9
There was substantial engagement between key GCSB staff about the terms of the MOU.
Ultimately the staff member who had raised concerns about possible use for military
purposes advised others that the draft MOU addressed those concerns.
Simon Murdoch’s tenure as Acting Director-General ended the week before Christmas
2011. On 3 February 2012 Ian Fletcher took over as Director-General.
The MOU was signed in March 2012 by a GCSB Deputy Director. My inquiry found no
records to indicate the Director-General was involved. Mr Fletcher advised the inquiry that
he did not recall being briefed on the capability when he started at the GCSB, and has no
recollection of the capability operating at GCSB or of Simon Murdoch’s concerns.
Analysis of decision-making process
It is clear from records that from the outset the GCSB recognised legal and policy issues
with hosting the capability, particularly its potential use for supporting military action.
GCSB staff had in-depth knowledge of this and how the capability’s predecessor had been
used. They investigated the system through engagement with overseas partners. Senior
officials at the GCSB, including two Directors-General, were informed about the nature of
the system and the issues arising.
Legal staff were also involved relatively early in the process and continued to be involved
up to the signing of the MOU, including in its drafting. There appears, however, to have
been a lack of substantive written legal advice, which might have demonstrated whether
and how legal concerns about the capability were addressed.
It is not clear from the records how concerns about the capability’s potential use for
military purposes were mitigated, other than the email that the wording of the MOU had
addressed concerns (paragraph 34 above). The records show that in the nearly two years
leading up to signing the MOU the Bureau understood the capability as directly associated
with military applications. There are, however, no records of any substantive analysis to
show how concerns raised about this were dealt with. An offer to remove the capability
for such targeting was not taken up, but it is not clear whether it was given serious
consideration.
Acting Director-General Murdoch’s email in late 2011 (paragraph 33 above) shows clearly
that he did not think a final decision on hosting the capability had been made at that point.
He anticipated further analysis of legal risk and presumed the Bureau would brief the
Minister and possibly the IGIS. This inquiry found no records of any further analysis or
consideration of these matters between late August 2011 and the signing of the MOU by a
Deputy Director at GCSB in March 2012.
The MOU included provisions for GCSB to ensure tasking of the capability was compliant
with New Zealand law and Government expectations regarding foreign partner agency
activities in New Zealand. This might have been considered sufficient mitigation of any risks
or concerns, but this inquiry found no records of any such analysis.