Washington and Lee Law Review Washington and Lee Law Review
Volume 79
Issue 4
Fall
Article 3
Fall 2022
Creativity Without IP? Vindication and Challenges in the Video Creativity Without IP? Vindication and Challenges in the Video
Game Industry Game Industry
BJ Ard
University of Wisconsin Law School
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BJ Ard,
Creativity Without IP? Vindication and Challenges in the Video Game Industry
, 79 Wash.
& Lee L. Rev. 1285 (2022).
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1285
Creativity Without IP? Vindication
and Challenges in the Video Game
Industry
BJ Ard
*
Abstract
This Article intervenes in the longstanding debate over
whether creative production is possible without exhaustive
copyright protection. Intellectual property (IP) scholars have
identified “negative spaces” like comedy and tattoo art where
creativity thrives without IP, but critics dismiss these examples
as niche. The video game industry allows for fresh headway. It
is now the largest sector in entertainment—with revenues greater
than Hollywood, streaming, and music combined—yet IP does
not protect key game elements from duplication. Participants
navigate this absence using non-IP strategies like those identified
in negative-space industries: AAA developers invest in
*
Assistant Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School and Affiliate
Fellow, Yale Law School Information Society Project. I thank Chris Bavitz,
Bruce Boyden, Michael Carrier, Jim Charne, Anuj Desai, Simon Ferrari,
James Grimmelmann, Brian Holland, Camilla Hrdy, Mark Lemley, Glynn
Lunney, Betsy Rosenblatt, Guy Rub, Chris Seaman, Mitra Sharafi, Cathay
Smith, Steph Tai, Rebecca Tushnet, Saurabh Vishnubhakat, Peter Yu, and
participants at the 2022 Harvard/Yale/Stanford Junior Faculty Forum, the
2022 AALS Emerging Voices in IP Workshop, the 2022 InGAME International
Conference, the 2021 Intellectual Property Scholars Conference (IPSC), the
Junior Law & Tech* Workshop, the 2021 Works-in-Progress in IP Colloquium
(WIPIP), the Yale Law School Information Society Project Technology Law
Speaker Series, and the University of Wisconsin Faculty Workshop for
invaluable feedback on this Article. Thanks also go out to Luke Dremel, Robert
Ling, David Stilin, and Alexander Zahn for excellent research assistance.
Support for this research was provided by the Office of the Vice Chancellor for
Research and Graduate Education at the University of Wisconsin-Madison
with funding from the Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation.
1286 79 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1285 (2022)
copy-resistant features while indie game developers rely on
community norms. The answer to whether creative production is
possible within IP’s negative space even in a capital-intensive
industry is thus a decisive yes.
Studying this industry also compels us to go beyond
surface-level questions of whether creative production is possible
and to grapple with how the configuration of IP and non-IP
protections shapes what is produced and how this configuration
favors some creators over others. The industry likewise pushes us
to recognize that the stability of these regimes is contingent on
broader features of technology, the economy, and society at large.
In fact, the industry has come full circle from a sector where
copying plagued the industry, to one where it became a non-issue,
to one where it has reemerged as a problem in mobile gaming.
The video game industry is also crucial for study because it
embodies the state of creative production in the information age.
Scholarship has long treated legacy industries like Hollywood
and music as paradigmatic without attending to the complex
realities of modern creative production and the importance of
going beyond IP to understand how these industries work. It is
time we moved past the conceptual divide between “full IP” and
negative spaces to interrogate the overlapping but partial legal
protections across both sides of the line.
Table of Contents
I
NTRODUCTION ................................................................ 1288
I. S
TATE OF THE INDUSTRY ....................................... 1298
A. Early Clones, Low Quality, and
Market Crashes ............................................... 1298
B. Hitting Reset ................................................... 1304
C. Contemporary Sectors ..................................... 1308
1. AAA Productions ....................................... 1309
2. Indie Games ............................................... 1313
II. L
IMITS OF COPYRIGHT FOR GAME DESIGN ............ 1317
A. Copyright Coverage ........................................ 1318
B. Character Copyright ....................................... 1319
C. Idea-Expression Dichotomy ............................ 1320
D. Systems-Methods Exclusion ........................... 1321
1. Scope of the Exclusion ............................... 1322
CREATIVITY WITHOUT IP? 1287
2. The Tetris Decision .................................... 1324
E. Scènes à Faire ................................................. 1328
F. Fair Use ........................................................... 1329
III. P
ROTECTION BEYOND COPYRIGHT ........................ 1331
A. Gameplay Patents ........................................... 1331
1. Doctrinal Barriers ..................................... 1333
2. Practical Concerns..................................... 1334
B. Franchise Rights ............................................. 1335
1. Trademark ................................................. 1335
2. Trade Dress ............................................... 1336
IV. C
OMPETING WITHOUT IP ....................................... 1338
A. Adventures in Negative Space ........................ 1341
1. Copy-Resistant Markets ........................... 1343
2. Norm Enforcement .................................... 1345
3. Non-Pecuniary Motivations ...................... 1348
B. AAA Games ..................................................... 1349
1. Copy Resistance ......................................... 1349
2. Franchise Entrenchment .......................... 1351
a. Trademarks and Third-Party
Licenses ............................................... 1351
b. Network Effects .................................... 1354
3. Feedback Loop: More of the Same ............ 1355
C. Indie Games .................................................... 1356
1. Community Norms .................................... 1357
2. Finding a Niche ......................................... 1359
3. Alternative Funding .................................. 1361
4. The Pressure of Mobile ............................. 1361
V. I
MPLICATIONS ........................................................ 1363
A. Measuring Success .......................................... 1365
1. Revenues and Productivity ....................... 1365
2. Creative Content ....................................... 1366
3. Broader Impact .......................................... 1367
B. Success for Whom? .......................................... 1368
C. Contingent Stability ....................................... 1370
D. Breaking the Binary ....................................... 1373
C
ONCLUSION .................................................................... 1374
1288 79 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1285 (2022)
I
NTRODUCTION
Is copyright necessary for creative production? Scholars
grappling with this question have investigated numerous case
studies on creative activity in intellectual property’s (IP’s)
“negative spaces”—activities ranging from fashion
1
to comedy,
2
stage magic,
3
haute cuisine,
4
and tattoo artistry,
5
along with fan
communities,
6
where creativity thrives without need for IP.
These studies indicate creative industries may be able to achieve
a “low-IP equilibrium” where creators mitigate the risk of
copying through non-IP strategies, often by enforcing
anti-copying norms among creators.
7
Some scholars have drawn on the negative-space literature
to question the need for IP in other creative industries.
8
1. See generally Kal Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, The Piracy
Paradox: Innovation and Intellectual Property in Fashion Design, 92 V
A. L.
REV. 1687 (2006) [hereinafter, Raustiala & Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox];
Kal Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox Revisited, 61
S
TAN. L. REV. 1201 (2009) [hereinafter Raustiala & Sprigman, The Piracy
Paradox Revisited].
2. See generally Dotan Oliar & Christopher Sprigman, There’s No Free
Laugh (Anymore): The Emergence of Intellectual Property Norms and the
Transformation of Stand-Up Comedy, 94 V
A. L. REV. 1787 (2008); David
Fagundes & Aaron Perzanowski, Clown Eggs, 94 N
OTRE DAME L. REV. 1313
(2019).
3. See generally Jacob Loshin, Secrets Revealed: Protecting Magicians’
Intellectual Property Without Law, in L
AW AND MAGIC: A COLLECTION OF
ESSAYS 123 (Christine A. Corcos ed., 2010).
4. See generally Emmanuelle Fauchart & Eric von Hippel, Norms-Based
Intellectual Property Systems: The Case of French Chefs, 19 ORG. SCI. 187
(2008).
5. See generally Aaron Perzanowski, Tattoos & IP Norms, 98 M
INN. L.
REV. 511 (2013).
6. See generally Steven A. Hetcher, Using Social Norms to Regulate Fan
Fiction and Remix Culture, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1869 (2009); Cathay Y.N. Smith,
Beware the Slender Man: Intellectual Property and Internet Folklore, 70 F
LA.
L. REV. 601 (2018); Elizabeth L. Rosenblatt, Who Will Speak for the Slender
Man?: Dialogism and Dilemmas in Character Copyright, 70 F
LA. L. REV. F. 69
(2018); Rebecca Tushnet, Legal Fictions: Copyright, Fan Fiction, and a New
Common Law, 17 L
OY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 651 (1997).
7. See Amy Kapczynski, Order Without Intellectual Property Law: Open
Science in Influenza, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 1539, 1543–44 (2017); Elizabeth L.
Rosenblatt, A Theory of IP’s Negative Space, 34 C
OLUM. J.L. & ARTS 317,
341–57 (2011).
8. See, e.g., Aaron Perzanowski & Kate Darling, Introduction, in
C
REATIVITY WITHOUT LAW: CHALLENGING THE ASSUMPTIONS OF INTELLECTUAL
CREATIVITY WITHOUT IP? 1289
Copyright is costly because it poses obstacles for future creators
9
and raises prices for consumers.
10
The conventional account
holds that these costs are justified because copyright
incentivizes the creation and distribution of creative works.
11
By
documenting communities where these incentives are
unnecessary, the negative-space literature suggests copyright
should be scaled back in other sectors where it does not
meaningfully advance creativity.
Critics of the negative-space literature argue against the
general application of these case studies because they analyze
niche forms of creative production that do not require large
capital expenditures.
12
Some also question whether IP is absent.
One scholar has noted, for example, that the authors of the
fashion case study that launched the study of IP’s negative space
“make a strong case for why fashion can function in the absence
of copyright, but they largely ignore the role played by
trademarks.”
13
Critics argue that formal IP rights become
increasingly necessary as an industry grows in economic
significance and production becomes more expensive.
14
Other
work questions the distributive consequences of non-IP
strategies like deference to norms, finding that the benefits of
PROPERTY 7 (Kate Darling & Aaron Perzanowski eds., 2017) (“We cannot
prove, nor do we claim, that communities that rely on social norms or
market-based responses to address information appropriation produce an
optimal balance of incentives and costs. But the same is true of the case for
strong IP protection.”).
9. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis
of Copyright Law, 18 J.
LEGAL STUD. 325, 332 (1989) (“The effect [of copyright
protection] would be to raise the cost of creating new works . . . .”).
10. See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Reexamining Copyright’s Incentives-Access
Paradigm, 49 V
AND. L. REV. 483, 492–98 (1996); Oren Bracha & Talha Syed,
Beyond the Incentive-Access Paradigm? Product Differentiation & Copyright
Revisited, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1841, 1852–53 (2014).
11. See, e.g., Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S.
539, 558 (1985).
12. See Kapczynski, supra note 7, at 1545–46; Jonathan M. Barnett, The
Illusion of the Commons, 25 B
ERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1751, 1755 (2010) (“[T]hese
markets tend to be confined to technologically primitive markets where
innovators have relatively insubstantial investments at risk.”); Rochelle
Cooper Dreyfuss, Does IP Need IP? Accommodating Intellectual Production
Outside the Intellectual Property Paradigm, 31 C
ARDOZO L. REV. 1437,
1455–57 (2010).
13. Dreyfuss, supra note 12, at 1450 (emphasis in original).
14. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
1290 79 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1285 (2022)
such strategies often flow to the well-financed or well-connected
incumbents least in need of protection.
15
The video game industry provides a unique opportunity to
test the viability of a low-IP equilibrium for a high-revenue,
capital-intensive creative industry.
16
With global revenues over
$170 billion in 2020, gaming has become one of today’s most
economically significant creative industries.
17
The industry now
generates greater revenues than Hollywood, music, and
15. Dreyfuss, supra note 12, at 1463–65; see Amy Kapczynski, The Law
of Informational Capitalism, 129 Y
ALE L.J. 1460, 1494 (2020) (book review)
(“One important task . . . is to unpack how demands for ‘openness,’ ‘sharing,’
and ‘freedom’ in the internet age helped enable—or at least did not stand in
the way of—the development of troubling forms of private power.”); Betsy
Rosenblatt, IP Law in the Shadow of Norms 8, 10 (July 26, 2021) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author). But see Raustiala & Sprigman, The Piracy
Paradox Revisited, supra note 1, at 1221 (“[F]ashion’s low-IP equilibrium does
at least deprive large fashion firms of one anticompetitive tool that big firms
operating in high-IP markets often use to grind down upstarts: lawyers.”).
16. The conventional designation of the games industry and other sectors
as “creative” can be problematic because the terminology foregrounds
“mysterious act[s] of inspiration” associated with individual creativity at the
expense of the material conditions of production and the more mundane ways
these industries shape culture. Peter Zackariasson, The Role of Creativity, in
C
HANGING THE RULES OF THE GAME: ECONOMIC, MANAGEMENT AND EMERGING
ISSUES IN THE COMPUTER GAMES INDUSTRY 105, 106–07 (Sabine Hotho & Neil
McGregor eds., 2013); see also Wallace McNeish, Critical Perspectives on the
Games Industry: Constructs and Collusion, in CHANGING THE RULES OF THE
GAME: ECONOMIC, MANAGEMENT AND EMERGING ISSUES IN THE COMPUTER
GAMES INDUSTRY 166, 182 (Sabine Hotho & Neil McGregor eds., 2013) (“The
games industry is far from special, rather it is an industry that like any other
is concerned with manufacturing and selling commodities with the aim of
generating profits.”); cf. Julie E. Cohen, Creativity and Culture in Copyright
Theory, 40 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1151, 1154 (2007) (“Like other cultural
processes, artistic and intellectual processes are substantially and importantly
shaped by the concrete particulars of expression, the material attributes of
artifacts embodying copyrighted works, and the spatial distribution of cultural
resources.”). This Article retains the conventional terminology but
conscientiously interrogates the role that law and economic forces play in
shaping production and cultural content.
17. Kellen Browning, In a World Let Loose, Video Game Makers Are
‘Doubling Down’, N.Y.
TIMES (May 30, 2021), https://perma.cc/CWR3-3RNW
(last updated July 23, 2021). Lockdowns during the COVID-19 pandemic
contributed to 2020 revenues, but 2019 revenues surpassed $150 billion prior
to these developments. Wallace Witkowski, Videogames Are a Bigger Industry
than Movies and North American Sports Combined, Thanks to the Pandemic,
M
ARKETWATCH (Dec. 22, 2020, 11:36 AM), https://perma.cc/FQA4-YRTK (last
updated Jan. 2, 2021, 10:27 AM).
CREATIVITY WITHOUT IP? 1291
streaming services combined.
18
It is also capital intensive, with
recent blockbusters costing $100 million or more in production
costs and sometimes just as much in marketing.
19
Gaming’s
significance is also evident in its cultural impact. What was once
a hobby for teenage boys
20
now engages 64% of the U.S.
population, nearly half of them women and spanning all age
groups.
21
Video games have also been a lightning rod in U.S.
culture wars, most notably for prompting debates over violence
in entertainment media;
22
depictions of sexuality;
23
and issues
of diversity, equity, and representation.
24
18. Felix Richter, Gaming: The Most Lucrative Entertainment Industry
by Far, S
TATISTA (Sept. 22, 2020), https://perma.cc/56RE-MFM6. Video game
revenues have exceeded Hollywood’s since at least 2009 and music’s since at
least 2007. Tom Chatfield, Videogames Now Outperform Hollywood Movies,
T
HE GUARDIAN (Sept. 27, 2009, 6:29 AM), https://perma.cc/P36W-2LHU; see
Jacqui Cheng, Report: Video Game Spending to Surpass Music Spending This
Year, ARS TECHNICA (June 23, 2007, 10:35 AM), https://perma.cc/M2LK-XNTP.
19. See, e.g., Chatfield, supra note 18 (documenting Grand Theft Auto IV’s
production costs).
20. See Data E. USA, Inc. v. Epyx, Inc., 862 F.2d 204, 209–10, 210 n.6
(9th Cir. 1988) (deeming a game’s target audience to be a “discerning
17.5-year-old boy”).
21. E
NT. SOFTWARE ASSN, 2020 ESSENTIAL FACTS ABOUT THE VIDEO GAME
INDUSTRY 3–5 (2021), https://perma.cc/HGQ5-AT49 (PDF). Players are also
racially diverse. Survey data indicates a greater proportion of Black and
Hispanic respondents self-identify as “gamers” than their white peers. See
Monica Anderson, Views on Gaming Differ by Race, Ethnicity, P
EW RSCH. CTR.
(Dec. 17, 2015), https://perma.cc/UTD5-T73E.
22. See Brown v. Ent. Merchs. Ass’n., 564 U.S. 786, 804 (2011)
(“California’s effort to regulate violent video games is the latest episode in a
long series of failed attempts to censor violent entertainment for minors.”);
Patrick M. Markey & Christopher J. Ferguson, Teaching Us To Fear: The
Violent Video Game Moral Panic and the Politics of Game Research, 10 A
M. J.
P
LAY 99, 102 (2017) (“As early as 1983 . . . the U.S. Surgeon General[]
suggested that video games . . . were a leading cause of family violence.”);
Ralph Blumenthal, ‘Death Race’ Game Gains Favor, But Not with the Safety
Council, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 28, 1976), https://perma.cc/ZB6B-TZAS.
23. See Protect Children from Video Game Sex and Violence Act, H.R.
669, 108th Cong. § 3(a) (2003); Cian Maher, Mass Effect 2’s Jack Was
Originally Pansexual, But Non-Straight Romances Were Cut Because of Fox
News, T
HEGAMER (Jan. 22, 2021), https://perma.cc/FT33-F8GB.
24. Video game history has witnessed progressive reform followed by
backlash. Women and allies in the industry came forward with the
#1reasonwhy movement to confront gendered harassment in video games in
2012, five years before the #MeToo movement emerged in Hollywood. See
J
ESPER JUUL, HANDMADE PIXELS: INDEPENDENT VIDEO GAMES AND THE QUEST
FOR
AUTHENTICITY 115 (2019). The “GamerGate” incident followed shortly
1292 79 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1285 (2022)
Video games’ rise to prominence is all the more significant
given that key game elements lack IP protection. While we
normally turn to copyright to protect creative works, copyright
offers only thin protection for game design.
25
It covers aspects of
increasingly photorealistic games that make them resemble
films—art assets, unique characters, and soundtracks—but it
does not cover design elements unique to games as an
interactive medium.
26
For over forty years, this gap has meant
that copyright does not prohibit “clones”—games that utilize the
same gameplay and compete for the same set of players.
27
Game
developers therefore require strategies beyond IP to compete
with those who would copy their works.
Gaming should, under these circumstances, be a prime
candidate for studying how IP—or its absence—impacts a major
creative industry. Yet video games are conspicuously absent
from IP scholarship. The number of law review pieces featuring
“video-game” within ten words of “copyright” is nearly an order
of magnitude less than the number mentioning “music” or
“software.”
28
What little has been written on video games has
been split across a wide range of topics but seldom focuses on
cloning or the ultimate question of how IP shapes the industry
and creative content of games.
29
The breadth is not in itself
after, launching a campaign of coordinated harassment that “involved online
attacks and threats toward a number of developers and critics—especially
marginalized developers, women, and developers with nontraditional gender
identities.” Id. at 118.
25. See infra Part II.
26. Cf. Drew S. Dean, Comment, Hitting Reset: Devising a New Video
Game Copyright Regime, 164 U.
PA. L. REV. 1239, 1279 (2016) (advising
designers to infuse games with “more ‘traditional’ forms of expression” for
protection).
27. See infra Part I.
28. Searching Westlaw’s law reviews and journals database through
January 1, 2022, for all hits on “copyright” within 10 words of “music” yielded
6,614 results and a similar search for “software” yielded 7,844. Searching for
“video-game!” yielded only 933. Even restricting the search to publications
since the year 2000—excluding prior decades where games were less
economically and culturally salient—“music” yields 5,361 hits, “software”
5,568, and “video-game!” 642.
29. Notable exceptions include a comment by Drew Dean, supra note 26,
arguing for greater protection in response to cloning by mobile developers, and
the newly published article by Christopher B. Seaman & Thuan Tran,
Intellectual Property and Tabletop Games, 107 I
OWA L. REV. 1615 (2022),
addressing how IP rights impact innovation in the related sector of board
CREATIVITY WITHOUT IP? 1293
surprising given that the copyright issues salient for games
have evolved alongside their technological and social contexts.
The arcade machines of the 1970s and 1980s sat in public places
and forced courts to decide whether gameplay constituted
“public performance;”
30
the console wars of the 1990s raised
questions of whether games could be reverse engineered or
emulated;
31
and increasing authenticity has raised questions
around the depiction of real people and places, or even athletes’
tattoos.
32
In recent years, several pieces—many by enterprising
law students—have interrogated the respective rights of game
developers and fan communities as players have begun
streaming gameplay on platforms like Twitch and YouTube or
animating game characters like puppets to create “machinima”
videos.
33
games. One of my own students has also written a forthcoming paper on issues
of labor law and unionization in the industry. Laura Newberry, Note, The
ABCs of Gaming: Activision, Biden, and Coronavirus Set the Stage for Labor
Unionization in the Video Game Industry, 2022 W
IS. L. REV. (forthcoming) (on
file with author).
30. See, e.g., Red Baron-Franklin Park, Inc. v. Taito Corp., 883 F.2d 275,
278–79 (4th Cir. 1989).
31. See Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1518–19 (9th
Cir. 1992); Sony Computer Ent., Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596,
603–05 (9th Cir. 2000).
32. See E.S.S. Ent. 2000, Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc., 547 F.3d 1095,
1097–98, 1101 (9th Cir. 2008) (rejecting trademark and trade dress claims for
depiction of a strip club); Solid Oak Sketches, LLC v. 2K Games, Inc., 449 F.
Supp. 3d 333, 346–50 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (finding that in-game depiction of
tattoos on NBA players constituted fair use).
33. See generally David E. Ashley, Note, The Public as Creator and
Infringer: Copyright Law Applied to the Creators of User-Generated Video
Content, 20 F
ORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 563 (2009); J. Remy
Green, Note, All Your Works Are Belong to Us: New Frontiers for the Derivative
Work Right in Video Games, 19 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 393 (2018); Shani Shisha,
Fairness, Copyright, and Video Games: Hate the Game, Not the Player, 31
F
ORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 694, 761–69 (2021); Ryan Wallace,
Comment, Modding: Amateur Authorship and How the Video Game Industry
Is Actually Getting It Right, 2014 BYU L. REV. 219 (2014). Scholars have also
documented expansion of end-user license agreements and DMCA
anti-circumvention measures in games alongside similar developments in
software generally. See generally BJ Ard, Notice and Remedies in Copyright
Licensing, 80 M
O. L. REV. 313 (2015) [hereinafter Ard, Notice and Remedies];
Joshua A.T. Fairfield, Nexus Crystals: Crystallizing Limits on Contractual
Control of Virtual Worlds, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 43 (2011); Guy A. Rub,
Against Copyright Customization, 107 I
OWA L. REV. 677 (2022).
1294 79 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1285 (2022)
This lack of scholarly attention to cloning is surprising,
however, because cloning has been one of the industry’s few
constants. In gaming’s earliest days, developers crashed the
market by flooding it with Pong clones.
34
The practice continued
through the arcade, console, and mobile gaming eras because
judicial decisions since as early as 1981 repeatedly held that
cloning does not infringe the copyright in the original
games
35
—up to a point.
36
This makes video games ripe for study
on not only how the industry functions in the absence of strong
copyright protection today, but also how this state of affairs has
impacted the industry’s history and evolution.
The industry’s evolution provides remarkable illustrations
of dynamics identified in prior studies of IP’s negative space. On
one side of the industry are highly commercialized AAA games
that cost upward of $100 million to produce.
37
AAA publishers
copy and build on popular gameplay elements from their
competitors, but cloning disputes are rare.
38
This sector
resembles the paradigmatic low-IP equilibrium where the
harms of copying are mitigated by features of the works
themselves.
39
One cannot cheaply clone a multimillion dollar
game and expect it to be competitive: much of the game’s appeal
comes from features like hyper-realistic graphics and sprawling
34. See generally Mark J.P. Wolf, The Video Game Industry Crash of
1977, in B
EFORE THE CRASH: EARLY VIDEO GAME HISTORY 81 (Mark J.P. Wolf
ed., 2012).
35. See Incredible Techs., Inc. v. Virtual Techs., Inc., 400 F.3d 1007,
1012–15 (7th Cir. 2005); Data E. USA, Inc. v. Epyx, Inc., 862 F.2d 204, 209
(9th Cir. 1988); Atari, Inc. v. Amusement World, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 222,
229–30 (D. Md. 1981); Capcom U.S.A., Inc. v. Data E. Corp., No. C 93-3259,
1994 WL 1751482, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 1994).
36. See Atari, Inc. v. N. Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607,
617–18 (7th Cir. 1982) (holding defendant infringed on Pac-Man because it
copied the protagonist and enemies too closely); Universal City Studios, Inc. v.
Nintendo Co., 615 F. Supp. 838, 859 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff’d, 797 F.2d 70 (2d Cir.
1986).
37. See infra I.C.1.
38. See Eric A. Taub, In Video Games, Sequels Are Winners, N.Y.
TIMES
(Sept. 20, 2004), https://perma.cc/UC5H-2LF2 (“The game industry is not
interested in original ideas. We don’t even waste our time pitching them . . . .”
(internal quotation omitted)); Christopher Lunsford, Note, Drawing a Line
Between Idea and Expression in Videogame Copyright: The Evolution of
Substantial Similarity for Videogame Clones, 18 I
NTELL. PROP. L. BULL. 87,
101 (2013).
39. See infra Part IV.A.1.
CREATIVITY WITHOUT IP? 1295
open worlds that are expensive to duplicate and therefore
resistant to copying regardless of IP protection.
40
Effectively,
however, major franchises are guilty of cloning their own games
given how heavily they rely on sequels and associated
trademarks.
41
Critics have derided this sequelization as a sign
of creative stagnation since the advent of the AAA sector in the
early 2000s.
42
On the other side are “indie” games. Independent studios
have adopted a different ethos; they strive to innovate in theme
and gameplay rather than compete on production value.
43
This
sector resembles the paradigmatic norm-enforcement regime.
44
Indie success requires winning approval from the cultural
intermediaries who award exhibition space, prizes, and
networking opportunities to promising developers.
45
Winning
approval, in turn, requires compliance with community
anti-copying norms, which mitigates cloning among indie
developers.
46
Indie studios also avert cloning by picking themes
and aesthetics without mainstream appeal,
47
and they
additionally mitigate risk through financial innovations like
crowdfunding.
48
Because the novel gameplay mechanics at the
core of many indie games are cheap to emulate, however, they
now face the risk of cloning by opportunistic actors in mobile
gaming.
49
40. See infra Part IV.B.1.
41. See Taub, supra note 38 (“In the six-month period ending in June,
only two of the 10 best-selling video games were based on original ideas . . . .”).
42. See id.
43. J
UUL, supra note 24, at 34–37; see infra Part I.C.2.
44. See infra .
45. See, e.g., Felan Parker et al., Megabooth: The Cultural Intermediation
of Indie Games, 20 N
EW MEDIA & SOCY 1953, 1968 (2017); see infra Part
IV.C.1.
46. See Christian Katzenbach et al., Copies, Clones, and Genre Building:
Discourses on Imitation and Innovation in Digital Games, 10 I
NTL J. COMMCN
838, 852–53 (2016); Tom Phillips, “Don’t Clone My Indie Game, Bro”: Informal
Cultures of Videogame Regulation in the Independent Sector, 24 C
ULTURAL
TRENDS 143, 149–51 (2015) (outlining the “evaluation of the artistic integrity
of games” that takes place informally within the indie community, often done
through public shaming).
47. See infra Part IV.C.2.
48. See infra Part IV.C.3.
49. See infra Part IV.C.4.
1296 79 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1285 (2022)
While this case study advances the debate over IP’s
negative space, the significance of the video game industry goes
beyond vindicating the argument that creative production is
viable with limited IP protection. The video game industry
exemplifies the realities of contemporary creative production
and the complex interplay of legal and non-legal protections
across creative industries. Moving forward, this case study
advances our understanding of the creative industries in four
ways. First, it pushes us beyond asking whether such production
is possible and to grapple with how the interplay of legal and
non-legal protections shapes the substance of what the industry
produces and determines which creators are likely to succeed.
Competing by budget, like AAA publishers, raises the costs of
entry, and, combined with reliance on trademarks, leads to lack
of variety in big-budget games.
50
Meanwhile, indie studios are
steered toward niche content and arguably under-rewarded for
innovation and risk-taking.
51
Second, this study requires us to recognize that creative
industries are not monolithic. AAA and indie approaches
represent two very different strategies within the same
industry, and outcomes within each segment vary.
52
Other
pursuits such as fashion and comedy likewise have incumbents
at the top, amateurs trying to break in, and, undoubtedly, many
tiers of creative and financial success in between.
53
Assessing
whether a legal regime works—or even whether it is
low-IP—depends on which segments we examine.
Third, close examination of these segments and their
history also shows that the stability of the regime is contingent
on its intersections with broader trends in technology, the
market, and society.
54
Cloning was rampant in the early years
because games were simple and cheap to copy.
55
Game
developers responded with technical protections and business
strategies that mitigated cloning until such point that
50. See infra Part V.A.
51. See infra Part V.A.
52. See infra Part V.B.
53. See, e.g., Fabian Holt & Maria Mackinney-Valentin, Can Anyone Be a
Designer?: Amateurs in Fashion Culture, 3 A
RTIFACT: J. DESIGN PRAC. 6.1, 6.1
(2015).
54. See infra Part V.C.
55. See infra Part I.A.
CREATIVITY WITHOUT IP? 1297
top-selling games were so expensive to produce that cloning was
no longer a threat.
56
Yet cloning reappeared as mobile gaming
became popular because people were once again playing games
that were simple and cheap to copy.
57
Fourth, this case study demonstrates the shortcomings of a
taxonomy that bifurcates industries into either the “full-IP” or
negative-space category.
58
Notwithstanding the law’s apparent
indifference to cloning, some may object that games do not
belong in the negative-space discussion.
59
Others question
whether even paradigmatic examples like fashion and comedy
qualify, given the prominence of trademarks in fashion and the
reality that many comedians seek to profit from copyrighted
specials.
60
But to quibble over whether any given industry
makes the cut is to risk missing the point. Every category of
creative works features some elements that are legally
protected, some subject to de facto protection through practical
obstacles or norms, and others that competitors can readily
appropriate. Protection regimes exist on a spectrum, not a
binary. To progress our understanding of today’s creative
industries requires opening the field and recognizing the
dynamics playing out across both sides of the supposed divide
between negative-space industries and those, like film and
music, that are conventionally recognized as having full
copyright protection.
61
56. See infra Parts I.B, I.C.1.
57. See infra Part I.C.2.
58. See infra Part V.D.
59. These objections may stem from the observation that copyright law
formally protects against consumer copying in the form of piracy. Even in this
setting, however, formal legal rights do only part of the work. Although full
examination of these dynamics is beyond the scope of this Article, it bears
noting that video game publishers have established comprehensive anti-piracy
protection not by threatening legal action but by adopting technical measures
and business models that create practical obstacles for piracy and dampen its
financial impact. See, e.g., Andrew V. Moshirnia, Giant Pink Scorpions:
Fighting Piracy with Novel Digital Rights Management Technology, 23
D
EPAUL J. ART, TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 2 (2012). I intend to develop these
observations further in future work.
60. See Dreyfuss, supra note 12, at 1450.
61. This broadens the dialog to include, among other scholarship, work
on copyright’s role in structuring investment in capital-intensive works like
films and work documenting the correlation between changes in copyright
enforceability and the output of the music industry. See generally Julie E.
1298 79 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1285 (2022)
This Article develops the foregoing arguments in five Parts.
Part I traces the history of the gaming industry, with special
attention paid to cloning in the early years; the later emergence
of AAA games, where cloning is not a major threat; and indie
games, where the resurgence of cloning once again raises
problems. Part II engages with legal doctrine to explain why
copyright provides only limited protection against cloning, and
Part III explains why patent and trademark do not fill this gap.
Part IV introduces the negative-space literature and situates
the video game industry’s non-legal strategies for addressing
cloning within that body of scholarship. Finally, Part V delves
further into the broader implications of this case study for
understanding the interplay between copyright and the creative
industries.
I. S
TATE OF THE INDUSTRY
Understanding the industry requires knowing its history.
Many contemporary struggles echo those the industry faced in
the early years of arcade games, Atari home consoles, and
rampant cloning. More recent trends stem from the industry’s
adoption of digital distribution and online business models. The
following discussion outlines the developments that laid the
groundwork for two contemporary models for competing: the
big-budget, AAA publishers and the lower budget indies.
A. Early Clones, Low Quality, and Market Crashes
The history of the industry begins with the release of the
arcade game Computer Space in 1971 by Nolan Bushnell and
Ted Dabney; the pair would go on to found Atari the following
year and release the arcade hit Pong.
62
Many imitators followed
Cohen, Copyright as Property in the Post-Industrial Economy: A Research
Agenda, 2011 W
IS. L. REV. 141 (2011); GLYNN LUNNEY, COPYRIGHTS EXCESS:
MONEY AND MUSIC IN THE U.S. RECORDING INDUSTRY (2018).
62. See S
TEVEN L. KENT, THE ULTIMATE HISTORY OF VIDEO GAMES xii,
38–39 (2001). The history of non-commercial video games reaches back to at
least 1961 with Spacewar!, which was created by a team at MIT. See RANDY
NICHOLS, THE VIDEO GAME BUSINESS 16 (2014). Setting the tone for all that
was to come, Computer Space was itself a clone of Spacewar!. See Casey
O’Donnell, The North American Game Industry, in THE VIDEO GAME INDUSTRY:
FORMATION, PRESENT STATE, AND FUTURE 99, 100 (Peter Zackariasson &
Timothy L. Wilson eds., 2012).
CREATIVITY WITHOUT IP? 1299
with cloned “table tennis” games.
63
As it turns out, Atari itself
copied from another developer to create Pong:
64
Bushnell and
Dabney began working on Pong after viewing a pre-release
demonstration of a table tennis game for the first home video
game console, the Magnavox Odyssey.
65
The Odyssey hit the
market in September 1972 with twelve games, including Table
Tennis at the top of the list; Atari released the virtually identical
Pong two months later.
66
For a time the games were
complementary: Pong was so popular in arcades that it drove
people to buy the Odyssey to keep playing at home.
67
The
companies’ relationship soured around Atari’s release of Home
Pong in 1975.
68
Magnavox responded with a patent suit against Atari and
other imitators, leading to one of the first video game lawsuits
69
and the only major episode of patent enforcement involving
game clones.
70
The patent covered the game mechanic whereby
a player-controlled symbol (the paddle) strikes a
computer-controlled symbol (the ball) and causes the latter to
change direction.
71
Atari and several other defendants elected to
63. See HAROLD GOLDBERG, ALL YOUR BASE ARE BELONG TO US: HOW FIFTY
YEARS OF VIDEOGAMES CONQUERED POP CULTURE 30–31 (2011) (“By the time
the trend peaked, there were well over 100,000 Pong-inspired arcade games
across the United States.”).
64. See T
RISTAN DONOVAN, REPLAY: THE HISTORY OF VIDEO GAMES 14–26
(2010).
65. R
ALPH H. BAER, VIDEOGAMES: IN THE BEGINNING 81 (2005); see Kate
Willaert, Pixels in Print (Part 2): Advertising Odyssey—The First Home Video
Game, VIDEO GAME HIST. FOUND. (Mar. 20, 2020), https://perma.cc/3JQD-
L9FG.
66. See Willaert, supra note 65.
67. See Chris Kohler, How Pong and the Odyssey Console Launched the
Videogame Era, W
IRED (Jan. 9, 2015, 6:30 AM), https://perma.cc/8DXE-W75D
(“Pong’s success was actually visited back onto the Odyssey, which had its
biggest sales in 1974—after Pong had become a huge arcade success, but a
year before Atari could launch its first Home Pong product.”).
68. See D
ONOVAN, supra note 64, at 34–36.
69. See William K. Ford, Copy Game for High Score: The First Video
Game Lawsuit, 20 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 37 (2012). The first suit was filed
between another pair of Pong imitators in 1973. See id. at 3.
70. See generally Magnavox Co. v. Bally Mfg. Corp., 414 F. Supp. 891
(N.D. Ill. 1976).
71. See U.S. Patent No. 28,507 (filed Apr. 25, 1974); Magnavox Co. v. Chi.
Dynamic Indus., Nos. 74 C 1030 & 74 C 2510, 1977 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17996,
at *4 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 10, 1977).
1300 79 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1285 (2022)
settle and pay license fees to continue selling Pong, while those
who refused to settle lost in court.
72
The proliferation of Pong clones also set the stage for the
Video Game Crash of 1977. By 1977 there was a glut of
“first-generation” game consoles, many of which were poorly
made and most of which could only play one game—usually
some version of table tennis—or a handful of pre-installed
games.
73
Sales stagnated because consumers who bought one
had no reason to buy another.
74
Retailers’ inability to sell these
consoles compounded following the release of
“second-generation” consoles like the Atari 2600 that allowed
consumers to acquire new games via standalone cartridges.
75
First-generation stock sat unsold or was sold at a loss, and many
manufacturers were forced out of business.
76
Atari continued to produce hits in the arcades and on home
consoles—and imitators continued to follow. Its game Asteroids
spawned the clone Meteors, which prompted Atari to file a
pivotal copyright lawsuit.
77
Both games had the player pilot a
spaceship with the objective of shooting space rocks while
avoiding collisions.
78
The court enumerated twenty-two
similarities, from inclusion of exactly three different sizes of
rocks to awarding extra lives when the player scored 10,000
points.
79
Yet the court found no infringement.
80
As it explained, the
resemblance traced back to “the basic idea of a video game
involving space rocks.”
81
Copyright does not give any company
exclusive rights to an idea; likewise, it does not convey a
72. See Magnavox, 1977 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17996, at *12; DONOVAN, supra
note 64, at 26.
73. See Wolf, supra note 34, at 83–87.
74. See id.
75. See id.
76. See id. at 83.
77. See generally Atari, Inc. v. Amusement World, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 222
(D. Md. 1981).
78. See id. at 227.
79. Id. at 224–25.
80. Id. at 229–30.
81. Id. at 229.
CREATIVITY WITHOUT IP? 1301
monopoly on expressive elements necessary or inevitable in
depicting that idea.
82
Undeterred, Atari returned to court to enforce the copyright
in Pac-Man.
83
Atari did not create the original game.
84
Rather,
after Pac-Man became an arcade sensation, Atari acquired the
exclusive license to adapt it for home consoles.
85
Before Atari
could release its version, however, a competitor released the
unauthorized Pac-Man clone K.C. Munchkin!.
86
Both were maze
chases: “the player directs [a] gobbler through the maze
consuming dots and avoiding capture by the monsters; by
gobbling a power capsule, the player can reverse the roles.”
87
Screen captures reveal additional similarities:
82. See id. (“[T]he Court must be careful not to interpret [Atari’s]
copyright as granting [Atari] a monopoly over those forms of expression that
are inextricably associated with the idea of such a video game.”); see also infra
Part II.C.
83. See Atari, Inc. v. N. Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607,
620 (7th Cir. 1982).
84. See D
ONOVAN, supra note 64, at 87–89.
85. See Thomas M.S. Hemnes, The Adaptation of Copyright Law to Video
Games, 131 U. P
A. L. REV. 171, 191 n.125 (1982).
86. See Atari, Inc., 672 F.2d at 620.
87. Id. at 611.
1302 79 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1285 (2022)
Figure 1: Atari v. North American Philips
Pac-Man, left; K.C. Munchkin!, right
This time, Atari prevailed. As in the Asteroids case, the
court recognized Atari could not monopolize the maze-chase
idea.
88
The court insinuated that if Pac-Man involved common
themes or real-world occurrences—like a bank robber fleeing
security guards—competitors would have latitude to copy the
game and its characters.
89
What distinguished Pac-Man was its
fanciful artistic choices: a main character who was a
disembodied mouth and antagonists in the form of multicolored
ghosts.
90
The defendant infringed by taking the same artistic
direction.
91
88. Id. at 617 (distinguishing unprotectable methods of play from
“concrete details of the visual presentation [that] constitute the copyrightable
expression”).
89. See id. at 617 n.10, 618 (suggesting less protection for characters with
“reference to the real world” as was the case for a competing game Take the
Money and Run).
90. Id. at 617–18.
91. See id. at 618. Other instances where plaintiffs prevailed followed
similar logic. See, e.g., Midway Mfg. Co. v. Bandai-America, Inc., 546 F. Supp.
125, 146 (D. N.J. 1982) (holding the insectile shape of aliens in Galaxian
protectable); Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Nintendo Co., 615 F. Supp. 838,
CREATIVITY WITHOUT IP? 1303
Most games in this era did not approach the success of
Asteroids or Pac-Man.
92
The market flourished for only a few
short years after the 1977 crash before the more devastating
Video Game Crash of 1983.
93
Atari’s game sales accelerated
following its 1980 release of the home version of Space Invaders,
the “killer app” of its day.
94
In the rush to meet consumer
demand, however, developers sacrificed quality. The ill-fated
Atari game E.T. the Extraterrestrial—regarded as “the worst
video game of all time”
95
—is emblematic. Atari reportedly spent
$20 million for rights to produce a game based on the Spielberg
film.
96
The rush to release the game in time for Christmas meant
that developers had only six weeks to work—far less than the
industry norm—resulting in a confusing game and
disappointment for movie fans.
97
While many blame the E.T.
game for the crash, it was merely the tip of the iceberg. Anyone
with rudimentary programming skills could make games for the
Atari 2600.
98
The market became saturated with low-quality
titles not from studios who could pay millions for film licenses,
but from innumerable small operations looking for a quick
859 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff’d, 797 F.2d 70 (2d Cir. 1986) (extending protection to
Mario’s distinctive march in Donkey Kong).
92. See K
ENT, supra note 62, at 143 (Pac-Man appeared on the cover of
Time magazine, inspired a hit song, and translated into a popular Saturday
morning cartoon show.”). Notwithstanding its mark on pop culture, even
Pac-Man faced mixed success: The arcade original was a fan favorite, but Atari
was ultimately stuck with five million unsold copies of its inferior home
release. See D
USTIN HANSEN, GAME ON!: VIDEO GAME HISTORY FROM PONG AND
PAC-MAN TO MARIO, MINECRAFT, AND MORE 46 (2016).
93. See K
ENT, supra note 62, at 123–77.
94. The Definitive Space Invaders, R
ETRO GAMER, Dec. 2003–Jan. 2004,
at 23, 25.
95. Geoff Brumfiel, Total Failure: The World’s Worst Video Game, NPR
(May 31, 2017), https://perma.cc/TF6K-7AEA.
96. I
AN BOGOST, PERSUASIVE GAMES: THE EXPRESSIVE POWER OF
VIDEOGAMES 175 (2007).
97. See id.; Ted Trautman, Excavating the Video-Game Industry’s Past,
T
HE NEW YORKER (Apr. 29, 2014), https://perma.cc/CP93-AUEP.
98. See John M. Arnone, Game (Not) Over: How a Mark Saved Video
Games, 19 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 247, 247–48 (2010); see HANSEN, supra
note 92, at 46 (“The real problem wasn’t that there weren’t any good games, it
was that the good games were getting drowned out by the bad ones.”).
1304 79 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1285 (2022)
profit.
99
As quality declined, consumer confidence and sales
plummeted.
100
The second generation of consoles met its end as
millions of cartridges sat on shelves and in warehouses
unsold.
101
In just over a decade, the industry established several
trends that would endure into the present. Imitation was
widespread,
102
players were frustrated with quality,
103
and
courts established in these early years that games were only
partly protected.
104
Patents would continue to be important, but
for hardware rather than games.
105
Going forward, the focus
would be copyright, and its exceptions and limitations would
leave room for imitation.
B. Hitting Reset
Nintendo spearheaded the third console generation with
the U.S. release of the Nintendo Entertainment System (NES)
in 1985.
106
The industry learned the importance of quality
control from the 1977 and 1983 crashes.
107
Nintendo pursued
this objective through marketing and the design of its system: it
implemented a lockout code called 10NES so third parties could
not release unauthorized games.
108
This meant Nintendo could
99. See Arnone, supra note 98, at 247 n.2 (noting that even dog food
companies began to create video games).
100. See id. at 248.
101. Or worse. As one journalist reports: “[D]emand for video games had
fallen so much that [Atari] dumped fourteen trucks’ worth of merchandise in
a New Mexico landfill and poured cement over the forsaken games to prevent
local children from salvaging them.” Trautman, supra note 97.
102. See Wolf, supra note 34, at 81–83.
103. See Arnone, supra note 98, at 248.
104. See Atari, Inc. v. Amusement World, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 222, 229–30
(D. Md. 1981); see also Atari, Inc. v. N. Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672
F.2d 607, 617 (7th Cir. 1982).
105. See Kyle Gross, Game On: The Rising Prevalence of Patent-Related
Issues in the Video Game Industry, 12 SMU
SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 243, 247
(2009) (“Of the few patents in effect during the early years of the video game
industry, most focused on gaming hardware . . . .”).
106. See Arnone, supra note 98, at 248.
107. See id.
108. See Julie E. Cohen, Reverse Engineering and the Rise of Electronic
Vigilantism: Intellectual Property Implications of “Lock-Out” Programs, 68 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1091, 1101 (1995) [hereinafter Cohen, Reverse Engineering]; see
CREATIVITY WITHOUT IP? 1305
screen for quality and reject low-effort clones like those that
precipitated prior crashes. This control also assured parents of
child-friendly content, albeit at the price of censorship: beyond
profanity, Nintendo removed practically any reference to
sexuality, religion, or politics.
109
Similar technical restrictions were widely adopted but
ultimately limited in effect. Nintendo sued for copyright
infringement when Atari copied 10NES in its efforts to bypass
it—Atari asserted fair use and lost.
110
This case was unusual,
however, because Atari had obtained Nintendo’s original source
code through false representations to the Copyright Office.
111
If
Atari had instead obtained the code through reverse
engineering, the court suggested that its actions could have
constituted fair use.
112
The following month, the Ninth Circuit
embraced that dicta in a decision involving a lockout code for the
Sega Genesis console.
113
Prior to that case, third parties could
release games for Genesis only with Sega’s approval, and they
were subject to a ten to fifteen dollar license fee per cartridge.
114
Game maker Accolade reverse engineered the system to bypass
the lockout code.
115
The Ninth Circuit ultimately held that
also Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 836 (Fed. Cir.
1992).
109. Dominic Arsenault, System Profile: The Nintendo Entertainment
System (NES), in T
HE VIDEO GAME EXPLOSION: A HISTORY FROM PONG TO
PLAYSTATION AND BEYOND 109, 111 (Mark J.P. Wolf ed., 2008); see also Lewis
Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 780 F. Supp. 1283, 1296 (N.D. Cal.
1991), aff’d, 964 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1992) (emphasizing efforts to prevent harm
to the “Nintendo Culture”).
110. See Atari, 975 F.2d at 843.
111. See id. at 841–42 (“Because Atari was not in authorized possession of
the Copyright Office copy of 10NES, any copying or derivative copying of
10NES source code from the Copyright Office does not qualify as a fair use.”).
112. See id. at 842; see also 4 N
IMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.05[D][4] (2022).
Reverse engineering would involve working backwards from published “object
code” to determine the “source code,” revealing details of the lockout
mechanism. Cohen, Reverse Engineering, supra note 108, at 1098, 1098 n.29.
From there, programmers could devise the means to bypass it. Id. Atari
essentially cheated: it lied to obtain the source code without doing the work.
113. See Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1525 (9th Cir.
1992). The Supreme Court subsequently endorsed this decision. See Google
LLC v. Oracle Am., Inc., 141 S. Ct. 1183, 1199, 1208 (2021).
114. See K
ENT, supra note 62, at 381.
115. Sega Enters., 977 F.2d at 1514–15.
1306 79 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1285 (2022)
reverse engineering to create interoperable software was fair
use.
116
Nearly a decade later, Sony sued the maker of a
PlayStation emulator, that is, a program that runs PlayStation
games on a computer without the purchase of a PlayStation
console.
117
The Ninth Circuit held this too was fair use.
118
Cumulatively, this meant console manufacturers had little
ability to constrain third-party games and add-ons.
These rulings left the door open to unauthorized clones, and
decisions in this era followed the trend of the prior decade.
Competitors could copy gameplay, depictions of the same sports
or other life activities, and even fantasy elements so long as they
were rooted in common tropes. Take the suit by Capcom,
developer of Street Fighter II, against the similar game Fighter’s
History.
119
Both were fighting games that depicted martial
artists in their typical (often stereotypical) garb, many of whom
could execute special moves like throwing fireballs from their
hands.
120
The resemblance was palpable:
Figure 2: Capcom U.S.A. v. Data East
Street Fighter II, left; Fighter’s History, right
116. See id. at 1520 (“Where there is good reason for studying or examining
the unprotected aspects of a copyrighted computer program, disassembly for
purposes of such study or examination constitutes a fair use.”).
117. See generally Sony Comput. Ent. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596
(9th Cir. 2000).
118. See id. at 608. The Supreme Court has also cited this case favorably.
See Google, 141 S. Ct. at 1198, 1208.
119. See generally Capcom U.S.A., Inc. v. Data E. Corp., No. C 93-3259,
1994 WL 1751482 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 1994).
120. See id. at *12–15.
CREATIVITY WITHOUT IP? 1307
When Capcom moved to enjoin the game, the district court
deemed Capcom’s copyright claim meritless.
121
It dissected
Street Fighter II’s characters and signature moves and found
them unoriginal because they replicated uniforms and styles
prevalent in real martial arts and pop culture.
122
Even Street
Fighter II’s fantastical elements—like the ability to hurl magical
projectiles—were preceded by examples in earlier games and
comic books.
123
The court refused to award the plaintiff a
monopoly in the genre.
The more novel development was the rise of sequels and
franchises. Popular games spawned sequels with familiar
gameplay alongside incremental improvements to take
advantage of new consoles’ graphical capabilities.
124
Two of the
most prolific were the Super Mario Bros. series of side-scrolling
platformers with ten releases from 1985 through 2002 and the
Final Fantasy roleplaying-game series with eleven releases over
as many years.
125
Popular franchises like Mario also launched
spin-offs beyond the game’s original premise: puzzle games like
Dr. Mario, racing games like Mario Kart, and titles starring his
brother Luigi, his rival Wario, or his dinosaur companion
Yoshi.
126
As commentators observed, sequels crowded out
opportunities for new ideas and market entrants.
127
By 2004,
even contemporary journalists at The New York Times had
taken note, warning: “All licensed and all sequel game titles all
121. See id. at *15.
122. See id. at *11–12. The Ninth Circuit reached a similar conclusion in
earlier litigation featuring the maker of Fighter’s History as plaintiff, where
the similarities originated in the unprotectable “idea of a martial arts karate
combat game” and “idea of the karate sport.” Data E. USA, Inc. v. Epyx, Inc.,
862 F.2d 204, 209 (9th Cir. 1988) (emphasis in original).
123. See Capcom, 1994 WL 1751482, at *15–16.
124. See André Marchand & Thorsten Hennig-Thurau, Value Creation in
the Video Game Industry: Industry Economics, Consumer Benefits, and
Research Opportunities, 27 J.
INTERACTIVE MKTG. 141, 143 (2013).
125. See Mario Through the Years, N
INTENDO, https://perma.cc/D2BU-
F59G; History, S
QUARE ENIX, https://perma.cc/P6EG-CV9B.
126. See Mario Through the Years, supra note 125.
127. See, e.g., David B. Nieborg, Triple-A: The Political Economy of the
Blockbuster Video Game 204–05 (June 22, 2011) (Ph.D. dissertation,
University of Amsterdam) (ResearchGate).
1308 79 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1285 (2022)
the time will give the consumer the impression that the market
will never get interesting.”
128
The proliferation of sequels coincided with ongoing patterns
of improvement and planned obsolescence in game hardware.
Even without innovations in gameplay or story, technical
advances in graphics allowed console manufacturers and game
publishers to push a narrative of constant improvement: games
just like those you enjoyed before, only better.
129
These advances
are most pronounced with the launch of new console
generations, which push gamers to upgrade roughly every
five years.
130
Constant cycling of sequels and
consoles—we have entered the ninth generation with the
PlayStation 5—nonetheless entails considerable expenses for
consumers and a growing ecological toll.
131
C. Contemporary Sectors
The industry coalesced into roughly its modern form by the
early 2000s.
132
At the forefront are big-budget AAA games that
promise ever-improving graphics and a steady stream of sequels
in well-trodden franchises.
133
Their distinguishing feature,
besides production value, is the dominance of
publishers—publishers decide which games to fund and then
128. Taub, supra note 38.
129. See N
ICHOLS, supra note 62, at 30 (“Reliance on planned obsolescence
through changes in the hardware sector has given the industry two
advantages—a continually changing framework for design and innovation and
a regular source of restimulating dying markets.”); James Newman, Save the
Videogame! The National Videogame Archive: Preservation, Supersession, and
Obsolescence, M/C J. (July 25, 2009), https://perma.cc/Y82U-RUQ5.
130. See J
UUL, supra note 24, at 61 (criticizing the console-era account of
video game history because “in practice video game design changed relatively
little between console generations from Playstation2/Xbox and later”).
131. See N
ICHOLS, supra note 62, at 146 (documenting resultant toxic
waste); Richard Maxwell & Toby Miller, “Warm and Stuffy”: The Ecological
Impact of Electronic Games, in T
HE VIDEO GAME INDUSTRY: FORMATION,
PRESENT STATE, AND FUTURE 179, 185 (Peter Zackariasson & Timothy L.
Wilson eds., 2012) (documenting outsized impact on vulnerable youth and
communities in the Global South).
132. See Dmitri Williams, Structure and Competition in the U.S. Home
Video Game Industry, 4 I
NTL J. ON MEDIA MGMT. 41, 46–48 (2002); Nieborg,
supra note 127, at 82–83.
133. See Felan Parker, Canonizing Bioshock: Cultural Value and the
Prestige Game, 12 G
AMES & CULTURE 739, 739–40 (2015).
CREATIVITY WITHOUT IP? 1309
delegate production to in-house or external studios.
134
While
these games implicate a range of IP issues, cloning disputes
among AAA developers have become rare.
135
Independent
studios—commonly known as “indie studios”—take a contrary
approach.
136
Rejecting the prevailing trend of publisher control,
indie studios instead play with alternative aesthetics, themes,
and game mechanics.
137
The price of this freedom has been
greater precarity, including vulnerability to a resurgence of
cloning.
1. AAA Productions
Game publishers began using the AAA designation in the
1990s as games became big business.
138
Appropriately enough,
publishers adapted the term from finance. As recent scholarship
explains:
Triple-A or AAA rank games refers to the bond credit
classification system developed by the largest American
credit rating agencies—Moody’s, S&P, and Fitch. On their
scale, the AAA is the highest mark, assigned for the safest
bonds that have the strongest capacity to meet financial
expectations . . . . [W]hat it essentially stands for are games
with large teams, larger budgets, and the largest prospective
returns, aimed as selling the highest possible number of final
products to recoup the astronomical investment: games as
commodities.
139
One might have thought publishers would decline in importance
beginning in the early 2000s as digital distribution eliminated
the direct expenses of publishing and distributing physical game
134. See Alexander Bernevega & Alex Gekker, The Industry of Landlords:
Exploring the Assetization of the Triple-A Game, 17 G
AMES & CULTURE 47,
51–53 (2022).
135. See Marie Dealessandri, Clone Culture and Its Continuous Impact on
Indie Developers, G
AMESINDUSTRY.BIZ (Feb. 18, 2022), https://perma.cc/XBS4-
APPF.
136. For two of the most comprehensive treatments of the indie sector to
date, see J
UUL, supra note 24, and Felan Parker’s meta-analysis of indie-game
scholarship, F
ELAN PARKER, INDIE GAME STUDIES YEAR ELEVEN 1 (2014)
https://perma.cc/QG5S-ULM4 (PDF).
137. See J
UUL, supra note 24, at 12–14.
138. See Bernevega & Gekker, supra note 134, at 48.
139. Id. (emphasis in original) (internal citations omitted).
1310 79 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1285 (2022)
disks.
140
Publishers have retained their positions, however,
because they hold the capital—and often the trademark
rights—that developers require in order to be competitive in this
environment.
141
AAA game development entails significant production
costs.
142
Studios employ hundreds of programmers and artists,
many dedicated to crafting the increasingly photorealistic
graphics and animation that gamers have come to expect, at an
estimated running expense of $10,000 per month per employee
over several years.
143
Demands have also increased with the
growing popularity of “open worlds” in which players can freely
explore large virtual areas.
144
Some open worlds now exceed 100
square miles of virtual space, requiring developers to populate
every street, alley, and forest.
145
As a result, contemporary AAA
games routinely cost $100 million or more for development
alone.
146
Marketing comprises the other major expense. It is not
unusual for publishers to spend $30 million or more promoting
a new release.
147
Lying between development costs and
marketing costs are the sums paid to celebrities and sports
leagues. Developers have enlisted A-list celebrities as voice
140. See Williams, supra note 132, at 48–49.
141. See Andrew Grantham & Raphael Kaplinsky, Getting the Measure of
the Electronic Games Industry: Developers and the Management of Innovation,
9 I
NTL J. INNOVATION MGMT. 183, 191–92 (2005); Williams, supra note 132, at
47; Nieborg, supra note 127, at 104–05.
142. See Parker, supra note 133, at 740.
143. See J
ASON SCHREIER, BLOOD, SWEAT, AND PIXELS 3 (2017); Parker,
supra note 133, at 740.
144. See Julie Muncy, Open-World Games Are Changing the Way We Play,
W
IRED (Dec. 3, 2015, 6:30 AM), https://perma.cc/4LEG-53EA.
145. See id. (“Expansive worlds are expensive and difficult to design, and
as such tend to be filled with repetitive content: cookie-cutter tasks,
collectibles, and encounters designed to fill a game space that might otherwise
be nearly empty.”).
146. As former Sony Interactive CEO Shawn Layden admitted: “[I]t’s just
not sustainable. Major triple-A games in the current generation go anywhere
from $80 million to $150 million or more to build, and that’s before marketing.
Dean Takahashi, Shawn Layden Interview: The Man with the Crash Bandicoot
T-shirt, V
ENTUREBEAT (June 23, 2020, 8:00 AM), https://perma.cc/64CX-
QELQ.
147. See, e.g., Karyne Levy, The Most Expensive Video Games Ever Made,
I
NSIDER (July 7, 2014, 9:30 PM), https://perma.cc/CQB9-MHQM.
CREATIVITY WITHOUT IP? 1311
actors for game characters for over a decade, and we have
entered an era where games model in-game characters after
these performers. Notable examples include Gwen Stefani in
Band Hero
148
and Keanu Reeves’ high-profile involvement with
Cyberpunk 2077.
149
These performers must be paid.
150
Likewise,
developers of sports games pay hundreds of millions of dollars
to leagues like the National Football League and Major League
Baseball for licenses to depict their teams and trademarks.
151
Another feature of AAA games is the continuous
proliferation of sequels. Of the worldwide top 100 selling games
of 2018, eighty were sequels, including all but one of the top
twenty.
152
The outlier was fifth-placed Spider-Man, part of the
larger Marvel franchise.
153
When industry participants speak of
obtaining or developing “an IP,” they generally mean
trademarks and related character copyrights needed for sequels
or spin-offs in an established franchise.
154
Publishers maintain
ownership of these rights and license them to studios when the
time comes for future installments.
155
In addition, publishers
have expanded their markets by releasing their games across all
current platforms and for PC. Gamers can purchase the
eighteenth installment in the Call of Duty franchise, for
148. No Doubt v. Activision Publ’g, Inc., 122 Cal. Rptr. 3d 397, 401 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2011).
149. Keanu Reeves’ Newest Role Is in the Video Game Cyberpunk 2077.
Whoa, NPR
(Dec. 10, 2020, 3:56 PM), https://perma.cc/3TG5-F83W.
150. See Kemp Powers, Videogames Give Actors Second Chance, R
EUTERS
(Jan. 31, 2008, 5:45 AM), https://perma.cc/48XP-RJHZ (reporting
compensation of $500,000 or more “to do an hour’s worth of voice work”).
151. See N
ICHOLS, supra note 62, at 132–33 (documenting EA’s $750
million deal “for the exclusive use of ESPN’s logo and images” and similar NFL
deals); Sarah E. Needleman, NBA Inks Billion-Dollar Deal with Maker of 2K
Videogame, W
ALL ST. J. (Jan. 15, 2019, 4:58 PM), https://perma.cc/4JQ5-
XTWG.
152. Global Yearly Chart 2018, VGC
HARTZ, https://perma.cc/J25M-5QKB.
153. Id.
154. While the terminology may confound IP lawyers, insiders use “an IP”
as shorthand for an existing franchise, fantasy world, or set of characters,
whether from a game, film, or television series. See, e.g., Sarah Impey, Part 1:
The Pros and Cons of Using a Licensed IP, G
AMEANALYTICS (Dec. 16, 2020),
https://perma.cc/FW8N-8QLH; Ankit Jain & Richie Hecker, To IP or Not To
IP, That Is the Question, TECHCRUNCH (Nov. 2, 2016, 9:00 PM),
https://perma.cc/4W3R-MHGS.
155. See Nieborg, supra note 127, at 83.
1312 79 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1285 (2022)
example, for any of five current systems.
156
In parallel, console
manufacturers have moved past the age of lockout codes and
have become liberal in making third-party content, including
indie games, available for purchase.
157
While games have grown increasingly formulaic, AAA
publishers have raced to pioneer new commercialization
strategies. Historically, games were products.
158
Anyone who
wanted to play Super Mario Bros. in 1985 could buy a copy;
having paid once, they could play as often as they liked and
access all game features. Many recent games have moved
instead to the “software as service” model.
159
Rather than
drawing revenues primarily from the sale of finished games,
they seek to monetize each title indefinitely by making desirable
features subscription based, selling downloadable content, or
introducing microtransactions.
160
Two more infamous strategies
are the sale of “loot boxes,” transactions where the player pays
for a randomized chance to obtain in-game goods, and the sale
of “day one DLC,” content already developed by release day that
the player must nonetheless pay extra to access.
161
Many players and critics have voiced dissatisfaction with
current offerings. Some question overreliance on sequels and the
perceived rent-seeking of new business models.
162
Others take
issue with quality directly, complaining of an increase in bugs
156. See Call of Duty: Black Ops Cold War Editions FAQ, ACTIVISION
SUPPORT (Dec. 21, 2020), https://perma.cc/R5V4-Y4PA; see also Barry Ip,
Technological, Content, and Market Convergence in the Games Industry, 3
GAMES & CULTURE 199, 214 (2008).
157. See J
UUL, supra note 24, at 124.
158. See Jason Schreier, Top Video Game Companies Won’t Stop Talking
About ‘Games as a Service’, K
OTAKU (May 30, 2017, 3:40 PM),
https://perma.cc/D6S5-57DC.
159. See id.
160. See id.
161. See generally Allen Copenhaver & O. Hayden Griffin III, White-Collar
Criminality Within the Video Game Industry, 16 G
AMES & CULTURE 783 (2021);
Kishan Mistry, P(l)aying To Win: Loot Boxes, Microtransaction Monetization,
and a Proposal for Self-Regulation in the Video Game Industry, 71 RUTGERS U.
L. REV. 537 (2018); Leon Y. Xiao et al., Regulating Gambling-Like Video Game
Loot Boxes: A Public Health Framework Comparing Industry Self-Regulation,
Existing National Legal Approaches, and Other Potential Approaches,
C
URRENT ADDICTION REP., no. 9, July 2022, at 163.
162. See, e.g., Bernevega & Gekker, supra note 134, at 57; Mistry, supra
note 161, at 541.
CREATIVITY WITHOUT IP? 1313
and a decline in enjoyability.
163
The decline in quality may be
partly due to the industry’s poor labor conditions. Game
development has come under scrutiny for forcing “crunch” on
workers, as in 80-hour workweeks without overtime pay.
164
Employees also face precarity as they often find themselves
terminated once the crunch is over and a game is released.
165
Little wonder, then, that so many developers dream of becoming
independent and forming their own studios.
2. Indie Games
Indie studios seek to break free from publishers. As with
indie films, articulating what it means to be an indie studio is
more art than science. Financial independence is only part of
the story.
166
Contemporary indie developers also seek cultural
independence as expressed through the rejection, subversion,
and remixing of mainstream trends in gameplay and theme.
167
Interviews indicate that many indie developers seek financial
independence in service of cultural independence—they define
success as having the resources to continue making the games
they want to make.
168
Widespread diffusion of indie games has become possible
through two business innovations. First, digital distribution
through platforms like Steam has allowed indie studios to
market to players without winning the approval of publishers or
shelf space at brick-and-mortar retailers.
169
Second,
crowdfunding platforms like Kickstarter have made it possible
for indie studios to obtain upfront investments without
163. See, e.g., Copenhaver & Griffin, supra note 161, at 788 (“[A]fter
consumers have complained about misleading or broken games, governments
and regulatory bodies have taken actions indicating that these institutions
may be taking these issues more seriously.”); Barry Ip & Gabriel Jacobs,
Quality in the Games Industry: An Analysis of Customer Perceptions, 23 I
NTL
J. QUALITY & RELIABILITY MGMT. 531, 545 (2006).
164. See generally S
CHREIER, supra note 143.
165. See generally id.
166. See J
UUL, supra note 24, at 12–14, 90–91.
167. Id. at 12–14.
168. See Jennifer R. Whitson et al., The Missing Producer: Rethinking
Indie Cultural Production in Terms of Entrepreneurship, Relational Labour,
and Sustainability, 24 E
UROPEAN J. CULTURAL STUD. 606, 611 (2018).
169. See J
UUL, supra note 24, at 123–24.
1314 79 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1285 (2022)
publishers.
170
In practice, many players and studios treat
crowdfunding pledges as pre-sales; donors often receive early
access to the game or other perks such as thanks or cameo
appearances in the game.
171
Success for indies depends on marketing, albeit marketing
of a different sort than in the AAA sector. Indie games strive to
stand out not with the sleekest graphics, but by establishing
themselves as more authentic than mainstream commercial
offerings.
172
How can a game be validated as authentic? More
concretely, how is a game to stand out amidst more than 8000
games released each year on Steam?
173
The answers lie in
impressing the actors who perform cultural intermediation in
this space—the individuals and institutions to whom the
community looks for validation.
174
To impress these intermediaries requires meeting
community expectations regarding game design and acceptable
copying.
175
The indie community craves innovation.
176
Sometimes this means experimenting with new art styles or
themes within established genres;
177
other times, this means
experimenting at the level of gameplay itself to introduce novel
game mechanics.
178
Community norms permit copying within
170. See SCHREIER, supra note 143, at 6–7 (tracing the “crowdfunding
revolution” to the 2009 campaign for Double Fine Adventure).
171. See id.
172. J
UUL, supra note 24, at 33–34.
173. See J. Clement, Number of Games Released on Steam Worldwide from
2004 to 2021, STATISTA (June 7, 2021), https://perma.cc/FM9T-M78W.
174. See, e.g., Parker et al., supra note 45, at 1955; Matthew E. Perks et
al., Autonomy, Integration, and the Work of Cultural Intermediation in Indie
Games, 6 M
EDIA INDUS., no. 2, 2019, at 18, 23; Whitson et al., supra note 168,
at 611.
175. See Perks et al., supra note 174, at 30.
176. See J
UUL, supra note 24, at 6 (“Independent and experimental games
contain a fundamental newness: they are about playing in new ways, solving
new problems, solving old problems for new reasons, being free to ignore
something we used to have to do, or framing video games in a new way . . . .”);
Andreas Jahn-Sudmann, Innovation NOT Opposition: The Logic of Distinction
of Independent Games, E
LUDAMOS, Mar. 2008, at 5, 7–8 (“[I]ndependent game
designers . . . pointedly work on alternative concepts on the configurational
level.”).
177. J
UUL, supra note 24, at 42, 150.
178. Id. at 92, 187.
CREATIVITY WITHOUT IP? 1315
limits.
179
Game developers recognize their craft has improved
over the past fifty years because they have had room to build on
what has come before.
180
The implicit tradeoff for borrowing,
however, is the expectation that the second comer will add
something new and avoid copying any facet of the game in its
entirety.
181
The second game must be distinct enough that
players would not regard the two as direct substitutes.
182
Indie games’ aesthetics and subject matter also differ from
those of AAA games. Indie studios lack the budgets to
distinguish themselves by having the most photorealistic 3D
graphics.
183
They have instead embraced “retro” aesthetics with
intentionally pixelated graphics or experimental styles that
evoke pre-digital art forms, like 2D cartoon animation or
impressionist painting.
184
Many also experiment with themes
and subject matter seldom featured in mainstream games. On
one side are survival-horror games, designed to be emotionally
unsettling;
185
on the other are those about working through
emotions productively, for example, grappling with depression
or overcoming enemies without violence.
186
Each design decision
provides indie studios with a chance to innovate and to carve a
distinctive niche in the market.
Despite these aspirations, the reality of indie development
is harsh. Some games become breakout hits—Minecraft and
Stardew Valley both originated with solo developers
187
—but
countless others never find their audience. Moreover, indie
developers do not face consistently better working conditions.
Having eschewed traditional publishers, indie studios must
179. See Lies van Roessel & Christian Katzenbach, Navigating the Grey
Area: Game Production Between Inspiration and Imitation, C
ONVERGENCE,
Apr. 2020, at 403, 408.
180. See id. at 416.
181. See id. at 408.
182. See id.
183. J
UUL, supra note 24, at 6.
184. Id. at 56.
185. See Katarzyna Marak, Independent Horror Games Between 2010 and
2020: Selected Characteristic Features and Discernible Trends, 29 I
MAGES
(S
PECIAL ISSUE) 175, 182 (2021).
186. See J
UUL, supra note 24, at 139–40, 160; Jahn-Sudmann, supra note
176, at 9.
187. See S
CHREIER, supra note 143, at 79.
1316 79 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1285 (2022)
carry out the networking and logistical work a publisher would
have otherwise handled. This administrative burden falls
unevenly, often along gendered lines, and goes unappreciated.
188
Indie workers also face crunch. Although the deadlines are
imposed by the reality of small studios’ financial needs rather
than by publishers, the burden of unhealthy and unrealistic
work hours once again weighs on employees.
189
Compounding this pressure, indie studios face real risks of
copying. The rise of indie games coincided with the emergence
of mobile gaming on devices like the iPhone.
190
Mobile
developers such as Zynga attained notoriety in the early 2010s
for copying games created by smaller developers.
191
The risk was
especially acute for games with simple graphics and mechanics.
Take the indie game Threes!. Its developers spent months
perfecting its simple mechanics: the player combines numbered
tiles on a four-by-four grid to create ever higher numbers.
192
They then released it for the nominal price of $1.99.
193
Days
later, a 19-year-old student released 2048 with practically
identical mechanics and layout:
194
188. See Perks et al., supra note 174, at 25–26 (observing that cultural
intermediaries, especially women in the field, must perform “emotional labor
management” as an aspect of their job); see also Laine Nooney, The Uncredited:
Work, Women, and the Making of the U.S. Computer Game Industry, F
EMINIST
MEDIA HIST., Jan. 2020, at 119, 126–27 (documenting marginalization of
women’s administrative and emotional labor beginning with the earliest days
of the computer gaming industry).
189. See, e.g., Amanda Peticca-Harris et al., The Perils of Project-Based
Work: Attempting Resistance to Extreme Work Practices in Video Game
Development, 22 O
RG. 570, 574 (2015); Whitson et al., supra note 168, at 613.
190. See Adrian Wright, It’s All About Games: Enterprise and
Entrepreneurialism in Digital Games, N
EW TECH. WORK & EMP., Mar. 2015, at
32, 38.
191. See Phillips, supra note 46, at 149. Copying popular games is not,
however, exclusive to the mobile format, as witnessed in the wave of clones
following the 2020 cross-platform indie hit Hades. See, e.g., Ari Notis, Myth:
Gods of Asgard Sure Looks Like Hades, K
OTAKU (June 22, 2021, 3:45 AM),
https://perma.cc/VY7M-8CJX.
192. See Kyle Vanhemert, Design Is Why 2048 Sucks, and Threes Is a
Masterpiece, W
IRED (May 7, 2014, 6:38 AM), https://perma.cc/7MM3-VNHG.
As one analyst concludes: “Creating a game this minimal is hard.” Ben
Kuchera, Why It Took a Year to Make, and Then Break Down, an Amazing
Puzzle Game, P
OLYGON (Feb. 6, 2014, 1:01 PM), https://perma.cc/QA5F-2MKL.
193. Kuchera, supra note 192.
194. See van Roessel & Katzenbach, supra note 179, at 412.
CREATIVITY WITHOUT IP? 1317
Figure 3: Threes! and 2048
Threes!, left; 2048, right
2048 eclipsed the original despite being regarded as inferior by
insiders. The developer tweaked 2048 to be easier, which was
less satisfying to game aficionados but more appealing to mass
audiences.
195
The developer of 2048 also released the game for
free and collected revenues from ads—at the time a novel
business model—effectively dooming the game that inspired
it.
196
Though copying was undeniable, litigation in these
clone-heavy years was rare. One of the few successful
anti-cloning suits from the mobile era came not from an indie
studio but the makers of Tetris, as detailed below.
II. L
IMITS OF COPYRIGHT FOR GAME DESIGN
The resurgence of clones in the context of indie games
prompts a question: Why are these not open-and-shut cases of
copyright infringement? We live in an age where copyright
touches all aspects of our lives, especially our engagement with
195. See Vanhemert, supra note 192; van Roessel & Katzenbach, supra
note 179, at 412.
196. See van Roessel & Katzenbach, supra note 179, at 413.
1318 79 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1285 (2022)
digital media.
197
In our experiences with video games and other
software we are accustomed to overlapping IP and contractual
restrictions via terms-of-use and end-user-license
agreements.
198
These restrictions, however, are aimed at piracy
and consumer behavior. Although copyright and related
protections have obvious applications against bootlegging,
different rules are at play when competitors copy one another to
make new games. Copyright in the latter context leaves ample
space for cloning.
A. Copyright Coverage
Copyrights can protect video game plotlines and characters
as well as discrete game assets like art, music, and underlying
code.
199
This means that a competitor cannot copy games
wholesale nor directly replicate graphics and programming;
making a clone generally requires starting from the ground up.
Moreover, copyright sets limits on such duplication by
precluding creation of derivative works that are “substantially
similar.”
200
The prohibition on derivative works is nonetheless subject
to major caveats. Copyright’s goal of promoting creativity
requires leaving room for subsequent creators.
201
Copyright thus
denies protection entirely to ideas, systems, and methods of
operation, and it limits coverage of stock characters and other
necessary elements.
202
The collective impact of these limitations
constrains game developers’ ability to assert copyright against
clones.
197. See BJ Ard, More Property Rules Than Property? The Right To
Exclude in Patent and Copyright, 68 E
MORY L.J. 685, 688 (2019) [hereinafter
Ard, More Property Rules]; Ard, Notice and Remedies, supra note 33, at 322.
198. Ard, Notice and Remedies, supra note 33, at 334; Rub, supra note 33,
at 726.
199. See, e.g., MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Ent., Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 952
(9th Cir. 2010) (recognizing copyright in game assets like “the roar a particular
monster makes” or “a virtual image of that monster” (citation omitted)).
200. See Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, 952 F.3d 1051, 1064 (9th Cir. 2020).
201. See, e.g., Google LLC v. Oracle Am., 141 S. Ct. 1183, 1195 (2021).
202. See id. at 1196.
CREATIVITY WITHOUT IP? 1319
B. Character Copyright
Copyright protects original characters and plots.
203
The key
criterion is whether the character has been “distinctively
delineated.”
204
Courts applying this standard have extended
protection to characters from Mickey Mouse
205
to Rocky
Balboa,
206
Batman,
207
and even the Batmobile (apart from
Batman)
208
because they are distinct in appearance and
personality.
209
This standard has historically favored characters in visual
media, like comic books and films, relative to those who appear
only in prose.
210
Video game characters would seem to enjoy the
same status. While not phrased in terms of character copyright,
the Pac-Man case illustrates this point.
211
Though his
personality was thin, Pac-Man was visually distinctive.
212
Competitors could not lawfully release a game “which made [its
central character] substantially similar to PAC-MAN”—a
mouth-shaped hero chased by “ghost monsters”—without
copyright exposure.
213
Subsequent characters like Mario have
become increasingly elaborate in their appearance and
backstory and therefore even more squarely protectable.
214
203. See 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §§ 2.09[G], 2.12[A][1].
204. Id. § 2.12.
205. Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 757–58 (9th Cir.
1978).
206. Anderson v. Stallone, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d 1161, 1166 (C.D. Cal. 1989).
207. DC Comics v. Reel Fantasy, 696 F.2d 24, 27 (2d Cir. 1982).
208. DC Comics v. Towle, 802 F.3d 1012, 1024–25 (9th Cir. 2015).
209. See Warner Bros., Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 720 F.2d 231, 241 (2d Cir.
1983) (“In determining whether a character in a second work infringes a
cartoon character, courts have generally considered not only the visual
resemblance but also the totality of the characters’ attributes and traits.”).
210. See Walt Disney Prods., 581 F.2d at 755 (“[I]t is difficult to delineate
distinctively a literary character.”).
211. See Atari, Inc. v. N. Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607,
617–18 (7th Cir. 1982); see supra notes 83–91 and accompanying text.
212. See Atari, 672 F.2d at 617.
213. Id. at 617–18.
214. Characters embodying common tropes may nonetheless be protected
only against literal copying. See infra Part II.E. Nintendo thus prevailed when
Universal asserted that Nintendo’s gorilla Donkey Kong infringed King Kong’s
copyright. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Nintendo Co., 746 F.2d 112, 120 (2d
Cir. 1984). Nintendo subsequently named a new, now-popular character
1320 79 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1285 (2022)
Copyright likewise extends to specific plotlines, especially
the right to create sequels. Courts have consistently found
unauthorized sequels in literature and visual media to be
infringing.
215
At least one video game case has reached the same
conclusion.
216
In a dispute over the first-person shooter Duke
Nukem 3D, the Ninth Circuit found infringement likely when an
unauthorized third party released new playable maps:
A copyright owner holds the right to create sequels, and the
stories told in the N/I MAP files are surely sequels, telling
new (though somewhat repetitive) tales of Duke’s fabulous
adventures. A book about Duke Nukem would infringe for
the same reason, even if it contained no pictures.
217
Plot protection beyond sequels is more limited. While many
clones are so similar that copying is undeniable, this replication
only becomes actionable when it targets protected elements like
specific characters and plots.
218
Similarities are non-actionable
when they flow from the same basic idea or underlying tropes.
219
C. Idea-Expression Dichotomy
The idea-expression dichotomy is a bedrock principle
establishing that copyright covers only the expression of an idea,
not the idea itself. This principle drove the court’s reasoning in
the Asteroids-Meteors case.
220
As the court observed, the games
shared at least twenty-two “similar or identical” design features
and “[i]t seem[ed] clear that defendants based their game on
plaintiff’s copyrighted game.”
221
The court nonetheless held that
“Kirby” in honor of attorney John Kirby, who represented Nintendo against
Universal. Tim Turi, Miyamoto Talks Wii U, Zelda, and Nintendo’s Past, G
AME
INFORMER (June 17, 2011, 11:00 AM), https://perma.cc/37FL-ZBJA.
215. See, e.g., Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 83 n.11 (2d Cir. 2010)
(finding infringement likely in an unauthorized Catcher in the Rye sequel
regardless of “whether Salinger own[ed] a valid copyright in the [main]
character”).
216. See generally Micro Star v. Formgen Inc., 154 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir.
1998).
217. Id. at 1112 (citation omitted).
218. See 4 N
IMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03[B][2] (2022).
219. See id.
220. See Atari, Inc. v. Amusement World, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 222, 230 (D.
Md. 1981).
221. Id. at 224–25, 230.
CREATIVITY WITHOUT IP? 1321
there was no infringement because the similarities resulted
from both games starting with “the idea of a game involving a
spaceship combatting space rocks.”
222
Some specific game details may have crossed the line from
idea into expression, in which case the idea-expression
dichotomy would not have applied directly. To bridge the gap,
the court also invoked the merger doctrine: “[W]hen an idea is
such that any use of that idea necessarily involves certain forms
of expression, one may not copyright those forms of expression,
because to do so would be in effect to copyright the underlying
idea.”
223
Accordingly, even though many elements of the two
games’ expression were the same, there was no infringement
because “[t]here are certain forms of expression that one must
necessarily use in designing a video game in which a player
fights his way through space rocks and enemy spaceships.”
224
The idea-expression dichotomy and the merger doctrine also
implicate gameplay,
225
though many aspects of gameplay are
better understood from the perspective of copyright’s
systems-methods exclusion.
D. Systems-Methods Exclusion
Copyright experts have historically been skeptical that
copyright protects games.
226
In caselaw, these doubts have often
found expression in terms of the idea-expression dichotomy,
conceptualizing game rules as unprotectable “ideas” and
ostensibly expressive game elements as unprotectable because
they have “merged” with those ideas.
227
However, the
222. Atari, Inc., 547 F. Supp. at 229 (emphasis added).
223. Id. at 228 (emphasis in original).
224. Id. at 229.
225. See, e.g., Capcom U.S.A., Inc. v. Data E. Corp., No. C 93-3259, 1994
WL 1751482, at *7–8 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 1994) (excluding “control sequences
due to merger of idea and expression).
226. See, e.g., 1 N
IMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2A.14 (2022); Bruce E. Boyden,
Games and Other Uncopyrightable Systems, 18 G
EO. MASON L. REV. 439, 440
(2011); Seaman & Tran, supra note 29, at 1634.
227. See, e.g., Data E. U.S., Inc. v. Epyx, Inc., 862 F.2d 204, 209 (9th Cir.
1988) (finding the various mechanical elements of a karate game, such as types
of kicks and punches, merge with the idea of a martial arts combat game
therefore making the mechanics inseparable from the idea); Atari, Inc., 547 F.
Supp. at 229.
1322 79 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1285 (2022)
idea-expression dichotomy has engendered confusion over
where to draw the line, particularly for software.
228
As Judge
Learned Hand once observed, “Nobody has ever been able to fix
that boundary, and nobody ever can.”
229
This confusion could be
avoided by attending to another limiting doctrine in copyright:
the exclusion of coverage for functional elements including any
“system” or “method of operation.”
230
1. Scope of the Exclusion
Many cases where courts invoked the idea-expression
dichotomy are better understood as exclusion-of-method cases.
Both principles are encapsulated in section 102(b) of the
Copyright Act, which excludes any “idea,” “system,” or “method
of operation” from copyright protection.
231
Likewise, both
principles stem from the foundational case Baker v. Selden.
232
Although Baker is credited with introducing the idea-expression
dichotomy,
233
the “idea” in Baker was an approach to accounting,
specifically, “a system of book-keeping.”
234
The Court’s rationale
for denying copyright did not depend on the metaphysical
distinction between “idea” and “expression”—the opinion did not
even use the word “idea” in this context.
235
Instead, the Court
held that such a system “is the province of letters-patent, not
copyright.”
236
Less archaically, it held that copyright is not
228. See Pamela Samuelson, Why Copyright Law Excludes Systems and
Processes from the Scope of Its Protection, 85 T
EX. L. REV. 1921, 1976–77
(2007).
229. Nichols v. Universal Pictures, Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930).
But see Bruce E. Boyden, Learned Hand: You’re Reading Him Wrong, M
ARQ.
UNIV. L. SCH.: MARQ. UNIV. L. SCH. FAC. BLOG (Apr. 13, 2018),
https://perma.cc/FQH2-UVD3 (“Hand saw the inexpressible nature of the test
for infringement as, not a problem, but rather an indication it was a task
tailor-made for judicial discretion.”).
230. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b).
231. Id.
232. 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
233. See id. at 103; 1
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2A.04(A)(2) (2022). But see
Samuelson, supra note 228, at 1924 (questioning this common conception).
234. Baker, 101 U.S. at 100.
235. Samuelson, supra note 228, at 1226 (“[T]he Supreme Court’s decision
in Baker used the word ‘ideas’ only twice, and in neither context was the Court
saying that copyright did not protect abstract ideas.”).
236. Baker, 101 U.S. at 102.
CREATIVITY WITHOUT IP? 1323
meant to protect functional systems or similarly utilitarian
subject matter; these must be protected by patent or not at all.
237
This ensures more rigorous evaluation.
238
It also pares the term
of protection down from copyright’s life of the author plus
seventy years to patent’s more modest twenty years total.
239
Subsequent decisions likewise exclude methods and
systems even though many have articulated their holdings in
terms of the idea-expression dichotomy and merger.
240
Take
Morrissey v. Proctor & Gamble Co.
241
This case dealt with a
sweepstakes—a game of chance.
242
The plaintiff sued the
defendant for “copying, almost precisely” the published rules for
its competition.
243
The court found that “the substance of the
contest was not copyrightable,” citing Baker.
244
But the opinion
was ambiguous regarding the precise doctrine at work. For
decades, the conventional understanding was that Morrissey
stood for the merger doctrine, which applies “when there is only
one or but a few ways of expressing an idea.”
245
Revisiting the
case and the import of Baker opens another reading:
sweepstakes rules are uncopyrightable because they specify a
method for operating a system.
The same logic extends to non-sweepstakes games, whether
players operate them manually (board games) or digitally (video
games). Indeed, one introductory text for game designers defines
games as “machines for playing with,” and game rules as
“mechanics” to “be assembled into systems.”
246
Copyright’s
systems-methods exclusion thus prevents copyright owners
from monopolizing game mechanics through a backdoor
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. See 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (copyright duration); 35 U.S.C. § 154(2) (patent
term). Some video games constitute “works made for hire,” in which case
copyright instead extends 95 years from publication. 17 U.S.C. § 302(c).
240. See Samuelson, supra note 228, at 1942.
241. 379 F.2d 675 (1st Cir. 1967).
242. Id. at 676.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 678.
245. P
ETER S. MENELL ET AL., 2 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW
TECHNOLOGICAL AGE: 2020, 576 (2020).
246. R
OBERT ZUBEK, ELEMENTS OF GAME DESIGN 2, 5 (2020) (emphasis in
original).
1324 79 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1285 (2022)
patent.
247
As one scholar argues in the context of games, it also
precludes the copyright owner from claiming creative efforts
properly attributed to the player.
248
And, again, it avoids the
confusion of trying to distinguish idea from expression.
249
2. The Tetris Decision
Tetris Holding, LLC v. Xio Interactive, Inc.
250
merits
discussion because it is the most significant example of a court
recognizing copyright protection in game mechanics.
251
Its
conclusion that practically verbatim copying may constitute
infringement is defensible, but its analysis of game mechanics
252
is flawed.
253
The copyright owner for the famous 1984 puzzle
247. See Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 102 (1879).
248. See Boyden, supra note 226, at 442 (“Games . . . do not communicate
expression to the players so much as provide a forum for the gameplay
experience to occur.”); see also B
OGOST, supra note 96, at ix (arguing the
expressive form distinctive to games is “procedural rhetoric, the art of
persuasion through rule-based representations and interactions” (emphasis in
original)).
249. See Samuelson, supra note 228, at 1974–77.
250. 863 F. Supp. 2d 394 (D.N.J. 2012).
251. See John Kuehl, Video Games and Intellectual Property: Similarities,
Differences, and a New Approach to Protection, 7 C
YBARIS 313, 329 (2016).
252. Tetris Holding, 863 F. Supp. 2d at 411–15.
253. Notwithstanding the general trend against copyright enforcement
with respect to game mechanics, the risk of another decision like Tetris
Holding may give copyists pause. See Kuehl, supra note 251, at 332 (“[Tetris
Holding] was also viewed as a possible killing blow to ‘knock-off’ games:
improvements in technology significantly expand the creative limits of game
developers, developers of cloned video games may have diminishing success in
arguing that their wholesale copying is permissible because expression has
merged with idea.” (citation omitted)). Yet remarkably few cases have followed
the same logic or expressly rebutted Tetris Holding in the decade since that
decision. The closest to follow it was the Spry Fox case, decided the same year,
where the court denied a motion to dismiss litigation involving Triple Town
and Yeti Town, two games with similar underlying mechanics; it settled
without setting precedent. See Dean, supra note 26, at 1267–68 (“Although
Spry Fox only came up on a motion to dismiss, the case is significant for the
fact that, unlike the identical copying in Tetris Holding, the court found
substantial similarity plausible even though Yeti Town’s artwork and sound
elements were readily distinguishable from Triple Town’s.”); Spry Fox LLC v.
LOLApps, No. 2:12-cv-00147, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153863, at *22 (W.D.
Wash. Sept. 18, 2012). In my discussions with defenders and critics of Tetris
Holding, the one point of common ground was surprise that it did not set off
decisions either following or expressly rejecting it.
CREATIVITY WITHOUT IP? 1325
game Tetris sued the maker of the mobile game Mino.
254
The
defendant’s game was practically identical in gameplay and
shared similarities beyond those dictated by game rules.
255
The
court observed, for example, that the defendant chose to use
“virtually identical” colors for pieces of the same shape, and that
“shading and gradation of color are used in substantially similar
ways to suggest light is being cast on the pieces.”
256
The opinion
included side-by-side comparisons:
Figure 4: Illustration from Tetris Holding v. Xio
Tetris pieces on left of each pair; Mino pieces on right
Other visual similarities included the pieces changing color once
they locked in place and the gameboard filling with squares from
top to bottom upon game over.
257
The court ruled for the plaintiff
based on near-total copying—the court could discern no
meaningful innovation in the defendant’s copying of Tetris’s
gameplay and stylistic choices.
258
The court’s analysis of gameplay elements within the
idea-expression framework was nonetheless problematic. It
defined the high-level “idea of Tetris” as “fitting different shaped
pieces together to form complete lines,” and treated any
decisions implementing the idea as expression.
259
It found, for
254. Tetris Holding, 863 F. Supp. 2d at 396–97.
255. See id. at 410.
256. Id. at 410, 411 n.11.
257. See id. at 413.
258. See id. at 410–11, 416 (finding both games styles and gameplay nearly
indistinguishable). Finding liability against copying without meaningful
innovation also aligns with game-developer norms, which permit copying only
if the copyist adds something new. See supra notes 175–182 and accompanying
text.
259. Tetris Holding, 863 F. Supp. 2d at 411. A later decision dealing with
a card game drew a more defensible line, extending protection to the artwork
and characters for a game but excluding it as to the special abilities and other
game mechanics associated with each character. See generally DaVinci
Editrice S.R.L. v. Ziko Games, LLC, 183 F. Supp. 3d 820 (S.D. Tex. 2016).
1326 79 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1285 (2022)
example, that Tetris’s choice of shapes was protectable
expression.
260
Likewise, it determined that Tetris’s use of a
playing field taller than it was wide was arguably an idea, but
Tetris’s use of a playing field specifically twenty units high by
ten units wide was expression.
261
One could contest the court’s
findings on each element, but the core difficulty for this mode of
analysis is the lack of clear parameters for setting the correct
level of abstraction for distinguishing idea from expression.
262
Shifting the frame to ask instead whether a particular
design choice was necessary to carry out the system or method
of the game would clarify the analysis. The interface between
patent and copyright is instructive: copyright does not cover
elements that constitute patentable subject matter
263
and
issuance of a patent for a system suggests it is functional and
should be excluded from copyright.
264
This presents obstacles for
puzzle games like Tetris because patents have been granted on
puzzles and methods for solving them.
265
Tetris Holding itself
references a patent for gameplay in the puzzle game Dr.
Mario.
266
Although the court leveraged this patent to argue
there are other ways to express the rules of Tetris, the better
argument is that the patent on similar gameplay elements
suggests that analogous elements in Tetris should be excluded
as functional.
Prior litigation involving non-digital puzzles bolsters the
conclusion. The most famous puzzle patent is the Nichols patent
for a 2x2 puzzle cube and a method for solving it,
267
which the
inventor successfully asserted against the makers of the
260. See Tetris Holding, 863 F. Supp. 2d at 411.
261. See id. at 413.
262. See generally Margot E. Kaminski & Guy A. Rub, Copyright’s
Framing Problem, 64 UCLA
L. REV. 1102 (2017).
263. See 1 N
IMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2A.07[D][4][c][iii] (2022).
264. See id. § 2A.07[D][5] (explaining “to the extent that a utility patent
covers a given production, that fact alone indicates that it is functional, and
hence outside the boundaries of vindication under copyright laws”); Pamela
Samuelson, Strategies for Discerning the Boundaries of Copyright and Patent
Protections, 92 N
OTRE DAME L. REV. 1493, 1531 (2017).
265. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 3,655,201 (filed Mar. 4, 1970).
266. See Tetris Holding, LLC v. Xio Interactive, Inc., 863 F. Supp. 2d 394,
412 (D.N.J. 2012) (referencing U.S. Patent No. 5,265,888 (filed Feb. 19, 1993)).
267. See U.S. Patent No. 3,655,201 (filed Mar. 4, 1970).
CREATIVITY WITHOUT IP? 1327
Rubik’s cube.
268
The original 3x3 Rubik’s cube was held
non-infringing—the change in dimensions meant the puzzle and
methods for solving it differed from those claimed in the
patent.
269
The lesser-known Rubik’s Pocket Cube, however, was
held to infringe because it embodied the 2x2 design.
270
Patent
availability for those elements of a puzzle that determine the
method of play and viable solutions indicates these elements fall
outside copyright.
271
Bringing this logic back to Tetris Holding, asking whether
something like a twenty by ten playing field is an “abstract
idea”
272
is needlessly metaphysical. Asking instead whether
those dimensions impact the method of play or potential
solutions makes the inquiry concrete. The fact that different
dimensions would require different strategies suggests these
mechanics are functional and therefore non-copyrightable: a
taller playing field would allow more blocks to pile up, making
the puzzle easier to solve. A narrower playing field would allow
the player to complete the puzzle with fewer blocks but would
also require more careful planning, changing the method of play
even more fundamentally. Tetris’s selection of playing pieces
falls outside copyright for similar reasons. The game utilizes all
possible combinations of four blocks connected end to end.
273
To
remove or add any shapes would change the nature of the puzzle
and the methods for solving it.
274
268. See Moleculon Rsch. Corp. v. CBS, Inc., 793 F.2d 1261, 1273 (Fed. Cir.
1986).
269. See id. at 1271–72.
270. See id. at 1272.
271. See supra note 264; see also Laureyssens v. Idea Grp., Inc., 964 F.2d
131, 142 (2d Cir. 1992) (observing that defendant’s change to the puzzle design
“result[ed] in a qualitatively different challenge to the puzzler”).
272. See supra note 261 and accompanying text.
273. Eric Adler, A Game of Clones: Video Game Litigation Illustrated,
PNW
STARTUP LAW. (July 10, 2014), https://perma.cc/SL36-TE65.
274. As one observer explained, albeit in the language of the
idea-expression dichotomy:
1328 79 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1285 (2022)
E. Scènes à Faire
Scènes à faire shields video games from liability for covering
typical game subject matter because it precludes copyright
owners from suing over the use of tropes and standard
conventions of a genre.
275
It establishes that no film studio can
claim the exclusive right to produce Westerns in which good
guys wear white hats and bad guys wear black hats, just as no
game developer can stop competitors from including crosses,
stakes, or baroque costuming in a vampire-hunter game.
276
The
doctrine also applies to technical or stylistic conventions—in the
Pac-Man case, for example, the court refused to find
infringement for copying “standard game devices” like a maze,
scoring table, or the use of dots to score points.
277
Courts often use scènes à faire to deny infringement in
games depicting similar real-world activities. In Data East v.
Epyx,
278
for example, the Ninth Circuit dismissed the
similarities between two karate-fighting games because “the
visual depiction of karate matches is subject to the constraints
inherent in the sport of karate itself.”
279
The Street Fighter II
case extended the logic further: the copyright owner could not
assert protection over stereotypical martial arts garb or special
moves regardless of whether they appeared in the real world or
[T]he 7 basic Tetris shapes seem more like idea than expression. There are
only 7 tetrominos. Selecting all of them seems like embodiment of the idea
of tetrominos. Imagine a falling puzzle game with trominos (left) or
pentominos (right). Sure it’s possible, but would you really want to play it?
Id. (emphasis in original).
275. See Apple Comput., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435, 1444 (9th
Cir. 1994) (“[W]hen similar features in a videogame are as a practical matter
indispensable, or at least standard, in the treatment of a given [idea], they are
treated like ideas and are therefore not protected by copyright.” (internal
quotation omitted)).
276. Cf. Davis v. Walt Disney Co., 393 F. Supp. 2d 839, 847 (D. Minn. 2005)
(identifying “superhero capes, leotards, masks, chest emblems, boots, belts,
and flared gloves” as stock elements), aff’d on other grounds, 430 F.3d 901 (8th
Cir. 2005).
277. Atari, Inc. v. N. Am. Philips Consumer Elecs., 672 F.2d 607, 617 (7th
Cir. 1982); 4 N
IMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03[B][4] (2022) (explaining that
“certain patterns and situations are bound to recur” across different works
because there are “‘incidents, characters or settings which are as a practical
matter indispensable, or at least standard, in the treatment of a given topic”).
278. 862 F.2d 204 (9th Cir. 1988).
279. See id. at 209.
CREATIVITY WITHOUT IP? 1329
only in comic books.
280
Similar results followed in litigation
involving golf arcade games, where the court invoked scènes à
faire to excuse similarities inherent in depicting the same
underlying sport, in the use of standard menu screens, and even
in both games’ inclusion of commentary to “mimic
condescending real television golf announcers.”
281
Many conventions could arguably be excluded as ideas or
game rules; indeed, when courts exclude an element for being
“indispensable” they seldom clarify whether they mean
indispensable in the sense of merger, finding there are only so
many ways to express the idea, or scènes à faire, finding the
elements standard for the genre.
282
Scènes à faire is nonetheless
useful because it provides a mechanism for excluding these
elements without the line-drawing problems of the
idea-expression dichotomy.
283
F. Fair Use
Fair use is the best-known and mostly widely discussed
doctrine in copyright.
284
It requires balancing four factors: (i) the
purpose and character of the use, (ii) the nature of the
copyrighted work, (iii) the amount and substantiality used, and
(iv) the effect on the potential market for the work.
285
Fair use
was instrumental in the reverse engineering of video game
280. Capcom U.S.A., Inc. v. Data E. Corp., No. C 93-3259, 1994 WL
1751482, at *13 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 1994) (“[T]he Court finds that even a
majority of the moves that are allegedly special and fanciful are ultimately
unprotectable either because they are unoriginal scenes-a-faire or have not
actually been copied by Data East.”); see supra notes 119–123 and
accompanying text.
281. Incredible Techs., Inc. v. Virtual Techs., Inc., 400 F.3d 1007, 1015 (7th
Cir. 2005).
282. See, e.g., Data East, 862 F.2d at 209 (introducing both doctrines before
finding similarities between two karate games “inseparable from,
indispensable to, or even standard treatment of the idea of the karate sport”
(emphasis in original)); Atari, Inc. v. Amusement World, 547 F. Supp. 222,
228–29 (D. Md. 1981) (introducing both doctrines before concluding “these
similarities are inevitable”).
283. See supra Part II.C.
284. See 4 N
IMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.05 (2022) (“[I]ndeed, more law
review articles are published about fair use than cases actually adjudicating
the subject!”).
285. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
1330 79 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1285 (2022)
consoles to create compatible games.
286
Despite its prominence
elsewhere in copyright, however, fair use has not been central
to cloning disputes.
Fair use would not assist defendants in most cloning cases
because courts tend to analyze the four factors through
the lens of transformative use.
287
Where the work is
transformative—meaning it “adds something new, with a
further purpose or character, altering the first with new
expression, meaning, or message”—courts tend to excuse such
use as fair.
288
While transformativeness is not strictly required
to establish fair use,
courts have become reluctant to find fair
use without it.
289
Transformativeness presents an obstacle for clones because
the act of cloning implies a lack of transformative purpose.
Developers create these games for the same purpose as the
originals, namely, to provide entertainment for players who
enjoy that type of game.
290
Unfortunately for these imitators,
transformation of purpose is the most essential factor for
establishing transformative use.
291
In relevant caselaw, fair use
has been denied in many cases dealing with reference guides or
similar add-ons for popular television shows or movies because
286. See generally Sony Comput. Ent., Inc. v. Connectix, Corp., 203 F.3d
596 (9th Cir. 2000); Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir.
1992). See also supra notes 110–118 accompanying text.
287. See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Making Sense of Fair Use, 15 L
EWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 715, 734 (2011); 4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.05[A][1][b] (2022).
288. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994).
289. Empirical analysis of all decisions discussing transformativeness
shows that defendants prevailed in fewer than 10% of decisions where the use
was found non-transformative. Clark D. Asay et al., Is Transformative Use
Eating the World?, 61 B.C. L. R
EV. 905, 942 (2020).
290. Instances where the copyist achieves this goal while also providing
transformation are rare but not unheard of. For example, 2013’s Organ Trail
borrows extensively from the classic educational game Oregon Trail, complete
with the risk of cholera or dysentery. See Jim Sterling, Review: The Organ
Trail, D
ESTRUCTOID (Apr. 2, 2013), https://perma.cc/P2FV-9ZFH. The
difference in this well-regarded parody is that the westward journey is by
station wagon and the goal is not homesteading but rather escaping zombies.
Id.
291. See 4
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.05[B] (2022).
CREATIVITY WITHOUT IP? 1331
creating new works for the purpose of entertaining the same fan
base was deemed non-transformative.
292
III. P
ROTECTION BEYOND COPYRIGHT
Copyright is not the only IP regime one might assert
against clones. Given copyright’s exclusion of methods and
systems, it is natural to turn toward patent because functional
inventions are the core of the utility-patent regime. But
doctrinal and practical hurdles limit patent’s applicability to
video games. Trademark law is also worth considering. Indeed,
when participants in the industry talk about “the IP” for a game,
they typically mean the trademarks and related rights
necessary to produce sequels within an established franchise.
293
Video game publishers take great care to protect and cultivate
these trademarks. Trademark law does not, however, prevent
competitors from making substantively similar games. The use
of trademarks and related rights to police the boundary of
existing franchises is thus significant on its own terms, but not
as an obstacle to cloning.
A. Gameplay Patents
Patentable subject matter includes any “process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter” that meets the
requirements of patentability.
294
Developers could, in theory,
seek patents for uncopyrightable gameplay methods. Indeed,
many IP scholars have argued copyright’s functionality
exclusion is meant to channel rights-seekers into the patent
292. See, e.g., Castle Rock Ent. v. Carol Publ’g Grp., 150 F.3d 132, 142 (2d
Cir. 1998) (concluding Seinfeld trivia book’s “purpose” was “to repackage
Seinfeld to entertain Seinfeld viewers”); Twin Peaks Prods. v. Publ’ns Int’l,
996 F.2d 1366, 1375–76 (2d Cir. 1993) (finding no transformative purpose in
an unauthorized Twin Peaks guidebook); Toho Co. v. William Morrow & Co.,
33 F. Supp. 2d 1206, 1217 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (finding no transformative purpose
in an unauthorized Godzilla guidebook).
293. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
294. 35 U.S.C. § 101.
1332 79 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1285 (2022)
system.
295
Whoever obtained that patent would hold exclusive
rights to the claimed gameplay method for twenty years.
296
Patents are common in the industry, but most cover
technical aspects relating to hardware or system
performance.
297
While some game mechanics are
patented—like the “falling object” gameplay of
Dr. Mario
298
—patents in gameplay are rare and have seldom
been asserted against clones. The major outlier, Magnavox’s
litigation against “table tennis” clones like Pong, was a product
of its time.
299
As an electronics manufacturer in the 1970s,
Magnavox would have been more familiar with patent than
copyright, and the litigation commenced before it was
established that copyright applied to software (generally)
300
or
video games (specifically).
301
Few gameplay patents have been
asserted in the fifty years since.
302
While the absence of
295. See, e.g., Viva R. Moffat, The Copyright/Patent Boundary, 48 U. RICH.
L. REV. 611, 615 (2014) (explaining how IP law’s functionality exclusions
perform a channeling function).
296. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2).
297. See, e.g., McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299,
1303–08 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (involving patents for automatically synchronizing
facial expressions in video games); Atari Corp. v. Sega of Am., Inc., 869 F.
Supp. 783, 786–88 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (involving a patent on horizontal scrolling
with minimal interruption of memory access).
298. U.S. Patent No. 5,265,888 (filed Feb. 19, 1993); see supra note 266 and
accompanying text; see also U.S. Patent No. 5,390,937 (filed Mar. 16, 1992)
(patenting Final Fantasy’s active time battle system); U.S. Patent No.
6,935,954 (filed Dec. 14, 2000) (patenting a “Sanity System for Video Game”);
U.S. Patent No. 7,402,104 (filed Sept. 20, 2004) (patenting rolling objects into
a ball in Katamari Damacy); U.S. Patent No. 10,926,179 (filed Mar. 25, 2016)
(patenting the “nemesis system” for customized antagonists in Middle Earth:
Shadow Over Mordor).
299. Magnavox Co. v. Chi. Dynamic Indus., 201 U.S.P.Q. 25, 27 (N.D. Ill.
1977); see supra notes 69–72 and accompanying text.
300. See Computer Software Copyright Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517,
§ 101, 94 Stat. 3015, 3028 (1980) (adding “computer program” to the copyright
laws in 17 U.S.C. § 101); Google LLC v. Oracle Am., Inc., 141 S. Ct. 1183, 1199
(2021) (“By defining computer programs in § 101, Congress chose to place this
subject matter within the copyright regime.”).
301. See Atari Games Corp. v. Oman, 979 F.2d 242, 247 (D.C. Cir. 1992)
(reversing the Copyright Office’s refusal to register a video game).
302. One case that surprised developers involved Sega’s patent on the
gameplay of Crazy Taxi, which covered features like virtual pedestrians who
dodge oncoming cars and floating directional arrows pointing to the next
objective. See U.S. Patent No. 6,200,138 (filed Oct. 30, 1998). Sega sued when
CREATIVITY WITHOUT IP? 1333
decisions leaves few cases to analyze, patent doctrine and
practical obstacles explain why obtaining and enforcing
gameplay patents would be difficult.
1. Doctrinal Barriers
Gameplay methods face difficulty meeting two patentability
requirements. The first is non-obviousness.
303
A developer
seeking a patent must do more than create something new.
304
The developer must invent something not obvious to the “person
having ordinary skill in the art,” in this case the typical game
designer.
305
In practice, courts often look to whether it would
have occurred to the designer to combine elements in the prior
art—pre-existing inventions—to arrive at the invention claimed
in the patent application.
306
For games, this would mean determining whether the
typical designer would have thought to combine features from
prior games to arrive at a particular game mechanic.
307
If so, the
method would be deemed obvious and therefore unpatentable.
308
The problem is that so many titles are iterative improvements
on what has already been done.
309
Predictable permutations of
mechanics from prior games are thus barred from patenting.
The second hurdle is patentable subject matter. Patents do
not cover “abstract ideas.”
310
The concept is elusive in
patent—much like in copyright—and courts continue to puzzle
over the Supreme Court’s latest guidance in Alice.
311
Litigation
these features appeared in a Simpsons-themed clone. See Case Analysis: Sega
v. Fox, P
ATENTARCADE (July 12, 2010), https://perma.cc/AB44-3TXC. The case
caught attention because suits like this are rare, and it generated no precedent
because it settled before trial. See id.
303. 35 U.S.C. § 103.
304. See id. § 102(a).
305. Id. § 103.
306. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 416 (2007).
307. See id. at 418.
308. See id. at 417.
309. See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
310. Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014).
311. 573 U.S. at 216–17; see Amdocs (Isr.) Ltd. v. Openet Telecom, Inc.,
841 F.3d 1288, 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“The problem with articulating a single,
universal definition of ‘abstract idea’ is that it is difficult to fashion a workable
1334 79 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1285 (2022)
following Alice has, however, resulted in the invalidation of
patents directed at gameplay involving standard card decks or
dice for merely implementing “abstract rulesets.”
312
Of course, filing for patents requires assistance from
attorneys regardless of subject matter. The arcane nature of the
abstract-ideas questions surrounding game rules compounds
this need, foregrounding a set of practical obstacles.
2. Practical Concerns
The absence of patents from cloning disputes also stems
from practical considerations. Patenting is expensive and takes
years: the average cost is over $20,000 and patents may not
issue for twenty-three months.
313
This arrangement is especially
unfortunate for indie developers because, even assuming that
indie studios are more innovative and therefore likely to develop
non-obvious and therefore patent-eligible mechanics, they are
less likely to have resources for patenting.
314
One might think indie studios could file for patents after a
game proved commercially successful. But this would be difficult
because a developer must file no later than one year after “public
disclosure” of the gameplay method.
315
At the latest, this means
within one year of the game’s release.
316
However, the clock
could start running years earlier; pre-sales would likely
constitute disclosure under what is known as the “on-sale bar,”
as would public demonstrations or promotional materials
depicting patentable aspects of gameplay in sufficient detail.
317
In an industry where presales through crowdfunding campaigns
and detailed pre-release trailers are common, the decision to
patent would need to be made prior to release.
definition to be applied to as-yet-unknown cases with as-yet-unknown
inventions.”).
312. E.g., In re Marco Guldenaar Holding B.V., 911 F.3d 1157, 1162 (Fed.
Cir. 2018); In re Smith, 815 F.3d 816, 819 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
313. U.S.P.T.O.,
FY 2020 PERFORMANCE & ACCOUNTABILITY REP. 35,
46–47 (2020), https://perma.cc/J5LY-2D8X (PDF); David Fagundes &
Jonathan S. Masur, Costly Intellectual Property, 65 VAND. L. REV. 677,
689–90 (2012).
314. See supra Part I.C.2.
315. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)(1)(B).
316. Id. § 102(b)(1).
317. Id. § 102(a)(1).
CREATIVITY WITHOUT IP? 1335
B. Franchise Rights
Game developers often speak of obtaining “the IP” for a
game or about their aspirations to create their own IP. When
they refer to IP this way, they mean primarily trademarks and
any relevant copyright in characters or plot.
318
Trademark
rights are key to creating sequels to a popular game or
launching a new franchise.
319
These rights, however, do not stop
competitors from making clones or even promoting a game as
the “spiritual successor” to an earlier title.
320
1. Trademark
Trademark law is central to game franchises. Game titles
and iconic characters like Mario or Halo’s Master Chief set
established games apart regardless of whether other games
feature similar gameplay or subject matter.
321
Trademark law
prohibits clones or other competing games from using titles,
logos, or promotional materials that are confusingly similar.
322
This secures the publisher the exclusive right to develop games
under that title, release sequels, or authorize tie-ins like action
figures and television adaptations.
323
Trademark nonetheless poses few obstacles to cloning—it
protects titles and logos, not game mechanics or themes. Even
protection for titles is limited if using the trademarked words is
318. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
319. See infra Part IV.B.2.
320. See Nathaniel Ng, New Castles with Familiar Bricks—Balancing
Copyrights, Spiritual Successor Video Games, and Competition, 58 I
DEA 337,
364–66 (2018). A “spiritual successor” is “a game designed to be very similar
to a previously released game while distinguishing itself as a separate IP, often
made by many of the same team members who worked on the earlier game.”
DAN CARREKER, THE GAME DEVELOPERS DICTIONARY: A MULTIDISCIPLINARY
LEXICON FOR PROFESSIONALS AND STUDENTS 206 (2012).
321. One poll of U.S. schoolchildren in 1990 showed Mario was already
more recognizable than Disney’s Mickey Mouse. D
AVID SHEFF, GAME OVER:
HOW NINTENDO CONQUERED THE WORLD 9–10 (1993).
322. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A)–(B).
323. Video game publishers enjoy two layers of protection with respect to
these activities—copyright also prohibits unauthorized sequels, adaptations,
and depictions of copyrighted characters. See supra Part II.B.
1336 79 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1285 (2022)
necessary.
324
Descriptive fair use, distinct from copyright fair
use, allows competitors to use trademarked terms in their
original descriptive sense.
325
Hence the developer of the 2014
Viking game Banner Saga rebuffed opposition from the makers
of Candy Crush Saga (who sought to stop others from using
“candy” or “saga” in game titles) because the “sagas,”
descriptively, are epic stories featuring Vikings and figures from
Norse legend.
326
Nominative fair use and similar doctrines also
permit using game titles for comparison,
327
as dozens of
journalists have done in describing the Fall 2021 game
Eastward as “Zelda-like.”
328
This allowance leaves room for
developers to market clones to fans of popular games. Indeed,
first-person shooter games—now represented by best sellers like
Call of Duty—were originally called “Doom clones” in reference
to the genre-defining game Doom from 1993.
329
2. Trade Dress
Trade dress works like trademark, but for distinctive
product packaging or product configurations.
330
For software
products like video games, commentators have suggested that
324. See KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc., v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543
U.S. 111, 122 (2004).
325. See id.
326. See Wesley Yin-Poole, King vs The Banner Saga, E
UROGAMER,
https://perma.cc/WR9H-KD7X (last updated June 26, 2014).
327. See Peter M. Brody & Alexandra J. Roberts, What’s In a Domain
Name? Nominative Fair Use Online After Toyota v. Tabari, 100 T
RADEMARK
REP. 1290, 1301–02 (2010).
328. E.g., Teddy Amenabar, ‘Eastward’ Is a Love Letter to Classic RPGs
Without a Clear, Coherent Story, WASH. POST (Oct. 1, 2021, 4:16 PM),
https://perma.cc/SQ3H-PJL6; Nicole Carpenter, Eastward Is Equal Parts
Zelda, Earthbound, and Itself, P
OLYGON (Sept. 14, 2021, 9:00 AM),
https://perma.cc/92CM-7D79.
329. See GRENVILLE ARMITAGE ET AL., NETWORKING AND ONLINE GAMES 18
(2006). Similar designations remain in use for other genres, including
“roguelike,” a term for dungeon crawlers with procedurally generated levels
like those of the 1980 title Rogue, and “metroidvania,” a portmanteau of the
1986 titles Metroid and Castlevania referencing a distinct blend of action and
exploration. Marek Suchanek, The Language of Videogames 53 (June 30,
2021) (Ph.D. dissertation, Silesian University in Opava),
https://perma.cc/H2CT-PGCT (PDF).
330. See TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 28–29
(2001).
CREATIVITY WITHOUT IP? 1337
protected elements might include onscreen graphics or user
interfaces.
331
This possibility notwithstanding, few cases have
alleged trade dress infringement in video games. This may be
due to the limits of trade dress. Like copyright, trade dress
excludes functional elements; it does not cover anything that
affects “cost or quality” or where exclusive rights would put
competitors at a “significant non-reputation-related
disadvantage.”
332
As one scholar recently explained, this means
that trademark does not protect any feature with benefits that
would endure regardless of how many competitors used the
same feature.
333
Game mechanics and graphical features relating to
gameplay would thus be excluded from trade dress protection
due to their functionality just as they are excluded from
copyright.
334
To the extent deviating from established gameplay
would make a game more frustrating or less rewarding,
competitors would be disadvantaged if they could not copy it. As
with copyright, the one case to seriously test trade dress
functionality was Tetris Holding.
335
That court held that
“neither the color and style of the pieces nor the game board
being 20 units by 10 units . . . are functional in the context of
trade dress law.”
336
This conclusion may be sound with respect
to purely decorative aspects of color or style.
337
Like the
331. See Benjamin C.R. Lockyer, Comment, Trying on Trade Dress: Using
Trade Dress to Protect the Look and Feel of Video Games, 17 J.
MARSHALL REV.
INTELL. PROP. L. 109, 129 (2017); Lauren Fisher Kellner, Comment, Trade
Dress Protection for Computer User Interface “Look and Feel”, 61 U. C
HI. L.
REV. 1011, 1017 (1994).
332. TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 33 (citation omitted).
333. See Matthew G. Sipe, A Fragility Theory of Trademark Functionality,
169 U.
PA. L. REV. 1825, 1873–77 (2021). For example, using bright orange for
traffic cones would remain advantageous to the original user regardless of
copying because the color improves visibility. Referring to all carbonated
beverages as “Cokes,” by contrast, would reduce the mark’s value to the
original user by undermining the mark’s ability to specify Coca-Cola products.
See id. at 1873.
334. See Karen Leisten & Annemarie Ettinger, Protecting a Company’s
Graphical User Interface, W
ILMERHALE (May 6, 2002), https://perma.cc/D238-
9MNY; supra Part II.D.
335. Tetris Holding, LLC v. Xio Interactive, Inc., 863 F. Supp. 2d 394
(D.N.J. 2012); see supra Part II.D.2.
336. Tetris Holding, 863 F. Supp. 2d at 415.
337. See id.
1338 79 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1285 (2022)
copyright portion of the opinion, however, the analysis of
playing field dimensions is unsatisfying. The court concluded
that these aspects are nonfunctional because the game could be
designed differently and still “function perfectly well.”
338
While
the game would still be playable, it would not be playable in the
same way.
339
Changing the dimensions of play would make the
game harder in some ways and easier in others, and it would
thwart players who attempted to apply strategies they
developed playing Tetris.
340
Granting Tetris exclusive rights to
use these dimensions would thus confer a non-reputation-
related advantage—the ability to offer a game with a familiar,
popular set of mechanics—indicating that recognition of trade
dress rights was improper.
IV. C
OMPETING WITHOUT IP
Commercial success in the video game industry follows from
serving the demand for games similar to prior best-sellers. This
means keeping the same basic formula—familiar game
mechanics and story beats—but adding new content and
sharper graphics. The game mechanics and story beats of
popular games are common knowledge, and the foregoing
discussion explains why IP does not stop competitors from
duplicating them. One might expect competitors to break into
the market by copying these features, yet blatant cloning is rare
among major releases.
Consider a AAA example. The 2011 title The Elder Scrolls
V: Skyrim is an open-world action role-playing game in which
the player lives out the fantasy trope of playing the destined
hero.
341
The game has earned over $1.3 billion in revenue to
date.
342
The standard AAA strategy would be to release sequels
in the same vein.
343
But Skyrim’s publisher, Bethesda, has not
338. Id. at 416.
339. See supra note 274.
340. See supra notes 271–274 and accompanying text.
341. See generally B
EING DRAGONBORN: CRITICAL ESSAYS ON THE ELDER
SCROLLS V: SKYRIM (Mike Piero & Marc A. Ouellette eds., 2021).
342. See Mistry, supra note 161, at 552.
343. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
CREATIVITY WITHOUT IP? 1339
simply released a new game like this one.
344
Instead, it
re-released the same game—Skyrim—in 2016 for a newer
generation of PlayStation and Xbox consoles and again in 2017
for Nintendo Switch.
345
Around the same time, it released
Skyrim–Special Edition (with remastered graphics) and Skyrim
VR (a virtual-reality version).
346
Yet another remaster hit the
latest generation of PlayStation and Xbox consoles on Skyrim’s
tenth anniversary in November 2021.
347
Remarkably, Skyrim
still ranked among the 100 top-selling and most-played games
on the leading PC-gaming platform Steam as of 2021 despite
being over a decade old by end of year.
348
So why has no
competitor overtaken Skyrim by releasing a game tailored to the
demand for similar games?
The answer lies beyond just IP. Legally speaking, other
developers are free to create their own open-world action
role-playing games that feature the player as a hero of legend.
Indeed, Skyrim popularized the open world-format, and its
systems for character advancement, crafting, and emergent
quest design have become standard among AAA role-playing
games.
349
The frequency and impact of copying is nonetheless
dampened by practical obstacles. Skyrim took $100 million to
develop and market even before it was remastered to take
344. Bethesda has, however, released games that riff on Skyrim with a
different gameplay mode (The Elder Scrolls Online, a massively multiplayer
online role-playing game in the same fictional universe) or a different theme
(Fallout 4, an open-world single-player game with similar gameplay set in a
post-apocalyptic future). See D
ANIEL REARDON & DAVID WRIGHT, THE DIGITAL
ROLE-PLAYING GAME AND TECHNICAL COMMUNICATION: A HISTORY OF
BETHESDA, BIOWARE, AND CD PROJEKT RED 8, 240–41 (2021).
345. See Dylan Candelora, Skyrim: Every Major Re-Release So Far (&
What Each One Improved About the Game), C
OMIC BOOK RES. (Nov. 19, 2021),
https://perma.cc/J9NY-KFKT.
346. See id.; see also R
EARDON & WRIGHT, supra note 344, at 8.
347. “Why build another Skyrim, the logic seems to run, when Skyrim
already exists—and, apparently, always will?” William Hughes, The Skyrim
Decade: How Bethesda’s Dragon-Slaying Opus Transformed Gaming, A.V.
CLUB (Nov. 11, 2021, 1:00 AM), https://perma.cc/G7GJ-72LM.
348. See Best of 2021: Top Sellers, S
TEAM, https://perma.cc/L2N8-E7KN;
Best of 2021: Most Played, S
TEAM, https://perma.cc/88Z3-MFH6; Best of 2021:
Best of VR, S
TEAM, https://perma.cc/EG7M-8DTQ.
349. See R
EARDON & WRIGHT, supra note 344, at 222–24, 240–41.
1340 79 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1285 (2022)
advantage of new consoles’ greater graphical capabilities.
350
One
cannot recapture Skyrim’s magic without similar expenditures
toward graphics and filling a massive open world.
351
Bethesda
itself strains to craft a sequel that meets fan expectations.
352
Nor
is it easy to break into this market without name recognition.
353
Though it has not yet spawned its own sequels, Skyrim is the
fifth major release in the Elder Scrolls series.
354
Its reputation
gives it staying power that trademark helps secure. Moreover,
even without online gameplay, Skyrim has generated a
community of fans who release “mods,” stream themselves
playing, and share memes from the game—all of which generate
network effects that accrue to Bethesda’s benefit.
355
To make sense of these dynamics requires going beyond IP
to consider IP’s “negative space” through case studies showing
how creators compete in markets where IP is unavailable. The
following Subparts unpack those studies. As the discussion will
show, the AAA and indie sectors of the game industry are
remarkable exemplars of two very different modes of
competition in this space. If the AAA sector follows trends in the
fashion industry, then the indie sector falls in the same
neighborhood as haute cuisine and stand-up comedy.
350. See Solomon Thompson, 25 Crazy Things Fans Didn’t Know Behind
the Making of Skyrim, T
HE GAMER (Apr. 26, 2019), https://perma.cc/WE46-
EJNR.
351. See supra notes 145–146 and accompanying text.
352. See Kat Bailey, Todd Howard: Making Starfield Was Now or Never,
Even if Elder Scrolls 6 Had to Wait, IGN (Nov. 9, 2021, 2:05 PM)
https://perma.cc/JD79-HPHZ.
353. See Taub, supra note 38.
354. See Jerrad Wyche, Every Elder Scrolls Game, Its Starting Region &
Opening Quest, T
HE GAMER (May 6, 2022), https://perma.cc/67LH-A8SA.
355. See Piia Varis & Jan Blommaert, Conviviality and Collectives on
Social Media: Virality, Memes, and New Social Structures, 2 M
ULTILINGUAL
MARGINS 31, 40 (2015) (explaining how Skyrim’s “then I took an arrow in the
knee” meme “became wildly productive and can now be tagged to an almost
infinite range of different expressions”).
CREATIVITY WITHOUT IP? 1341
A. Adventures in Negative Space
The conventional economic rationale for intellectual
property centers on the problem of free-riding.
356
Society wants
creators to invest in intellectual works because we benefit from
them.
357
Complications arise, however, because intellectual
works tend to be expensive to produce and cheap to copy.
358
This
dynamic leaves creators vulnerable to being undercut by
copyists who would free-ride by making and selling cheap copies,
which the copyists could afford to do because they would not
bear the same upfront costs.
359
The risk of being undercut in this
way could discourage creators from making these works in the
first place.
360
IP laws—like copyright and patent—avert this
problem by endowing creators with exclusive rights to make and
sell copies.
361
To illustrate, consider a film like James Cameron’s Titanic.
Adjusted for inflation, it is one of the most expensive films ever
made, costing $200 million in 1997.
362
Profit-motivated studios
invest in these projects because they expect to make enough
money not only to cover their expenses, but also to profit.
363
Copying threatens this objective. It costs twenty-five cents to
burn a film to DVD.
364
Digital filesharing is even cheaper.
365
Studios could not compete with copyists who free-rode off the
studio’s efforts and sold bootleg DVDs; market competition could
356. See Stephanie Plamondon Bair & Laura G. Pedraza-Fariña,
Anti-Innovation Norms, 112 N
W. U. L. REV. 1069, 1076 (2018) (critiquing
negative-space scholarship for doing the same).
357. See id. at 1080.
358. See Landes & Posner, supra note 9, at 326.
359. Id.; see also Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Copyright and the 1%, 23 S
TAN.
TECH. L. REV. 1, 8 (2020).
360. See Landes & Posner, supra note 9, at 328.
361. See id. at 326.
362. See Madeline Berg, The Most Expensive Movies Ever Made, F
ORBES
(Apr. 27, 2016, 9:30 AM), https://perma.cc/8RR5-J2KC.
363. See Landes & Posner, supra note 9, at 327.
364. See How to Burn a DVD,
WIKIHOW, https://perma.cc/2JYV-XZRG (last
updated Apr. 20, 2022); Smart Buy 100 Pack DVD-R 4.7gb, A
MAZON,
https://perma.cc/E7RD-3684.
365. See Arista Rec. LLC v. Lime Grp. LLC, 784 F. Supp. 2d 398, 410–11
(S.D.N.Y. 2011).
1342 79 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1285 (2022)
drive the DVD price as low as the marginal cost of 25 cents.
366
Profit-seeking studios would not invest upfront without
protection against this sort of copying and movies like this would
not be made.
367
Copyright provides the legal framework for this
investment by giving studios exclusive rights to sell their
films.
368
Many commentators have (over)simplified this logic to
the notion that IP rights provide the incentives necessary for
creators to produce new works.
369
Scholarship on IP’s negative space challenges the
traditional account. IP’s negative space, as defined by one of the
scholars who coined the term, consists of areas of intellectual
production where we would expect intellectual property to play
a role but “for some reason—an accident of history, or doctrine,
or as a result of the norms of a particular creative
community”—creativity proceeds without it.
370
The study of
negative space throughout creative industries is predominated
by case studies on industries where participants seem to have
solved the free-riding problem through strategies other than
IP.
371
366. This simplification ignores commercialization strategies other than
DVD sales. Perhaps studios would try to thwart bootlegging by screening the
film only in theaters and making sure no copies left the theater, or perhaps
they would find ways to elevate the theater experience to make it more
appealing than home viewing. Studios might even initiate an ad campaign to
convince consumers that buying unauthorized DVDs harmed artists. These
strategies would mitigate free-riding, but not eliminate it. Moreover, the
expense of these strategies would impact creators’ bottom lines.
367. See Landes & Posner, supra note 9, at 335.
368. See id. at 326.
369. See Cohen, supra note 61, at 143 (“[T]he incentives-for-authors story
is wrong as a descriptive matter. Everything we know about creativity and
creative processes suggests that copyright plays very little role in motivating
creative work.”).
370. Christopher Jon Sprigman, Conclusion: Some Positive Thoughts
About IP’s Negative Space, in C
REATIVITY WITHOUT LAW: CHALLENGING THE
ASSUMPTIONS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (Kate Darling & Aaron Perzanowski
eds., 2017), 249, 252 [hereinafter Sprigman, Positive Thoughts]; see also
Rosenblatt, supra note 7, at 319 (“In IP law, negative space is a series of nooks,
crannies and occasionally oceans—some obscure, some vast—where creation
and innovation thrive in the absence of intellectual property protection.”).
371. See Perzanowski & Darling, supra note 8, at 1, 5–7.
CREATIVITY WITHOUT IP? 1343
1. Copy-Resistant Markets
Free-riding is averted in some industries by features of the
product or the market.
372
Kal Raustiala and Christopher
Sprigman inaugurated the study of IP’s negative space by
identifying this pattern in the fashion industry.
373
Fashion
designers produce new designs each year.
374
Contrary to the
received wisdom that IP is necessary to induce creativity, they
produce these designs even though neither copyright, trade
dress, nor design patent protects fashion designs.
375
Raustiala
and Sprigman found that the industry was viable due to synergy
between producing new designs and copying by imitators.
376
When designers introduce a look, copying by other designers
establishes it as a trend and drives sales.
377
Fast-fashion
operators subsequently take up the look and sell it through
affordable mass-market retailers.
378
Once it reaches the masses,
high-fashion customers seek something new to set themselves
apart.
379
The stage is thus set for a fashion designer to introduce
yet another new look, restarting the cycle.
380
The fashion case study has drawn a range of criticism due
to its prominence. Some question whether it truly exemplifies a
negative space given the substantial role trademarks play in
fashion (and the litigiousness of prominent brands).
381
Garment
designs may lack legal protection, but many garments sport
trademarked logos for which customers are willing to pay a
372. See Bair & Pedraza-Fariña, supra note 356, at 1076.
373. See generally Raustiala & Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox, supra note
1.
374. Id. at 1693.
375. See id. at 1699–1705.
376. See id. at 1726 (“Rapid diffusion leads early-adopter consumers to
seek out new designs on a regular basis, which in turn leads to more copying,
which fuels yet another design shift.”).
377. See id. at 1728–29.
378. See id. at 1721.
379. See id.
380. See id.
381. See, e.g., Dreyfuss, supra note 12, at 1450. On the litigiousness of
Louis Vuitton, see Mike Masnick, Louis Vuitton’s International Tour of
Trademark Bullying Runs Smack Dab into UPenn Law School Who Explains
Trademark Law in Return, T
ECHDIRT (Mar. 6, 2012, 5:46 AM),
https://perma.cc/3PFD-7BSA.
1344 79 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1285 (2022)
premium. The cycle itself also leads to waste through
expenditures on advertising and the staggering environmental
consequences of stoking demand for products that consumers
may discard within the year.
382
Notwithstanding the criticism, fashion is an important
example because, due to distinctive features of the market, it
has been identified as an industry where copying ultimately
benefits those who are copied.
383
This characteristic is unusual
in the literature. More commonly, industries avert free-riding
not because copying helps them, but because features of the
product or market make copying expensive or impractical. I call
this feature “copy resistance.” Stand-up comedy demonstrates
how features of a creative work can mediate the difficulty of
copying.
384
Jokes are subject to only thin copyright protection.
385
In earlier decades when jokes were more generic, the absence of
legal protection meant comedians could nab popular jokes to
retell as their own.
386
Beginning in the latter twentieth century,
however, comedy has become increasingly personalized, even
autobiographical, making jokes harder to appropriate.
387
It
would be difficult for a comedian without a similar background
to land jokes that reflect, say, Margaret Cho’s experience as a
Korean-American woman and LGBTQ+ social activist or
Kumail Nanjiani’s as a Pakistani-American immigrant man.
This change in substance has made jokes more copy-resistant.
388
382. See Dreyfuss, supra note 12, at 1460; Kal Raustiala & Christopher
Jon Sprigman, Faster Fashion: The Piracy Paradox and Its Perils, 39 C
ARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 535, 546 (2021) [hereinafter Raustiala & Sprigman, Faster
Fashion] (“[A]s of 2015, greenhouse gas emissions from textiles production and
the fashion industry were ‘more than those of all international flights and
maritime shipping combined.’”); see also id. at 547 (questioning why society
“treat[s] fashion differently from any other form of economic activity that
produces environmental harms”).
383. See Raustiala & Sprigman, Piracy Paradox, supra note 1, at 1691.
384. See Oliar & Sprigman, supra note 2, at 1854–56.
385. See id. at 1801–05.
386. See id. at 1844–45.
387. See id. at 1852–53 (explaining that contemporary comedy emphasizes
“the individual comedian’s point of view,” making appropriation less attractive
in an industry in which “stealing is condemned”).
388. See Kapczynski, supra note 7, at 1547 n.37 (stating that it is difficult
for comedians to steal or copy jokes because modern comedy favors “jokes that
are ‘point-of-view’ driven”).
CREATIVITY WITHOUT IP? 1345
Related case studies document the efforts of conventional
“full-IP” industries to attain copy resistance. Music and
pornographic films provide two examples.
389
Even though
albums and films are subject to copyright protection, digital
file-sharing has precipitated a de facto decrease in copyright
effectiveness for these media products.
390
In response, the
industries have moved to live musical performances or exclusive
“cam shows;” would-be copyists cannot replicate these as
cheaply because their value stems from the live performance
rather than the recording.
391
This shift does not make copying
impossible. Extending the example of music, a competitor could
host a live musical performance based on another’s act by
renting space and hiring performers. The problems associated
with free-riding would nonetheless be diminished because the
expense would preclude the competitor from aggressively
undercutting prices.
392
2. Norm Enforcement
Exploration of IP’s negative space began with a case study
in fashion, an industry where features of the market render
copying beneficial to those whose work is copied. In contrast to
that dynamic, an even greater number of case studies have
identified negative spaces where participants mitigate
free-riding through enforcement of community norms.
393
This
work builds on the insights of property scholar Bob Ellickson,
whose book Order Without Law follows dispute resolution
389. See Sprigman, Positive Thoughts, supra note 370, at 261–63.
390. See Kate Darling, IP Without IP?: A Study of the Online Adult
Entertainment Industry, 17 S
TAN. TECH. L. REV. 655, 684 (2014); Christopher
Jon Sprigman, Copyright and Creative Incentives: What We Know (And Don’t),
55 HOUS. L. REV. 451, 461 (2017) [hereinafter Sprigman, Copyright and
Creative Incentives]; see also L
UNNEY, supra note 61, at 74 (approaching
file-sharing “as a natural experiment in radically reduced copyright
protection”).
391. See Darling, supra note 390, at 693 (explaining how the adult
entertainment industry has adapted by creating more live video content);
Sprigman, Copyright and Creative Incentives, supra note 390, at 461 (“[T]he
music industry adapted to piracy by re-emphasizing the live concert
experience, which, unlike recordings, cannot effectively be pirated.”).
392. See Sprigman, Positive Thoughts, supra note 370, at 262–63.
393. See Bair & Pedraza-Fariña, supra note 356, at 1076.
1346 79 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1285 (2022)
among cattle ranchers in Shasta County, California.
394
He
demonstrated the primacy of social norms in governing
relations. Neighbors aspired to conduct themselves or make
reparations in conformity with community norms regardless of
what the law required, and those who did not conform faced
social sanctions from gossip to ostracism.
395
Studies of IP’s
negative spaces have revealed similar trends in norm
enforcement as a solution to free-riding across creative fields as
varied as stage magic, haute cuisine, tattoo art, and
fan-fiction.
396
Video games have also featured in this
literature—but with respect to fan creations rather than
professional developers.
397
Comedy is also of special interest
because, in addition to demonstrating copy resistance, it stands
as a paradigmatic example of norm enforcement.
398
Governance through norms holds intuitive appeal, driven
by the sense that it avoids the acrimony of legal proceedings and
allows participants to tailor rules to better fit their needs.
Norms among Michelin-star chefs, for example, strike a more
subtle balance than formal IP law by encouraging chefs to
publicize innovative recipes while punishing those who copy
others’ recipes exactly or pass off others’ as their own.
399
Any
warm feelings about relying on norms rather than law must be
tempered, however, by recognizing that violence often
accompanies enforcement: when warnings fail, ranchers and
comedians alike may fall back to their fists.
400
Moreover,
394. See generally ROBERT ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW
NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1994).
395. Id. at 176–78.
396. See generally Loshin, supra note 3 (stage magic); Fauchart & von
Hippel, supra note 4 (haute cuisine); Perzanowski, supra note 5 (tattoo art
industry); Hetcher, supra note 6 (fan-fiction).
397. E.g., Shisha, supra note 33, at 760 (explaining that professional
gamers “wield considerable power and influence, and are well-positioned to
dispense harsh reputational sanctions” in the gaming industry); Wallace,
supra note 33, at 228–30.
398. See Oliar & Sprigman, supra note 2, at 1809–31.
399. See Fauchart & von Hippel, supra note 4, at 192–93, 195–96. But see
Oliar & Sprigman, supra note 2, at 1864 (finding norms in comedy “simple and
crude” relative to copyright).
400. See E
LLICKSON, supra note 394, at 131; Oliar & Sprigman, supra note
2, at 1796–97; id. at 1820 (“It is significant . . . that such acts of violent or
potentially violent retribution enjoy considerable legitimacy within the
comedic community.”).
CREATIVITY WITHOUT IP? 1347
communities where norms predominate are those where
participants have latched onto conformity and norm-policing as
markers of esteem and belonging.
401
Several scholars have
documented how these social and emotional commitments can
lead to overenforcement, difficulties adapting to change, and the
entrenchment of biases and incumbents.
402
The most significant limitation of this strategy is that
norms only bind community members.
403
This is not to say
subscribing to norms is entirely voluntary; communities that
control access to resources may be able to insist.
404
Consider the
plight of an aspiring comic or magician. Clubs will refuse to book
her for shows if she attains notoriety as a norm-breaker, ending
her career.
405
Likewise, she may not be invited to the
conferences or nominated for the awards that would allow her
to advance.
406
Yet norms may lack force against those already at
the top. Accusations of stealing by newcomers against
established participants are less likely to stick, and a star may
401. See Rosenblatt, supra note 15, at 8, 10.
402. See, e.g., Richard McAdams, The Origin, Development, and
Regulation of Norms, 96 M
ICH. L. REV. 338, 419–23 (1997) (arguing that when
norms are enforced excessively or too zealously, they may prove inefficient or
even harmful); Anthony J. Casey & Andres Sawicki, The Problem of Creative
Collaboration, 58 W
M. & MARY L. REV. 1793, 1822–23 (2017); Rosenblatt, supra
note 15, at 10; see also Madhavi Sunder, Cultural Dissent, 54 S
TAN. L. REV.
495, 555–56 (2001) (problematizing the law’s uncritical reinforcement of
traditional norms for “insulating cultures from change and entrenching the
existing power structures of a community”).
403. See Dreyfuss, supra note 12, at 1458–62.
404. See, e.g., Katherine J. Strandburg, Curiosity-Driven Research and
University Technology Transfer, in U
NIVERSITY ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER: PROCESS, DESIGN, AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 93,
108–09 (Gary D. Liecap ed., 2005) (explaining how non-compliance with
academic science norms may lead to “denial of the scarce resources of research
funding and attention”).
405. See Oliar & Sprigman, supra note 2, at 1817–18.
406. See Loshin, supra note 3, at 137–39 (“Magicians whom other
magicians perceive as behaving badly may not be invited to give lectures,
invited to perform in magic competitions, or featured in magic trade
publications.”); cf. Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Beyond the
Patents–Prizes Debate, 92 T
EX. L. REV. 303, 316–19 (2013) (exploring “prizes,
grants, or tax incentives” as alternatives or complements to patents for
spurring innovation).
1348 79 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1285 (2022)
be able to trade off her name to book performances and media
appearances despite her transgressions.
407
3. Non-Pecuniary Motivations
Another undercurrent in the negative-space literature is
the salience of non-pecuniary motivations.
408
While profits drive
studios and their investors, motives vary for individual
creators.
409
If you asked an artist what drove her, it is unlikely
she would parrot the conventional story of copyright
incentives.
410
Depending on the artist, money might not even
approach the top the list. Rather, creators often speak of
intrinsic motivations such as the need to express
themselves—to do what they love or satisfy a compulsion.
411
Creators also act on social motivations, such as a desire to build
reputation or esteem.
412
These social motivations provide a
partial explanation for the efficacy of norm-enforcement regimes
documented in prior case studies.
413
Some creators may also
forego payment on a project because they seek to build
reputation or notoriety that they can translate into more
profitable ventures in the future.
414
Together these
407. See Oliar & Sprigman, supra note 2, at 1824 (“[E]nforcement was
relatively unlikely to succeed when the appropriator was a more popular comic
than the originator. . . . Also, intermediaries are less likely to enforce the
norms or refuse to deal when the alleged thief enjoys public appeal.”).
408. See Yochai Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, or, Linux and The Nature of the
Firm, 112 Y
ALE L.J. 369, 426–27 (2002) [hereinafter Benkler, Coase’s Penguin]
(explaining that intrinsic and social-psychological rewards sometimes
motivate creative production more than monetary rewards); Rosenblatt, supra
note 7, at 343–45.
409. See Rosenblatt, supra note 7, at 320–21.
410. See Cohen, supra note 61, at 143 (“Everything we know about
creativity and creative processes suggests that copyright plays very little role
in motivating creative work.”).
411. See id.; see also Rebecca Tushnet, Economies of Desire: Fair Use and
Marketplace Assumptions, 51 W
M. & MARY L. REV. 513, 524 (2009) (“Some of
these reasons are pleasant, some are unpleasant, even destructive.”).
412. See Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, supra note 408, at 427–28; Rosenblatt,
supra note 7, at 344–46.
413. See e.g., Rosenblatt, supra note 7, at 332.
414. See Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, supra note 408, at 424–25 (explaining
how free software development can be motivated by “reputation gains” or
“more mundane benefits, such as consulting contracts, customization services,
and increases in human capital”).
CREATIVITY WITHOUT IP? 1349
non-pecuniary motives provide an additional layer of
incentives—effectively a subsidy—for creative production.
While these incentives facilitate creation of more works for
society to enjoy, we should take care not to romanticize the idea
of creating for the love of art. It can all too easily obscure the
problems that follow from overworking and underpaying
creative workers.
415
Nor should we take creativity as some sort
of mystery divorced from artists’ material realities.
416
These
dynamics also compound problems for marginalized workers
across creative industries, given that many of the workers
whose labor goes unrewarded or undercompensated are women,
indigenous peoples, or members of the LGBTQ+ community.
417
Full assessment of any domain of creative production requires
accounting for these costs and their impact on what is
produced.
418
B. AAA Games
1. Copy Resistance
Video games present a rich case study because they are the
face of modern creative production. Their economic and social
significance alone would merit attention, as would the
industry’s unique configuration of IP and non-IP protections. As
closer examination shows, the industry also embodies several
trends previously documented in copyright’s negative space. The
AAA sector guards itself from cloning because the expense of
making AAA games renders them copy resistant. Recall that one
major concern with copying is free-riding—when a work is
expensive to produce but cheap to copy, third parties can
undercut the creator by making copies and selling them for
415. See Dreyfuss, supra note 12, at 1464; Renyi Hong, Game Modding,
Prosumerism and Neoliberal Labor Practices, 7 I
NTL J. COMMCN. 984, 985
(2013) (documenting extraction of value from unpaid video-game modders).
416. See Cohen, supra note 61, at 146–47.
417. See, e.g., Dreyfuss, supra note 12, at 1464 (women and indigenous
peoples); J
UUL, supra note 24, at 113–19 (transgender and gender non-binary
developers); Bonnie Ruberg, The Precarious Labor of Queer Indie
Game-Making: Who Benefits from Making Video Games “Better”?, 20
T
ELEVISION & NEW MEDIA 778, 780 (2019).
418. See e.g., Ruberg, supra note 417, at 779–80.
1350 79 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1285 (2022)
less.
419
Legal protection is less urgent where the expenses of
copying are comparable to those of producing the original.
420
Later entrants might choose to copy something popular, but
they would be restricted in their ability to undercut the price
because they too would have to recoup their upfront
investments.
421
Such is the case with AAA games. Blockbuster games now
cost upward of $100 million to develop and market due to
investment in features like graphics, celebrity involvement, full
voice acting, and open worlds.
422
These games are expensive to
clone because competing head-to-head with the original requires
comparable expenditures on graphics and marketing.
423
Competitors can benefit from the original game’s marketing to
the degree that it popularizes a genre, but popular genres are so
crowded that a game is unlikely to stand out without its own
marketing.
424
Even if there are no legal obstacles to making
similar games, the cost of competing via budget, as it were,
presents practical obstacles that mitigate cloning.
Overt piracy would present a different problem. A game
that cost $100 million to produce could be burned to a disc for
twenty-five cents, giving rise to the risk of free-riding.
425
This
problem is averted, however, because copying and selling a
game outright remains prohibited.
426
Copyright likewise
prohibits competitors from copying specific art assets or lines of
code.
427
They may create similar art and code, but they must
start from square one, forcing them to incur comparable
expenses. Copyright thus prohibits specific forms of copying that
raise serious free-riding problems while leaving game makers to
sort out others.
419. See supra notes 356–360 and accompanying text.
420. David Friedman, Standards as Intellectual Property: An Economic
Approach, 19 U.
DAYTON L. REV. 1109, 1116 (1994).
421. See id. at 1118.
422. See supra notes 143–151 and accompanying text.
423. See supra Part I.C.1.
424. See, e.g., Chatfield, supra note 18.
425. See supra note 364 and accompanying text.
426. See supra Part II.A.
427. See supra Part II.A.
CREATIVITY WITHOUT IP? 1351
2. Franchise Entrenchment
AAA games also benefit from legal and non-legal protection
over franchises. Recall that eighty of the top 100 games of 2018
were sequels.
428
So too were all but one of the top twenty.
429
The
outlier, Spider-Man, may not have been a video game sequel but
it was an extension of an established franchise for a superhero
whose popularity spans sixty years.
430
Publishers’ investment in these franchises is no accident.
Imitating a popular game may be viable in a market where
players want more games like that game. That strategy is not
viable, however, if players are loyal to a franchise and resistant
to substitutes. By wielding trademarks and related licensing
rights to protect their franchises, publishers insulate
themselves against competition. Publishers bolster these efforts
through additional non-legal strategies to cultivate and lock in
their established fan bases.
a. Trademarks and Third-Party Licenses
The absence of comprehensive copyright protection does not
necessarily mean the industry gets by without IP. Participants
may instead rely more heavily on whatever IP rights remain
available. Much like fashion relies on trademark in the absence
of copyright, participants in the video game industry rely on
trademarks and related rights to protect franchises.
431
Trademark law does not protect substantive game design
elements, but it does give developers exclusive rights to release
sequels and spin-offs.
432
428. See Global Yearly Chart 2018, supra note 152.
429. Id.
430. Additionally, though 2018’s Spider-Man was not marketed as a sequel
and did not continue the story arc from any prior game, it followed at least
twenty-two prior Spider-Man games across several platforms spanning four
decades beginning with the 1982 Spider-Man for the Atari 2600. See Chris
Hodges, Every Spider-Man Video Game, Ranked from Worst to Best,
S
CREENRANT (July 10, 2017), https://perma.cc/7ZXQ-UBNT. If a game
qualifies as a sequel by utilizing the same title, the same characters, and the
same trademarks and character copyrights, then all twenty best sellers of 2018
were sequels.
431. See supra Part III.B.
432. See supra Part III.B.
1352 79 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1285 (2022)
Reliance on trademark also makes sense given the
industry’s historical issues with quality. Trademarks are
important in markets where it would be difficult to evaluate
quality before purchasing a good.
433
Brands and similar marks
allow purchasers to make informed decisions despite this
difficulty by relying on past experience and brand reputation.
434
If unethical sellers falsely used other manufacturers’ marks,
however, brands would be useless because purchasers could not
rely on them.
435
Trademark prohibits this deception.
This rationale fits the video game industry. Players cannot
inspect game quality firsthand prior to purchase and hundreds
of new titles are released for Nintendo, PlayStation, and Xbox
home consoles each year; the number is an order of magnitude
greater for PC games and greater still for mobile games.
436
Many
consumers also regret prior bad purchases.
437
Consumer
reliance on known franchises makes sense in light of these
dynamics and the industry’s focus makes sense as a response to
this consumer strategy.
Producers also rely on third-party licenses with celebrities
and sports leagues that make games costly if not impossible to
duplicate. Inclusion of celebrities generates media buzz, and the
right of publicity provides legal support for publishers’
marketing and promotion.
438
The 2020 title Cyberpunk 2077, for
example, received considerable attention prior to release
because one of the main characters was voiced by and modeled
433. See MENELL ET AL., supra note 245, at 891.
434. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An
Economic Perspective, 30 J.L.
& ECON. 265, 269–70 (1987).
435. See id. at 270.
436. See, e.g., List of PlayStation 4 Games (A–L), WIKIPEDIA,
https://perma.cc/XJQ7-4U7Q (documenting 3,419 PlayStation 4 games
released since the console’s introduction in 2013); List of PlayStation 4 Games
(M–Z), W
IKIPEDIA, https://perma.cc/Y65Y-TR58 (noting an additional 3,386
PlayStation 4 games); Clement, supra note 173 (documenting over 8,000 new
PC games per year); J. Clement, Apple App Store: Number of Available
Gaming Apps as of Q1 2021, S
TATISTA (Jan. 24, 2022), https://perma.cc/JU6P-
S5CU (documenting over 18,000 new iPhone gaming applications from Q4
2020 to Q1 2021).
437. See supra notes 95–101, 158–161 and accompanying text.
438. See, e.g., C
AL. CIV. CODE § 3344(a) (2022) (prohibiting use of “another’s
name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness” for advertising or selling or
soliciting purposes). See generally JENNIFER E. ROTHMAN, THE RIGHT OF
PUBLICITY: PRIVACY REIMAGINED FOR A PUBLIC WORLD (2018).
CREATIVITY WITHOUT IP? 1353
after actor Keanu Reeves;
439
in like fashion, Giancarlo Esposito
of Breaking Bad fame lent his voice and likeness to the
antagonist of the 2021 release Far Cry 6.
440
Studios pay
significant sums to include A-list celebrities.
441
Because the
right of publicity protects celebrities’ likenesses, including their
voices, it prohibits other studios from including these or other
celebrities unless they incur comparable expenses.
442
Like
graphics and other production expenses, the inclusion of
celebrities contributes to copy resistance.
Licenses with sports leagues provide even more significant
advantages. If an action star like Sylvester Stallone assigns
exclusive rights to his likeness to developers at Acme Studios,
then Bruce Willis may still be available to Weyland-Yutani;
better or worse substitutes exist.
443
But consider the result of
licenses like the seven-year, $1.1 billion deal the NBA signed
with Take-Two Interactive, maker of the NBA 2K series of
games.
444
Most basketball fans who play video games want the
experience of using actual teams, with actual logos, with actual
players.
445
Competitors who are excluded from using these may
still offer a genericized basketball game, but they will face an
uphill battle for a market share. Competing via license deals is
prohibitively expensive for smaller studios, but enforceability of
the relevant trademarks leaves the availability of copyright
439. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
440. See Audrey Cleo Yap, Giancarlo Esposito on Playing a Gus
Fring-esque Dictator in ‘Far Cry 6’, V
ARIETY (July 12, 2020, 1:07 PM),
https://perma.cc/UY4E-SG9T.
441. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
442. The right of publicity would likewise stop game studios from imitating
celebrities’ voices. See Midler v. Ford Motor, 849 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1988)
(holding that the imitation of Bette Midler’s “distinctive voice” in an
advertisement supported a right-of-publicity claim).
443. The example might sound farfetched if one was unaware that both
actors recently reprised their roles from the action films Rambo and Die Hard,
respectively, for a Call of Duty ’80s Action Hero DLC. See Eddie Makuch, Call
of Duty Devs Talk Die Hard Missions and What It Took to Bring Rambo and
McClane to the Game, G
AMESPOT (May 18, 2021, 4:19 PM),
https://perma.cc/AX9X-HSKM.
444. See Needleman, supra note 151.
445. See Jake Dee, 10 Best Basketball Video Games, Ranked by Metacritic,
S
CREENRANT (July 13, 2021), https://perma.cc/8LHR-WSM6 (demonstrating
that all of the top-ranked basketball video games are NBA games with
real-world players and teams).
1354 79 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1285 (2022)
protection, other than the right to prohibit wholesale piracy,
largely beside the point.
b. Network Effects
Many games also accrue value through the growth of their
player bases; this provides established games another asset that
cannot be appropriated. The literature on network effects
provides perspective. Some goods and services become more
valuable because others use the same good or service.
446
The
canonical examples come from communications: the value of
phone service increases as more people have phones, much like
the value of a service like Facebook increases as more people
join. Games benefit from similar dynamics.
The point is most evident for online multiplayer games.
Take the popular battle-royale game Fortnite. It has attracted
over 350 million registered users, with a record of over 12
million online at the same time.
447
A large player base is
valuable for a multiplayer game because it facilitates
matchmaking, allowing players to find others of comparable
skill levels to play against at any time of day.
448
This gives
Fortnite a competitive advantage. A new entrant could not
out-compete Fortnite simply by introducing a game with better
graphics, gameplay, and other design features; it would need to
be sufficiently better to overcome the network effects supporting
the incumbent game.
A popular game may also simply attract a fanbase that
promotes the game and makes it more popular. As referenced
above, even single-player games like Skyrim reap benefits by
attracting large online communities eager to share strategies,
memes, and game mods.
449
These mods—adding sometimes
hundreds of hours of free, fan-made content—provide value and
replayability to the game through fans’ uncompensated labor.
450
446. See Rosenblatt, supra note 7, at 348.
447. Mansoor Iqbal, Fortnite Usage and Revenue Statistics (2022), B
US.
APPS., https://perma.cc/7JKF-L4EY (last updated June 30, 2022).
448. See generally Mingliu Chen et al., Matchmaking Strategies for
Maximizing Player Engagement in Video Games (Sept. 22, 2021) (unpublished
manuscript), https://perma.cc/EQW2-HBRC (PDF).
449. See Reardon & Wright, supra note 344, at 100–06.
450. See Note, Spare the Mod: In Support of Total-Conversion Modified
Video Games, 125 H
ARV. L. REV. 789, 800–01 (2012) (discussing how “free labor
CREATIVITY WITHOUT IP? 1355
Streaming platforms like YouTube and Twitch, where many
players congregate, have also become important networks for
organic or sponsored promotion of whichever games popular
streamers choose to play.
451
Those games popular enough to
attract streamers’ attention accordingly attract even more
players, entrenching their popularity.
Games, like other online services, may also be designed to
lock players in. One way of achieving this is by exploiting the
decision-making weaknesses outlined in the behavioral
economics literature.
452
The sunk cost fallacy, for example, may
keep players attached to a game after they have spent money on
subscriptions or microtransactions.
453
Various aspects of the
software-as-service business model may therefore not only
generate immediate revenue, but also contribute to long-term
player retention.
454
3. Feedback Loop: More of the Same
Publishers’ strategy of investing heavily in graphics and
other high-budget assets intensifies their reliance on
established franchises. There is a feedback loop between the
two. When investors put $100 million toward a game, they want
assurances that the game will sell enough copies to return a
profit. One way to increase that likelihood is to create sequels
for games that sold well in the past—if the seventeenth
installment of Call of Duty sold twenty-million copies, it is a
good bet that the nineteenth installment will also sell.
455
Besides
pushing studios to keep gameplay consistent, this drive to tap
and leisure . . . lets the industry sidestep copyright issues through the
‘ideological masking of modding as a collaborative process’”).
451. See Mark R. Johnson & Jamie Woodcock, The Impacts of Live
Streaming and Twitch.tv on the Video Game Industry, 41 M
EDIA CULTURE &
SOCY 670, 676 (2018).
452. See generally Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and
Economics, 50 S
TAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998).
453. See Erica L. Neely, Come for the Game, Stay for the Cash Grab: The
Ethics of Loot Boxes, Microtransactions, and Freemium Games, 16 GAMES &
CULTURE 228, 238 (2019).
454. See id.
455. See Call of Duty, W
IKIPEDIA, https://perma.cc/YEA2-TJZD
(documenting the release of the nineteenth installment in 2022); see Taub,
supra note 38 (“[I]ncreasingly, the game industry shares something else with
Hollywood: a heavy reliance on sequels.”).
1356 79 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1285 (2022)
into an established audience may also discourage studios from
touching cultural or political controversy, such as the inclusion
of police and police misconduct in games where it would be
thematically appropriate. One recent example that drew
attention was Spider-Man: Miles Morales, which omitted law
enforcement rather than confronting the complicated themes
featured in the original source material in connection with Miles
Morales’ experience as a Black and Puerto Rican teen whose
father is on the force.
456
Another was Cyberpunk 2077, a game
set in a dystopian future, where the developers promised police
corruption and brutality but underdelivered on these themes in
the final release.
457
C. Indie Games
The video game industry is financially precarious for small
studios, including most indie studios. Cloning adds to this
precarity. In rare cases of particularly egregious cloning,
developers may possess viable IP claims,
458
but indie studios’
innovations tend to consist of game mechanics and novel
themes, categories with only thin IP protection. Barring legal
recourse, indie studios cannot avert copying the same way as
AAA studios. They generally lack resources to engage in a
graphics or marketing arms race with other entrants to the
same genre. Indeed, the story of Threes! and 2048 outlined above
highlights an unfortunate dynamic where one studio releases a
game but a clone captures the market through better polish and
marketing.
459
Yet cloning has not derailed indie development as much as
one might expect. This may be partly due to a different
orientation to financial risk.
460
Asked to define success, many
456. See, e.g., Eliana Dockterman, Spider-Man: Miles Morales Could’ve
Tackled Police Reform Head-On. Instead, the Cops Are Almost Entirely Gone,
TIME (Nov. 10, 2020, 3:34 PM), https://perma.cc/66TU-GHYU (criticizing the
game’s avoidance of any discussion of police brutality).
457. See Wes Fenlon, 9 Features that Didn’t Make It to the Final Version
of Cyberpunk 2077, PCG
AMER (Dec. 16, 2020), https://perma.cc/7U2G-T585.
458. See, e.g., Spry Fox LLC v. LOLApps, No. 2:12-cv-00147-RAJ, 2012 WL
5290158, at *1–2 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 18, 2012); see supra note 253 and
accompanying text.
459. See supra notes 192–196 and accompanying text.
460. See Whitson et al., supra note 168, at 611.
CREATIVITY WITHOUT IP? 1357
indie developers simply wish to have the freedom to keep
making the kinds of games they want to make.
461
Some measure
of financial success remains necessary, but intrinsic motivations
partly explain why indie studios keep making games despite the
risks.
462
Developers also benefit from systemic barriers to cloning.
Community norms restrict copying among indie developers, and
selection of niche aesthetics and themes gives indie games a
measure of copy resistance. Crowdfunding also alleviates risk
because it provides revenues prior to release and therefore
(usually) prior to the risk of cloning.
463
This equilibrium remains
fragile, however, and the explosion of mobile games threatens it.
1. Community Norms
Cloning among indie developers is averted because the
community is one where norm enforcement is viable. Too many
games are released each year for players to navigate simply by
browsing the virtual shelves on a platform like Steam.
464
Additionally, dedicated indie-game players are selective in
screening games for the sort of subcultural authenticity often
associated with indie games, much like aficionados of indie
music or films.
465
Success requires developers to win the
approval of cultural institutions within the indie sector so they
can win invitations to expos, nominations for awards, and
connections to potential investors for future projects.
466
Securing
this approval requires conforming to indie norms.
461. See id.
462. See supra Part IV.A.3.
463. Exceptions arise where developers announce a game in progress and
a third party immediately begins making a clone; motivated copyists may beat
the original creator to market. See, e.g., Russ Pitts, Cloned at Birth: The Story
of Ridiculous Fishing, P
OLYGON (Apr. 24, 2013, 12:00 PM),
https://perma.cc/U8YS-6KLX. Recall that the industry began with Atari’s
co-founders copying Magnavox’s Table Tennis after witnessing a pre-release
demonstration. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
464. See supra note 436.
465. See J
UUL, supra note 24, at 38–39.
466. See, e.g., Whitson et al., supra note 45; Perks, supra note 174, at 17;
Whitson et al., supra note 168.
1358 79 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1285 (2022)
Indie developers pride themselves on originality.
467
Some
degree of copying is expected, but subsequent developers are
expected to innovate beyond what has come before.
468
Similarly,
case studies on haute cuisine uncovered a norm among chefs
against copying another chef’s recipe exactly.
469
Imitation is
permitted, but chefs must add their own spin.
470
This standard
resists precise specification; whether a recipe follows the
original too closely is the sort of thing chefs claim to know when
they see.
471
Research on game developers and players reveals
similar norms. It is a breach of community norms to copy an
entire system unchanged.
472
Moreover, it is a breach to simply
reskin a game—to keep the same underlying mechanics and
change only the artwork or overall theme.
473
As with cuisine,
how much must be changed is left to community discretion: indie
developers “openly admit they borrow elements from other
games themselves, so they are careful in judging fellow game
developers who are accused of cloning.”
474
Motives also matter.
One who copies to profit off of the original is scorned, while a fan
who copies in homage may be tolerated or even welcomed.
475
Norm enforcement is difficult, however, against those who
stand outside the community. Shaming is a common sanction
for breach of norms in the indie community as in others and, in
the age of social media, it can in theory be deployed even against
outsiders.
476
Indie studios that have attempted such public
shaming campaigns against outside developers who have
467. See, e.g., van Roessel & Katzenbach, supra note 179, at 408–10.
468. See id.
469. See Fauchart & von Hippel, supra note 4, at 192–93.
470. See id.
471. See id. at 193.
472. See van Roessel & Katzenbach, supra note 179, at 408.
473. See id. at 408 (“Developers generally agree on these extreme ends of
imitation: a wholesale copying of any of the three main components is not
acceptable.”).
474. Phillips, supra note 46, at 149 (“[E]valuation of the artistic integrity
of games is done via informal channels, by the indie development community
themselves . . . .”); van Roessel & Katzenbach, supra note 179, at 411.
475. See van Roessel & Katzenbach, supra note 179, at 413.
476. See Phillips, supra note 46, at 149. See generally Kate Klonick,
Re-Shaming the Debate: Social Norms, Shame, and Regulation in an Internet
Age, 75 M
D. L. REV. 1029 (2016); Elizabeth L. Rosenblatt, Fear and Loathing:
Shame, Shaming, and Intellectual Property, 63 D
EPAUL L. REV. 1 (2013).
CREATIVITY WITHOUT IP? 1359
imitated indie games too closely have realized only limited
success.
477
2. Finding a Niche
Many indie developers also make creative decisions that
render their games copy-resistant. They do this not by ramping
up production value or otherwise making their games expensive
to copy, per se. Instead, they choose aesthetics, themes, and
mechanics that are less popular and therefore less profitable to
copy.
Indie developers are the hipsters of the industry: they
define game-design criteria in opposition to the mainstream.
478
Some of these decisions, particularly with respect to aesthetics,
are driven by financial constraints. Indie developers have
smaller budgets than AAA developers. They cannot afford to
make games with hyper-realistic 3D graphics; if they tried, the
resulting game would convey the disappointing impression that
it could have been good if only it had a proper budget.
479
Many
indie developers have nonetheless produced memorable,
aesthetically pleasing games by adopting an intentionally retro
style evoking the pixelated look of video game consoles of the
1980s and 1990s.
480
Pixelated graphics can be achieved on a
smaller budget and without enlisting nearly as many artists as
the contemporary AAA game.
481
Other decisions are driven by developers’ desire to explore
perspectives and ways of being that are missing from AAA
games. Many mainstream games follow action-hero plotlines
where players conquer obstacles through violence. Depression
Quest—the indie game sadly best known as the initial target of
GamerGate—charts a different course; it puts the player in the
position of battling depression while managing medications and
relationships.
482
Another notable entry, Undertale, adopts the
trappings of a combat-heavy, 90s-era roleplaying game, but it
provides the option to overcome opponents by befriending them
477. See infra Part IV.C.4.
478. See supra notes 165, 176–178 and accompanying text.
479. J
UUL, supra note 24, at 34.
480. Id. at 28.
481. Id.
482. Id. at 139–40.
1360 79 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1285 (2022)
(at greater difficulty than simply killing them).
483
Recent indie
games have also featured stories and relationships grounded in
the experiences of the LGBTQ+ community.
484
Indeed, games
like Depression Quest have prompted some gamers to complain
that “politics” should be kept out of games.
485
Adopting non-mainstream aesthetics and themes is no
guarantee against copying, but it does impact the calculus for a
profit-driven appropriator. The protection is not durable,
however, if an indie trend goes mainstream. Consider the
trajectory of “survival horror” games. The survival horror genre
was utilized by mainstream publishers as early as 1996 and
represented a partial turn away from traditional action games,
subverting player expectations by requiring them to sometimes
run or hide.
486
Even so, by 2008, AAA horror games had
succumbed to the conventions of standard action-shooter games
to better appeal to mainstream audiences.
487
Around the same
time, indie developers launched a contrary approach to survival
horror. The indies armed players with little more than a
flashlight.
488
They restricted player autonomy so thoroughly
that some hapless protagonists could do little more than sit at a
desk, anxiously watching security cameras.
489
This approach
proved surprisingly popular through titles like the 2012 game
Slender: The Eight Pages (featuring the infamous Slender Man)
and the 2014 game Five Nights at Freddy’s (a nightmarish take
on the animatronics of Chuck E. Cheese), both of which
benefited from streaming by YouTubers.
490
As a result, however,
483. Id. at 156–62.
484. See id. at 112–17.
485. See Simon Parkin, Zoe Quinn’s Depression Quest, THE NEW YORKER
(Sept. 9, 2014), https://perma.cc/J3F3-CMCT. These complaints admit no hint
of irony. The implicit position is that the typical game featuring a gun-toting
vigilante solving problems through gratuitous violence is politically neutral.
486. See Laurie N. Taylor, Gothic Bloodlines in Survival Horror Gaming,
in H
ORROR VIDEO GAMES: ESSAYS ON THE FUSION OF FEAR AND PLAY (Bernard
Perron ed., 2009), at 46–47.
487. See B
ERNARD PERRON, THE WORLD OF SCARY VIDEO GAMES: A STUDY IN
VIDEOLUDIC HORROR 34, 220–21, 232 (2018); Jim Sterling, How Survival
Horror Evolved Itself Into Extinction,
DESTRUCTOID (Dec. 8. 2008),
https://perma.cc/6Z94-A8UP.
488. See P
ERRON, supra note 487, at 238.
489. See id. at 239.
490. See id. at 71; supra note 451 and accompanying text.
CREATIVITY WITHOUT IP? 1361
non-combat survival horror has ascended in popularity and
spawned numerous clones.
491
3. Alternative Funding
Crowdfunding also provides indie studios a buffer against
the financial impact of cloning. Indie studios launch campaigns
on platforms like Kickstarter and Indiegogo to fund their
games.
492
These campaigns typically consist of early-stage
presales: supporters pay money upfront in exchange for a copy
of the game months or years later.
493
This dampens commercial
risk. If the developer has already covered its expenses and paid
its employees, it is not fatal to the studio if a clone outcompetes
the game after its release.
494
The unfortunate side effect is that crowdfunding may also
inadvertently contribute to a decline in quality. Pressure to
succeed on the market provides an incentive for studios to
release a well-polished game that will receive high reviews and
sell an adequate number of copies. Studios that make enough
presales through crowd funding can afford to worry less about
the quality of the final release.
4. The Pressure of Mobile
Mobile games pose a threat to indie studios because many
mobile developers stand outside the indie community but make
games similar in scope. Indie studios enjoy some measure of
security vis-à-vis other indie studios because they can count on
shared norms to mitigate copying. They need not worry about
copying by major studios because AAA publishers generally lack
interest in making similar games. Even setting aside niche
aesthetics and themes, indie games tend to be modest in scope,
while AAA publishers seek to create expansive worlds with
491. See PERRON, supra note 487, at 239. See generally Marak, supra note
185.
492. See supra notes 170–171 and accompanying text.
493. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
494. To a degree, crowdfunding shifts game development away from the
market-based funding system contemplated by IP law and toward a patronage
system where interested parties invest in promising creators. Cf. M
ARK ROSE,
AUTHORS AND OWNERS: THE INVENTION OF COPYRIGHT 16–17 (1993).
1362 79 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1285 (2022)
hours of gameplay, if not an experience that extends indefinitely
with ongoing subscription revenues.
495
None of these obstacles deter non-indie mobile developers.
Mobile developers are heterogenous—some are major
corporations while others are shoestring operations in other
countries—but few identify with the indie community.
496
As a
class, mobile games also tend to be relatively simple. Some of
the most popular mobile games are built around just one central
game mechanic, like the slingshot action of Angry Birds or the
match-three puzzles of Candy Crush Saga.
497
Indie studios that
develop an innovative new game mechanic face the risk of
mobile developers appropriating the mechanic and releasing
competing games. This was the context for the Threes! and 2048
story introduced above.
498
The makers of Threes! spent months
honing the number-combination mechanic for their puzzle
game.
499
After release, the makers of 2048 created their own
version in mere days.
500
2048 subsequently dominated the
market partly because the developers made the game easier,
enticing a wider audience, and in even greater part because they
released the game for free and monetized it through in-app
advertising.
501
The latter developer won out not because its
makers put in the work to make a better game, but because they
appropriated a well-honed game mechanic and applied their
superior fluency with the marketing and monetization of
smartphone apps.
502
495. See supra Part I.C.1.
496. See N
ICHOLS, supra note 62, at 100, 104. Norm enforcement is further
complicated by the diversity of contexts in which the industry operates outside
the United States. See Hailey J. Austin & Robin J.S. Sloan, Through the
Shanzhai Lens: Reframing the Transmedial Copying and Remaking of Games,
12 BRITISH J. CHINESE STUD., July 2022, at 133, 148 (using a case on Chinese
copying to develop “an additional lens through which to understand and
interpret game remakes and copying in different cultural contexts”).
497. See N
ICHOLS, supra note 62, at 93.
498. See supra notes 192–196 and accompanying text.
499. See Vanhemert, supra note 192.
500. See id.
501. See id.
502. See id.
CREATIVITY WITHOUT IP? 1363
V. I
MPLICATIONS
Critics of the negative-space literature argue that
formalization of property rights is inevitable for any industry
that grows sufficiently profitable or cost intensive.
503
Their
position finds confirmation in the perception that the
negative-space case studies are confined to niche areas of
creative production.
504
French cuisine, tattoos, and comedy are
not major industries compared to fixtures of popular culture like
movies or music. Nor are recipes, tattoo designs, or jokes
expensive to produce; they can be devised by a single individual
or small team without need to coordinate the hundreds of
workers involved in producing something like a film.
505
The
fashion industry is a more complicated example. Fashion is a
major industry, but one where trademark law is important even
without copyright.
506
Moreover, if we focus on the design of
specific garments, as Raustiala and Sprigman did, then we once
again find ourselves looking at a type of creative work both
inexpensive to produce and within the grasp of an individual
designer.
507
Scholars have yet to dispel this criticism by providing a case
study that identifies a major creative industry operating in IP’s
negative space. To be sure, scholars have identified examples in
science and engineering. Yochai Benkler pioneered the study of
commons-based peer production, which undergirds development
of the open-source software constituting a significant portion of
our digital infrastructure.
508
Addressing the negative-space
literature directly, Amy Kapczynski detailed the operation of
503. Kapczynski, supra note 7, at 1545–46; see Barnett, supra note 12, at
1755. See generally Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57
A
M. ECON. REV. 347, 347–57 (1967) (positing property rights emerge whenever
benefits of formal property rights exceed costs of administering a property
system).
504. See Kapczynski, supra note 7, at 1545.
505. See Barnett, supra note 12, at 1785.
506. See Dreyfuss, supra note 12, at 1450.
507. See Raustiala & Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox, supra note 1, at
1705–17.
508. See Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, supra note 408, at 381–84. Wikipedia,
a non-fiction peer-production project, has likewise been extraordinarily
impactful. See Y
OCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL
PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM 70–74 (2006).
1364 79 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1285 (2022)
the Global Flu Network—the collaborative network responsible
for creating the flu vaccine each year—to vindicate the existence
of a capital-intensive site of intellectual production of immense
social importance that operates without recourse to IP.
509
Yet
the implications of these studies for creative production remain
unclear. In addition to focusing on scientific rather than creative
pursuits, these examples feature modes of production distinct
from those typically utilized in negative-space creative
industries: they involve the unique dynamics of commons-based
peer production and open science rather than those of the
copy-resistant markets and community norms featured in fields
like fashion and comedy.
510
Against this backdrop, the video game industry provides a
crucial example. The foregoing discussion of video games
demonstrates the viability of creative production without
extensive IP protection in a high-revenue, capital-intensive
industry. Though many prior negative-space case studies were
confined to small-scale creative production, study of the game
industry shows this mode of production exists in a major
entertainment sector. Remarkably, this case study also
advances two threads often treated separately in the literature:
the AAA sector of the industry instantiates a low-IP equilibrium
made possible because features inherent to big-budget games
make them copy-resistant while the indie sector features
norm-based enforcement.
But the video-game industry is more than just another
example. It also calls the assumptions and focus of
negative-space scholarship into question. Prior studies have
been imprecise in their criteria for the existence and viability of
a negative space. Most seem to suggest that it is sufficient to
show that creative production occurs in a sector without full IP
protection. This sets the bar too low. As the following discussion
shows, to truly evaluate creative production without IP requires
more robust definitions of success, more attention to the
diversity of strategies throughout each industry, and more
recognition that the stability of any IP or non-IP regime is
contingent. The video game industry also opens a new paradigm
509. See Kapczynski, supra note 7, at 1542.
510. See Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, supra note 408, at 375–76; Kapczynski,
supra note 7, at 1591–95.
CREATIVITY WITHOUT IP? 1365
for thinking about the creative industries as a whole. The world
is not neatly divided into “full-IP” and negative-space
industries. Rather, all creative industries feature a combination
of elements protected by IP, elements subject to de facto
protection, and elements that are freely appropriable. To insist
on an artificial divide is to obscure trends that cut across both
sides of the line.
A. Measuring Success
This case study underscores the need to go beyond the
threshold question of whether creative production is possible
without IP. More recent contributions to the negative-space
literature have recognized that the configuration of IP and
non-IP protections impacts not only the number of new works
produced—the usual concern of IP policy—but also their
substance and ultimate social utility.
511
The video game
industry provides a rich case study to interrogate these impacts
further.
1. Revenues and Productivity
Assessing the revenues and productivity of the current
regime relative to potential alternatives is one starting point for
analysis, though this assessment is indeterminate with present
data. Part of what makes the video game industry attractive for
study is its financial success. As a $170 billion-per-year
industry, it generates tremendous revenues.
512
It is also
successful relative to other sectors of the entertainment
industry, as evidenced by how thoroughly its revenues surpass
those of Hollywood and the music industry.
513
There is also the question of productivity. Conventional
analysis of creative production—throughout IP scholarship but
also in some of the negative-space literature—often seeks to
511. See, e.g., Kapczynski, supra note 7, at 1546 (“Magicians and
comedians produce creative works, to be sure, but do they produce enough of
them, or the right kind, from a social perspective?”); Sprigman, Positive.
Thoughts, supra note 370, at 258–59 (reflecting on how changes in jokes’
substance accompanied the emergence of anti-copying norms).
512. See Browning, supra note 17.
513. See sources cited supra note 18.
1366 79 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1285 (2022)
calibrate the system to maximize output.
514
The present
arrangement performs well in absolute terms, with thousands
of releases on Steam each year, hundreds on consoles, and tens
of thousands more for mobile.
515
We do not know how many
games would be produced in a counterfactual scenario with
greater or lesser formal protection. We have only the assertions
from some developers that the present arrangement is
preferable to greater IP because formal protection for game
mechanics would inhibit the creation of future games.
516
2. Creative Content
IP scholars and video game critics are of course also
concerned with indicators other than raw productivity. The
industry’s exclusion mechanisms and competitive strategies
shape not only how much is made but also the substance of it.
This aspect of competition without IP has been observed in
comedy.
517
One reason jokes have become more
autobiographical, scholars hypothesize, is that it makes them
harder to appropriate despite thin copyright protection.
518
Some trends in game development likewise embody design
decisions that make games more copy resistant. Among AAA
publishers, intense reliance on sequels takes advantage of
formal IP protection via trademark and character copyright; it
also leads to more of the same. AAA games also enjoy de facto
protection because key elements are expensive to copy. Pursuit
of these strategies impacts the substance of what is made
beyond encouraging sequels. Consider “open world” gameplay,
which provides a sprawling environment for players to explore
rather than discrete levels.
519
Many players enjoy the model, but
it is expensive to develop this volume of content and it forecloses
514. See Bair & Pedraza-Fariña, supra note 356, at 1076.
515. See supra note 436.
516. See, e.g., Phillips, supra note 46, at 149; van Roessel & Katzenbach,
supra note 179, at 411.
517. See Kapczynski, supra note 7, at 1547 n.37.
518. See supra notes 387–388 and accompanying text; cf. Chance
Solem-Pfeifer, ‘Jokes Seth Can’t Tell’ Is the Best New Segment in Late Night,
V
ULTURE (July 15, 2016), https://perma.cc/WQU9-F8CV (“Meyers would be
off-brand and out-of-bounds to do the material, but remiss to let it die in the
writer’s room.”).
519. See Muncy, supra note 145.
CREATIVITY WITHOUT IP? 1367
the possibilities of a more tightly crafted narrative.
520
Or
consider games with full voice acting. Such dialog is more
immersive, but also more expensive.
521
It also imposes
constraints on the games’ writers—they must finalize dialog
earlier in development so it can be recorded, and budgetary
constraints preclude the breadth and depth of earlier text-based
approaches.
522
Indie developers, by contrast, define their content in
opposition to what they perceive as mainstream.
523
This is
simultaneously expressive and instrumental: niche or
controversial subject matter is less likely to be copied. There
may be social value in this insofar as it encourages development
of a wider array of perspectives. For the same reasons niche
content is unlikely to be copied, however, it is also unlikely to
sell many copies, cabining the financial incentives that might
support such diversity.
3. Broader Impact
Examining the total social impact of games is beyond the
scope of this paper. To be sure, the predominance of
market-based incentives skews industry investment toward
what is popular, and money spent on first-person shooters might
be better spent on games that promote human connection or
something entirely different, like renewable energy research.
524
But these objections cut across essentially all creative
production, in or out of IP’s negative space.
525
More germane to the present discussion is the observation
that the strategies developers have adopted in lieu of IP impact
the social utility of games in specific ways. As in the fashion
industry, the planned obsolescence of each console generation
produces significant waste with consequent harms to the
environment and the marginalized communities where that
520. See id.
521. See N
ICHOLS, supra note 62, at 126.
522. But see Shreyas Nivas, The Promise of Voice AI in Game Development,
V
ENTUREBEAT (Sept. 14, 2020, 6:16 AM), https://perma.cc/3FPD-FTA6.
523. See supra Part IV.C.2.
524. See Kapczynski, supra note 7, at 1546–47.
525. See id.
1368 79 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1285 (2022)
waste is dumped.
526
Moreover, the move to software as a service,
and the ensuing drive to retain players, has driven developers
to compete in some instances not by making better games, but
by designing more addictive gameplay loops and exploiting
common decision-making foibles to keep players coming back
day after day.
527
Developers’ pursuit of formal rights other than copyright
also has wider societal consequences. For example, the game
industry has moved toward non-disclosure agreements (NDAs)
to reduce its exposure to copying via employee leaks, but these
agreements come at the expense of employee mobility,
knowledge sharing, and innovation.
528
As a collateral
consequence, these NDAs also reduce industry transparency,
thereby insulating it from scrutiny.
529
B. Success for Whom?
Divergence in competitive strategies between AAA and
indie developers also speaks to a larger issue with the study of
creative industries: the need to account for variation within each
industry. Stepping back to consider who wins in the industry as
a whole and within each subsector is necessary to answer the
sorts of questions the negative-space literature sets out to
answer.
Even basic descriptive claims about whether the industry
relies on IP are difficult to establish without attending to
intra-industry variation. Prior criticism of the negative-space
literature has touched on this. As one scholar observed, top
performers in ostensibly low-IP fields like comedy turn to formal
IP protections to secure rights in recorded performances.
530
Superstars in the indie gaming sector have likewise turned to
trademark, much like AAA developers, after finding themselves
526. See supra notes 131, 382 and accompanying text.
527. See supra notes 452–454 and accompanying text.
528. See J
AMIE WOODCOCK, MARX AT THE ARCADE: CONSOLES, CONTROLLERS
& CLASS STRUGGLE 64–65 (2019); see also Orly Lobel, Exit, Voice & Innovation:
How Human Capital Policy Impacts Equality (& How Inequality Hurts
Growth), 57 HOUS. L. REV. 781, 784 (2020) (describing NDAs as “impediments
to mobility”).
529. See W
OODCOCK, supra note 528, at 64–65.
530. See Dreyfuss, supra note 12, at 1450.
CREATIVITY WITHOUT IP? 1369
with a hit like Minecraft or Stardew Valley.
531
Critics who argue
greater profits in the industry inevitably lead to greater reliance
on formal IP
532
paint with too broad a brush; greater profits for
individual actors in an industry may lead to greater reliance on
formal IP by those stars relative to other participants.
Breaking the analysis apart is also necessary to evaluate
normative arguments about whether the configuration of IP and
non-IP protections is working. Take the lack of formal IP for
game mechanics. Even the straightforward question of how lack
of IP impacts financial success depends on the subsector. It
seems to be a non-issue for AAA games since gameplay
innovations are not their selling point; they borrow mechanics
from other games and have theirs borrowed in turn.
533
It is,
however, a problem for indie games, whose core innovations
often center on gameplay.
534
And it is a boon for non-indie
developers working in mobile development because they may
freely poach popular indie innovations and monetize them.
535
Notice also how this segmentation intersects with more
complicated questions of how the absence of thicker IP impacts
creativity. AAA games face criticism for redundancy and lack of
imagination in part because they direct most of their
investments toward elements with de facto protection from
copying, which may yield games innovative in their technical
artistry rather than gameplay or storytelling. Indie developers
continue to innovate in aspects like gameplay and theme,
though the risk of cloning by outside actors may diminish their
incentives to do so.
Some configurations of legal and non-legal protections
impact market entry directly. An important critique of IP rights
is that they contribute to market concentration, with potentially
deleterious effects for innovation.
536
Non-IP exclusionary
strategies can, unfortunately, have similar effects. Recall
531. See, e.g., SCHREIER, supra note 143, at 79.
532. E.g., Barnett, supra note 12.
533. See supra Part I.C.1.
534. J
UUL, supra note 24, at 34–35; see supra Part I.C.2.
535. See supra notes 496–502 and accompanying text.
536. For the canonical account, see Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare
and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in T
HE RATE AND DIRECTION OF
INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 619 (1962).
1370 79 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1285 (2022)
Nintendo’s response to the crash of 1983.
537
That crash, like the
1977 crash before it, was precipitated by the proliferation of
low-quality games including low-effort clones.
538
In the absence
of legal protection, Nintendo implemented technological
protection and took an active role in choosing which developers
would be allowed to bring their games to the popular Nintendo
console.
539
Other console manufacturers like Sega followed
suit.
540
To enter the market required satisfying a gatekeeper.
Now, entry into the mainstream gaming market is regulated by
the sheer expense of producing a competitive AAA title.
541
Scholars of innovation theory warn that gatekeeping has stifled
the diversity of ideas in other contexts, calling for further
investigation of this dynamic in gaming.
542
The indie sector’s reliance on community norms also creates
potential barriers to entry. Norms-based protection for a
creative industry has significant intuitive appeal; it can be
calibrated to the needs of a particular community in a way
general copyright law cannot and it can be enforced without the
time and expense of litigation.
543
But, as noted above, norms
tend to entrench the status of established insiders within a
creative community.
544
C. Contingent Stability
The emerging precarity of indie studios also underscores
just how contingent the stability of any protection regime is. The
ultimate impact of any configuration of rights depends on wider
developments in technology, the market, and society at large.
545
537. See supra notes 106–109.
538. See supra notes 98–101 and accompanying text.
539. See supra notes 106–109 and accompanying text.
540. See supra notes 113–118 and accompanying text.
541. See supra notes 143–146 and accompanying text.
542. See, e.g., B
ARBARA VAN SCHEWICK, INTERNET ARCHITECTURE AND
INNOVATION 320–28 (2010); Mark A. Lemley & Lawrence Lessig, The End of
End-to-End: Preserving the Architecture of the Internet in the Broadband Era,
48 UCLA
L. REV. 925, 945 (2001).
543. See supra notes 399–400 and accompanying text.
544. See supra note 402 and accompanying text.
545. See Perzanowski & Darling, supra note 8, at 5–6 (“The dominant
narrative of IP largely overlooks the role that social norms, marketplace
strategy, and architectural changes can play in shaping an environment
CREATIVITY WITHOUT IP? 1371
This concern is implicit in the low-IP equilibrium terminology
used in negative-space scholarship.
546
The absence of copyright
in fashion design is viable because several factors come into
alignment. When a fashion house introduces a design, it enjoys
a first-mover advantage because, for a time, it is the only one
selling the design; it takes time before imitators can start
production, especially since most fashion houses are situated in
the developed world while many garment factories are situated
in less-developed nations.
547
They make money by selling to
fashion-forward customers during that window. Over time,
retailers diffuse the design to the masses, fashion-forward
customers demand novelty, and fashion houses introduce
something new, repeating the cycle.
548
This equilibrium has
strained as advances in communications technology have
facilitated ever faster copying.
549
A copyist can snap photos from
a Paris runway and text them to a garment factory in seconds.
These developments should be of interest even if the equilibrium
holds steady because they mark the opportunity to study what
makes an equilibrium stable.
550
The video game industry illustrates this point further
because its history is one where the equilibrium has come and
hospitable to creativity.”). See generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE VERSION 2.0
(2006).
546. See, e.g., Raustiala & Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox, supra note 1, at
1698–99; Rosenblatt, supra note 7, at 322.
547. See Raustiala & Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox, supra note 1, at
1761–62; Rosenblatt, supra note 7, at 346–47 (“[F]irst mover advantages and
network effects explain how originators continue to thrive in the absence of
strong intellectual property rules . . . .”). But see Raustiala & Sprigman, Faster
Fashion, supra note 382, at 542 (discounting this advantage).
548. See supra notes 377–380 and accompanying text.
549. See, e.g., Arielle K. Cohen, Designer Collaborations as a Solution to
the Fast-Fashion Copyright Dilemma, 11 C
HI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 172
(2012); Jared Schroeder & Camille Kraeplin, Give Me a ©: Refashioning the
Supreme Court’s Decision in Star Athletica v. Varsity into an Art-First
Approach to Copyright Protection for Fashion Designers, 26 UCLA
ENT. L. REV.
19, 52–53 (2019). But see Raustiala & Sprigman, Faster Fashion, supra note
382, at 541–42 (“Those claims always seemed ahistorical and overblown—the
camera and the fax machine made fashion copying rapid decades ago—and
now, after more than a quarter-century online and the industry yet to be
destroyed, we submit that the Internet has been exonerated . . . .”).
550. See BJ Ard, Making Sense of Legal Disruption, 2022 W
IS. L. REV.
FORWARD 42, 51 (arguing disruption arises when existing institutions lack the
capacity to recalibrate the regime).
1372 79 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1285 (2022)
gone. Cloning posed a real threat in the Pong era because games
were simple and cheap to copy.
551
Through the 1980s and 1990s,
console manufacturers took measures to increase game quality
and weed out low-effort clones.
552
Through design and business
strategy, the manufacturers inserted themselves as gatekeepers
over which games would be released. By the early 2000s,
however, games had become copy resistant because they were
expensive to duplicate.
553
Gatekeeping was no longer needed to
halt cloning, or at least so it would seem from the dominant
players’ opening of their consoles to third-party developers.
554
In
parallel, however, indie and mobile game developers introduced
games that were once again simple and relatively cheap to
produce.
555
The threat of cloning likewise reappeared.
556
These studies also demonstrate that the viability of a
particular arrangement in one area of law is often contingent on
the state of others. In fashion as in video games, trademarks
remain available and they favor established incumbents.
557
Major studios also benefit from patent protection for graphical
advances and from trade secret law and its related employee
restrictions that help them leverage the talents of designers.
558
The creative industries historically have not been shy about
seeking the expansion of copyright.
559
But it may be that we
have not seen the same sort of agitation with respect to video
games because the established studios are satisfied with the
status quo.
560
551. See supra Part I.A.
552. See supra Part I.B.
553. See supra Part I.C.1.
554. See supra Part I.C.1.
555. See supra Part I.C.2.
556. See supra Part I.C.2.
557. See supra Part IV.B.2.a.
558. See supra notes 528–529 and accompanying text.
559. See, e.g., J
ESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 55–57 (2001) (detailing
industry involvement in the Copyright Act of 1976); id. at 128–45 (detailing
industry involvement in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act).
560. Indeed, this sort of political equilibrium was the focus of the original
fashion case study. See Raustiala & Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox, supra note
1, at 1699 (“When we use that phrase [‘low-IP equilibrium’], we mean that the
three core forms of IP law . . . provide only very limited protection for fashion
designs, and yet this low level of legal protection is politically stable.”
(emphasis added)).
CREATIVITY WITHOUT IP? 1373
Consider also the impact of other areas of the law on the
substance of what is produced. The availability—or lack
thereof—of copyright and trademark shape game quality. But
so does labor and employment law around issues like the
enforcement of NDAs.
561
Pressed to explain why game quality
has suffered in recent years, some commentators point to poor
working conditions—crunch and financial precarity force
studios to rush games out the door before they are finished.
562
Labor and employment law may be just as important as IP law,
if not more so, for diagnosing and addressing these problems.
D. Breaking the Binary
Do video games occupy IP’s negative space? The question
defies easy answers, particularly in the AAA sector. Copyright
covers finished games on the consumer side, trademarks and
similar rights play a major role throughout development, and
this Article has barely touched on the link between patents and
the technical artistry of video game hardware and
programming. Yet game design itself lacks substantial formal
protection and popular themes are freely appropriable as ideas
or tropes. This has led to cloning and reliance on non-IP
strategies for dealing with cloning. If the use of formal IP for
some aspects of game design disqualifies the industry, then the
paradigmatic negative-space industries rest on the same shaky
foundations. Most consumers experience comedy and magic not
through live performances, but through copyrighted
recordings.
563
We see high-profile copyright suits over the
duplication of tattoo art in films and movies even though
litigation is not the standard way of addressing copying among
tattoo artists.
564
And fashion, the original object of inquiry, is
561. See supra notes 528–529 and accompanying text.
562. See, e.g., Alex Pareene, Video Games are a Labor Disaster: Why Do
Game Studios Keep Imploding?, NEW REPUB. (June 25, 2021),
https://perma.cc/W9YB-ZWFT.
563. See Dreyfuss, supra note 12, at 1450.
564. See, e.g., Solid Oak Sketches, LLC v. 2K Games, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 3d
333 (S.D.N.Y. 2020); David Kravets, Hangover Tattoo Lawsuit: Can You
Copyright Flesh?, W
IRED (May 27, 2011, 3:25 PM), https://perma.cc/HB9W-
7QDP.
1374 79 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1285 (2022)
the paradigmatic example of an industry centered around
trademarks.
565
Placing industries on one side or the other of the dividing
line is not what matters. That taxonomy was important for
answering the preliminary question of whether creative
production could be sustained without IP. The scholarship has
settled that question decisively. The divide is less helpful for the
remaining questions, like the impact of a particular
configuration of rights on the substance of what is produced, the
distributive consequences of that protection regime, and the
regime’s long-term stability. Every sector of creative production
features some elements that are legally protected, some subject
to de facto protection because of copy-resistant features or
enforceable anti-copying norms, and some elements free for
appropriation. What new insights may come from comparison
across these sectors? The work has already begun in studies
synthesizing the negative-space literature alongside “natural
experiments” in fields like music that have experienced de facto
reduction in copyright protection due to file-sharing.
566
Scholars
have also studied the interplay of proprietary software, which
utilizes conventional copyright protection, and open-source
software, which takes a contrary stance toward IP.
567
Further
work remains to disentangle the formal and de facto protections
of the “full-IP” creative industries, how they have changed over
time, and how they align with the observations of the
negative-space literature.
C
ONCLUSION
The video game industry vindicates the argument that
capital-intensive creative production is possible with thin
copyright protection while simultaneously challenging the
standard paradigm for studying IP’s negative space. The time
has come to move past the question of whether such production
is possible. Every industry has its own configuration of IP and
non-IP protections, and it is now incumbent on those of us
working in this space to explore how these regimes shape what
565. See supra note 381 and accompanying text.
566. See Sprigman, Copyright and Creative Incentives, supra note 390; see
also L
UNNEY, supra note 61, at 74.
567. See, e.g., Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, supra note 408.
CREATIVITY WITHOUT IP? 1375
the industry produces, what its broader impacts are, and which
creators can enter the market. Each of these industries has a
history with lessons for how changes in technology, the market,
and the works themselves make a particular production regime
viable—or push it to fail. Emerging social and technological
trends will continue to shape and reshape these industries and
test the limits of our frameworks for understanding them.
Beyond its implications for IP’s negative space, the video
game industry also sets the paradigm for studying creative
production in the information age. This is not an argument for
video game exceptionalism, but for recognition of greater
complexity throughout the creative industries. The study of
creative production has focused too long on a dated paradigm
modeled on the operation of legacy industries like Hollywood
and the recording industry in the twentieth century. Examining
the video game industry compels us to recognize and grapple
with the complex realities of partial legal rights, overlapping
legal and non-legal protections, and the existence of very
different regimes for the regulation of competing developers
relative to consumers. Only by confronting these challenges can
we progress our understanding of how the law intersects with
creative production and align our prescriptions for legal reform
with the realities of culture and entertainment in the
twenty-first century.