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SEC SETTLES CHARGES AGAINST BMW
AG FOR INACCURATE SALES
DISCLOSURES IN RULE 144A BOND
OFFERINGS
In September 2020, the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission (the "SEC") settled allegations that the German
automaker Bayerische Motoren Werke AG ("BMW AG") and two
of its U.S. subsidiaries (collectively, "BMW") made inaccurate
and misleading disclosures about BMW's retail sales volume in
the United States in connection with several Rule 144A bond
offerings. As part of the settlement, BMW agreed to pay an $18
million penalty and to cease and desist from future violations of
these relevant provisions.
This enforcement action is unusual, in as much as the SEC rarely brings
enforcement actions related to exempt offerings relying on Rule 144A under the
Securities Act of 1933, as amended (the "Securities Act"). It highlights the risk
that a non-U.S. issuer (and non-SEC registrant) may still be investigated for
inaccurate disclosures, including those relating to non-financial key performance
indicators, made in connection with a private offering of securities to institutional
investors in the United States.
Summary of the SEC's allegations
According to the SEC, between 2016 and 2019, BMW AG raised an aggregate of
$18 billion through seven Rule 144A bond offerings by its U.S. subsidiary, BMW
US Capital, LLC ("BMW USC"). The SEC alleged that these offerings were
materially misleading because from 2015 to 2019 BMW AG's domestic subsidiary,
BMW of North America, LLC ("BMW NA"), inflated its reported retail sales volume
in the United States, which helped BMW AG to close the gap between its actual
retail sales volume and internal retail sales targets. Specifically, the SEC alleged
that BMW NA had engaged in the following three problematic reporting practices,
which resulted in inaccurate reporting of U.S. retail vehicle sales volume data:
Use of demonstrator and loaner designations to inflate retail sales
volume. The SEC alleged that from January 2015 through March 2017
BMW NA sought to have dealers improperly designate vehicles as
What is Rule 144A?
Rule 144A is a resale exemption
under the Securities Act. Rule 144A
offerings typically involve offering
securities to one or more financial
institutions (often referred to as
initial purchasers), who then resell
the securities to qualified
institutional buyers. An offering
memorandum is typically prepared
to market the securities sold
prospective investors in reliance on
Rule 144A.
SEC SETTLES CHARGES AGAINST BMW AG
FOR INACCURATE SALES DISCLOSURES IN
RULE 144A BOND OFFERINGS
2 | November 2020
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demonstrators or loaners to boost BMW NA's reported retail sales.
According to the SEC, as part of this conduct, BMW NA would offer
financial incentives to U.S. dealers to encourage them to report vehicles
as demonstrators or service loaners, which BMW NA subsequently
reported as retail sales even though these vehicles were not sold to
customers at that time. During this period, demonstrators and loaners
accounted for 27% of BMW NA's reported retail sales. These incentive
programs also impacted year-over-year retail sales volume comparisons.
For instance, a July 2015 internal study found that, even though BMW NA
had publicly reported 7% year-over-year growth in retail sales volume
between the first half of 2014 and the first half of 2015, it had in fact
experienced a 0% growth rate between these periods.
Banked retail sales. The SEC alleged that from 2015 through 2019
BMW NA underreported retail sales in some months in order to create a
reserve of unreported sales that it could use later in subsequent monthly
reports. According to the SEC, as part of this conduct, in months that
total retail sales reported by dealers exceeded BMW NA's internal sales
targets, BMW NA selected which retail sales number to report publicly
and "banked" (i.e., held back) the remaining retail sales. Conversely, the
SEC alleged that, in months that total retail sales reported by dealers fell
short of internal sales targets, BMW NA management used retail sales
from the bank to help close the gap to its internal targets. Such
adjustments using the bank often exceeded 10% of the total retail sales in
a month. The use of the bank was planned and approved by BMW NA
management, and BMW AG was aware of this practice.
Improper changes to its sales reporting calendar. The SEC alleged
that in 2015 and 2017 BMW NA improperly modified its sales reporting
calendar. According to the SEC, in both 2015 and 2017, BMW NA failed
to follow the industry standard sales reporting calendar, which reports
sales through January 2 as having occurred in the prior year. The SEC
alleged that in 2015 BMW NA improperly extended the 2014 calendar
year until January 5 in order to inflate December 2014 sales. The SEC
alleged that BMW NA took the opposite approach in 2017 and improperly
shortened the 2014 calendar year as an alternative method of creating a
bank of January 2017 sales.
In addition to these three problematic practices, the SEC alleged that BMW failed
to implement recommendations from its internal audit team, which would have
rectified these issues. Specifically, in March 2015, BMW's internal audit team
identified BMW NA's use of "banked" retail sales. Shortly thereafter, in May 2015,
this team also identified the use of demonstrators and loaners to increase sales
numbers. Despite the identification of these issues, BMW NA failed to take
measures to rectify these practices.
The SEC's theory of the violation
This enforcement action was brought by the SEC under Section 17(a) of the
Securities Act, which includes antifraud provisions that prohibit fraud and
misrepresentations in the offer or sale of securities. Section 17(a), unlike the
more commonly used Rule 10b-5 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as
SEC SETTLES CHARGES AGAINST BMW AG
FOR INACCURATE SALES DISCLOSURES IN
RULE 144
A BOND OFFERINGS
November 2020 | 3
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amended (the "Exchange Act"), does not require a showing of "scienter,"
and liability under this section may be premised solely on a finding of
negligence. Therefore, the SEC had a lower burden of proof.
1
Using this lower standard, the SEC alleged that the inflated sales volume
was materially misleading even though the offering memoranda disclosed
that:
BMW's retail vehicle sales volume data (designated as a "non-
financial key performance figure") did not correlate directly to
BMW's revenue recognition; and
vehicles delivered for dealer use or demonstration and service
loaner vehicles were included in the retail sales data.
According to the SEC, these caveats were not sufficient because BMW
failed to disclose:
reliance on these problematic sales practices to increase retail
sales volumes;
the magnitude of the improper use of demonstrators and loaners;
and
the use of the bank or the retail sales reporting calendar
modifications.
The SEC took specific issue with the use of demonstrators and loaners
solely for the purpose of artificially increasing sales numbers, without regard
to business need.
As a result, the SEC determined that the retail sales volume figures
provided to investors were misleading in violation of Sections 17(a)(2) and
17(a)(3) of the Securities Act.
Key Takeaways
The BMW enforcement action raises several key concerns that non-U.S.
issuers of Rule 144A bonds will want to consider.
Extraterritorial reach of SEC enforcement. Case law under Rule
10b-5 presents certain limitations on the extraterritorial reach of
Rule 10b-5 for private rights of action by investors. The SEC is,
however, not constrained by this case law when it initiates
enforcement proceedings against non-U.S. issuers under Section
17(a) of the Securities Act or Rule 10b-5. As demonstrated by this
enforcement action against BMW, the reach of the U.S. securities
law may be expansive. Moreover, the recent ruling in Stoyas v.
Toshiba Corp. further highlights the potentially broad reach of U.S.
securities law liability for non-U.S. issuers, even in the context of
private rights of action brought under Rule 10b-5. For additional
information on the Toshiba case, see our recent client alert
.
1
Section 17(a), unlike Rule 10b-5, does not create a private right of action for investors.
Comparison of Section 17(a) of the Securities
Act and Rule 10b-5 of the Exchange Act
Section 17(a) of the Securities Act renders it
unlawful, in connection with the offer or sale of
any security or security-based swap agreement,
to:
employ any device, scheme, or artifice to
defraud;
obtain money or property by means of any
untrue statement of a material fact or any
omission to state a material fact necessary in
order to make the statements made, in light
of the circumstances under which they were
made, not misleading; or
engage in any transaction, practice, or
course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon the
purchaser.
Rule 10b-5 of the Exchange Act renders it
unlawful, in connection with the purchase or sale
of any security, to:
employ any device, scheme, or artifice to
defraud;
make any untrue statement of a material fact
or to omit to state a material fact necessary in
order to make the statements made, in the
light of the circumstances under which they
were made, not misleading; or
engage in any act, practice, or course of
business which operates or would operate as
a fraud or deceit upon any person.
Violations of Sections 17(a)(2) and (a)(3) do not
require "scienter" and may be premised on a
finding of negligence. In contrast, courts have
interpreted Rule 10b-5 to require scienter and,
accordingly, negligent conduct is insufficient to
create liability under the rule. Scienter in this
context means the
intent on the part of the
defendant to deceive, manipulate or defraud.
Reckless conduct, however, may nevertheless
meet the scienter requirement, though the
degree of recklessness may vary by court.
While the U.S. Supreme Court has not opined
on whether reckless conduct meets the
scienter requirement under Rule 10b-5, many
courts have interpreted Rule 10b-5 as
extending liability to such conduct.
SEC SETTLES CHARGES AGAINST BMW AG
FOR INACCURATE SALES DISCLOSURES IN
RULE 144A BOND OFFERINGS
4 | November 2020
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Importance of preparing accurate and materially complete
disclosures. Non-U.S. issuers seeking to access the U.S. capital
markets should bear U.S. disclosure standards in mind when preparing
investor-targeted disclosures, including not only the offering documents
that are specifically prepared for prospective investors but also the
issuer's public announcements that are made close in time to an offering.
As highligh
2
ted in this enforcement action, problematic reporting practices
related to non-financial information, such as key performance indicators
(i.e., sales volume data), can give rise to violations of U.S. antifraud
provisions. To facilitate preparation of accurate and materially complete
disclosures, an issuer who is undertaking an offering to U.S. investors
should collaborate with the initial purchasers to subject its disclosures to
potential investors, including any relevant press releases, to a due
diligence review. In addition, issuers will want to consider whether they
have put in place effective controls and procedures related to reporting
material financial and non-financial information to ensure the consistency
as well as accuracy of such disclosures.
The importance of cooperating with the SEC. In its Order, the SEC
noted that the SEC considered the degree to which BMW offered
substantial and extensive cooperation with its investigation,
notwithstanding challenges presented by the COVID-19 pandemic, in
agreeing to a reduced penalty. In addition, the SEC considered BMW's
voluntary undertaking of remedial measures during the investigation,
including ending the use of "banked" retail sales and publicly issuing
revised U.S. retail sales volume data.
Conclusion
The SEC's enforcement action against BMW serves as a reminder to non-U.S.
issuers of Rule 144A bonds of the broad extraterritorial reach of U.S. antifraud
protections and the importance of preparing accurate and materially complete
disclosures for potential investors. In the event of an SEC enforcement action, an
issuer would likely benefit from cooperating with the investigation, and the degree
of cooperation could lead to a correspondingly reduced penalty
SEC SETTLES CHARGES AGAINST BMW AG
FOR INACCURATE SALES DISCLOSURES IN
RULE 144
A BOND OFFERINGS
November 2020 | 5
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FOR INACCURATE SALES DISCLOSURES IN
RULE 144A BOND OFFERINGS
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