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The Reintegration of the Loyalists in Post-Revolutionary America The Reintegration of the Loyalists in Post-Revolutionary America
Marco J. Lloyd
Gettysburg College
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Lloyd, Marco J. (2023) "The Reintegration of the Loyalists in Post-Revolutionary America,"
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The Reintegration of the Loyalists in Post-Revolutionary America The Reintegration of the Loyalists in Post-Revolutionary America
Abstract Abstract
Most White Loyalists were able to successfully reintegrate into society after the American Revolution.
They made their case through decisions to stay and petition for amnesty, which was helped by
demonstrating that they embodied republican civic virtues and by making amends with their community.
Americans were willing to accept them back into society because of republican ideals, exhaustion from
the war, the desire to repair community cohesion, and the social ties that prevailed between both sides
throughout the war.
Keywords Keywords
Loyalism, Revolution, Reintegration, America, History, Colonial, Revolutionary, Tory
This article is available in The Gettysburg Historical Journal: https://cupola.gettysburg.edu/ghj/vol22/iss1/9
124
The Reintegration of the Loyalists in Post-
Revolutionary America
Marco J. Lloyd | Gettysburg College ‘23
Enduring historical perceptions of the Loyalists emerged
almost as soon as the war ended. Early Americans wanted to create
a sense of identity and unity in the new republic, portraying the
Revolution as a unified overthrowing of a tyrannical and
oppressive government, both to glorify their nation and serve as a
model for future national unity. Loyalists were thus resigned to an
ignoble footnote in American historiography for almost two
centuries.
1
Historians did not extensively reexamine the role of
Loyalists until the rise of new social history in the 1960s and
1970s. With this, there was a newfound interest in the stories not
previously told and history from the bottom up. There is now an
understanding that the American Revolution was a civil war in
many regards, with significant numbers of active individuals
opposing independence. Scholars such as Robert Calhoon were
instrumental in developing the concept of Loyalists as complex
1
Eileen Ka-May Cheng, “American Historical Writers and the Loyalists, 1788-
1856: Dissent, Consensus, and American Nationality,” Journal of the Early
Republic 23, no. 4 (2003): 495–97.
125
and dynamic actors in these events.
2
Historians have broken down
the misconception that Tories were primarily the aristocratic elites
of the community, committed to conservatism out of their desire to
maintain their position at the top.
3
There is now an understanding
of Loyalists as a diverse group, economically, racially, and
behaviorally.
4
As a heterogeneous group, Loyalists encountered a diverse
array of treatment after the war. Most historians focus primarily on
the Loyalists who absconded to Canada. This is likely because
many of those who left were elite and highly committed, and thus
the most prominent and well-recorded.
5
Similarly, historians often
emphasize the persecution of Loyalists, looking at confiscation and
harassment, arguing that Americans took vengeance on those who
worked against their idea of liberty. However, recently several
historians have studied small communities and groups of Loyalists
2
Robert M. Calhoon, Tory Insurgents the Loyalist Perception and Other Essays
(Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 2010), xvi-xix.
3
Joseph S. Tiedemann, Eugene R. Fingerhut, and Robert W. Venables, The
Other Loyalists: Ordinary People, Royalism, and the Revolution in the Middle
Colonies, 1763-1787 (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2009),
2.
4
Ruma Chopra, Choosing Sides: Loyalists in Revolutionary America, American
Controversies Series. (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, Publishers, 2013),
2.
5
Rebecca Brannon, From Revolution to Reunion: The Reintegration of the
South Carolina Loyalists (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2016),
5. For a thorough and well-researched account of Loyalists abroad see Maya
Jasanoff, Liberty’s Exiles: American Loyalists in the Revolutionary World,
National Book Critics Circle Award (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2011).
126
who decided to remain in the United States. Judith L. Van Buskirk
examined the complex interactions between Loyalists and Patriots
in New York City.
6
Valerie H. McKito examined a case study of
New York Loyalists.
7
Rebecca Brannon provided a comprehensive
understanding of reintegration in South Carolina.
8
Finally, this
paper will draw on a study of Loyalists in the rural community of
Deerfield, Massachusetts.
9
These studies collectively provides
valuable insight into why post-Revolutionary society was so
willing to accommodate those that had worked against
independence.
Creating a narrative for the fate of Loyalists after the
Revolution is a challenge because there was not a uniform process.
Besides vague guidance from the Continental Congress and the
mostly ignored provisions in the Treaty of Paris, there was no
national policy towards Loyalists. The matter of their treatment
was primarily handled by the states, which often devolved that
responsibility to the local level.
10
Therefore, any discussion of
6
Van Buskirk, Generous Enemies: Patriots and Loyalists in Revolutionary New
York (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2002).
7
Valerie H. McKito, From Loyalists to Loyal Citizens: The DePeyster Family of
New York, (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2015)
8
Brannon, Revolution to Reunion.
9
Marco J. Lloyd, “The Reintegration after the Revolution: The Deerfield Tories
from 1781 to 1800” (Deerfield, MA, Historic Deerfield Library, 2022).
10
Rebecca Brannon, “America’s Revolutionary Experience with Transitional
Justice,” in The Consequences of Loyalism: Essays in Honor of Robert M.
Calhoon (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 2019), 191.
127
Loyalist reintegration must be a discussion of overall trends, with
many differences in individuals' experiences.
11
However, a pattern
emerges throughout the states. During the war, Patriots took
measures to neuter the threat caused by Loyalist opposition. This
was done extralegally, through mob action and intimidation, and
legally through Test Acts, amercement, confiscation of property,
banishment, and even imprisonment. Legal actions against
Loyalists came to a head at the end of the war when many radicals
called for vengeance in victory, and the British army’s withdrawal
left Loyalists without a safe haven. 1783 and 1784 saw the height
of Loyalist persecution and flight. Even then, persecution was
relatively moderate. There was no widespread policy of execution
for political enemies, a feature of many revolutions. The main
methods of persecution, confiscation and banishment were very
limited in scope. Historians estimate that at least a fifth of colonists
had demonstrated Loyalism in some way, but only 1/40th
absconded. This is a tiny fraction, especially when one considers
11
Unfortunately, the scope of this paper also must be limited to the experiences
of White Loyalists, both for the sake of maintaining the focus of this paper and
because Blacks and Native Americans can hardly be described as “reintegrating”
into a society they were all but excluded from. Additionally, the fate of female
Loyalists was often so intertwined with their husband’s it was difficult to find
information unique to their experiences. Some women did petition the South
Carolina General Assembly, but the legislature refused to afford them political
agency. Brannon, Revolution to Reunion, 71-72. Women likely participated in
social reintegration with the local community, but future research needs to be
done to support this.
128
that most of those who left did so by choice.
12
Legislation naming
those for confiscation and banishment rarely listed over a few
hundred names in each state, compared to the tens of thousands
who ended up leaving.
13
After the immediate post-war action against Loyalists, the
situation greatly improved for those able to weather the storm.
Tempers cooled, and many Loyalists were able to reconcile with
their neighbors. Many who had their property confiscated were
able to regain it, and many who had absconded were able to return.
Even before 1783, state legislatures and courts began hearing
Loyalist petitions and cases. In 1784 many states pulled back on
the confiscation laws and began passing amnesty acts as the decade
progressed. The ratification of the Constitution, with its assurances
of rights for all, theoretically prohibited any continuing legal
persecutions, such as denial of the franchise or other sanctions.
States with outstanding anti-Loyalist laws gradually relaxed them,
allowing Loyalists to rejoin society as equal American citizens.
14
Within a decade, the losing side of a civil war was able to
successfully reconcile themselves with the country they fought
against. This was possible through the actions of Loyalists who
12
Jasanoff, Liberty’s Exiles, 6-8.
13
Brannon, “America’s Experience,” 203.
14
Brannon, “America’s Experience,” 203-207.
129
helped their own integration and through the willingness of both
elite and common Patriots.
Loyalists made a case for their reintegration
Accounts of the injustices suffered by Loyalists can often
take away the agency Loyalists had in determining their fate.
However, Loyalists were not helpless victims, subject to the whims
of the Patriots, but independent actors whose choices influenced
their reintegration. Very few Loyalists were compelled to leave.
Those named for expulsion were a tiny fraction of those who left.
Many of those who absconded did so by choice. Some were fearful
of future retaliation if they chose to stay. After the liberation of
New York, the papers were filled with calls for vengeance against
the Loyalists.
15
The author of one broadside, under the pseudonym
“Brutus,” egged them on to flee while they still can, assuring them
that it is foolish to think that Congress will give them “favor or
protection,” and any who say so “are deluding you to
destruction.”
16
Messages like these understandably intimidated
Loyalists, although time would show that the radical’s bark was
worse than their bite. By contrast, New York’s papers painted a
15
Van Buskirk, Generous Enemies, 183-87.
16
Brutus [pseud.], “To All Adherents to the British Government and Followers
of the British Army, Commonly Called Tories” (Poughkeepsie, NY, 1783).
130
rosy picture of life in Nova Scotia as a land full of harmony and
opportunity. In addition, many had little faith in the success of the
new republic, fearing injustice, instability, and poverty.
17
Others
were too committed to king and country to become citizens of a
new nation. While some were too despised to be able to stay
peacefully, the choice to leave was often motivated by self-interest
and ideology rather than force.
18
Many of those who fled in 1783 were still able to return
successfully. McKito’s study of the DePeyster family is a valuable
case study of this scenario. They were a prominent New York Tory
family, and all male members took up arms for the British. In
1783, they fled to Canada. After a decade in exile, one of the sons,
Frederick, returned to New York. He not only survived in post-
Revolutionary New York but thrived, becoming a very successful
merchant. Neither he nor the commercial dynasty he founded were
persecuted for his Tory past.
19
Even one who had taken up arms
against his fellow citizens was effortlessly reintegrated back into
society because by the time he returned, individuals were generally
more concerned with new issues and day-to-day life than past
conflicts. In this regard, Frederick was representative of many
exiles who were successfully able to return after their tempers had
17
Van Buskirk, Generous Enemies, 177-79.
18
Jasanoff, Liberty’s Exiles, 8-9.
19
McKito, Loyalists to Loyal Citizens, 2-7.
131
cooled.
20
In some cases, exiles in other states could return before
the war concluded if they demonstrated loyalty to the United
States.
21
However, an overwhelming majority of Loyalists decided
to stay, demonstrating that whatever persecution they faced at the
end of the war was tolerable to some degree. Remarkably, even
some of those formally expelled by state legislatures staunchly
stayed put. At least one-third of those banished by the
Massachusetts General Assembly never left the state.
22
In South
Carolina, so many Loyalists stayed on their theoretically
confiscated property that the legislature caved and gave them
clemency.
23
This further demonstrates how de jure proscription
against Loyalists can often overstate their de facto persecution and
that Loyalists had agency in their interactions with Patriot
governments. Those that chose to stay were also able to reintegrate
easier than those who chose to leave and later return.
24
This is
partially because those who left severed their interpersonal
connections and thus lost a driving force behind social
reintegration.
25
20
Brannon, “America’s Experience,” 203-206.
21
Thomas N. Ingersoll, The Loyalist Problem in Revolutionary New England
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 287.
22
Brannon, “America’s Experience,” 203.
23
Brannon, Revolution to Reunion, 112-13.
24
Brannon, Revolution to Reunion, 113-14.
25
Van Buskirk, Generous Enemies, 191-95.
132
Additionally, those that stayed had the opportunity to
demonstrate that they could peacefully coexist with Whig
neighbors and live under an American government. In general,
Loyalists helped their case by embodying (or making the
appearance of embodying) civic virtues. A major argument against
reintegration was that Tories lacked republican virtues, with many
accusing them of being treacherous, barbarous, and tyrannical in
nature.
26
Former Loyalists made the case that even while aiding the
British, they were merciful and charitable to their adversaries.
After the war, they attempted to display that they possessed the
honorable character necessary for a good citizen of a republic.
27
For example, the former Tories of Deerfield took a very active role
in town government, aiding the community in mundane services
like repairing a meadow fence or establishing a fund for an
itinerant minister.
28
Demonstrating that they could be constructive
members in an American republican society helped Loyalists win
back the trust and support of their Patriot neighbors and convinced
the legislatures that they should be allowed to fully reintegrate.
26
Aaron Nathan Coleman, “Justice and Moderation? The Reintegration of the
American Loyalists as an Episode of Transitional Justice,” in The Consequences
of Loyalism: Essays in Honor of Robert M. Calhoon (Columbia, SC: University
of South Carolina Press, 2019).
27
Brannon, Revolution to Reunion, 82-90.
28
Lloyd, “Reintegration,” 19-20.
133
Loyalists also made their case in very concrete ways. Those
who had been accused of treason were often allowed clemency
based on an oath of allegiance to the new republic. The use of an
oath of allegiance for reintegration stems from the ideas of
“volitional allegiance,” that were emerging at the time.
29
Resulting
from the American Revolution, ideas about citizenship and loyalty
were in flux. The rebels had recently flung off their British
subjecthood. Therefore, it followed that American citizenship and
allegiance were an individual choice, and in the chaos and
confusion of a civil war, individuals could reasonably need time to
make that choice.
30
Beyond this theoretical understanding, an oath
of allegiance was also a practical means for reintegration. There
were far too many Loyalists to try for treason. Oaths were cheap,
quick, and uniform procedures that were generally effective as
written records of submission, admissions of wrongdoing, and
prescriptions for future good behavior.
31
It seems naïve today to
expect reformed behavior based on words alone. However,
eighteenth-century American Enlightenment society placed heavy
emphasis on honor, civility, and public virtue.
32
Therefore, oaths
29
Robert M. Calhoon and Timothy M. Barnes, “The Reintegration of the
Loyalists and the Disaffected,” in Tory Insurgents, The Loyalist Perception and
Other Essays (University of South Carolina Press, 2010), 352.
30
Calhoon and Barnes, “Reintegration,” 352-353.
31
Calhoon and Barnes, “Reintegration,” 353-356.
32
Gordon S. Wood, Revolutionary Characters: What Made the Founders
Different (New York: Penguin Press, 2006), 12-16.
134
were forceful in the sense that breaking one would sabotage an
individual’s reputation and confirm to the state that an individual
did not possess the necessary civic virtues to be a responsible
citizen.
Finally, Loyalists who had been subject to legal
punishments made effective use of petitions to appeal those
decisions. In South Carolina, seventy percent of Loyalists who
faced punishment promptly petitioned the legislature.
33
Petitioning
was popular because it was effective. In the eighteenth century,
petitioning was a highly valued right and a way for the otherwise
voiceless to have their cases heard. Loyalists used them to argue
the rule of law, plead their case for citizenship, and explain the
reasoning behind their actions. Brannon argued that the most vital
part of a petition was demonstrating to the legislature that their
local community accepted and supported them. In other words,
legal reintegration often hinged on a demonstration of existing
social reintegration.
34
This involved them providing evidence they
possessed the aforementioned social virtues. Loyalists often had
friends and neighbors sign their petitions or write letters to attest to
their virtues and display their social reintegration.
35
In order to get
the backing of their neighbors, Loyalists often had to make
33
Brannon, Revolution to Reunion, 65.
34
Brannon, Revolution to Reunion, 90-95.
35
Brannon, Revolution to Reunion, 91-93.
135
personal amends. Few records survive of interpersonal interactions
between community members, but those that do show that many
Patriots expected an apology. Some did not feel they had anything
to apologize for, but those who were willing to humiliate
themselves and show sincere contrition were better able to repair
the social ties that were so vital to their reintegration.
36
Therefore,
Loyalists were able to make choices that helped their case for
forgiveness.
American society was willing to reconcile the Loyalists
American society was generally receptive to Loyalists’
cases for reintegration, accepting most but the most notorious and
unrepentant. The nation’s willingness to reintegrate Loyalists came
from both the bottom-up and the top-down. At the end of the war,
many elite Whigs supported Loyalist reintegration, blunting, and
later helping to repeal, legislation against the Tories.
37
They also
penned highly influential defenses of reintegration that appealed to
both republican values. One of the most outspoken advocates for
integration was Alexander Hamilton, who adopted the pen name
“Phocion” in reference to an Athenian general who advocated for
coexistence with their former Macedonian enemies.
38
He appealed
36
Brannon, Revolution to Reunion, 73-76.
37
Van Buskirk, Generous Enemies, 186-93.
38
Coleman, “Justice or Moderation?” 185.
136
to republican sensibilities, saying that the “spirit of Whiggism is
generous, humane, beneficent, and just” and it “cherishes legal
liberties, holds the rights of every individual sacred, and condemns
or punishes no man without regular trial.”
39
Hamilton equated
republican virtue to forgiving one’s enemies. He also implicitly
pointed out the hypocrisy of fighting for liberty, just to deny that to
others. Aedanus Burke, a conservative revolutionary from South
Carolina, pointed out the illiberal nature of anti-Tory laws based
on the South Carolina constitution, the Magna Carta, and common
law legal reasoning.
40
For example, he described all Tory laws as
ex post facto laws which “even in arbitrary governments is
reckoned tyranny.”
41
He continued, arguing doing these injustices
to Loyalists would have endangered the freedom of them all. The
republican case for reintegration was perhaps most succinctly put
by Christopher Gadsden when he said, “he that forgets and
forgives most, such times as these, in my opinion, is the best
citizen.”
42
After a long struggle for liberty and individualism,
many felt they had to tolerate former opponents to demonstrate
their republicanism and commitment to liberal pluralism.
43
39
Alexander Hamilton, “A Letter from Phocion, to the Considerate Citizens of
New-York” (Philadelphia, PA, 1784), 3-4.
40
Aedanus Burke, “An Address to the Freemen of the State of South Carolina”
(Charleston, SC, 1783), 19-20.
41
Burke, “An Address,” 23.
42
Brannon, Revolution to Reunion, 107.
43
Ingersol, Loyalist Problem, 303.
137
These elites also gave practical and economic reasons for
clemency. Burke cited Machiavelli, arguing that amnesty after a
civil war is often an effective strategy for avoiding future
bloodshed. He backed this up by contrasting Crowell’s ill-fated
lustration with the example of Charles II's successful policy of
amnesty after the Restoration.
44
The English Civil War and the
brutal fighting of the Revolution would have been all too clear to
his audience. The citizens would not want their republican victory
to turn to tyranny nor to fail and require the restoration of the
monarchy. Therefore, they should resist the desire to purge their
opponents, or their sacrifice will be for nothing. Hamilton was
even more practical. He argued that by continuing the confiscation
of property against the recommendations of the Treaty of Paris,
America was losing international credibility, and even jeopardizing
the treaty itself.
45
At this point, Britain was still largely in control
of the territory west of the Appalachians that it had formally ceded
in the peace treaty. Hamilton argued that if the Americans did not
hold up their side of the bargain, Britain could reasonably refuse to
hold up their end, which was something no one wanted. Both men
also argued that reintegration was essential to the economic
success of the new republic because many Loyalists were
44
Burke, “An Address,” 29-31.
45
Hamilton, “Letter from Phocion,” 8-10.
138
merchants, and their expertise and international connections would
be vital for moving the country towards successful global trade.
46
These men are examples of prominent Whigs who used their
influence to call for amnesty for Loyalists.
The tendency for some elite Whigs to take the side of
Loyalist reintegration was for similar reasons expressed by
Hamilton and Burke. However, it can also be explained as a part of
the conservative reaction against the more radical elements of the
revolution. Throughout the war, elite Whigs viewed the leveling
and redistributive tendencies of the revolutionary mob with great
concern. They needed popular support to gain independence from
Britain, but once the war was won, they wished to maintain the
internal American hierarchy. Therefore, elite Whigs saw the calls
for vengeance against Tories, especially fellow elites, as a
dangerous step towards anarchy and equality. Many conservative
and moderate Whigs were even willing to align themselves with
former Tories in the New York government to work against the
radicals.
47
This political allegiance can also be seen in smaller
communities. The Deerfield Whigs marched side by side with their
former Tory adversaries to defend the Springfield arsenal against
the radicals during Shays’ Rebellion.
48
In South Carolina, elite
46
Brannon, Revolution to Reunion, 131.
47
Van Buskirk, Generous Enemies, 185-89.
48
Lloyd, “Reintegration,” 24-26.
139
Whigs were especially motivated to create White unity to
discourage slave revolts.
49
Therefore, elite Whigs aided the
reintegration of Loyalists because of perceived shared interests.
While moderate elite Whigs played a significant role in
pushing for Loyalist reintegration, it would be inaccurate to
describe it as a top-down affair. These elite calls for reintegration
were likely influential because a great portion of the populace
already favored reintegration.
50
Evidence for this can be seen in the
fact that there were remarkably few crowd actions against
remaining Loyalists after the war. In the lead-up and duration of
the war, the Patriots furthered their cause through mob actions
intended to intimidate and humiliate Loyalists and Neutralists to
attempt to punish them for their Toryism and disincentivize
potential sympathizers from working against independence.
51
However, after the war, there were very few crowd actions against
Loyalists and their sympathizers, even when tempers were still
running high. During the Revolution, crowds harassed lawyers
who represented Loyalists, accusing them of being friends of
government. However, after the war, many high-profile lawyers
built successful careers helping former Loyalists regain their
49
Brannon, Revolution to Reunion, 130.
50
Van Buskirk, Generous Enemies, 193.
51
Benjamin H. Irvin, “Tar, Feathers, and the Enemies of American Liberties,
1768-1776,” The New England Quarterly 76, no. 2 (2003): 221-25.
140
properties.
52
There were still some mobs, but there were
remarkably few, and they often targeted a few high-profile
individuals, who refused to play by the rules of reintegration by
brazenly flaunting community norms. Brannon argued that the
limited mob actions against a few high Tories served as a safety
valve for popular frustration and allowed the crowds to have an
important feeling of agency in deciding who got to reintegrate.
This allowed the vast majority of Loyalists to pass unmolested.
53
One explanation for the lack of opposition towards Loyalists is
exhaustion from the war effort. The Revolution lasted eight long
years. During this time, people experienced disorder, violence, and
economic uncertainty. Many simply wanted an end to conflict, and
to further persecute the Loyalists would be to continue the strife.
54
Supporting this idea, South Carolina, the state most torn apart by
civil war was the most clement, not the most vengeful as one might
expect, likely because people were so tired of conflict.
In addition to the desire to end the war, there was a great
desire to repair the fractured community. Eighteenth-century
American communities were built around consensus and the
common good. Therefore, when someone held heterodox views, it
52
Salley E. Hadden, “Lawyering for Loyalists in the Post-Revolutionary War
Period,” in The Consequences of Loyalism: Essays in Honor of Robert M.
Calhoon (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 2019), 135-36.
53
Brannon, Revolution to Reunion, 114-15.
54
Van Buskirk, Generous Enemies, 189.
141
was often seen as a danger to society.
55
Consequently, most
people’s treatment of Loyalists was not purely motivated by a
desire to punish ideological opponents, but to repair the cohesion
of society. This understanding is key to explaining the actions of
Patriots towards Loyalists. Those sent into exile were the ones too
divisive and notorious to coexist with.
56
On the other hand, they
would usually grant forgiveness to Loyalists who demonstrated
their willingness to be reintegrated into society, through the
aforementioned means of penitent apology and demonstrations of
civic virtue. Recanting one’s deeds against the community was
often enough to restore one’s reputation.
57
According to Barbara
Clark Smith, these methods of reintegration were already used for
other types of nonconformists before the Revolutionary War, and
Loyalists were treated in the same manner: “Such public acts of
contrition, reform, and conformity were repeated countless times in
countless localities.”
58
The people of the community were willing
to accept Loyalists for the repair of their community cohesion and
used existing methods of reintegration.
Finally, the Patriots were willing to accept the Loyalists
because the groups were not as distinct as sometimes thought.
55
Barbara Clark Smith, The Freedoms We Lost: Consent and Resistance in
Revolutionary America (New York: New Press, 2010), 111-12.
56
Van Buskirk, Generous Enemies, 177.
57
Calhoon and Barnes, “Reintegration,” 350-352.
58
Smith, Freedoms We Lost, 111.
142
Most people had family or close friends that fell on the other side
of the civil war. As Van Buskirk argued, Patriots and Loyalists
maintained these interpersonal connections throughout the war.
Borders between British and American-occupied territories were
permeable. While the leaders labeled the other side as enemies and
tried to ban contact between the two, ordinary people kept in
contact with their friends and family even on the other side.
59
The
hardships of war and the influx of refugees often made these
connections necessary as people depended on the assistance of the
other side, further blurring people’s political allegiances.
60
These
wartime connections became invaluable for post-war
reconciliation. As Van Buskirk says, “in 1783, they did not have to
begin building bridges to one another; those bridges had never
been destroyed during the war.”
61
For most people, the
relationships between people and communities were more
important than former disagreements about kings and
governments.
Conclusion
Brutus’ New York broadside boldly claimed that it is not
possible that “Whigs and Tories can live peaceably in the same
59
Van Buskirk, Generous Enemies, 1-4.
60
Van Buskirk, Generous Enemies, 5-7.
61
Van Buskirk, Generous Enemies, 195.
143
society.”
62
He was incorrect in this prediction as well. Most White
Loyalists were able to successfully reintegrate into society, through
their decisions to stay and by advocating for their rights and
reconciling with their community. Patriots were willing to accept
the Loyalists because of the ideals of republicanism and the desire
to return to a harmonious society. However, in some regards
Brutus’ words were true. Whigs and Tories did not live peacefully
in the same society because after the war those distinctions became
irrelevant for those who stayed. Both the victors and losers of the
war for independence lived together as American citizens.
For a civil war that was so long and costly, it is remarkable
that the victors did not seek out greater punishments from their
former enemies. Just a few decades later, the victors of the French
Revolution would carry out a series of brutal purges against the
defenders of the old order. In the history of revolutions, such
moderation and amnesty is the exception, rather than the norm.
Some may attribute this to the limited extent of the American
Revolution as radical and redistributive. It was indeed a
conservative revolution in the sense that it did not immediately
upend the social order. However, by instituting a liberal society
that was willing to tolerate people like the Loyalists, who held
beliefs contrary to the government, the war for independence truly
62
Brutus, “To All Adherents.”
144
was revolutionary in the sense of being novel and unique. Just as it
was remarkable for Washington to hand back power to republican
institutions, it was remarkable that American society as a whole
was willing to reconcile with their former enemies. It was not a
painless process, and certainly many faced injustice in the time it
took to reintegrate. However, one could reasonably trace the ideal
of Loyalist reconciliation to the ideals of ideological pluralism and
freedom of association that would become central tenants of
American political philosophy.
145
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