacity and range in the event of a conict.
42
e Ger-
man Navy planned to use the squadron to harass British and American ships in the Pacic and
to prevent a shiing of assets to the Atlantic rather than to defend German colonies. Within
14
China Strategic Perspectives, No. 7
months aer the outbreak of World War I, every German colony in the Pacic was under the
control of Australia, New Zealand, or Japan.
Dual Use Logistics Facility. Some Chinese analysts and PLA ocers argue that an overseas
base would provide improved logistics and supply support to out of area PLAN ships and task
forces at lower cost and with greater capability than commercial facilities. e overseas base would
be equipped with medical facilities, refrigerated storage space for fresh vegetables and fruit, rest
and recreation sites, a communications station, and ship repair facilities to perform minor to in-
termediate repair and maintenance. In a 2010 interview, retired Rear Admiral Yin Zhou argued
that “a relatively stable, relatively solid base for re-supply and repair would be appropriate” to
support Chinese ships conducting antipiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden. “Such a base would
provide a steady source of fresh fruit, vegetables and water, along with facilities for communica-
tions, ship repair, rest and recreation, and medical evacuation of injured personnel.”
43
Dai Xu, a former PLA Air Force colonel, argued in 2009 that China “needs to have power
adequate to protect world peace before it will be able to eectively shoulder its international
responsibilities and develop a good image. e fulllment of this duty requires a specic supply
facility for the provision of support.”
44
Dai argued that escorting and peacekeeping missions will
become regular PLAN missions: “How to execute these tasks in ever wider sea areas with even
lower costs and over longer periods of time is bound to become a practical issue that will have
to be dealt with by strategic decision-making departments.”
45
Military analyst Liu Zhongmin
echoes these themes: “[H]ow China will develop its overseas bases is a question that we can no
longer avoid answering. . . . Since China began to send navy convoys on anti-piracy missions to
the Gulf of Aden and the Somali coast in 2008, the lack of overseas bases has emerged as a major
impediment to the Chinese navy’s cruising eciency.”
46
e String of Pearls Model. e String of Pearls concept emerged from a 2004 Booz Al-
len Hamilton (BAH) study, “Energy Futures in Asia: Final Report.” e authors argued that if
China needed to protect its ow of energy through the Indian Ocean, it could build on its ex-
isting commercial and security relationships to establish a string of military facilities in South
Asia. At the time, press reports suggested China had contributed to construction of naval bases
in Burma, funded construction of a new port in Gwadar, Pakistan, and invested in commercial
port facilities in Sri Lanka and Bangladesh. e speculative analysis in the BAH study has come
to be accepted in some Indian and U.S. policy circles as a description of China’s actual strategy
for its out of area activities.
Considered narrowly as a logistics model, the main dierence between the Dual Use Logis-
tics Facility and String of Pearls models lies in the potential for Chinese commercial investments
15
Chinese Overseas Basing Requirements
in port facilities to support higher intensity military and combat operations. Construction of
commercial port infrastructure could serve as cover for construction of secret munitions stock-
piles and other port infrastructure that could support combat operations. Chinese commercial
ties with host countries could potentially translate into secret agreements to allow PLAN access
to the facilities in a conict. Finally, Chinese investments in commercial port facilities (and the
resulting expansion in Chinese political inuence in host countries) might allow commercial
ports to be transformed into full-edged Chinese military bases at some point in the future.
e November 2004 BAH report marks the rst analytic reference to a so-called Chi-
nese String of Pearls strategy. e authors were asked to address the question: “If China were
confronted with a vulnerable source of energy supplies and the possibility of the United States
cutting o China’s source of energy supplies through its superior navy, what possible strategies
would the Chinese pursue and do we see any evidence that this is taking place?” e Booz Al-
len team did not extensively research Chinese sources to determine Chinese perspectives, but it
engaged in educated speculation on strategic responses China might pursue if confronted with
a “Malacca Dilemma”
47
worst-case scenario. e term String of Pearls originated with “uniden-
tied participants of a workshop conducted to support this project.”
48
e report submitted to the Oce of Net Assessment devotes only two pages to the String
of Pearls concept. In a section entitled “Sealane Strategy,” the authors note that Chinese activi-
ties in Pakistan, Bangladesh, Burma, Cambodia, and the South China Sea suggest that “China is
building strategic relationships along the sealanes from the Middle East to the South China Sea
in ways that suggest defensive and oensive positioning to protect China’s energy interests but
also serve its broader security objectives.” e report states:
participants at the Energy Futures in Asia workshop referred to this set of strategic
relationships along the sealanes as China’s ‘String of Pearls.’ . . . ese relationships,
which have been developing for years, could serve multiple strategic objectives for
the Chinese. For example, bolstering its presence in Myanmar and Pakistan hems
in India and simultaneously positioning [sic] China to address the vulnerability
to its seaborne oil shipments with either defensive or oensive tactics. A sealane
strategy positions China to take a more oensive approach to securing its energy
resources by threatening to raise the risk premium for other energy consumers.
Using its strategic positioning along the sealanes, China could pursue a deterrence
strategy if it believed that its energy ows were in danger of being interdicted or
threatened by the United States or others.
16
China Strategic Perspectives, No. 7
Such a deterrence strategy “would entail posing a credible threat to any ship in the seal-
anes, thereby creating a climate of uncertainty about the safety of all ships on the high seas.
Whether or not China will have the capacity to pose a credible threat is uncertain and a point
of debate; China would require both robust military capabilities and permission from the host
countries to allow it to undertake oensive operations from their territories.” e report in-
cluded a map labeled “China’s Activities Along the Sealanes” that “highlights Gwadar and Pasni,
Pakistan; three locations in Myanmar; the potential location of a Kra Canal in ailand; Woody
and Hainan Island in the South China Sea.”
Other defense analysts subsequently adopted the term “String of Pearls,” oen treating
it as a description of China’s actual strategy rather than speculative analysis. For example,
the author of a 2006 report titled “String of Pearls: Meeting the Challenge of China’s Rising
Power Across the Asian Littoral” published by the U.S. Army War College’s Strategic Studies
Institute asserted:
Each “pearl” in the “String of Pearls” is a nexus of Chinese geopolitical inuence
or military presence. Hainan Island, with recently upgraded military facilities, is a
“pearl.” An upgraded airstrip on Woody Island, located in the Paracel archipelago
300 nautical miles east of Vietnam, is a “pearl.” A container shipping facility in
Chittagong, Bangladesh, is a “pearl.” Construction of a deep water port in Sittwe,
Myanmar, is a “pearl,” as is the construction of a navy base in Gwadar, Pakistan.
Port and aireld construction projects, diplomatic ties, and force modernization
form the essence of China’s “String of Pearls.” e “pearls” extend from the coast
of mainland China through the littorals of the South China Sea, the Strait of
Malacca, across the Indian Ocean, and on to the littorals of the Arabian Sea and
Persian Gulf.
49
e report argued that Chinese eorts to establish a presence in the Indian Ocean are a response
to concerns about access to energy shipments from the Persian Gulf:
To sustain economic growth, China must rely increasingly upon external sources
of energy and raw materials. Sea lanes of communication (SLOC) are vitally
important because most of China’s foreign trade is conducted by sea, and China
has had little success in developing reliable oil or gas pipelines from Russia or
Central Asia. Since energy provides the foundation of the economy, China’s
17
Chinese Overseas Basing Requirements
economic policy depends on the success of its energy policy. Securing SLOCs for
energy and raw materials supports China’s energy policy and is the principal
motivation behind the “String of Pearls.”
50
Considered in terms of logistics and military capability, the String of Pearls Model would
oer some advantages. It could be less costly than a dedicated network of overseas military
bases, since commercial investments in port infrastructure would generate some economic re-
turns that military bases would not. Commercial investments are less likely to provoke negative
international reactions than military bases or base access agreements. is model could also
potentially oer a stepping stone toward a future network of dedicated military bases, with
commercial investments helping to build the political relationships necessary for countries to
provide China with base access or permit Chinese bases on their territory.
e String of Pearls Model would have signicant operational drawbacks as well. Com-
mercial port facilities would not oer ammunition storage, prepositioned spare parts for mili-
tary vessels, or maintenance specialists. ey would provide less operational security and be
vulnerable to attack in event of a conict. Even if China were able to covertly preposition mili-
tary supplies or negotiate secret base access agreements with host countries, Beijing would like-
ly have diculty securing permission to use such bases to support combat operations against
major countries. Some of these operational drawbacks could be overcome by improvements
in facilities and port security, but beyond a certain point such improvements would transform
commercial “pearls” into overt Chinese military bases.
Warehouse Model. e Warehouse Model developed by the British between the two world
wars demonstrates a h potential way for a naval power to maintain a eet far from home.
Aer considering their economic situation and war plans, the British decided a few defensible
ports with large oil supplies and fully capable repair facilities were the best method to support
naval operations in the Far East. e Royal Navy decided to stockpile oil at its naval base in
Singapore rather than upgrading the coal-based infrastructure at smaller ports or investing in a
costly tanker procurement program.
51
Singapore was supplied with all the necessary stores and
dock facilities to act as the base of operations for the Far East Fleet. Ports west of Singapore were
never adequately updated to support major eet operations.
52
e Royal Navy relied entirely on
oil stores within its main ports. In 1921, the British did not operate a single oil tanker east of the
Suez Canal.
53
Singapore was chosen due to its location protecting the main SLOC to India and
because it was more defensible than alternatives such as Hong Kong. It was expected to be able
to hold out for 3 months against superior Japanese forces until reinforcements could arrive from
continued on page 20
18
China Strategic Perspectives, No. 7
Broader Interpretations of the “String of Pearls”
e meaning of the term String of Pearls has broadened over time to go well
beyond a speculative description of how China might use commercial investments to sup-
port naval operations in the Indian Ocean. Some analysts now use the term to refer to any
Chinese blue water navy capability developments, any activity the Chinese navy has taken
part in outside of the Asia-Pacic Region (for example, the PLAN’s Gulf of Aden deploy-
ments), and any eorts China may undertake to ensure continued access to oil and raw
materials coming from Africa and the Middle East.
Some assessments assign motives that go far beyond concerns about access to
energy and raw materials. One assessment argues: “e ‘String of Pearls’ strategy . . .
provides a forward presence for China along the sea lines of communication that now
anchor China directly to the Middle East. e question both the United States and India
have is whether this strategy is intended purely to cement supply lines and trade routes, or
whether China will later use these in a bid for regional supremacy.”
1
Other assessments, especially from Indian think tanks and defense organizations,
state unequivocally that the objective of China’s String of Pearls strategy is to dominate
the Indian Ocean region. Consider this analysis from the Indian Army’s Centre of Land
Warfare Studies:
China’s strategy to acquire port facilities for its navy in Pakistan,
Myanmar, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, is well known and has been called
China’s “string of pearls” policy by western analysts. Beijing’s game plan
appears to be to isolate India and dominate the SLOCs from the Indian
Ocean to the South China Sea. Notwithstanding that Beijing is actively
pursuing initiatives to tie down India in its neighborhood, it lodged
protests in May 2006 over a new “quadrilateral” initiative held in Manila
between the U.S., Japan, India and Australia.
2
e String of Pearls concept has shaped how many analysts think about China’s
activities in South Asia and the potential for the PLA Navy to operate overseas. A Google
search for China and String of Pearls results in almost 300,000 hits. e Congressional
Research Service’s periodic assessment of Chinese naval capabilities specically mentions
19
Chinese Overseas Basing Requirements
the String of Pearls concept as a possible future path for Chinese military operations.
3
e String of Pearls was also mentioned in the Department of Defense’s Joint Operating
Environment 2008, which includes a map entitled “e String of Pearls: Chinese political
inuence or military presence astride oil routes.” e map is of China, the Indian Ocean,
and the Persian Gulf with areas in South Asia demarcated as potential “pearls.”
4
Supporters of a more expansive String of Pearls concept argue that China’s invest-
ment and construction of both commercial and military sites in South Asia and broader
development of strategic relations in the region are designed to:
assure access to energy supplies and raw materials coming in from the Middle East
and the Persian Gulf
exert Chinese political inuence in the Indian Ocean region
encircle, dominate, or hem in India
militarily dominate the Indian Ocean region
deter the United States, India, or other powers in South Asia from interdicting
Chinese shipping coming from the Persian Gulf.
1
Chris Devonshire-Ellis, “China’s String of Pearls Strategy,” in China Brieng.com, March
18, 2009, available at<www.china-brieng.com/news/2009/03/18/china%E2%80%99s-string-of –
pearls-strategy>.
2
Gurmeet Kanwal and Monika Chansoria, “Breathing Fire: China’s Aggressive Tactical
Posturing,” Centre for Land Warfare Studies Issue Brief no. 12, October 2009, 5.
3
Ronald O’Rourke, “China Naval Modernization: Implication for U.S. Navy Capabilities—
Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service report RL33153, October 17,
2012, 43.
4
As found in e Joint Operating Environment 2008: Challenges and Implications for the
Future Joint Force (Norfolk, VA: U.S. Joint Forces Command, November 25, 2008), available at
<www.scribd.com/doc/10537915.joe-2008>.
20
China Strategic Perspectives, No. 7
Europe. Britain had two smaller bases located closer to Japan, both of which relied on Singapore
as a logistics center.
e Royal Navy’s Logistical Model—a few very large bases intended to provide “one stop
shopping”—directly led to its naval diculties during World War II. ese ports established
British control over critical sea lines of communication, but the vast distances between them
made reinforcement extremely dicult during the initial stages of a conict. e Royal Navy re-
lied too heavily on Singapore and subsidiary bases and neglected the procurement and elding
of the necessary eet auxiliaries and support ships for aoat logistics and replenishment at sea.
54
When the British war plan failed and Singapore was captured, other British bases could not be
utilized eectively because they were too distant from intended operational areas or lacked the
necessary infrastructure.
55
Furthermore, once one of these mega bases fell, the lack of interme-
diate logistic centers made staging an oensive operation exceedingly dicult.
e Warehouse Model does have a few distinct advantages. e largest is its low interna-
tional prole; relying on only a few well-equipped and dispersed bases limits the number of
reliable allies needed and reduces the political ramications of basing troops abroad. is was
not a problem for Imperial Britain, but it was a serious consideration for the Soviets, who built
a similar naval infrastructure during the Cold War using ports in Egypt, Somalia, and its satel-
lite countries. A second advantage is cost. It is cheaper to build and maintain a few major bases
than to develop and maintain a global network of well-equipped bases. Finally, large bases can
have defensive capabilities and, if successfully defended, provide an excellent in-theater staging
point for oensive operations.
Model USA. International experts consider the U.S. logistics model the most successful meth-
od to maintain large-scale military operations abroad. e terrestrial network combines large bases
with minor bases/port access agreements to support U.S. naval and air forces and allow for exible
resupply. In addition to established infrastructure, the U.S. Navy currently maintains the largest aux-
iliary ship eet in the world. e result is unprecedented capabilities to resupply ships while under-
way and to support prolonged ground operations from the sea. In addition to more than 30 naval
bases and naval support facilities, the U.S. Military Seali Command has 110 active service ships
supporting eet operations.
56
e United States currently maintains a signicant base operations
network in every major ocean and sea and thus possesses a logistics system that can support opera-
tions anywhere in the world. e large auxiliary eet means that the loss of any single base or even a
series of bases does not automatically reduce the Navy’s operating range or capacity.
e U.S. response to the tsunami that struck the IOR on December 26, 2004, demonstrates
the logistic system’s exibility. Immediately aer the tsunami struck, the U.S. Air Force quickly
21
Chinese Overseas Basing Requirements
mobilized to create a forward logistics base in ailand some 8,000 miles from CONUS.
57
e
Air Force transported approximately 24.5 million pounds of supplies over 47 days.
58
e Navy
also contributed greatly to the relief eort. By January 1, 2005, the USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN
72) Carrier Strike Group was providing logistical support, along with a Marine Expeditionary
Unit that arrived on January 4.
59
A U.S. Navy hospital ship sailed from San Diego and arrived
in waters near Aceh within 2 weeks of the disaster. Forty-nine percent of the xed wing aircra,
55 percent of the helicopters, and 25 percent of the ships used in the humanitarian relief eort
were of U.S. origin.
is exible logistics system allows the U.S. military to surge troops, supplies, and logistics
support quickly and to support operations far from CONUS because it maintains logistics hubs
scattered throughout the world. Yet the U.S. logistics model derives its strength mainly from its
large auxiliary eet and airli capacity. e sheer number of platforms and amount of li capac-
ity support a wide variety of operations far from U.S. soil.
One major shortcoming of the U.S. logistics model is the high cost of building and main-
taining large and complex bases, ports, and ships, making it economically infeasible for less
auent countries. Maintaining a geographically distributed and extensive system of bases also
requires immense diplomatic and political capital. Finally, countries that choose to pursue such
an extensive and capable logistics network may raise international concerns about potential
interventionist ambitions. From a purely military perspective, however, the American logistics
model is unrivaled in terms of capability.
e Chinese Foreign and Defense Policy Interest Framework
Which logistics model is China most likely to adopt to support its expanding international
interests? Table 2 examines each model against criteria important to Chinese foreign and de-
fense policy interests to assess the likelihood that Beijing will pursue a particular model.
Three of the six logistics support models do not satisfy China’s broad foreign policy
interests as enunciated by Beijing throughout its history of foreign relations. The Lean
Colonial, Warehouse, and USA models all violate two of China’s most important foreign
policy principles: noninterference in the internal affairs of other countries and not acting
like an imperialist or hegemonic power. The Lean Colonial Model is simply not applicable
to a postcolonial world of sovereign states. Given China’s self-image as a champion of the
developing world and a positive alternative to other global powers, it is highly unlikely to
pursue models that involve large overseas military bases or extensive networks of facilities
on the sovereign territory of other states. Beyond the rationale that China is unlikely to
22
China Strategic Perspectives, No. 7
Pit Stop Lean
Colonial
Dual Use
Logistics
Facility
String of
Pearls
Warehouse Model
USA
Does not
threaten China’s
“peaceful rise”
image
Ye s No Ye s Ye s No No
Does not pose
a risk to China’s
relationship with
host nation
Ye s Ye s Ye s Yes No No
Neighboring
countries will not
feel threatened
Ye s Ye s Ye s Yes No No
Helps China
address a wide
range of military
contingencies
No No Ye s Ye s Ye s Ye s
Helps China
protect its
overseas
economic
interests
No No Ye s Ye s Ye s Ye s
Relatively
inexpensive
No Yes No No No No
Satises
expectations of
ordinary Chinese
citizens
No No Ye s Ye s Ye s Ye s
Does not
generate
excessive friction
with the United
States
Ye s Ye s Ye s Yes/No No No
Protected against
external attack
No No No No Ye s Ye s
Does not require
large amounts of
transportation
assets
Ye s Ye s No No Ye s No
Table 2. Assessments of Chinese Logistics Models and International Interests
23
Chinese Overseas Basing Requirements
violate foreign policy principles that it has established as a foundation for its foreign and
defense policy behavior, there is an even stronger reason that China will not establish these
kinds of overseas bases. They would threaten China’s image as a peaceful rising power and
could imperil China’s future economic growth, if the international community interprets
such bases as evidence of malign Chinese long-term intentions.
In contrast, the Pit Stop Model closely conforms to China’s foreign policy principles. How-
ever, for reasons discussed below, this model is unlikely to support China’s national security
interests over the long term.
Does the Pit Stop Model Serve Chinese Long-Term Security Interests?
Today’s limited out of area PLA operations are consistent with Chinese foreign policy and
national security interests. China’s policy species that it will not set up military bases in other
countries. Ocial policy states that China does not take part in operations far from China’s
shores except at the invitation of a host country or when mandated by an international organi-
zation like the United Nations. China’s ocial overseas basing policy is consistent with eorts
to portray China’s rise as “peaceful” to the international community. Even given these policy
limitations, the PLAN has been able to conduct Gulf of Aden counterpiracy operations success-
fully since late 2008.
e Gulf of Aden deployment demonstrates that the Chinese military remains at the very
nascent stages of out of area combat operations.
60
For now, the PLAN appears to be content to
remain at this stage of low-intensity combat naval force development, which can be supported
using only commercial facilities (albeit at a higher cost than other logistics models).
An earlier NDU study on China’s out of area naval operations argued that most great pow-
ers follow a path of increasingly demanding out of area operations.
61
If China follows this path,
it will eventually participate in maritime intercept operations, engage in combat with pirates in
the high seas, and continue to escort shipping through pirate-infested waters. China is likely
to conduct freedom of navigation operations to keep its sea lines of communication open and
could potentially engage in major combat operations to defend or seize disputed territories in
the South and East China Seas or to protect natural resources associated with disputed maritime
territory. China might also have to conduct SLOC protection operations if an Indian Ocean
state such as India decides to threaten Chinese shipping with air, surface, and subsurface forces.
Some Chinese government ocials and military ocers recognize the need to resolve the pi-
racy problem on land, implying that the government could eventually employ special forces or
other military assets to deal with that problem.
62
24
China Strategic Perspectives, No. 7
All of these missions imply the use of PLA forces to engage in combat with pirates, ter-
rorists, insurgents, and potentially other states. However, there are a number of reasons why a
logistics support model that depends solely on commercial facilities cannot support combat
operations that result in signicant loss of materiel and manpower.
First, a country cannot assure access to commercial facilities during times of conict.
63
For
example, during the Civil and Spanish-American wars, Hong Kong and Japan would not allow
the U.S. Asiatic Squadron to access commercial port facilities. Second, commercial facilities do
not have the capability to support severely damaged warships, mortuary services for soldiers
killed in action, and medical attention for large numbers of wounded service members. Severely
damaged warships can sometimes be repaired in foreign commercial shipyards, but this could
be extremely expensive in the absence of a special arrangement with the host country, and a re-
quest could be denied due to political considerations. Even if commercial facilities agree to per-
form these operations, supporting the PLA Navy would not necessarily be their top priority if
other commercial opportunities are more lucrative or the costs of abrogating existing contracts
are too high. China cannot assume that foreign commercial port facilities would act against
their own commercial interests to support China during a regional conict.
High Costs of the Pit Stop Model
e high costs associated with an exclusively commercial logistics network will pressure
China to pursue a dierent model, especially if the scope and intensity of PLA Navy out of area
operations increase over time. Conversations with PLA ocers indicate that using commercial
ports to support the Gulf of Aden deployments has been extremely costly and time-consuming.
en-PLA Chief of General Sta General Chen Bingde indicated in May 2011 that the PLA has
encountered operational diculties in sustaining the Gulf of Aden deployment. Chen did not
explicitly cite cost, but this was likely one factor.
64
U.S. Navy logisticians suggest relying solely on commercial facilities can prove extremely
costly, especially in wartime. Experts point out that even in operations short of war, there is a
direct relationship between conict intensity and the need for security at ports and other fa-
cilities.
65
Necessary security features might include patrol boats to monitor and patrol harbors;
divers to check for saboteurs below the water line; erection of jersey barriers and other fences
around the piers serving the ships; and additional security personnel monitoring the gates.
66
A
commercial facility depends on costly private contractors or its own personnel to perform these
services. A military facility can perform these functions more eciently with military person-
nel. Ship and military equipment repair can also be extremely costly. Although a commercial
25
Chinese Overseas Basing Requirements
facility can repair ships damaged in low-intensity combat, these repair services would be ex-
tremely expensive.
67
e Pit Stop Model is unlikely to remain a viable logistics alternative if the
intensity of Chinese military out of area operations increases in parallel with China’s expanding
global economic, political, and security interests.
e Dual Use Logistics Facility and the String of Pearls: Two Viable Options
This analysis suggests that the Dual Use Logistics Facility and String of Pearls logistics
models are most consistent with China’s longstanding foreign policy principles and can
best support China’s expanding overseas economic and security interests. The third sec-
tion of the study examines the ability of the two models to support the most likely PLAN
operations over the next 20 years; the fourth section examines whether the String of Pearls
Model could support higher intensity combat operations as part of a long-term effort to
dominate the IOR.
Dual Use Logistics Facility versus the String of Pearls: e Inductive
Approach
e Dual Use Logistics Facility and the String of Pearls models both appear compatible
with Chinese foreign policy principles and with China’s long-term overseas interests. Both
models would involve the PLA using a mix of commercial and military facilities to project
power farther from China’s shores. China would need to develop close political and strategic
ties with at least some host nations to gain greater access to their commercial and military facili-
ties. Both models would support increased out of area operations to protect China’s expanding
overseas economic, political, and security interests.
e two models dier in two important respects (other than the site of the bases). First, the
Dual Use Logistics Facility Model is not tied to port access in specic countries, while the String
of Pearls Model requires China to have good political relations with numerous host countries.
e so-called pearls are all associated with specic facilities in specic countries that can be
examined. Second, the String of Pearls Model can potentially provide greater logistics support
for military and combat operations if overt commercial access arrangements are supplemented
with covert prepositioning of munitions and military supplies and secret diplomatic agreements
for base access in the event of a conict.
If China intends mainly to combat nontraditional threats and develop a modest power pro-
jection capability to respond to a relatively small-scale overseas contingency, such as a noncomba-
tant evacuation operation (NEO), humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) missions,
26
China Strategic Perspectives, No. 7
low-intensity conict, counterterrorism, or protection of PRC expatriates, the Dual Use Logistics
Facility is sucient. China could use dual use facilities as forward operating logistics platforms
to engage in nontraditional security operations (including special forces operations ashore) to
combat terrorists and other threats to China’s overseas operations and citizens. However, if China
seeks the capability to conduct major combat operations in the Indian Ocean, the String of Pearls
Model is more plausible.
is section explores the ability of these two models to support the most likely PLAN op-
erations in the Indian Ocean (excluding major combat operations) by examining the physical
characteristics of sites supposedly associated with the String of Pearls and studying the patterns
of current PLAN operational behavior overseas. e potential ability of the String of Pearls
Model to support the force structure China would need to dominate the Indian Ocean is ex-
plored in the next section.
Examining the Physical Evidence for the String of Pearls
In recent years, authors have started to look more critically at the physical evidence for
the existence of a Chinese “String of Pearls.” One assessment addressed persistent rumors that
China has built or is building military bases in Burma. Veteran Burma watcher William Ashton
wrote in 1997:
For all the reports on this subject which have appeared . . . few appear to draw
on rm evidence or can be traced to reliable sources. Many seem to be based
on rumours, speculation or even deliberate misinformation. ere has also
been considerable confusion over particular places, developments and military
capabilities, which has then been recycled by journalists and academics in
subsequent articles.
68
In a 2007 article, “Burma, China and the Myth of Military Bases,” Andrew Selth writes, “It
seems to have escaped the notice of most observers that at no stage had the existence of a large
Chinese SIGINT [signals intelligence] station on Great Coco Island been ocially conrmed
by any government other than India’s, which was hardly an objective observer. is includes
the U.S., which has both an interest in China’s activities in the Indian Ocean and the means to
detect them.”
69
Aer an in-depth examination of Great Coco Island and Hainggyi Island, both
reportedly candidates for China’s String of Pearls, Selth found no physical evidence of a military
facility on these islands:
27
Chinese Overseas Basing Requirements
Great Coco Island has no sheltered harbor or facilities capable of handling a
ship of any size. ere was only a small pier there until 2002, when the berthing
facilities on the island were reportedly expanded. e airstrip, while apparently
extended some time aer 1988, was also vulnerable to the region’s poor weather.
Similarly, neither the hydrography nor the topography of Hainggyi Island lent
themselves to the construction of a maritime facility of any size.
70
Selth concludes that “it would appear that there are a number of small maritime surveillance sites
scattered around the Burmese coastline, including on Great Coco Island, some of which may have
discreet intelligence functions. Much of the equipment at these sites is likely to have been provided
by China, as part of the deals struck between Rangoon and Beijing aer 1988.”
71
Another assessment casts a skeptical eye on Gwadar, another String of Pearls candidate site:
e Gwadar deep-sea port is a case in point. e state-owned China Harbour
Engineering Company, funded with a $198 [million] Chinese loan, has helped
Pakistan complete the rst stage of this project for a major Pakistan port near
the entrance to the Persian Gulf at the mouth of the Straits of Hormuz. It does
indeed have a strategic signicance as the possible terminus of a land route
from western China and central Asia to the Indian Ocean, which would have
considerable economic signicance. But there seems little or no evidence that a
naval base facility is part of the package, or indeed that China has any current
intention or capacity to maintain an Indian Ocean eet for which Gwadar could
be a base. e same applies to the other civil engineering and commercial projects
in the region which are quoted as evidence for the String of Pearls thesis, from
Cambodia to Sri Lanka.
72
Other analysts have pointed out that, with the exception of the special case of Pakistan
(discussed below), “government ocials in the respective ‘pearl’ countries have openly repudi-
ated reports they have given China any preferential treatment and that Beijing is quietly build-
ing and/or planning to build military bases in their sovereign territories.”
73
Bangladesh’s Prime
Minister Sheikh Hasina claimed that the Chittagong port was “part of her government’s strategy
to connect Bangladesh to the greater Asian region in order to develop its markets and promote
economic growth in the interests of the people of that country.”
74
Sri Lanka initially proposed
the Hambantota port modernization project to India in 2005 but was turned down by New
28
China Strategic Perspectives, No. 7
Delhi. Sri Lanka subsequently obtained agreement from Beijing to nance eight infrastructure
projects, including the Hambantota project, in 2007.
75
Pakistan is the one country that may be interested in oering its territory as a potential
site for a Chinese overseas base. In May 2011, Pakistan’s defense minister caused an uproar in
the region when he announced that Pakistan had asked China to build a naval base at Gwadar
and that the request had been clearly conveyed to the Chinese.
76
e Chinese government im-
mediately issued a at denial that China had any intention of constructing military bases in
Pakistan.
77
e issue of Gwadar as a potential base for Chinese military operations recently
regained further currency with the announcement that Port Singapore Authority (PSA)—the
Singapore company originally appointed by the Pakistan government to manage the port
of Gwadar—no longer plans to play that role and that a Chinese rm will eventually take
over operations.
78
e fact that a Singaporean company was running day-to-day operations
at Gwadar made Chinese use of the port as a covert military facility highly unlikely, but even
the news that a Chinese rm will be taking over operations makes the possibility only slightly
more plausible. One of the primary reasons that PSA has withdrawn from the project is that
Pakistan has failed to provide some of the long-term infrastructure and logistical support
features necessary to make the port successful—factors that also make it unlikely to serve as
a “p e a r l .”
79
Several sites in the Indian Ocean are of signicant interest to Chinese companies and may
have some military utility. But is the PLA using these facilities to support operations in the In-
dian Ocean?
Operational Patterns of Behavior: Current PLAN Overseas Logistics Support
A second way to examine the relative merits of the Dual Use Logistics Facility and the
String of Pearls Models is to analyze current PLA operational patterns of behavior. All militar-
ies prepare for operations by rehearsing missions before they perform them, by cooperating
with allies and other partners that would be involved in joint operations, and by surveying the
geographic landscape, terrain, and areas they expect to operate in.
Some Western observers argue that China has already proven it intends to develop
overseas basing and facilities because it currently utilizes an overseas basing network to
support its Gulf of Aden deployments.
80
Figure 1 represents China’s Gulf of Aden overseas
basing network. Daniel Kostecka, an analyst with the U.S. Navy staff, points out that “[t]
he existence of this support network can be seen in the ports in the Indian Ocean where
the PLAN has quietly called. The list of these ports is an indicator of not only where the
29
Chinese Overseas Basing Requirements
PLAN prefers to replenish its ships and rests its crews but also of where it is likely to de-
velop formal arrangements should it choose to do so.”
81
In contrast to the claims of String of
Pearls advocates, the current Chinese overseas access network does not overlap with “pearl”
candidate sites at all. Instead, the PLAN has operated out of ports such as Salalah, Aden,
Djibouti, and Karachi.
Table 3 presents PLAN port visits during the rst eight Gulf of Aden counterpiracy de-
ployments. ere have been additional task force rotations since this assessment was conducted
in mid-2013, but an examination of subsequent visits reects similar patterns, with no use of the
String of Pearls candidate ports to support PLAN counterpiracy operations.
82
Figure 1. PLA Navy Ports of Call in Support of the Gulf of Aden Counterpiracy
Task Force
30
China Strategic Perspectives, No. 7
Port Number of
Visits
Dates Deployment
Number
Support Activity Longest
Visit (days)
Salalah,
Oman
10 6/21/09
8/14/09
1/2/10
4/1/10
6/8/10
8/10/10
10/11/10
1/19/11
1/28/11
4/10/11
2
nd
3
rd
4
th
5
th
5
th
6
th
6
th
7
th
7
th
8
th
Food, perishables,
diesel fuel, water,
liberty
10
Djibouti 6 1/24/10
5/3/10
9/13/10
9/22/10
12/24/10
2/21/11
4
th
5
th
6
th
6
th
6
th
7
th
Food, perishables,
water
5
Aden,
Yemen
10 2/21/09
4/25/09
7/23/09
9/28/09
10/24/09
2/5/10
3/14/10
5/16/10
7/26/10
10/1/10
1
st
1
st
2
nd
3
rd
3
rd
4
th
4
th
5
th
6
th
6
th
Food, perishables,
water,
diesel fuel
5
Colombo,
Sri Lanka
1 1/11/10 4
th
Goodwill 3
Abu Dhabi,
UAE
1 3/25/10 5
th
Goodwill
Jedda, Saudi
Arabia
1 11/27/10 6
th
Goodwill 5
Karachi,
Pakistan
1 3/13/11 8
th
Goodwill
Alexandria,
Egypt
1 7/26/10 5
th
Goodwill 5
Cochin,
India
1 8/8/09 ? Goodwill 3
Table 3. PLAN Gulf of Aden Ship Port Visits
31
Chinese Overseas Basing Requirements
Rangoon,
Burma
1 8/29/10 5
th
Goodwill ?
Al Manmah,
Bahrain
2 9/9/10
12/9/10
6
th
Goodwill ?
Dar Es-
Salaam,
Tanzania
1 3/26/11 7
th
Goodwill, military
exchange
5
e two ports visited most frequently by PLAN ships were Salalah in Oman and Aden in
Yemen. Salalah appears to serve as a “catchall” relief site for PLAN ships deployed to the Gulf of
Aden and is used to replenish food, water, and fuel and also for liberty calls. Nearly every PLAN
Gulf of Aden task force has visited Salalah during its deployment.
PLAN ships visited Aden 10 times, making it one of the most frequently visited ports.
However, only one type of PLAN ship has visited Aden: comprehensive supply ships. e supply
ships replenish their food, water, and diesel fuel and then provide replenishment-at-sea services
to other ships in the PLAN Gulf of Aden Task Force. is operational pattern closely mirrors
U.S. Navy operational patterns in the Persian Gulf, suggesting that the PLAN studied and ap-
plied U.S. naval concepts of operation. at the port of Aden also happens to have been the port
in which the USS Cole was attacked by al Qaeda in 2000 is probably not lost on PLA Navy plan-
ners. us, the operational pattern of sending a single replenishment ship to Aden and having
it replenish other ships not only mimics the U.S. pattern of behavior but is also a prudent force
protection measure.
PLAN Gulf of Aden task forces have also used Djibouti to replenish naval supplies. A
number of militaries, including the U.S. Navy, regularly visit Djibouti to stock up on food, other
Table 3. PLAN Gulf of Aden Ship Port Visits (cont.)
Sources: Daniel J. Kostecka, “Places and Bases: e Chinese Navy’s Emerging Support Network in the In-
dian Ocean,” Naval War College Review 64, no. 1 (Winter 2011); Li Jianwen and Mo Xiaoliang, “Chinese
‘Zhoushan’ Warship Berths at Port of Djibouti,” PLA Daily, February 22, 2011, available at <http://eng.
mod.gov.cn/DefenseNews/2011-02/22/content_4226259.htm>; “Escort Fleet of the Chinese Navy Began
Visit to South Africa,” Chinese-Embassy.org, April 6, 2011, available at <www.chinese-embassy.org.za/eng/
zngx/t812975.htm>; Liu Yiwei and Hourui, “Chinese Warship Berths at Port of Salalah,” PLA Daily, April
12, 2011, available at <http://eng.mod.gov.cn/DefenseNews/2011-04/12/content_4236914.htm>; Andrew
S. Erickson and Austin M. Strange, No Substitute for Experience: Chinese Antipiracy Operations in the Gulf
of Aden, Chinese Maritime Studies, Number 10 (Newport, RI: U.S. Naval War College, 2013).
32
China Strategic Perspectives, No. 7
perishables, and water when deployed on counterpiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden. e
multinational nature of the facility means that PLAN ships and personnel frequently interact
with U.S., European Union, Japanese, and Korean naval personnel at this site, providing oppor-
tunities for ad hoc cooperation.
e PLAN has conducted port visits before and aer Gulf of Aden deployments, includ-
ing visits to Cochin, India; Alexandria, Egypt; Colombo, Sri Lanka; Dar Es-Salaam, Tanzania;
Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates; Jeddah, Saudi Arabia; and Karachi, Pakistan. e PLAN
did not replenish naval supplies during these visits, which were port calls to bolster Chinese
diplomatic relations with the host country. ese visits likely involved liberty calls for Chi-
nese crewmembers.
Chinese resupply activities are mostly conducted on a commercial basis. China and
the host governments do not sign memoranda of agreement or negotiate a status of forces
agreement covering visiting Chinese sailors. Chinese commentators describe PLAN port
visits as similar to a visit by a tourist cruise ship. The host nation provides the ships “hotel
services” and expects the sailors to aid the local economy through “tourist” activities. The
local Chinese embassy or consulate negotiates agreements for PLAN ships to use facility
water, food, and fuel. The Chinese embassy or consulate also arranges to have spare parts
flown in by commercial air so that crews may conduct minor or intermediate repairs to
ships and helicopters.
is exclusive reliance on commercial port access is unlikely to persist. Recent reports
suggest that the PLAN is considering using the Seychelles as a port of operations for Gulf of
Aden deployments. Seychelles Foreign Minister Jean-Paul Adam indicated in September 2012
that his country has invited China to set up a military presence.
83
Subsequent Chinese press
reports indicated that the PLAN was considering the option to use the Seychelles to support
logistics and supply eorts for PLAN counterpiracy task forces. is news adds credence to the
argument that the PLAN will move from exclusive reliance on commercial ports (the Pit Stop
Model) and reach agreements with host nations to use their military facilities (the Dual Use
Logistics Facility Model).
84
What do these observations indicate about the viability of the String of Pearls Model versus
the Dual Use Logistics Facility Model? First, there is no evidence that the Chinese are currently
conducting military activities at any of the String of Pearls sites. To date, PLAN Gulf of Aden
task forces have not used or visited a single String of Pearls site. Second, transactions between
the PLAN and host countries providing support for PLAN Gulf of Aden operations have been
commercial in nature. ese ports have only provided “hotel services,” replenished supplies,
33
Chinese Overseas Basing Requirements
and served as liberty sites for visiting PLAN ships. Finally, the number of PLA forces and units
involved in out of area activities has been very limited. None of this evidence supports asser-
tions that the Chinese intend to deploy enough forces in the Indian Ocean area to dominate the
region or engage in major combat operations with any of its neighbors.
ere is little physical evidence to suggest China is constructing or investing in port facili-
ties in other countries to prepare for future combat operations against India or other countries
in the region. Continued PLAN heavy reliance on commercial port facilities—mostly in coun-
tries that would likely be neutral if China and India engaged in a shooting war—would create
signicant vulnerabilities in a conict. If China were in fact preparing for major conict, it
would likely negotiate with a politically reliable host nation and revisit a single military base
repeatedly to accustom its forces to working with an ally in a familiar operating environment.
Could the String of Pearls Support Major Combat Operations?
is part of the study explores the arguments of those analysts who believe China intends to
use the commercial port facilities and political relationships associated with the String of Pearls
to encircle India and dominate the Indian Ocean. Such an objective would require China to have
sucient forces and an associated logistics support infrastructure to conduct major combat op-
erations in the Indian Ocean. e analysis identies the forces China would need to dominate the
IOR and the other activities China would need to undertake to support this objective.
Base Construction for Combat Operations
If China decided to try to encircle India or dominate the Indian Ocean, Chinese military
planners would have to expect a potential conventional military response from India, the largest
military power in South Asia. If China accepts this risk and decides to build military facilities
in the String of Pearls to support this objective, planners would have to take projected Indian
military capabilities into account.
An examination of India’s air order of battle alone suggests that this would be a very
risky proposition. India has a variety of aircraft within range of all the String of Pearls sites,
including older MiG-23s and more modern Su-30s and Mirage 2000s. None of these ports
are covered by effective integrated air defense systems, which make PLAN or PLA assets
stationed there vulnerable to air attack. Although the PLA could station mobile surface-to-
air (SAM) sites to defend String of Pearls facilities (as they did in North Vietnam during
the Vietnam War), SAMs would provide little or no defense against India’s conventional
ballistic missiles.
34
China Strategic Perspectives, No. 7
Stationing military assets, particularly naval assets, at vulnerable String of Pearls sites
would also divide Chinese military forces in the event of a conict. e String of Pearls sites
would be a long way from Chinese waters. Assuming the ability to pass through the Strait of
Malacca and Strait of Lombok, the PLAN’s most modern destroyers would require more than
6 days to sail from Gwadar to the southernmost Chinese ports (151 hours at 29 knots; see
appendix 1 for distances). Stationing signicant numbers of military assets far from China
would make them unavailable to defend the Chinese mainland against other potential ad-
versaries, including the United States and Japan. In order for it to deploy large portions of
its naval and air assets so far from its territory, China would have to be condent that other
parties would not enter a conict between China and India and that hostilities would remain
conned to the Indian Ocean.
e naval forces required to actually do what String of Pearls adherents claim China is
attempting—to encircle India and to militarily dominate the Indian Ocean—would constitute
an enormous naval force that would cast great doubts on Chinese claims of “peaceful develop-
ment.” A prudent naval planner in Beijing would conclude that the PLAN would need to deploy
a force at least as large as the Indian Navy to dominate the Indian Ocean. Appendix 2 lists the
current and projected (2020) Indian naval order of battle. A Chinese navy seeking to dominate
the IOR in 2020 would need at least 3 aircra carriers, 32 surface combatants, and 21 subma-
rines in addition to the forces necessary to handle non–Indian Ocean missions. If China’s cur-
rent naval force structure (see appendix 2) represents the force needed to meet local maritime
security needs, then the PLAN would need a force structure equivalent to both the 2013 PLAN
and the 2020 Indian navy to conduct both missions. China’s naval force structure would have
to be much larger than it is today to address the PLAN current defense mission and a projected
Indian Ocean campaign.
A new generation of Indian strategic analysts observes that the String of Pearls might not
actually make sense from China’s point of view. For example, Iskander Rehman argues in “Chi-
na’s String of Pearls and India’s Enduring Tactical Advantage” that:
[B]y virtue of India’s immense geographical advantages in the region, it is
dicult to imagine China ever being able to wield as much military clout in
the region as India can. India’s natural peninsular formation means that it has
been described by some as akin to an ‘unsinkable aircra carrier’ jutting out
into the Indian Ocean. Any naval task force venturing into the Bay of Bengal
with hostile intentions would have to contend with India’s air force and naval
35
Chinese Overseas Basing Requirements
aviation, operating not only from the mainland, but also from the Andaman
and Nicobar archipelago in the Andaman Sea, whose airstrips are currently
being extended, and which is slated to eventually host Sukhoi squadrons, and
possibly MiGs and Mirages.
85
Rehman adds:
China’s naval presence in the region will be dispersed along the several, oen
distant nodal points that constitute its string of pearls. Assuming that these forces
together are superior in both quantity and quality to the Indian Navy, which is,
all in all, most unlikely, India will still have the immediate advantage of force
concentration and hence superiority if it decides to conduct a rapid strike at an
isolated group of Chinese vessels. A direct attack on a naval base would be highly
undesirable, as it would trigger a severe crisis with the hosting country. A massive
naval deployment outside one such base could have the desired eect however,
by compelling the Chinese to de-escalate their land assault, much as the Indian
Navy’s stationing of its eet 13 nautical miles outside Karachi during the Kargil
war prompted, some claim, the Pakistan Army to accelerate the withdrawal of its
forces from the disputed islands.
86
String of Pearls and Major Combat Operations
As already noted, the PLAN does not currently make use of any of the candidate String of
Pearls sites to support counterpiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden. Any commercial port has
some military utility. However, the question is whether supposed String of Pearls ports at the
Coco Islands, Hambantota, Chittagong, and Gwadar are capable of supporting PLAN major
combat operations in the Indian Ocean.
is question can be answered by identifying the physical features necessary to use a facil-
ity to conduct major combat operations. e U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) and Depart-
ment of Transportation apply a standard set of criteria to characterize military port facilities
used to support major U.S. combat operations.
87
ese criteria are listed in the le column of
table 4. Comparison of these criteria with the physical characteristics of the PLAN naval base at
Zhanjiang indicates that Chinese military port facilities are designed and constructed to meet
very similar standards. (See appendix 3 for the detailed comparison.)
36
China Strategic Perspectives, No. 7
Requirements Gwadar Hambantota Chittagong Coco Islands
Recommended infrastructure 2012 2035 2012 2035 2012 2035 2012 2035
ree berthing spaces 1,000
linear feet each
X X X X
Minimum water depth of 35
feet
X X X X
30–45 acres of open storage X X X X X
Four rail ooading spurs of
1,000 feet of straight track each
Four rail/truck end ramps X X
Gatehouse/security X X X X X X
Access to port-owned
interchange yard to support
switching two trains per day
X X
Suitable area to land/service
helos (~5 acres)
X X X X X
Two container handlers X X X X X X
Adequate interior roadways
to port facilities
X X X X
Oce space with adequate
utilities and communication
service
X X X X
Processing area for 30 trucks X X X
Wash rack that meets USDA
requirements
Terminal Access
Close proximity (<10 miles)
to interstate highway system
X X X X
Access to at least one major
commercial rail carrier
X X X X
Water channel access width of
500 feet and depth of 35 feet
X X X X X
Access to commercial
rail interchange yard (if
port-owned facilities are
inadequate)
X X X X
Table 4. U.S. DOD Port Requirements Applied to String of Pearls Candidatess
37
Chinese Overseas Basing Requirements
Table 4 compares the current (2012) and projected (2035) physical features of String of
Pearls candidate sites with the DOD port criteria. With the exception of Chittagong port in
Bangladesh, the candidate String of Pearls sites all fall far short of what DOD considers mini-
mally acceptable to support major combat operations. Projected improvements by 2035 may
give some of the candidate sites additional capabilities to support military operations, although
these improvements are intended to support expanded commercial activities. Of note, the port
in the Coco Islands does not meet any of the DOD criteria. While Chittagong currently satises
most of the DOD criteria, and Gwadar and Hambantota might do so at some point in the future,
all three of these ports are located close to India and would be highly vulnerable to attack.
is examination nds little evidence to support the claims of String of Pearls advocates
that Chinese investments in port facilities in the Indian Ocean reveal a Chinese intention to
encircle India or dominate the Indian Ocean militarily. China would require a much larger navy
to conduct such operations, and it would make little strategic sense to station the bulk of that
force so far away from Chinese territory. Major combat operations would require logistics and
support capabilities that go well beyond what commercial ports could provide. Covert ordnance
facilities could expand the capability of commercial ports to support some combat operations,
but sustained major combat operations would require bases and the defensive military forces
necessary to protect them from attack. Such a logistics infrastructure would be an overt string of
Chinese military bases, not a covert String of Pearls. Although the long-term development plans
for some of these port facilities would improve their capability to support combat operations
(if planned facility improvements materialize), they are in locations highly vulnerable to attack
Sources: Gwadar Port Authority Web site, available at <www.gwadarport.gov.pk/portprole.html>; “Devel-
opment in Port Hambanota,” Sri Lanka Port Authority Web site, available at <www.slpa.lk/port_hambantota.
asp?chk=4>; Shirajiv Sirimane, “H’tota Port Project Ahead of Schedule,” Sunday Observer (Sri Lanka), March
7, 2010, available at <www.sundayobserver.lk/2010/03/07/fea01.asp>; Chittagong Port Authority Web site,
available at <http://portal.cpa.gov.bd>; “Bangladesh to Build Second Naval Base in Chittagong,” Xinhua News
Agency, August 9, 2005, available at <http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200508/09/eng20050809_201204.
html>; “Bangladesh Oered China to Use the Chittagong Port as a Commercial Outlet,” Reuters, March 15,
2010, available at <http://gurumia.com/2010/03/15/bangladesh-oered-china-to-use-the-chittagon-port-as-
a-commercial-outlet/>; Cocos Islands on Google Maps, available at <www.google.com/maps/place/Coco+Isl
ands/@14.118519,93.37626,8z/data=!3m1!4b1!4m7!1m4!3m3!1s0x3091a3008390af:0xbc796b23fe024f25!2
sCoco+Islands!3b1!3m1!1s0x3091a3008390af:0xbc796b23fe024f25>.
38
China Strategic Perspectives, No. 7
Figure 2. “String of Pearls” Sites
39
Chinese Overseas Basing Requirements
by India. If China does plan to dominate the Indian Ocean militarily, a major and sustained
buildup of its naval forces is likely to be a better indicator of that intention than Chinese invest-
ments and construction in commercial port facilities in South Asia.
From a strategic point of view, a continued powerful U.S. and Indian military presence in
the Indian Ocean makes China unlikely to attempt to dominate that region. If the United States
enters into a rapid economic and military decline and India does not successfully modernize its
military forces, then a substantial PLAN presence in the Indian Ocean might become a game
changer for Chinese strategic inuence in South Asia. However, India is likely to continue to
develop and modernize its military, and the United States is unlikely to withdraw from the re-
gion in the foreseeable future.
Additional Considerations for a PLAN Logistics Base
e preceding analysis suggests that the Dual Use Logistics Facility Model is the logistics
support model that best suits future PLAN needs. is part uses interviews with U.S. military
logisticians and analysis of Chinese writings to identify likely characteristics of a potential Chi-
nese overseas logistics base.
Interviews with Military Logisticians
U.S. military logisticians have extensive experience supporting forward deployed forces in
peacetime and wartime situations. is section draws upon interviews with sta of the National
Defense University’s Center for Joint and Strategic Logistics and with Navy logisticians with
experience at the U.S. Navy Logistics Force Western Pacic or Commander, Logistics Group
Western Pacic (LOGWESTPAC) in Singapore to obtain a more detailed sense of the functions
and activities the PLAN might perform at overseas logistics facilities.
e interviews focused on logistics support considerations for the missions the PLAN is
most likely to perform and therefore did not examine logistics requirements for major combat
operations against a major power. Likely missions include presence and military diplomacy
missions, counterpiracy operations, maritime intercept operations, HA/DR, NEOs, SLOC pro-
tection by escorting Chinese shipping, and possibly counterterrorist operations on land us-
ing special forces troops. Such operations would support Chinese overseas interests without
threatening the United States or other countries in the Indian Ocean. e logistics and basing
infrastructure necessary to support such operations could also help project Chinese power and
inuence into the Persian Gulf, the Indian Ocean, and the African continent—regions of con-
siderable interest to China. e PLAN can support these operations with modest bases and
40
China Strategic Perspectives, No. 7
logistical support facilities instead of a robust network of military bases that may appear threat-
ening to countries in the region.
Interviewees were asked what a Chinese logistics network (including bases) to sup-
port these missions might look like. One expert suggested that if China would not require a
large ground force presence to conduct escort and counterpiracy operations and to provide
protection and NEO missions to Chinese expatriates, the bulk of China’s overseas mis-
sions would be expeditionary in nature and largely seabased.
88
PLA forces are unlikely to
need a large-scale, continuous replenishment effort. A hybrid logistics support network or
Dual Use Logistics Facility Model that mixes commercial and military facilities is entirely
workable for such missions.
89
This basing model also emphasizes commercial contracts to
support a Chinese military facility, cooperative development and use of a partner military’s
logistics support capabilities, and continued positive economic and political engagement
with the host nation.
90
Spare Parts: Warehousing or a Distribution Network? Logistics experts noted the diculty
in determining which ship or aircra parts will break before their expected service life is over.
However, the PLAN would not necessarily need to store large numbers of spare parts for ships and
aircra in warehouses. An alternative is to develop robust and redundant distribution networks
to quickly move spare parts where they are needed. Experts suggested a Chinese network might
look less like solid lines of control between specic locales and a few suppliers, and more like a spi-
der web of connections between local Chinese embassies/consulates, China-based PLA logistics
facilities, and various overseas and China-based suppliers, husbanding agents, and contractors.
91
is spider web model could also support some combat operations if resupply aircra and ships
could travel into the combat zone. Naval experts noted that with technician access to the ship or
aircra in question plus the availability of most spare parts by expedited delivery services, most
parts can be replaced even during wartime, with the exception of submarine and aircra carrier
nuclear reactors.
92
Most parts can be delivered to a repair facility by ship or airplane.
93
For many items, the PLA is likely to follow the U.S. military in avoiding warehousing (parts
stockpiled in a forward location) in favor of “stock positioning,” which involves contract arrange-
ments with a repair facility or host country to deliver resources to an agreed location at a specic
time.
94
Warehousing might still be required for spare parts that are only produced in China.
Local and Husbanding Agents. Stock positioning and warehousing typically involve the
use of local intermediaries or agents who can manage complex logistics transactions. e PLA
would need to develop relationships with local agents who could work with DHL, Federal Ex-
press, and local logistics assets to move materiel from point A to point B. ese local agents
41
Chinese Overseas Basing Requirements
must be able to negotiate and supervise the numerous contracts to provide supplies to PLA
units at port.
95
Light Footprint. With the exception of port calls to provide liberty for sailors, the PLAN
will likely keep surface combatants out to sea and send replenishment ships into port to refuel
and restock and then replenish the other ships at sea.
96
e PLAN currently operates this way in
the Gulf of Aden. Chinese comprehensive supply ships pull into Aden, replenish food and fuel,
and then resupply other members of the counterpiracy task force at sea.
97
is decreases costs
by reducing the number of berths required, limits potential political repercussions of a large
Chinese naval presence in port for a prolonged period of time, and reduces risk of casualties in
ports subject to terrorist attack.
Division of Labor among Dierent Logistics Hubs. Logistics experts drew a distinction
between logistical support for ships and for aircra. Air operations require extensive practice,
access to an aireld that can handle the type of aircra being used, that is close to transportation
assets, and that has the necessary fuel and maintenance capability. ey also require strategic
relationships with the host government and key host-nation contractors at the facility. e me-
chanics and parts needed for aircra maintenance are reasonably portable, so extensive ware-
housing of spare parts would not be needed if an eective distribution system is established.
98
ese special requirements suggest that in many instances air logistics support may be provided
in a dierent location than naval logistics support.
99
LOGWESTPAC experts noted that the PLAN will likely develop a network division of
labor, where logistics, supply, and repair functions are distributed among dierent locations.
100
For instance, damaged U.S. Navy ships are not repaired at Singaporean shipyards but instead
sail to Japan, which handles most major ship repairs in the Western Pacic.
101
Conversely, the
Singapore command maintains a strong web of connections and relationships with local con-
tractors and husbanding agents and thus has primary responsibility for logistics arrangements
throughout the Asia-Pacic region.
102
LOGWESTPAC only manages shipborne logistics, defer-
ring to its counterpart in Bahrain (Commander, Task Force 53) or to Commander, Fleet Air
Western Pacic in Atsugi, Japan, when air logistics support is needed. e PLAN will likely
develop similar divisions of labor among the various commercial and military sites that support
their operations.
Dual Use Activities. Interviewees noted that most logistics activities are dual use and can
be performed by either military or commercial ports or bases. Work force skills used to support
commercial activity—such as supply chain management—can also support military activity.
103
An aireld that supports commercial airliners can also support noncombat military aircra.
104
42
China Strategic Perspectives, No. 7
e PLA does not need a dedicated military base to install sensitive communications and other
equipment (including radars or even weapons systems); most functions can be performed at
commercial facilities. However, the PLA would need assured access, including permission to y
Chinese technicians into the host country, use maintenance and repair facilities, and conduct
the necessary work on a damaged ship or aircra.
105
Legal and Political Restrictions. LOGWESTPAC logisticians noted that the command
and staff have to work within various political and legal restrictions. Some host countries
want a high degree of control over a visiting military’s activities on the facility and expect
the visiting military to abide by very rigid legal obligations. For example, a host country
may refuse a port visit if a request is not cleared 48 hours in advance. Some countries re-
quire a 1-week advance notification of a port visit to provide time for flight clearances of
technicians being flown in to conduct repairs or install equipment on a ship. Host nations
are often politically sensitive about hosting large numbers of military personnel, which
encourages operations with a light footprint. Such political restrictions would especially
apply in scenarios where a visiting military was involved in a major regional conflict. For
example, Singapore might deny port visits and military flights if the United States were
engaged in a conflict with China.
106
PLA Overseas Missions and Overseas Logistics Characteristics. Our interviewees
also noted that the characteristics and extensiveness of the logistics support network for the
PLA will in some part be determined by the missions that the PLA will be expected to per-
form overseas.
107
If the CCP leadership is essentially satisfied with a more robust version of
the PLA counterpiracy mission, the overseas logistics support network would probably be a
more definitive and reliable version of what the Chinese navy enjoys today—that is, signed
access agreements with some of the countries that the PLAN currently uses for replenish-
ment and supply. If PLA overseas missions include NEOs, HA/DR, and force protection of
citizens, the PLA over the long run might attempt to establish permanent basic access to
a facility with communications, housing for sailors, medical facilities, rudimentary ship
and equipment repair, and replenishment and resupply functions. If the PLA is expected to
conduct ground operations ashore in a distant location, the services needed at the facility
would probably expand to include vehicle and equipment repair sites, intermediary medi-
cal and mortuary services, light prepositioned materiel sites for low-intensity conflicts, an
extensive training area for ground troops, and some warehouses for spare parts and sensi-
tive equipment. Finally, if PLAN missions involve an extensive SLOC protection mission,
the PLAN would probably seek to establish an extensive network of facilities geographically
43
Chinese Overseas Basing Requirements
dispersed to cover the wide area of the Indian Ocean. Additional features of the PLA over-
seas facility in this case would probably include large ship repair sites, extensive medical
and mortuary services, POL sites, ordnance storage sites, air traffic control services, and
other air support facilities and operations. The recent disappearance of Malaysian Flight
370 en route from Kuala Lumpur to Beijing has revealed that the Chinese military realizes
that it lacks the capability to maintain situational awareness throughout a vast space such
as the Indian Ocean.
108
How Big Would a Chinese Logistics Base Be? Former LOGWESTPAC staffers indi-
cated that their command has about 100 people.
109
Center for Joint and Strategic Logistics
experts suggested that the PLAN, with its less experienced personnel, would probably need
about 1.5 times more staff, or about 150 personnel.
110
Finnair, a commercial air shipping
company that performs air supply chain management functions, staffs its Helsinki terminal
with 350 people.
111
A full-fledged Chinese logistics base in Qingdao has a staff of approxi-
mately 500 personnel.
112
These figures suggest a range of 100 to 500 personnel at a Chinese
overseas logistics facility. Chinese scholars and military experts emphasize that PLA activi-
ties on a foreign base should be respectful of the wishes and sovereignty of the host country,
which suggests that the PLA might try to minimize its footprint. U.S. logistics experts share
this view. Considering all these factors, a Chinese overseas logistics support base might
have 150 to 200 personnel.
Selection Criteria for the Host Country
Chinese analysts have recently started to specify additional desired characteristics for their
overseas facilities. Dai Xu describes the criteria for selecting a specic region and country that
should host their overseas facility/facilities:
We must choose a region where our strategic interests are important and
concentrated and then select a country that has a friendly, solid relationship
with us. Not only can our overseas commercial eets obtain timely replenishment
once we have this kind of base, but our commercial interests in the countries and
regions around our base will also have a stable support point. is type of support
can not only encourage domestic enterprises to take further steps toward going
global, but can also deepen our friendship with the host countries and promote
cooperation on other issues.
113
44
China Strategic Perspectives, No. 7
Legal Requirements and Political Restrictions
Shen Dingli writes:
Bases established by other countries appear to be used to protect their overseas
rights and interests. As long as the bases are set up in line with international laws
and regulations, they are legal ones. But if the bases are established to harm other
countries, their existence becomes illegal and they are likely to be opposed by other
countries.
114
Shen argues that overseas basing decisions need to balance three relationships:
First, the relations between base troops and the host countries. It is possible
to set up military bases as long as the establishment is in line with the host
countries’ interests. Second, the relationship between the base troops and the
countries neighboring to the host country. If the base troops can maintain
regional stability, it will be probably welcomed by all the countries in the region.
ird, the relationship between the big countries in the world. e establishment
of the troop bases is sensitive to those big countries which have already set up
bases abroad.
115
Shaping the International Environment to Accept a Chinese Overseas Base
Military expert Liu Zhongmin argues that:
China also needs to make the international community aware of the fact that
overseas bases are needed for two purposes: China’s own interests and the
country’s assumption of more international responsibilities. ere is no need to
conceal these goals. Some countries expect China to undertake more international
responsibilities but object to China’s plans for overseas bases, which are necessary
for bearing such responsibilities. is is unreasonable.
He urges Chinese policymakers to begin consultations with potential hosts, noting that “China’s
traditional friendly relations with many coastal nations on the Indian Ocean make it possible
45
Chinese Overseas Basing Requirements
to set up overseas bases there.” Liu notes that Southeast Asian, Middle Eastern, and African
countries are not worried about Chinese overseas bases because China does not have a tradition
of maritime military expeditions. India is an exception, since it “has competitive relations with
China in the Indian Ocean.” Liu argues that consultations and cultivation of support from dif-
ferent international organizations and the global community can overcome obstacles.
116
Chinese analysts and military personnel advocating establishment of an overseas military
base argue that it should:
provide essential logistics and supply support for out of area military operations
conform to international law and the strict restrictions and preferences of the host nation
support an acceptable Chinese role in the larger regional and international context
be built in a country or countries that maintain friendly relations with China and whose
interests are advanced by a Chinese military presence
protect Chinese shipping and sea lines of communication against nontraditional and
traditional threats, ensure the safety of Chinese citizens and businesses abroad, and deter
foreign intervention against Chinese economic interests abroad.
117
Staging Points for Nontraditional Missions Ashore
A more speculative argument is the potential for China to establish staging points to sup-
ply ordnance, weapons, and other equipment to support ground operations against terrorists,
insurgents, and pirates in Africa. Comments by Chinese analysts and by the PLA Chief of Gen-
eral Sta in 2011 suggest Beijing may eventually decide that China’s economic interests in Afri-
ca require a ground force presence.
118
Special operations against nonstate actors in Africa could
be facilitated by a logistics support facility in a friendly country such as Pakistan. Such ground
operations would go well beyond the rationales currently oered by advocates of overseas Chi-
nese bases and would likely generate political concerns from African countries.
e PLA might be able to conduct limited ground combat operations without staging ord-
nance and weapons ashore. China could follow the example of a U.S. Marine Expeditionary
Unit (Special Operations Capable) (MEU[SOC]), which deploys a reinforced battalion sup-
ported by aircra and service support assets on board amphibious ships to conduct NEOs, HA/
DR operations, and low-intensity combat against terrorists and insurgents. MEU (SOCs) do not
46
China Strategic Perspectives, No. 7
need prestaged equipment to conduct 6-month-long missions. e deployment of China’s rst
landing platform dock to the Gulf of Aden in July 2010 with PLA special forces on board could
have been the initial test of such an operational concept.
119
Characteristics of a Future Chinese Overseas Logistics Base
Interviews with military logisticians and Chinese writings provide insight into the opera-
tional and political considerations likely to shape the characteristics, features, and location of a
potential overseas PLA logistics base. Pakistan’s status as a trusted strategic partner whose inter-
ests are closely aligned with China’s makes it the most likely location for such a base, but Karachi
would be better able to satisfy PLAN requirements than Gwadar. Chinese experts recognize that
host nation (and neighboring country) concerns will restrict which operations are possible from
an overseas base. Chinese experts also acknowledge the need for a concerted strategic communi-
cations plan to gain international support for an overseas base and to dispel international suspi-
cion. U.S. military logisticians suggest that a future Chinese overseas logistics base will likely be
dual use in nature, rely on distribution networks rather than warehousing for resupply, have a light
footprint of between 100 and 500 personnel, and make heavy use of husbanding agents.
Establishing an overseas base in South Asia would support a range of Chinese overseas
interests, but it might also give rise to additional interests. Dr. Rodney Lyons of the Australian
Strategic Policy Institute argues that a nation’s presence out of area is like gravity—a force that in
itself exerts pressure in a certain direction.
120
Chinese overseas logistics bases would be vulner-
able to attack if China conducted major combat operations against India or the United States.
But in peacetime, overseas logistics facilities could support a higher tempo of PLAN operations,
increase Chinese political leverage in dealing with regional countries, and advance Chinese
foreign policy goals. An increased PLA presence in the Indian Ocean would oer both oppor-
tunities and challenges for U.S. national security interests.
Conclusion and Policy Implications
This study began by examining China’s expanding overseas economic, political, and
security interests, which are likely to generate increasing demand for PLAN overseas de-
ployments. The study then identified and analyzed six basing models that the PLA might
employ to support such missions. After examining each model in relation to China’s long-
standing foreign policy principles and long-term interests, the research found two models
conform to China’s foreign policy principles: Dual Use Logistics Facility Model and String
of Pearls Model.
47
Chinese Overseas Basing Requirements
e current commercial Pit Stop Model is unlikely to be able to support the heightened
demand for military missions to protect China’s expanding international interests. Evidence
suggests that even the current tempo of counterpiracy operations and rotations is expensive and
is straining PLAN forces. ese factors will generate pressure for the PRC leadership to expand
access beyond current temporary access to commercial facilities. e Dual Use Logistics Facil-
ity and the String of Pearls Model are the two options that conform to China’s foreign policy
principles and would support likely missions to protect China’s foreign policy interests.
To distinguish between these two models, the assessment examined physical evidence of
sites associated with the String of Pearls and the patterns of current PLAN operations abroad.
ere is little physical evidence to suggest that China intends to use commercial port facilities
associated with the String of Pearls to support military operations. China’s current naval opera-
tional patterns of behavior do not involve any of the supposed String of Pearls sites. e PLAN
uses commercial facilities to support its Gulf of Aden operations and has not engaged in joint
military exercises with the host nations.
e study also explored the view that the String of Pearls indicates a Chinese intention to en-
circle India and dominate the Indian Ocean. e analysis noted that using the String of Pearls to
support major combat operations in the Indian Ocean would require a much larger Chinese naval
force structure and that the geography of the region favors India. e analysis also revealed that only
Chittagong port in Bangladesh has most of the physical features necessary to support major combat
operations. Gwadar and Hambantoto could potentially be upgraded over the next 20 years to im-
prove their capability, but improvements sucient to support major combat operations would likely
transform them into overt Chinese bases. Moreover, it would make little sense for China to conduct
combat operations from facilities highly vulnerable to Indian air and missile strikes.
Interviews with U.S. military logisticians and analysis of Chinese writings identied a num-
ber of likely characteristics of a potential Chinese overseas logistics base under the Dual Use Lo-
gistics Facility model. is information suggested that China would likely position any bases in a
country with a longstanding friendly relationship and similar strategic interests (such as Pakistan),
that the host country would likely impose restrictions on how China could use the bases, and that
China would need an eective strategic communications plan to ensure international support
and dispel suspicion. Logistics experts suggested that a future Chinese overseas logistics base will
likely be characterized by a dual use nature, reliance on distribution networks for resupply rather
than warehousing, a light footprint (between 100 and 500 personnel), a division of labor between
logistics hubs, and heavy use of husbanding agents. Chinese logistics facilities could also poten-
tially serve as a staging point for ground operations against nonstate actors.
48
China Strategic Perspectives, No. 7
An expanded PLAN overseas presence will present both opportunities and challenges for
U.S.-China strategic and military-to-military relations. Opportunities include expanding the
U.S. cooperative military relationship with China to:
121
enhance cooperation in NEOs, HA/DR operations, and other nontraditional security
elds
enter into discussions with China, India, and other interested parties about multilateral
SLOC protection
allow for cooperation in counterterrorism, force protection, and littoral maritime security
participate in joint U.S-China-India naval exercises
expand opportunities for logistics cooperation (for example, U.S. ships refueling from
Chinese underway replenishment ships or in Chinese-run facilities).
Although a Chinese forward presence would remain vulnerable to conventional attacks
from India or the United States, China would still be able to exert strategic pressure in the IOR.
In this light, the United States should:
continue strengthening its bilateral security relationship with India
pursue its own access agreements with countries in South Asia to balance any increased
Chinese strategic weight in the region
increase the frequency and depth of U.S. engagement with potential hosts for PLAN lo-
gistics facilities (for example, countries in the IOR, the Persian Gulf, and the Gulf of Aden)
consider initiating a series of rolling bilateral exercises with Indian Ocean countries
modeled aer the U.S.–Association of Southeast Asian Nations Cooperation Aoat Read-
iness and Training (CARAT) exercises and the U.S.–South American UNITAS exercises.
If China establishes a signicant forward basing presence, the PLAN will be operating in
closer proximity to U.S. forces and U.S. basing arrangements. e United States should:
49
Chinese Overseas Basing Requirements
continue to emphasize maritime safety issues and operational procedures in its Military
Maritime Consultative Agreement discussions with the Chinese
reach an understanding about U.S. access to facilities in the Indian Ocean where China
has access agreements
consider quid pro quo arrangements between U.S. and Chinese forces for the mutual
use of water, fuel, and other interchangeable services.
Finally, if some countries agree to host large-scale PLA bases, this choice would imply a
fundamental shi in their relations with the United States. As a consequence, the United States
should:
make clear that it does not support PLAN use of overseas bases to conduct combat
operations against other nation-states
make clear that if the host country allows the PLAN to conduct combat operations
from its facilities, the United States would consider the circumstances and might treat the
host country as a belligerent. In the event of a conict with China, the United States would
reserve the right to use force against facilities supporting Chinese military operations
make clear to the potential hosts of PLA bases that the United States will exert diplo-
matic and nancial pressure to ensure that they do not assist China’s use of force against
another nation-state in the IOR.
A Chinese announcement that the PLA has established an overseas military base or
reached a long-term base access agreement in the IOR will present a challenge for U.S. regional
policy in South Asia. However, China’s increasing presence in the Indian Ocean does not signal
an intention to encircle India or to dominate the Indian Ocean. e United States will need to
assure other countries that it remains actively engaged in order to balance the political lever-
age China will gain from a forward presence in the Indian Ocean and encourage China to act
responsibly as Beijing seeks to protect its overseas interests.
50
China Strategic Perspectives, No. 7
Sanya Zhanjiang
Point to Point Linear by Water Point to Point Linear by Water
Gwadar 2,656.95 4,392.77 3,054.31 5,280.85
Hambantota 1,816.78 2,676.65 2,221.85 3,300.90
Chittagong 1,028.93 2,746.19 1,198.54 3,365.75
Sanya N/A N/A 216.28 300.68
Zhanjiang 216.28 300.68 N/A N/A
Appendix 1. “String of Pearls” Distance to Chinese Bases in Nautical
Miles
Source: Jane’s Fighting Ships, available at <http://search.janes.com/Search/documentView.do?docid=/
content1/janesdata/yb/jfs/jfs_5719.htm@current&pageSelected=allJanes&keyword=Luyang%20
11&backPath=http://search.janes.com/Search&Prod_Name=JFS&>.
51
Chinese Overseas Basing Requirements
Appendix 2. Required PLAN Force Structure for an Indian Ocean
Region Conict
Source: Jane’s Fighting Ships, available at <http://client.janes.com/Search/documentView.do?docId=/
content1/janesdata/sent/sassu/indis130.htm@current&pageSelected=allJanes&keyword=India%20
Navy&backPath=http://client.janes.com/Search&Prod_Name=SASS&>.
Aircra Carriers Destroyers Frigates Submarines
2013 Indian Navy 2 8 13 15
2013 PLA Navy 1 26 53 63
2020 Indian Navy 3 15 24 24
2020 Total Minimum
PLAN Force
3 41 77 87
52
China Strategic Perspectives, No. 7
Requirements Zhanjiang
Recommended infrastructure Current
ree berthing spaces 1,000 linear feet each X
Minimum water depth of 35 feet X
30–45 acres of open storage X
Four rail ooading spurs of 1,000 feet of straight track each X
Four rail/truck end ramps X
Gatehouse/security
Access to port-owned interchange yard to support switching two trains per day X
Suitable area to land/service helicopters (~5 acres) X
Two container handlers X
Adequate interior roadways to port facilities X
Oce space with adequate utilities and communication service X
Processing area for 30 trucks
Wash rack that meets USDA requirements
Terminal Access
Close proximity (<10 miles) to interstate highway system
Access to at least one major commercial rail carrier X
Water channel access width of 500 feet and depth of 35 feet X
Access to commercial rail interchange yard (if port-owned facilities are
inadequate)
X
Appendix 3. U.S. DOD Port Requirements Applied to Zhanjiang
Sources: “Port of Zhanjiang: Port of Call,” WorldPortSource.com, available at <www.worldportsource.
com/ports/portCall/CHN_Port_of_Zhanjiang_2532.php >; “Zhanjiang Port: General Information,” Si-
noagentgd.com, available at <www.sinoagentgd.com/06Port_11.htm>; Xu Shaohua, “A Rising Port City in
South China,” speech given at brieng on Zhanjiang (Guangzhou) Investment Environment, November
5, 2003, available at <www.chinazj.net/daohan/e2003-11-05.htm>.
53
Chinese Overseas Basing Requirements
Appendix 4. Citizen and Netizen Public Opinion on Overseas Basing
Although the ability of public opinion to inuence Chinese government policy remains
debatable, some evidence suggests the Chinese Communist Party does take Chinese citizen
viewpoints into account in determining policy.
1
Polling data suggest the Chinese public has
a positive attitude toward overseas bases. In one 2009 poll by Huanqiu Shibao, 16,906 (89.6
percent) respondents said “yes” and 1,967 (10.4 percent) respondents said “no” to the question,
“Should China Establish Overseas Military Bases?”
2
An October 2009 Huanqiu Shibao poll asked, “How should China strengthen its eective-
ness in protecting Chinese vessels o the coast of Somalia?”
3
e construction of an overseas
base was suggested by 40.4 percent of respondents; 31 percent advocated increasing the number
of navy vessels; 21.2 percent called for increasing the area of protection; and 7.5 percent called
for asking for support from international navy forces. e poll also asked: “Focusing on the cur-
rent situation, what is the most pressing need for the Chinese navy?” Most respondents (32.7
percent) indicated that having a stable, reliable, overseas base was the most pressing need; 30.2
percent called for building an aircra carrier; 22.8 percent advocated increasing the capacity
of medium-sized surface ghter/destroyer vessels; and 14.3 percent called for increasing the
number of supply vessels.
4
Public opinion might not pressure the CCP to establish an overseas base or agree to long-
term access agreements. However, this data suggests the views of Chinese citizens would not be
an obstacle to establishing a permanent overseas basing network.
1
Linda Jakobson and Dean Knox, “New Foreign Policy Actors in China,” SIPRI Policy Paper
no. 26, September 2010, 44.
2
本期话：中国应该在海外设军事基地吗？[is Week’s Topic of Discussion: Should China
Establish Overseas Military Bases?], 2010, accessed at <http://debate.huanqiu.com/2009-12/675394.html>.
3
网民呼吁寻求海外基地组航母编队维护远洋利益 [Internet Users’ Call for Establishing
Overseas Bases and Arrange for Aircra Carriers to Better Protect Interests Overseas], October 20,
2009.
4
Ibid.
54
China Strategic Perspectives, No. 7
Notes
1
Beginning in 2009, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) began deploying three-
ship flotillas to the Gulf of Aden for the purposes of conducting counterpiracy operations. These
missions have largely involved escorting Chinese and other ships through areas known for Somali
pirate activity. Up until that point Chinese shipping had been threatened by an increasing number
of piracy activities, and the United Nations had authorized the formation of counterpiracy mis-
sions by its members.
2
See Christopher D. Yung et al., China’s Out of Area Naval Operations: Case Studies, Trajec-
tories, Obstacles, and Potential Solutions, China Strategic Perspectives 3 (Washington, DC: National
Defense University [NDU] Press, December 2010).
3
See Phillip C. Saunders, China’s Global Activism: Strategy, Drivers, and Tools, Institute for
National Strategic Studies Occasional Paper 4 (Washington, DC: NDU Press, 2006).
4
Two excellent overviews are David Shambaugh, China Goes Global: e Partial Power (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2013) and Elizabeth Economy and Michael Levi, By All Means Necessary:
How China’s Resource Quest is Changing the World (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014).
5
U.S. Energy Information Administration, “China is now the world’s largest importer of petro-
leum and other liquid fuels,” Today in Energy, March 24, 2014.
6
2011 China Customs statistics, accessed at Global Trade Information Services, Inc.
7
Chinese Ministry of Commerce data, accessed at CEICData.com, China Economic and In-
dustry Data Database, May 21, 2014.
8
e Heritage Foundation, “China’s Global Reach,” interactive map, available at <www.heri-
tage.org/research/projects/china-global-investment-tracker-interactive-map>.
9
Erica S. Downs, testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commis-
sion, hearing on “China’s Foreign Policy: Challenges and Players,” panel on “New Interest Groups in
Chinese Foreign Policy,” April 13, 2011.
10
Mathieu Duchâtel and Bates Gill, “Overseas citizen protection: a growing challenge for Chi-
na,” SIPRI Newsletter, February 2012, available at <www.sipri.org/media/newsletter/essay/february12>.
11
U.S. Energy Information Administration, “China,” February 4, 2014, available at <www.eia.
gov/countries/analysisbriefs/China/china.pdf>.
12
“China Focus: China ponders energy strategy,” Xinhua, February 13, 2014, <http://english.
cntv.cn/20140213/103226.shtml>; Michael Forsythe, “As U.S. Aims for Energy Independence, China
Heads the Opposite Way,” New York Times, February 13, 2014.
13
Andrew Erickson and Gabriel Collins, “China’s Oil Security Pipe Dream,” Naval War College
Review 63, no. 2 (Spring 2010), 91.
14
Daniel Hartnett, “e PLA’s Domestic and Foreign Activities and Orientation,” testimony
before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission hearing on “China’s Military and
Security Activities Abroad,” Washington, DC, March 4, 2009, 1.
15
Dai Xu, “China Should Establish Overseas Base,” Huanqiu Shibao, February 3, 2009, 11, ac-
cessed at <http://mil.huanqiu.com/top/2009-02/363027.html>.
16
Ibid.
55
Chinese Overseas Basing Requirements
17
Shen Dingli, “Don’t Shun the Idea of Setting Up Overseas Military Bases,” China.org, January
28, 2010, available at <www.china.org.cn/opinion/2010-01/28/content_19324522.htm>.
18
Ibid.
19
James Mulvenon, “Dilemmas and Imperatives of Beijing’s Strategic Energy Dependence: e
PLA Perspective,” in China’s Energy Strategy: e Impact on Beijing’s Maritime Policies, ed. Gabriel Col-
lins et al. (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2008), 5.
20
Ibid., 5–10.
21
Mi Zhengyu et al., China’s National Defense Concepts (Beijing: People’s Liberation Army
Press, April 1988), 200–202.
22
Ibid.
23
Christopher D. Yung, “Sinica Rules the Waves? e People’s Liberation Army Navy’s Power
Projection and Anti-Access/Area Denial Lessons from the Falklands/Malvinas Conict,” in Chinese
Lessons from Other People’s Wars, ed. Andrew Scobell, David Lai, and Roy Kamphausen (Carlisle, PA:
Strategic Studies Institute, 2011), 89–90.
24
Within the U.S. defense analysis literature, there is a long list of studies that support the idea of
high ordnance expenditure rates in combat. See, for example, Robert Berg, “e C.N.A. Ordnance Pro-
gramming Model and Methodology,” Professional Paper 424 (Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses,
October 1984), 19; Angelyn Jewell et al., “U.S.S. Nimitz and Carrier Airwing Nine Surge Demonstration,”
CRM 97-111.10 (Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, April 1998), 52–64. at the Chinese have
absorbed this lesson from their observations of foreign conicts, see Yung, “Sinica Rules the Waves?”
84–85, and Dean Cheng, “Chinese Lessons from the Gulf Wars,” in Scobell, Lai, and Kamphausen, 160.
25
Craig Hooper, “VLS Underway Replenishment: When Will the Navy Get Serious?” De-
fenseTech.org, June 10, 2010, available at <http://defensetech.org/2010/06/10/vls-underway-replenish-
ment-when-will-the-navy-get-serious/>.
26
According to the Hague Convention XIII, neutral nations must provide a belligerent “24-
hour . . . notice to depart . . . neutral ports or roadsteads at the outbreak of armed conict. . . . Belliger-
ent vessels, including warships, retain a right of entry in distress whether caused by force majeure or
damage resulting from enemy action . . . [however] [i]n the absence of special provisions to the contrary
in the laws or regulations of the neutral nation, belligerent warships are forbidden to remain in a neutral
port or roadstead in excess of 24 hours.” See U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps, U.S. Coast Guard, e Com-
mander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, Edition 2007, 7–2.
27
is report specically addresses the likelihood of this prospect later in the report as it ad-
dresses the possibility of a “String of Pearls” option being pursued by the Chinese military.
28
尹卓：中国海军应在吉布提建立长期社给基地 [Yin Zhuo: e Chinese
Navy should establish a long-term base at Djibouti], accessed at <http://cn.chan.cn/article/
n494656,fe393f,d2477_12053.html>.
29
Ibid.
30
Ibid.
31
Chen Bingde, “Forging a New China-U.S. Military-to-Military Relationship Featuring Mu-
tual Respect, Mutual Benet, and Cooperation,” speech at National Defense University, Washington,
DC, May 18, 2011.
56
China Strategic Perspectives, No. 7
32
Ibid.
33
By “hotel-like” or “tourist-like,” we mean naval operations that are stripped largely of
their military content. “Hotel services” of commercial ports essentially involve refueling, restock-
ing of foodstuffs, water replenishment, provision of electric power, and management or discarding
of waste. Such activities are essentially indistinguishable from commercial port services to non-
military vessels.
34
“Logistics: Chinese Warships Fill Indian Ocean Ports,” StrategyPage.com, July 9, 2010, avail-
able at <www.strategypage.com/htmw/htlog/articles/20100709.aspx>.
35
By ad hoc, we mean an arrangement that does not involve a status of forces agreement, a
formal memorandum of understanding or agreement, or a signed legal document specifying the nature
of the relationship between the visiting Chinese military and the host nation.
36
Cui Xiaohuo, “Navy has no plan for overseas base,” China Daily, March 11, 2010.
37
Ibid.
38
Zhang Zhao Zhong, “Will China Establish Overseas Military Bases?” China inkNet, Janu-
ary 26, 2010.
39
W.O. Henderson, “Germany’s Trade with Her Colonies, 1884–1914,” e Economic History
Review 8, no. 1 (1938), 7.
40
Hermann Hiery, e Neglected War: e German South Pacic and the Inuence of World
War I (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1995), 1.
41
Ibid.
42
Ibid., 11.
43
“China Navy Ocial Says Overseas Base Needed,” Asiancorrespondent.com, December
30, 2009, available at <http://asiancorrespondent.com/26981/china-navy-ocial-says-overseas-base-
needed/>.
44
Dai, 11.
45
Ibid.
46
Liu Zhongmin, “Overseas Bases Needed For Much More an Cruising Sailors,” Global
Times, May 21, 2010, available at <www.globaltimes.cn/content/533918.shtml>.
47
e term Malacca Dilemma was rst used by former General Secretary of the Chinese
Communist Party Hu Jintao at an economic work conference in 2003. He noted that China’s depen-
dence on oil coming from the Middle East would be vulnerable to certain powers who seek to control
navigation through the Strait of Malacca. See Shi Hongtao, “Energy Security Runs Up against the
‘Malacca Dilemma’: Will China, Japan, and Korea Cooperate?” China Youth Daily, June 15, 2004, as
referenced in Marc Lanteigne, “China’s Maritime Security and the ‘Malacca Dilemma’,” Asian Security
4, no. 2 (May 2008).
48
Communications with the Oce of Net Assessment, November 30, 2011. e subsequent
quotes for this paragraph and the next are drawn from communications with the Oce of Net Assess-
ment about the Booz Allen Hamilton report.
49
Christopher J. Pehrson, “String of Pearls: Meeting the Challenge of China’s Rising Power
Across the Asian Littoral,” Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, July 2006, 3.
50
Ibid., 5.
57
Chinese Overseas Basing Requirements
51
James Neidpath, Singapore Naval Base and the Defence of Britain’s Eastern Empire, 1919–1941
(New York: Clarendon Press, 1981), 53.
52
Chris Madsen, “Strategy, Fleet Logistics, and the Lethbridge Mission to the Pacic, and
Indian Oceans 1943–1944,” Journal of Strategic Studies 31, no. 6 (2008), 961.
53
Neidpath, 55.
54
Ibid., 953.
55
Ibid., 963.
56
Military Seali Command, “About Military Seali Command,” available at <https://seali-
command.com/about-msc/>.
57
Otto Kreisher, “Operation Unied Assistance,” Air Force Magazine 88, no. 4 (April 2005).
58
Ibid.
59
“Navy Logistics Supports Operation Unied Assistance,” e Navy Supply Corps Newsletter
(March/April 2005), 3.
60
Yung et al., China’s Out of Area Naval Operations, 38–40.
61
Ibid.
62
Zhang Yuwei, “Fight Somalia Pirates on Land, China Tells the UN,” China Daily, March
11–13, 2011.
63
According to e Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations:
all acts of hostility in neutral territory, including neutral lands, neutral waters, and
neutral airspace, are prohibited. A neutral nation has the duty to prevent the use of
its territory as a place of sanctuary or a base of operations by belligerent forces of
any side. If the neutral nation is unable or unwilling to enforce eectively its right of
inviolability, an aggrieved belligerent may take such acts as are necessary in neutral
territory to counter the activities of enemy forces, including warships and military
aircra, making unlawful use of that territory.
See e Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, 7-2.
64
Chen.
65
Author interviews with Captain Ronald Carr, Commander Brian George, and Commander
William Clarke, all members of the OPNAV N4 sta with experience at Logistics Force Western Pacic
in Singapore.
66
Ibid.
67
Ibid.
68
William Ashton, “Chinese Bases in Burma—Fact or Fiction?” Jane’s Intelligence Review 7,
no. 2 (July 1997), as cited in Andrew Selth, “Burma, China and the Myth of Military Bases” in Asian
Security 3, no. 3 (2007), 300.
69
Selth, 300.
70
Ibid., 301.
58
China Strategic Perspectives, No. 7
71
Ibid., 302.
72
Stephen Marks, “Understanding China’s Strategy: Beyond ‘Non-Interference’,” in Pambazuka
News, November 05, 2008, available at <www.pambazuka.org/en/category/books/51762>.
73
Billy Tea, “Unstringing China’s Strategic Pearls,” Asia Times, March 11, 2011, available at
<www.atimes.com/atimes/China/MC11Ad02.html>.
74
Ibid.
75
Ibid.
76
Peter Lee, “China Drops the Gwadar Hot Potato,” Asia Times, May 28, 2011, avail-
able at <http://atimes.com/atime/China/ME28Ad01.html>. Also see Farhan Bokhari and Kathrin
Hille, “Pakistan Turns to China for Naval Base,” Financial Times, May 22, 2011, available at <www.
.com/cms/s/0/f50629b6-81a7-11e0-8a54-00144feabdc0,dwp_uuid=4d9dd3aa-5d-11dc-b0fe-
0000779fd2ac.html>.
77
Lee.
78
“China May Take Over Gwadar Port from Singaporean Firm,” International Herald
Tribune, September 1, 2012, available at <http://tribune.com.pk/story/429443/china-may -take-
over-gwadar-port-from-singaporean-firm/>; also see “Gwadar Goes to China,” International
Herald Tribune, September 1, 2012, available at <http://tribune.com.pk/story/429152/gwadar-
goes-to-china/>.
79
“China May Take Over Gwadar Port from Singaporean Firm.”
80
Daniel J. Kostecka, “Places and Bases: e Chinese Navy’s Emerging Support Network in the
Indian Ocean,” Naval War College Review 64, no. 1 (Winter 2011), 65.
81
Ibid.
82
For an update of Chinese counterpiracy operations and port visits, see Andrew Erickson and
Austin Strange, “No Substitute for Experience: Chinese Antipiracy Operations in the Gulf of Aden,”
China Maritime Studies 10 (November 2013), 140–141.
83
“Seychelles Invited China to Set Up Anti-Piracy Base,” DefenseNews, September 4, 2012,
available at <www.defensenews.com/article/20111202/DEFSECT03/112020302/Seychelles-Invites-
China-Set-Up-Anti-Piracy-Base>; also see Jeremy Page and Tom Wright, “Chinese Military Considers
New Indian Ocean Presence,” Wall Street Journal, December 14, 2011, available at <http://online.wsj.
com/article/SB10001424052970203518404577096261061550538.html>; “China’s Seychelles Facility Not
a Military Base: Chinese Analysts,” FirstPost, December 13, 2011, available at <www.rstpost.com/print-
page.php?idno=155082&sr_no=0>.
84
Li Xiaokun and Li Lianxing, “Navy Looks at Oer from Seychelles,” China Daily, December
13, 2011.
85
Iskander Rehman, “China’s String of Pearls and India’s Enduring Tactical Advantage,”
Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, June 8, 2010, available at <www.idsa.in/idsacomments/Chi-
nasStringofPearlsandIndiasEnduringTacticalAdvantage_irehman_080610>.
86
Ibid.
87
Department of Defense, Engineering and Design of Military Ports: Unied Facilities Criteria,
UFC 4-159-02 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, January 16, 2004), 3-1–3-4, 7-1–7-2, 8-1–8-3,
12-1–12-6, 13-1–13-2.
59
Chinese Overseas Basing Requirements
88
Interview with COL George Topic, USA, (Ret.), Vice Director, Center for Joint and Strategic
Logistics, National Defense University, March 16, 2011.
89
Ibid.
90
Ibid.
91
Ibid.
92
Ibid.
93
Ibid.
94
Ibid.
95
Ibid.; interview with OPNAV N4 sta members with experience working out of Singapore.
96
Interviews with Carr, George, and Clarke.
97
Ibid.
98
Interview with Topic.
99
Ibid.
100
Interviews with Carr, George, and Clarke.
101
Ibid.
102
Ibid.
103
Interview with the Center for Joint and Strategic Logistics, January 2010. is point was
reiterated in a later interview with Topic.
104
Ibid.
105
Interviews with Carr, George, and Clarke.
106
Ibid.
107
Ibid.
108
Greg Torode and Michael Martina, “Search for MH370 Reveals a Military Vulnerability for
China,” Reuters News, April 22, 2014.
109
Interviews with Carr, George, and Clarke.
110
Interview with Topic.
111
“Finnair Cargo Terminal Operations,” FINNAIR.com, available at <www.nnaircargo.com/
en/terminal-operations/about-us.html>.
112
Zeng Sheng et al., “Focus on Highlights of Qingdao Support Base’s Military-Civilian Inte-
grated Support Training Exercise Under Informatized Conditions,” Renmin Haijun, December 3, 2010,
3 (in translation).
113
Dai.
114
Shen.
115
Ibid.
116
Liu.
117
e analysts and military scholars cited here, while notably more hawkish than the aver-
age Chinese commentators on issues related to defense, have nonetheless tended to espouse views that
generally reect government policy or are within the range of government debates over policy. It should
be noted that one of these scholars—Admiral Yin Zhuo—when considered by the CCP to “speak out of
school” was formally reprimanded and forced to make a retraction of his statements.
118
Chen.
60
China Strategic Perspectives, No. 7
119
“Type 071 Yuzhao Class Amphibious Transport Dock (LPD),” Globalsecurity.org, available
at <www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/yuzhao.htm>. Also see Je Engstrom, “PLA’s Growing
Force Projection Capabilities,” China Brief 10, no. 25 (December 17, 2010), 7-9.
120
Comments made at the Institute for National Strategic Studies 2011 Pacic Symposium
“e New Security Environment—Implications for American Security in the Asia Pacic Region,” Na-
tional Defense University, Washington, DC, April 4–5, 2011.
121
Although the U.S.-China military-to-military relationship has experienced ups and downs
over the past few years, there is some evidence that the Chinese would like to develop certain types of
cooperation. At the March 2011 PLA National Defense University–U.S. National Defense University
Strategic Dialogue in Beijing, China, PLA NDU representatives expressed an interest in having the two
militaries conduct joint exercises and lessons learned exchanges related to noncombatant evacuation
operations. Similar suggestions were made to State Department representatives at the 2011 Strategic and
Economic Dialogue.
61
Chinese Overseas Basing Requirements
About the Authors
Dr. Christopher D. Yung has been a Senior Research Fellow in the Center for Strategic
Research, Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), at the National Defense University
since September 2009. Prior to entering government service, Dr. Yung was a Senior Research
Analyst at the Center for Naval Analyses, where he led projects or was involved in analysis
related to China, Northeast Asia security, the People’s Liberation Army and its navy, and U.S.
interoperability with the militaries of the Far East. In addition to Dr. Yung’s China- and Asia-
related expertise, he has direct military operations analysis experience. Between 1998 and 2001,
he was the Special Assistant and Operations Analyst for the Commander, Amphibious Group
Two—the senior U.S. Navy amphibious command in the Atlantic Fleet. is was followed by an
assignment as Special Assistant and Operations Analyst for the Commander, U.S. Marine Corps
Forces Atlantic—the highest ranking Marine Corps operational command on the East Coast.
Dr. Yung holds a Ph.D. in International Relations from the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced
International Studies at e Johns Hopkins University. He also holds an MA in East Asian and
China Studies from the same institution. He received language certicates in Mandarin Chinese
from Columbia University and the Beijing Foreign Language Teacher’s Institute.
Mr. Ross Rustici was a Research Analyst in INSS. His areas of expertise include U.S.-Chi-
nese strategic relations, cyber, and the People’s Liberation Army, as well as PLA Navy opera-
tions, force sizing, and defense transparency. Mr. Rustici holds MA degrees in International
Relations and Public Administration from the Maxwell School of Syracuse University.
Mr. Scott Devary was a Research Intern in INSS. He holds an MA in International Rela-
tions and Diplomacy from Seton Hall University and a BA in Political Science from the Uni-
versity of Washington. He studied Mandarin Chinese at Tsinghua University in Beijing. Mr.
Devary has been a Contract Researcher in the Center for Global Security at the Department of
Energy and Brookhaven National Laboratory.
Ms. Jenny Lin is the Founder of Asia Taktik, LLC. She was a Salzburg Fellow and Sasakawa
Peace Foundation Resident Fellow in the Pacic Forum at the Center for Strategic and Inter-
national Studies. She simultaneously held research contracts at e Project 2049 Institute and
INSS. Her research focus includes the U.S.-Japan alliance and China’s energy, military, cyber,
and space industries. Ms. Lin received an MA in Public Policy from the American University
and BA in Government and Asian Studies from the University of Texas at Austin. She is uent
in Mandarin and Min Nan dialect.
Col kris bauman, usaF
Senior Military Fellow
mr. John a. Cope
Senior Research Fellow
Dr. T.X. hammes
Distinguished Research Fellow
mr. Frank G. hoFFman
Senior Research Fellow
Dr. ChrisTopher J. lamb
Distinguished Research Fellow
Dr. anDre le saGe
Senior Research Fellow
Dr. Thomas F. lynCh iii
Distinguished Research Fellow
mr. leo G. miChel
Distinguished Research Fellow
Dr. Denise naTali
Senior Research Fellow
Col riCharD ouTzen, usa
Senior Military Fellow
Dr. James J. przysTup
Senior Research Fellow
Dr. niCholas rosTow
Senior Director
Dr. phillip C. saunDers
Distinguished Research Fellow
Dr. ChrisTopher D. yunG
Senior Research Fellow
For a complete list of INSS researchers and staff, please visit www.ndu.edu/inss/index.cfm.
Center for Strategic Research Senior Fellows
